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The research investigated the factors that are associated with organisational 
performance in British local public services using the national assessment 
frameworks of Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) and 
Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA). Performance measurement was said by 
Behn (1995) to be one of the big questions of public management and the literature 
demonstrates this remains the case. More generally performance management 
has been the subject of a large number of studies, many in the private sector, that 
often consider a narrow spectrum of explanatory factors. This research is unusual 
in studying a relatively large number of possible explanations of performance using 
three different methods of inquiry: longitudinal questionnaire surveys of four types 
of local public service organisations, a content analysis of strategic documents and 
the use of organisational profiles regarding the post bureaucratic construct 
(Kernaghan, 2000). The research relied on the CPA and CAA results to provide an 
independent assessment of organisational performance; such data is not usually 
available for public services. CPA has been found to have driven up local 
government performance (Boyne, James and John et al, 2010) and therefore its 
use is very appropriate.  
The analysis used correlation to identify the significant (p<0.05) criteria which were 
then put through a principal component analysis (PCA). This resulted in the 
identification of 11 summary factors with the strongest five being Strategy, 
Performance management, Human resources, Culture and Engagement. Factors 
of lesser importance are Resources, Leadership, Reputation and Innovation. The 
term ‘summary factors’ has been used to denote that within each of these there 
are potentially a number of parts.  
The research can be used practically by organisations, to improve, by comparing 
their results on the questionnaire with the criteria associated with high 
organisational performance. Further, the summary factors provide confidence 
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Glossary and Abbreviations 
In some cases these are taken directly from original sources. 
Assessments of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) – The performance 
management framework which provided the Home Office and its partners with the 
capability to monitor and assess performance in policing and community safety by: 
geographic area  - e.g. local, regional, national; organisation  - e.g. police force; 
partnership - e.g. crime and disorder reduction partnerships and policy area  - e.g. 
neighbourhood policing. The framework focused on key services delivered by the 
police, working on their own or in partnership based on performance and diagnostic 
indicators set nationally, professional judgements relevant to the police and locally 
selected indicators which reflect local priorities for improvement. 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070108123845/police.homeoffice.g
ov.uk/performance-and-measurement/assess-policing-community-safety/apacs-
faqs-intro/, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) – Brings together the expertise and 
experience of chief police officers from the United Kingdom, providing a 
professional forum to share ideas and best practice, co-ordinate resources and 
help deliver effective policing. (http://www.acpo.police.uk/, last accessed 14 
September 2014). 
Audit Commission (AC) – The Audit Commission is a public corporation 
established in 1983 to protect the public purse. They appointed auditors to local 
authorities and had a key role in Best Value, CPA and CAA. Under CPA they 
inspected local authorities and fire services and were responsible for the ratings. 
Following the abolition of CAA in 2010 the Government announced that the Audit 
Commission would be abolished (scheduled for the end of March 2015) and its 
remaining duties either discontinued or given to other bodies. (http://www.audit-
commission.gov.uk/Pages/default.aspx, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Audit Commission Performance Indicators (ACPI) – The Citizen's Charter 
initiative in the early 1990s gave the Audit Commission an important role in 
designing and overseeing the audit and publication of local authority performance 
indicators through the Audit Commission Performance indicators – ACPIs. These 
aimed to improve the quality of public services by equipping citizens with objective, 
comparable data on quality and costs. The first ACPIs were collected and 
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reported for local authorities in England and Wales for the 1993/94 financial year. 
Indicators for police and fire authorities were reported from 1996/97. 
(http://archive.audit-commission.gov.uk/auditcommission/performance-
information/performance-data-collections-and-guidance/Pages/ac-performance-
indicators.aspx.html, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) – The concept of managing an organisation using a 
set of indicators covering all functional areas including financial, production, human 
resources and so on. Kaplan and Norton (1992) introduced the concept which has 
been developed considerably. 
Beacon Scheme – A United Kingdom (UK) government scheme that recognised 
excellence in public services, especially applied to local government. Winners were 
allowed to display a logo and committed to share their experiences and good 
practice with others to raise standards. (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
20120919132719/www.communities.gov.uk/publications/localgovernment/learnin
gandinnovation, last accessed 12 August 2014).  
Benchmarking – The practice of comparing an organisation with others or part of 
an organisation with other parts of the same organisation. There are many kinds 
of benchmarking which at the simplest could just be the sharing of cost data but 
can be extended to processes and so on. Organisations may participate in 
benchmarking clubs to facilitate effective sharing. Examples are by CIPFA 
(http://www.cipfa.org/services/benchmarking, last accessed 12 August 2014), LG 
Inform (http://lginform.local.gov.uk/about-lg-inform/benchmarking-local-data-lg-
inform, last accessed 12 August 2014) and the Improvement Service in Scotland 
(http://www.improvementservice.org.uk/benchmarking/, last accessed 12 August 
2014). 
Best Value (BV) – Best Value was designed to deliver better quality local services 
and real value for money. It placed a duty on local public services to secure 
continuous improvement. To support this, the Government established a 
performance management framework designed to enable best value authorities to 
assess and improve their services and ensure local people were better informed 
about the quality of the local service received. The duty of best value is still required 
and new statutory guidance was published in September 2011 
(http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/localgovernment/bestvalueconsultre
sp, last accessed 10 April 2014). 
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Best Value Performance Indicator (BVPI) – Introduced in 2000/01 and last 
reported for 2007/08. For a time they were reported alongside the earlier Audit 
Commission Performance Indicators that were subsumed. They were replaced by 
the National Indicator Set which came into effect from April 2008. 
(http://archive.audit-commission.gov.uk/auditcommission/performance-
information/ performance-data-collections-and-guidance/Pages/best-value-
performance-indicators.aspx.html, last accessed 3 October 2014). 
Best Value Performance Plan (BVPP) – Under Best Value an annual plan 
published by a council by 30 June each year, containing specified content. The 
plan looked both backward at performance in the previous year and also set out 
plans for future performance. It reported performance against target for the full-set 
of BVPIs and details of reviews undertaken and planned. External auditors 
reviewed the plan and reported any omissions to the Audit Commission. Also 
known as the Local Performance Plan (LPP). 
(http://web.archive.org/web/20030228034959/http:// www.local-
regions.odpm.gov.uk/bestvalue/legislation/ppreview/index.htm, last accessed 12 
August 2014). 
British Quality Foundation (BQF) – Founded in 1993 by the UK Government and 
leading UK businesses, the BQF is Europe's largest corporate membership 
organisation dedicated to performance improvement.  Recommends use of the 
EFQM Excellence Model (http://www.bqf.org.uk/, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Business Excellence Model (BEM) – See EFQM Excellence Model. 
Cardiff Studies – This five-year study evaluated the impact of the Best Value 
regime on local authorities in England between 2001 and 2006. The research team 
was asked to assess the effect that Best Value had on organisational and cultural 
changes in authorities and the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the 
services they provide. (http://business.cardiff.ac.uk/research/groups/centre-local-
and-regional-government-research/research-projects/long-term-impact-best-
value-regime, last accessed 12 August 2104). 
Care Quality Commission (CQC) – Regulation of health and social care by 
checking whether hospitals, care homes, GPs, dentists and other applicable 
services are meeting national standards. This is done by inspecting services and 
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publishing findings, helping people to make choices about the care they receive. 
(http://www.cqc.org.uk/, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Charter Mark – The Charter Mark introduced in 1992 was an award 
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmpubadm/411/41
106.htm, last accessed 12 August 2014)  demonstrating the achievement of 
national standard for excellence in customer service in United Kingdom public 
sector organisations. It was replaced in 2008 by the Customer Service Excellence 
standard open to all UK organisations (http://www.customerserviceexcellence. 
uk.com/, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) – The 
professional body for people in public finance with 14,000 members throughout the 
public services, in national audit agencies, in major accountancy firms, and in other 
bodies where public money needs to be effectively and efficiently managed. They 
champion high performance in public services, translating experience and insight 
into clear advice and practical services. This includes information and guidance, 
courses and conferences, property and asset management solutions, consultancy 
and interim people for a range of public sector clients.  (http://www.cipfa.org/, last 
accessed 12 August 2014). 
Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) – Replaced PCTs with responsibility for 
primary care in an area. CCGs have the freedom to commission (or buy) services 
for their local community from any service provider which meets NHS standards 
and costs. These could be NHS hospitals, social enterprises, voluntary 
organisations or private sector providers. This means care for patients, designed 
with knowledge of local services and commissioned in response to their needs. 
(For example, http://www.southteesccg.nhs.uk/, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) – A system introduced in 2009 
developed by the Audit Commission and other inspectorates to determine the 
performance of public services in localities. It replaced CPA. (http://archive.audit-
commission.gov.uk/auditcommission/inspection-assessment/caa/pages/default. 
aspx.html, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) – A system designed and 
administered from 2002 by the Audit Commission to rate local authorities and fire 
services on their performance at delivering services. It underwent a number of 
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iterations, most notably the ‘Harder Test’ in 2005, with the last ratings produced in 
2008 and then replaced by CAA. (http://archive.audit-commission.gov.uk/ 
auditcommission/inspection-assessment/cpa/pages/default.aspx.html, last 
accessed 23 September 2014). 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) – The requirement on local 
authorities to submit defined council services to competitive tender under the Local 
Government Acts of 1988 and 1992. It started with blue-collar services such as 
street cleaning and refuse collection and expanded to encompass white-collar 
services such as information and communications technology, finance and 
personnel. CCT was replaced by Best Value following the election of a new 
government in 1997. 
Corporate Assessment (CA) – Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
Corporate Assessment; a derived figure expressed as a percentage or between 
one and four (four best) from Audit Commission data that expresses the capability 
and capacity for the authority to operate corporately. Contributes to CPA Rating 
awarded. 
CPA Rating (CPAR) – Comprehensive Performance Assessment Rating; the 
overall score given to a council under CPA (also known as CPA Category). The 
rating was initially Poor, Weak, Fair, Good and Excellent and this changed to a 
rating between zero stars and four stars in 2005 when the ‘Harder Test’ was 
introduced. The CPA Rating combined a number of different judgements on overall 
performance, corporate capability and performance at delivering services. 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) – The Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 established the formation of statutory CDRPs in recognition of the idea 
that crime reduction cannot be the responsibility of just one agency, such as the 
police and should be tackled by a variety of agencies working together in 
partnership. 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) – Central 
government department with national responsibility for local government from 2006 
to date. (https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-
communities-and-local-government, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
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Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) – Central 
government department with national responsibility for local government 1997-
2002. 
EFQM Excellence Model – A non-prescriptive framework that can be used to gain 
a holistic view of any organisation regardless of size, sector or maturity. Over the 
past 20 years, the EFQM Excellence Model has been a blueprint for EFQM 
members and organisations across and beyond Europe to develop a culture of 
excellence, access good practices, drive innovation and improve their results. The 
EFQM Excellence Model is based on nine criteria.  Five of these are "Enablers" 
and four are "Results".  The "Enabler" criteria cover what an organisation does and 
how it does it.  The "Results" criteria cover what an organisation achieves. 
Originally known as the Business Excellence Model (BEM). 
(http://www.efqm.org/the-efqm-excellence-model, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
EU A8 – Eight countries that joined the European Union in May 2004: Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) – A not for profit 
membership foundation to share what works between member organisations as a 
way to help implementation of their strategies. EFQM brings together organisations 
striving for Sustainable Excellence. Members comprise private and public 
organisations of every size and sector, many active around the world; EFQM 
applies its know-how and extracts outstanding approaches by engaging with 
executives and front-line managers. EFQM is the custodian of the EFQM 
Excellence Model (http://www.efqm.org/, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Excellence Model (EM) – See EFQM Excellence Model 
Health & Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) – Was set up as an Executive 
Non Departmental Public Body in April 2013. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 
set out their responsibilities, which include: collecting, analysing and presenting 
national health and social care data.  Setting up and managing national IT systems 
for transferring, collecting and analysing information. Publishing a set of rules 
(called a Code of Practice) to set out how the personal confidential information of 
patients should be handled and managed by health and care staff and 
organisations. Building-up a library of 'indicators' that can be used to measure the 
quality of health and care services provided to the public  Acting to reduce how 
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much paperwork doctors, nurses and care workers have to complete by ensuring 
that only essential data is collected. Helping health and care organisations improve 
the quality of the data they collect. Creating a register of all the information 
produced, and publishing that information in a range of different formats so that it 
will be useful to as many people as possible while safeguarding the personal 
confidential data of individuals. (http://www.hscic.gov.uk/home, last accessed 23 
September 2014). 
Healthcare Commission – The Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection, 
also known as the Healthcare Commission was created in 2004. It was responsible 
for assessing standards of care provided by the NHS. Its responsibilities were 
taken over by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) in 2009 (https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/organisations/healthcare-commission, last accessed 12 August 
2014). 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) – Independently assesses 
police forces and policing across activity from neighbourhood teams to serious 
crime and the fight against terrorism (http://www.hmic.gov.uk/, last accessed 14 
August 2014). 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) – The UK’s tax authority 
responsible for making sure that the money is available to fund the UK’s public 
services and for helping families and individuals with targeted financial support 
(http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/, last accessed 14 August 2014). 
High Performance Work System (HPWS) – Typically HPWS comprise strategic 
human resource management, workplace partnership, and equality and diversity 
systems to enable employees to deliver high performance. 
Human Resources (Management) (HR(M)) – Policies and processes for the 
effective management of an organisation’s people. Includes such as training, 
appraisal and effective line management often as part of a strategic approach.  
Improvement and Development Agency (I&DeA) – Part of the LGA, formed in 
1998 to work in partnership with all councils in England and Wales, to serve people 
and places better, to enhance the performance of the best local government 
authorities, accelerate the speed of improvement of the rest, and develop the 
sector as a whole. It was renamed Local Government Improvement and 
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Development (LGID) in July 2010 although appears now subsumed within the 
LGA. 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100503135839/http://idea.gov.uk/id
k/core/page.do?pageid=1, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Investors in People (IIP) – Investors in People is owned by the UK government 
and managed nationally at Head Office by the UK Commission for Employment 
and Skills (UKCES). At Investors in People, one principle is key: good people make 
a great business. People’s strengths, people’s ambitions and people’s ideas are 
the engine of success. Accredited organisations can use the logo 
(http://www.investorsinpeople.co.uk/, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Key performance indicator (KPI) – One definition is: Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) can be defined as measures that provide managers with the most important 
performance information to enable them or their stakeholders to understand the 
performance level of the organisation. KPIs should clearly link to the strategic 
objectives of the organisation and therefore help monitor the execution of the 
business strategy. (http://www.ap-
institute.com/Key%20Performance%20Indicators .html, last accessed 12 August 
2014). 
Lean – The core idea of lean is to maximize customer value while minimising 
waste. Simply, lean means creating more value for customers with fewer 
resources. It consists of a variety of techniques. (http://www.lean.org/, last 
accessed 12 August 2014). 
LG Inform – Operated by the LGA, LG Inform presents up-to-date published data 
about local areas and the performance of councils and fire services. Some content 
is restricted to registered users (http://lginform.local.gov.uk/, accessed 12 August 
2014). 
Local Area Agreement (LAA) – Introduced in 2004, a three year agreement 
between government and a local area working through its Local Strategic 
Partnership. It contained a set of improvement targets which local organisations 
were committed to achieving and a delivery plan setting out what each partner was 
intending to do to achieve those targets. The meeting of agreed targets was 
associated with financial payments (LAA reward grant) by government. They were 
abolished in 2010. 
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Local Government – Organisations in the UK created by statute and 
democratically elected to oversee areas. Such bodies are known as local 
authorities or local councils. In England there are a number of classes and in some 
areas there are two tiers which cover the same area but have different 
responsibilities, providing different services. Some areas have a single tier 
especially, but not exclusively, in large urban areas. There has been a trend 
towards more of these unitary authorities. Scotland and Wales are completely 
unitary. These councils are known as principal councils to distinguish them from 
parish and town councils. (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-
method/geography/beginner-s-guide/ administrative/our-changing-
geography/local-government-restructuring/index.html, last accessed 12 August 
2014). 
Local Government Association (LGA) – The national voice of local government 
in England and Wales working with councils to support, promote and improve local 
government. They are a politically-led, cross-party membership organisation that 
works on behalf of councils to ensure local government has a strong, credible voice 
with national government. In total, 415 authorities are members of the LGA for 
2014/15. These members include 351 English councils, the 22 Welsh councils via 
the Welsh LGA, 31 fire authorities, 10 national parks via corporate membership 
through the English National Park Authorities Association and one town council 
(http://www.local.gov.uk/home, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Local Government Improvement Programme (LGIP) – Developed by the I&DeA 
and introduced in 1999 with the aim of providing a systematic process by which 
councils could learn from each other, principally through peer review. The 
programme was voluntary and used a model of the ‘ideal’ council; in effect a 
benchmarking of effectiveness characteristics. Replaced by peer challenge 
(http://www.local.gov.uk/peer-challenge, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Local Performance Indicator (LPI) – Indicators adopted locally by an 
organisation to measure, and hence enable it to manage, its performance at 
delivering against its aims and objectives. For example local authorities were 
expected to supplement nationally specified indicators with a set of LPIs.  
Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) – Introduced by the Government in 2000 as 
part of the national strategy to tackle problems in some of England's most 
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deprived areas. Extended to all areas as partnership working became regarded 
as a key element in addressing cross-cutting issues faced by society. 
National Audit Office (NAO) – Scrutinises public spending on behalf of 
Parliament. The audit of central government has two main aims. By reporting the 
results of audits to Parliament, government departments and bodies are held to 
account for the way they use public money, thereby safeguarding the interests of 
taxpayers. In addition, they work to help public service managers improve 
performance and service delivery (http://www.nao.org.uk/, last accessed 12 
August 2014). 
National Health Service (NHS) – The national health care system in the United 
Kingdom (http://www.nhs.uk/Pages/HomePage.aspx, last accessed 12 August 
2014). 
National Indicator (NI) – The single set of National Indicators (National Indicator 
Set, NIS) was announced by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government following the Government's Comprehensive Spending Review 2007. 
Effective from April 2008 to March 2011, implemented as the only set of indicators 
on which central government performance managed local government 
(http://archive.audit-commission.gov.uk/auditcommission/performance-
information/ performance-data-collections-and-
guidance/nis/pages/default.aspx.html, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
New Public Management (NPM) – The concept that public services (providers) 
have had to become more like the private sector in order to deliver improved 
services and better meet people’s needs. 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) – Central government department 
with national responsibility for local government 2002-2006. 
Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (OFSTED) 
– Inspect and regulate services which care for children and young people, and 
those providing education and skills for learners of all ages. Report directly to 
Parliament and are independent and impartial. Every week, they undertake 
hundreds of inspections and regulatory visits throughout England, and publish the 
results on their website. They work with providers which are not yet good to 
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promote their improvement, monitoring their progress and sharing with them the 
best practice (http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
oneplace – The website established for the reporting and dissemination of CAA 
results. (http://archive.audit-
commission.gov.uk/oneplace/Pages/default.aspx.html, last accessed 12 August 
2014). 
Peer Challenge – A process commissioned by a council involving a small team of 
local government peers spending time at the council to provide challenge and 
share learning (www.local.goc.uk/peer-challenge, last accessed 12 August 2014).   
Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) – The NHS Performance 
Assessment Framework (PAF) was published in April 1999, following a period of 
consultation, and is based on the balanced scorecard approach. The use of the 
balanced scorecard allows organisations to get a more rounded view of 
performance by identifying different key elements of performance and 
understanding how changes in them may have implications for others. The PAF is 
supported by a set of national headline NHS Performance Indicators. An annual 
development cycle was instigated in 2001 to improve the coverage of indicators 
across each area. 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.dh.gov.uk/en/ 
Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/AnnualReports/Browsable/DH_4992217, 
last accessed 12 August 2014). The latest variant is the NHS Outcomes 
Framework (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nhs-outcomes-
framework-2014-to-2015, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Performance Indicator (PI) – A measure of an aspect of an organisation’s 
operations such that they can be effectively managed, perhaps to meet a target. 
Sets of indicators include the ACPIs, APACS, BVPIs and NIs.  
Performance Management Framework (PMF) – A system to enable an 
organisation to manage its performance to achieve objectives. It typically consists 
of documentation including plans, processes and guidance, PIs and targets to be 
achieved. Also known as performance management system. 
Performance Management Score (PMS) – Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment Performance Management Score; a score between one and four (four 
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best) given by the Audit Commission to local authorities under CPA that expresses 
the capability and capacity for effective performance management. Contributes to 
CPA Rating awarded. 
Police Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) – A police national PMF 
operating prior to APACS (http://tna.europarchive.org/20100419081706/ 
http:/www.police.homeoffice.gov.uk/performance-and-measurement/performace-
assessment-framework/index.html, last accessed 12 August 2014). 
Primary Care Trust (PCT) – PCTs were responsible for commissioning health 
services from providers. Until 31 May 2011 they also provided community health 
services directly. They were abolished on 31 March 2013 with their work taken over 
by Clinical Commissioning Groups. 
Public Services Programme – The aim of the Public Services Programme was 
to foster an interdisciplinary research community with a multi-faceted approach to 
addressing key public service provision issues. They brought together nearly 100 
researchers from across the social sciences, and all four countries of the United 
Kingdom, to address the problems of public service performance. The 
programme was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and led 
by Professor Christopher Hood of Oxford University 
(http://www.publicservices.ac.uk/, last accessed 11 September 2014). 
Quality of Life (QoL) – In August 2005, as part of the Audit Commission Area 
Profiles project, a revised set of local quality of life indicators – supporting local 
communities to be sustainable was published. In line with other information 
presented through Area Profiles, all the indicators were drawn from published 
sources. Especially for use by LSPs.  (http://archive.audit-commission.gov.uk/ 
auditcommission/performance-information/using-performance-information/pages/ 
quality-of-life-indicators.aspx.html, last accessed 12 August 2014).  
Red Amber Green (RAG) rating – A traffic light system for monitoring 
performance against targets using performance indicators. 
Service Score (SS) – Comprehensive Performance Assessment Service Score; a 
score between one and four (four best) given by the Audit Commission to a range 
of services provided by local authorities under CPA that expresses the 
performance at delivering those services. Contributes to CPA Rating awarded. 
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Single data list (SDL) – A list of all the datasets that local government must submit 
to central government. If a data requirement is not on the list, councils won’t have 
to collect and provide it without receiving extra funding (https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/policies/making-local-councils-more-transparent-and-accountable-to-
local-people/supporting-pages/peoples-rights-to-see-council-accounts, last 
accessed 12 August 2014). 
Six Sigma – Six Sigma was developed by Motorola in 1986 and is a highly 
disciplined, structured programme aimed at delivering near perfect products and 
services by improving processes. It is used to analyse processes to discover where 
and how defects occur, measure them and eliminate the problem areas. 
(http://www.bqf.org.uk/performance-improvement/about-lean-six-sigma, last 
accessed 12 August 2014). 
Total Quality Management (TQM) – Total quality management can be 
summarised as a management system for a customer-focused organisation that 
involves all employees in continual improvement. It uses strategy, data, and 
effective communications to integrate the quality discipline into the culture and 
activities of the organisation. (http://asq.org/learn-about-quality/total-quality-
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Scholarly virtue is more a struggle than an achievement, and seeking 
knowledge about historically ambiguous phenomena such as organizational 
performance is more a necessary form of disciplined self-flagellation than a 
pursuit of happiness. 




1.1 The Big Question 
What are the big questions of public management? Behn (1995) considered this 
using as an analogy the kind of questions physicists ask, such as on the universe, 
the composition of matter and the theory of the formulation of galaxies. He goes 
on to consider how scientists try to answer these big questions suggesting it 
involves wisdom, hard work and sometimes luck but: 
 
As scholars of public management aspire to make their 
field a science, they, too, need to focus on big questions. 
Unfortunately, the effort to create a science of 
administration – to make management look more like 
physics (or, at least, more like economics) – has led to an 
emphasis on methodology, on the manipulation of data. 
After all, real scientists work with real data, that is, 
numbers (preferably numbers with many significant 
digits). Too often, the result is methodologically 
sophisticated research that address small, trivial issues. 
 
A reverence for methodology is not, however, what makes 
an endeavour scientific. It is an effort to answer major 
questions in a systematic way. What systematic means 
depends upon the question and upon the type of data and 
corresponding methodologies that are available to help 
answer the question. The work is driven by the question, 
not by the data or methodology….’ 
(Behn, 1995, p. 315) 
 
Of the three big questions Behn identifies this research is concerned with the third, 
‘Measurement: How can public managers measure the achievements of their 
agencies in ways that help to increase those achievements?’ (Behn, 1995, p. 315).  
 
This research is a contribution to the measurement big question that is part of the 
wider discipline of performance management. Literally, this is the management of 
organisational performance to deliver specified outcomes. The delivery of 
outcomes requires inputs, processes and outputs. How do we know when an 
outcome, or an intermediate stage in its attainment, has been reached? The 
answer is through measurement with or without a target. However, measurement 
in itself is of little consequence without the supporting ‘infrastructure’ of 




The key research question is quite simple: what factors drive organisational 
performance? Although, the question appears simple, as the literature (Chapter 
three) demonstrates the answer is anything but simple. An innovative and unusual 
approach is adopted testing a large number of criteria with those statistically 
significant (p<0.05) being put through a principal component analysis (PCA) to 
explore the data and highlight the most important factors.  
 
1.2 Performance Management 
The management of performance is generally regarded as a key activity for 
organisations to achieve their objectives. This implies the activity is consciously 
determined and pursued at all levels in the organisation. Performance 
management is important, whatever the nature of the organisation, and whatever 
the sector. It is varied, applies at any level in an organisation, may in itself be simple 
or complex and is rigorously applied or not. This could qualify the earlier comment 
in that the activity may not be consciously determined but is it therefore 
performance management? The term ‘management’ surely implies an active intent 
therefore; perhaps not all organisations actually practice performance 
management in the strict sense. 
 
What is performance management? What characterises it as a distinct activity and 
what are its key features? Critically what is important for determining organisational 
performance and does the setting or context influence the contribution(s)?  
 
1.3 Methodology 
The scope of this research is primarily English local public services, with some data 
available for Scottish and Welsh councils. Data was collected in 2005 from councils 
only, as part of an MBA (Goodchild, 2005) and only partially employed with the 
intention of applying it in longitudinal research. In 2009 and 2010 data was 
collected, in England only, from councils, fire services, police forces and, the now 
abolished, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). 
 
Desk research and a literature review identified criteria that may be associated with 
performance. The literature considered was wide-ranging covering all sectors and 
not restricted to the United Kingdom (UK).    
 
Initially, it was considered CPA reports published by the Audit Commission could 
be used. However, it was soon realised this approach would not give the detail 
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required, nor allow criteria to be given a score. Consequently it was decided a 
survey approach would be employed but was it best to do a few organisations in 
detail (case studies) or use a questionnaire to obtain data from many 
organisations? Given the key research question, it was decided the appropriate 
methodology was to gather data from a larger number of organisations to enhance 
wide applicability.  
 
The Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) rated principal English 
councils and fire services between 2002 and 2008. From 2009 the CPA was 
replaced by the Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) that included an 
assessment of the performance of councils, police forces, fire services and PCTs. 
 
A questionnaire survey was undertaken in 2005, 2009 and 2010 to be completed 
by a very senior officer at the corporate centre of each organisation. Case studies 
were undertaken in three organisations in 2005; and interviews took place in five 
organisations, after the analysis of the questionnaires. This qualitative data 
collection was designed to validate the questionnaire and promote a richer 
understanding.  
 
A content analysis was undertaken of English councils’ best value performance 
plans (BVPP). The BVPP was a statutory audited document in which a council had 
to report its planning, reviews and performance. It was hypothesised the quality of 
the content of the BVPP would be associated with the organisation’s performance.  
 
One of the tenets of new public management (NPM) is bureaucracy reduces as 
public organisations take on more private sector practices. Kernaghan (2000) 
developed an organisational profile to evaluate the extent to which an organisation 
had become post-bureaucratic. The extent to which this is the case and the 
relationship to organisational performance is tested. 
 
These different approaches served to triangulate the results thereby increasing 
confidence in answering the key research question. 
 
1.4 Process 
The Labour Government elected in 1997 introduced the BV regime to replace the 
previous Conservative’s compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) policy. In 2002 
the CPA was introduced with the purpose of rating principal English councils (and 
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later fire services) on their performance. The CPA provided an objective 
assessment of organisations’ performance to be correlated with responses to the 
questionnaires. The analysis for the other public service organisations used ratings 
data provided by the Healthcare Commission for PCTs and Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) for police. Audit Commission data on use of 
resources and audit was also used. 
 
The intention was to undertake surveys in 2009, 2010 and 2011, and also use the 
data collected in 2005. It was appreciated, when the research commenced, that 
the national framework could change, as CPA evolved to the harder test from 2005. 
Indeed, CPA was replaced by CAA from 2009 as flagged two years earlier. The 
CAA did not rate organisations in the same way as CPA but an overall rating could 
be calculated. However, CAA was abolished by the Government elected in May 
2010 and no equivalent national framework replaced it. The survey work was 
therefore curtailed. In the event the response to a paper (Goodchild, 2011) 
presented at the British Academy of Management (BAM) conference in 2011 
proffered the view sufficient data had been collected to answer the research 
question. 
 
In a review of sources of public service improvement Boyne (2003a) noted that the 
determinants of performance in the public sector was a small but growing area of 
research. This was promoted by the increasing availability of performance data 
due to the demands of government under the influence of NPM and in Britain the 
so called modernisation agenda. For example, although local government had 
been required for many years to submit various statistics to central government it 
is only more recently there has been a statutory duty to submit performance data 
(Carter, 1991). This began with the Audit Commission Performance Indicators 
(ACPI) and evolved through the BV regime. There were also other sets such as 
the Social Services/Health Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) indicators, 
Education Form 4, police Assessments of Policing and Community Safety 
(APACS) and Quality of Life (QoL) indicators. Some were statutory whilst others 
were collected on a voluntary basis, often encouraged by such as the Audit 
Commission. A national indicator set (NIS) was introduced from April 2008, in 
theory replacing all other sets applied to local strategic partnerships (LSPs). Details 
of the successive sets of indicators are available from the Audit Commission’s 
archive website (Audit Commission, 2013a). Other sets are available from the UK 




The key point about the ACPIs, and later BVPIs (and other national indicators), is 
they were externally audited and thus (in theory) not susceptible to manipulation by 
individual organisations.  
 
The CPA was not without its critics (Broadbent, 2003), for example Andrews, Boyne 
and Walker et al (2003) considered external factors that may result in a council being 
wrongly graded in CPA. They used correlation (used in this study) to identify whether 
deprivation, diversity, financial capacity, population and sparsity have an impact on 
CPA scores. They note the Audit Commission (2000b) argued CPA is based not on 
the external conditions that authorities face but how they are managed.  They 
conclude: 
 
The CPA process is flawed by its failure to take account of 
external circumstances beyond the control of local policy 
makers. Although external constraints were significant only 
in London and county councils, their effects have distorted 
the rankings in the CPA league table as a whole. Some 
councils have been falsely lauded for operating in 
favourable circumstances, whereas others have been 
wrongly criticised for the performance effects of difficult 
local conditions.  
 
     (Andrews, Boyne and Walker et al, 2003, pp. 26-27)  
 
 
Although CPA (eventually) takes deprivation into account; in some services 
principally education other factors noted by Andrews, Boyne and Walker et al 
(2003) were not.  From 2005 the CPA process changed (the harder test) with 
more importance being given to PIs and value for money (vfm) (Audit 
Commission, 2005). 
 
CPA was replaced from 2009 with CAA that only lasted one year, being abolished 
very quickly by the new Government. There is now no national framework for 
councils although a voluntary process is coordinated by the Local Government 
Association (LGA), whilst fire services still have a national framework. PCTs were 
abolished in 2013 and replaced by CCGs. The police still have a national 
framework operated by HMIC but as before with powerful input from the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). The health and social care sector is 
regulated and inspected by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) with a wide 
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range of indicators being reported through the Health & Social Care Information 
Centre (HSCIC). 
 
   1.5 Contribution to Knowledge 
The key contribution to knowledge is the ranked identification of summary factors 
associated with organisational performance. In particular the results can be used 
by organisations to identify and target specific areas to improve performance.  
 
    1.6 Thesis Outline 
Following this introduction there is a brief review of the legal and policy 
framework. Then a literature review provides a brief history of performance 
management, definitions, considers various factors and also highlights the 
complexities of attributing performance. Given the multi-disciplinary nature of 
performance management it was necessary to carefully bound the review, whilst 
not neglecting key issues. It includes frameworks and models that have been 
utilised, including Total Quality Management (TQM), the Excellence Model (EM), 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC), Best Value (BV), Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment (CPA) and Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) as well as 
consideration of matters such as strategy and human resources (HR). The 
problems of measuring performance and what performance may mean to 
differing stakeholders are considered, as well as the importance of context. 
 
Chapter four covers methodology with successive chapters dealing with the 
results pertaining to CPA, CAA, the BVPP content analysis, organisational 
profiles and the case studies/interviews. A further chapter then brings the 
mutually supportive results together.  
 
There is then a discussion regarding the research with reflection. Finally, 
conclusions are presented addressing the findings from theoretical and practical 
stances, whilst emphasising the contribution to knowledge and with 
recommendations for future research. 
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2. Legal and Policy Framework 
This chapter briefly outlines the legal and policy framework of Best Value, CPA 
and CAA. 
 
2.1 Best Value 
The duty of BV is owed to local citizens and was introduced by the Labour 
Government, elected in 1997, ostensibly to replace CCT, although externalisation of 
services was still regarded as possible (Department of Environment, Transport and 
the Regions, 1998a and 1998b). BV was supported by a suite of BVPIs and councils 
were required to publish an annual BVPP outlining their policies, priorities and 
achievements. An initial requirement was to achieve best quartile performance for 
the BVPIs within five years.  
 
The requirements as to content of the BVPP varied since it was a statutory duty in 
2000 and also, latterly, according to the rating an authority achieved in CPA: those 
rated excellent and good were permitted to reduce the scope. The statutory 
requirement ceased after 2008. 
 
Entwistle and Laffin (2005) reviewed the prehistory of BV and noted its origins in 
the drive to renew the Labour party and reduce its vulnerability to public sector 
unions in government. So BV was very much driven by political considerations as 
indeed was CPA. They state, ‘For those unversed in Labour’s problems with local 
government, the regime seemed like an excessively prescriptive and bureaucratic 
way of improving performance.’  (Entwistle and Laffin, 2005, p. 216). It is argued 
the review of BV in 2001 changed things considerably, so the 2004 regime was 
rather different to that launched in 1999. Through the LSP police and health were 
drawn in, although they also had their own requirements. 
 
BV was overshadowed by CPA from 2002 and although slimmed down it remains 
in force (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011).  
 
2.2 Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) 
CPA was announced by the Labour Government in the local government white 
paper, Strong Local Leadership - Quality Public Services, published in December 
2001 (Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions, 2001). The 
white paper stated: 
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The Government will put in place a comprehensive and 
integrated performance framework to help councils 
deliver better services for their communities. This will 
include:   
 clearly defined priorities and exacting performance 
standards; 
 a framework for performance assessment and 
proportionate and co-ordinated inspection including 
regular comprehensive assessments of each council’s 
overall performance; 
 extra freedoms and flexibilities for councils which are 
able to use them to make a real difference for their 
communities, over and above the universal 
deregulation described in chapter 4; 
 local PSAs to deliver accelerated improvements in 
priority services supported by additional freedoms; 
and a streamlined and reformed best value framework 
to help councils manage improvement across all 
services.  
 
(Department of Transport, Local Government and the 
Regions, 2001, pp. 23-24) 
 
Considerable information on CPA, including council scores, is available from the 
Audit Commission’s archived website (Audit Commission, 2013b)  
 
2.3 Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) 
The local government white paper Strong and prosperous communities stated: 
 
From April 2009, we will build on CPA with a system based 
on a combination of risk assessment, largely risk-triggered 
inspection, and audit. The new regime will be known as the 
Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA). Children’s 
Services Joint Area Reviews and Annual Performance 
Assessments, and social care star ratings will not continue 
beyond March 2009.  
 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2006, p. 133) 
 
The CAA was a performance assessment system similar to CPA, yet with important 
differences as the consultation (Audit Commission, 2007b), feedback and next steps 
(Audit Commission, 2008b) suggested: relevant to local people, area and outcome 
focused, constructive and forward-looking and joint and participative. It brought 
together the work of several inspectorates with the aim of giving an overall view of 
the performance of an area. Full details are available from the Audit Commission 
archive website (Audit Commission, 2013c). A website was specifically designed to 
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report CAA results, ‘oneplace – for an independent overview of local public services’ 
which is again available archived (Audit Commission, 2013d). The Audit 
Commission (2009a), with the other inspectorates, published the final framework 
document for the first year of CAA which highlighted the flexibility and re-focusing of 
inspection effort. The evidence from inspections and other sources and the 
(originally) 198 national indicator set (see Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2007b, for details of the indicators) fed into both the organisational 
assessments and the area assessment. 
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3. Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
This review is concerned with performance management specifically the factors 
associated with organisational performance. It provides context since the topic is 
extremely large and multi-disciplinary. Performance management in the public 
services is identified as being within NPM and the profound changes in the last two 
decades or so.  
 
The Centre for Business Performance (2004) noted that between 1994 and 1996 
one new article on business performance measurement appeared every five hours 
of every working day. In 1997 there were over 170,000 references to the topic on 
the web and this increased to 37,300,000 when checked on 24 July 2014. They did 
a literature review (Centre for Business Performance, 2005) covering similar topics. 
Its conclusions confirm the factors investigated through this research are those that 
may impact on performance.  
 
Andrews and Entwistle (2014a) review public service efficiency under NPM which is 
an integral component of organisational performance. They suggest that efficiency 
is a core concept that public services should address outlining the four faces of 
efficiency and the importance of managing the tensions between them and other 
factors of importance. Boyne (2003a) considering the determinants of public service 
performance found that this was most likely due to extra resources and better 
management.  
 
Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle (2010) edited a book considering theories of 
performance and how they related to public service performance. They suggested 
the nature of the organisation’s environment, the degree of regulation and the extent 
of strategic planning can be most likely linked to organisational improvement. The 
link between organisational culture and performance was more problematic, 
requiring further work. The transfer between sectors may or may not be appropriate 
but caution should be exercised on the transfer of private sector models to the public 
sector. The determination of causality is a real issue since the direction is often not 
clear. External constraints may be significant and more important than internal 





Table 3.1: Summary of factors linked to organisational performance (tabulated 
from Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle, 2010, pp. 205-217) 
Linked to service improvement Maybe linked to service 
improvement 
Organisation environment Innovation 
Human resources management Organisational learning 
Strategic planning Culture 
Collaboration Leadership 
Regulation  
Placed within context 
 
 
They go on to explain much more work has been done in the private sector and 
empirical studies on the public sector have mainly been done in the USA, UK and 
other Western countries. Most studies are quantitative; those qualitative tend not to 
consider performance and longitudinal studies are necessary. Most longitudinal data 
in the UK came from the Cardiff University studies considering mainly efficiency and 
effectiveness. They suggest a lack of research in this area is worrying because policy 
should be informed by what makes a difference to services. This research gap is 
partly addressed by the current research, in particular providing a mechanism for 
organisations to identify where to improve to have an impact.  
 
The research is also about the nature of performance management including 
strategy and implementation, in particular has performance management led to 
superior performance for processes, service delivery and importantly outcomes? 
Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) noted the distinctive nature of the public sector and how 
NPM has had unintended consequences.  
 
3.2 Context – New Public Management (NPM) 
Falconer outlined the key elements of NPM and as regards the Labour Party’s (then 
in government) agenda, identifies performance management as important in 
delivering responsive, quality public services, a strong public service ethos and the 
use of information technology (Falconer, 1999, p. 11). Lawton, McKevitt and Millar 
(2000) identified performance management as a key component of NPM with 
ambiguity, external legitimacy and implementation issues as key.  
 
Dunsire, Hartley and Parker tested the impact of ownership on performance, noting 
the ‘prevailing’ view government setting up ‘arms-length’ agencies or privatisation 
improved performance. However, change does not have to be public to private it 
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could be from one kind of public to another. It’s not the act in itself that causes the 
supposed increase in performance rather factors such as the role of the market, 
competition and/or an increase in management incentives. Their research gives 
conflicting results concluding, ‘….there was no clear relationship between enterprise 
performance and status change, change in competition, or change in control mode, 
singly or in combination.’   (Dunsire, Hartley and Parker, 1991, p. 38). 
 
Before moving on to a detailed review of some of the literature on performance 
management we should mention the impact of the so-called management gurus, for 
example Peters and Waterman (1982), Peters (1988), Crosby (1988) and Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992). Generally these have suggested new ways of working, 
particularly quality programmes and putting the customer at the centre of the 
organisation. Others suggest their impact has been less.  
 
Hood (1991) considered NPM from the perspective of doctrine; the intellectual case 
explained why its content was prominent in the 1980s and growing in the early part 
of the following decade. One of the doctrinal components of NPM was explicit 
standards and measures of performance. The justification for this is that 
accountability needs a clear statement of goals and efficiency requires a hard look 
at objectives (Hood, 1991, p.4). Talbot (1999) considered how performance has 
become a dominant theme in the majority of OECD countries. He asks some 
fundamental questions about performance and looks briefly at how developments 
in the use and understanding of performance have been changing in the private 
sector, especially the emergence of models such as the BSC. It was suggested 
while there is much to learn there are also key areas of difference between the 
private and public sectors.  
 
Within the UK, NPM began to have a significant impact with the election of a 
Conservative government in 1979 although prior to then the practical impact was 
limited (Ferlie, 1998, p. 3). Pratchett and Leach noted CPA took the importance of 
performance management to a new level (Pratchett and Leach, 2003, pp. 264-267). 
Pollitt (2000) also notes NPM as being performance-driven and the influence of 
published targets has improved performance in certain areas but then questions 
whether its impact is, in practice, as large as is often stated. Seddon (2003) is highly 
critical of the imposition of targets and claims ‘command and control’ thinking is sub-





Kernaghan (2000, pp. 92-93) charted the move from bureaucratic to post-
bureaucratic organisations and the shift from concern with process to results. 
Goodchild (2003, p. 11) used this method to illustrate the shift of Darlington Borough 
Council from 1988, as primarily a bureaucratic organisation to more post-
bureaucratic in 2003. Interestingly, the largest shift was from process oriented to 
results oriented, suggesting a large rise in performance management. Chapter eight 
uses Kernaghan’s model to investigate bureaucracy and organisational 
performance. Budd (2007) critiques this post-bureaucratic concept suggesting a 
continuity of practice rather than a distinct difference and further, may not lead to 
greater efficiencies.   
 
Davies, Nutley and Smith (1999, p. 3) suggest, apart from in health care, research 
on effectiveness has been less visible despite the considerable research activity in 
areas such as education, social services and criminal justice. They put this down to 
the lack of consensus regarding methodology and ‘little agreement on how to use 
the research evidence to inform policy and practice’. 
 
 
3.3 Performance Management - Definitions and what is it? 
Before considering some definitions in detail we can observe performance 
management may have a word before it such as: integrated (Verweire and Van 
den Berghe, 2003), contingent (Molleman and Timmerman, 2003), team 
(MacBryde and Mendibil, 2003), strategic (Kloot and Martin, 2000), corporate 
(Bourne, Franco and Wilkes, 2003; Lawrie, Gobbold and Marshall, 2004), total 
(Masterson and Taylor, 1996), business (Bourne, 2003 and Marr and Schiuma, 
2003). Generally these words add some self-explanatory context, although 
indicative of the wide-ranging nature of performance management. Performance 
management may also have a following word typically when describing the overall 
process or system, framework or model and as noted by Rouse and Putterill (2003, 
p. 791) these terms are often used interchangeably.   
 
The I&DeA produced a glossary of performance terms with the following definition: 
Performance is about contributing to agreed needs and objectives, 
rather than just assuming this is just “the way things generally are” 
or “the way the world is”. It’s about making a difference and doing 





Another definition of performance states:  
…performance is about deploying and managing well the 
components of the causal model(s) that lead to the timely 
attainment of stated objectives within constraints specific to the 
firm and to the situation. Performance is therefore case specific 
and decision-maker specific. Achieving congruence as to the 
definition of the parameters of performance and the causal 
model(s) that lead to it is one of the essential functions of 
management.  
 
(Lebas, 1995, p. 29) 
 
He quotes Sink (1991), ‘Measurement is complex, frustrating, difficult, challenging, 
important, abused and misused’ and then Lord Kelvin, ‘If you cannot measure it, it 
does not exist’ (Lebas, 1995, p. 23). 
 
It is clear from the outset, whilst there is a large element of imprecision around the 
term performance management there’s a commonality inherent in the concept. 
Armstrong and Baron (1998) allude to the difficulty of definition but go on to suggest 
performance management is both a strategic and integrated approach to achieve 
success by improving individual and organisational performance. The convergence 
of what we may regard as two approaches to performance management, people-
focused and system-based, is evident. 
 
An influential document on performance management, Choosing the Right FABRIC: 
A Framework for Performance Information, concentrates on the provision of 
performance information and suggests a framework (HM Treasury, 2001). Public 
services had been increasingly taking performance management seriously (in line 
with the requirements of NPM and demanded by central government), a process 
perhaps given impetus with the introduction of the PIs specified by the Audit 
Commission from 1993/94. Figure 3.1 illustrates the performance cycle showing 
directed action to achieve desired aims or outcomes. 
 
To summarise there is a great deal of commonality in definitions of performance 
management. The common elements appear to be; to have a system (with 
appropriate processes) enabling an organisation (and individuals within the 
organisation) to move towards the achievement of its aims and objectives (and know 
when it is moving in that direction). In order to do this an appropriate culture is 
necessary (performance management fits) with a sufficient quantity and quality of 
information. This summarises the working definition used in this research. 
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3.4 Performance Management – History 
In their book Performance Management: The New Realities, Armstrong and Baron 
(1998) devote chapter three to a short history of performance management. The Wei 
dynasty (AD 221-265) emperors had an ‘Imperial Rater’ whose job was to evaluate 
the performance of the official family. In the 14th century the Jesuits developed a 
formal rating system for their members (Koontz, 1971). The first formal monitoring 
systems came about through the work of Taylor prior to World War One and 
officers in the US armed forces were rated in the 1920s and this ‘scientific 
management’ spread into American factories. Performance appraisal (of 
individuals) became important in the 1950s and 1960s (merit systems). 
Management by Objectives (MBO) was influential in the 1960s and 1970s and at 
the about the same time the critical incident technique and behaviour rating scales 
became known but relatively unused. Subsequently, a reformed appraisal process 
emerged and this is current practice. This is usefully summarised in Table 3.2 
adapted from Armstrong and Baron (Table 1 and text in chapter 3), by the inclusion 



















Table 3.2: The genesis of performance management in summary (after 
















Packaged system Packaged 
system 





Applied to all staff Applied to all 
staff 


























as well as 
quantified 
measures 
Regular appraisal Annual appraisal Annual appraisal Continuous 
review with one 
or more formal 
reviews 











More than not 
direct link to pay 
May not be a 
direct link with 
pay 
Often linked to pay May not be a 
direct link to pay 
Monolithic system Monolithic 
system 




























Performance management as a recorded practice was first named by Beer and Ruh 
(1976) who considered ‘performance is best developed through practical challenges 
and experiences on the job with guidance and feedback from superiors’. This differs 
from a purist definition of performance management in not having a link with 
corporate objectives. They go on to explain it was in the 1980s that performance 
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management became a coherent discipline and one of the first books (Plachy and 
Plachy, 1988) on performance management was published. There is however a 
contrary view that performance management is not really new at all. Rather, it is old 
theories re-packaged and re-presented; for example the BSC is effectively MBO 
(Dinesh and Palmer, 1998). 
 
There is also a view performance management is not only difficult (the literature 
tends to agree) but also well-nigh impossible (the literature tends to disagree). Burke 
(2004) suggests the belief performance can be controlled (as opposed to measured 
or managed?) is a myth and this myth has developed into a cult. Therefore, can 
performance management do no more than give a retrospective understanding or 
can it be used to improve performance and to what extent? There is surely an 
implication in Burke’s bleak prognosis that attempting to manage performance is not 
entirely a wasted endeavour. One aim of this research is to evaluate performance 
management’s contribution to organisational performance.  
 
Marr and Schiuma (2003) demonstrated the dominance of the BSC, arising from 
Kaplan and Norton, (1992, 1996a, 1996b and 2000a). McKevitt and Lawton noted 
the distinction between practitioners striving for a PMF that works and some 
academics, who find, ‘…the systems do not meet their expectations of 
responsiveness and equity.’ (McKevitt and Lawton, 1996, p. 49). Barrett (2004) 
suggests performance management was in a period of rapid transformation due to 
a variety of factors coming together, including competitive and regulatory pressures 
and increasing availability of sophisticated software. Neely (2003) suggested, if in 
the 1980s organisations were criticised for measuring the wrong things (Johnson 
and Kaplan, 1987) then now they are measuring too much and obsessed with 
quantification. Talbot (2000) too noted public services in the UK awash with 
performance data providing little insight.  
 
Boyne (2003b) stated, ‘Academic researchers remain largely at the stage of 
clarifying questions rather than providing empirical answers….definitions of 
improvement are not technical and universal but politically constructed and 
contingent on a variety of circumstances….improvement is not a single phenomenon 
with a uniform interpretation….you can (temporarily) take improvement out of 
politics, but you can’t take politics out of improvement.’ (Boyne, 2003b, p. 224). 
These are important points which emphasise the contested nature of organisational 




The following sections consider key issues in performance management starting 
with the quantification and systematic approach or scientific management. 
 
3.5 Scientific Management  
Houck (1979) gives a brief history of scientific management and notes the early 
writings were with respect to engineering. Metcalf was the head of Frankford 
Arsenal who felt the managerial methods in place were wasteful and ineffective, 
stressing “systematizing functional operations and controlling their results.” 
Fredrick W. Taylor, regarded as the father of scientific management, published his 
Principles of Scientific Management in 1911. Houck also mentions the contribution 
of Henri Fayol who published, General and Industrial Management, in 1929. Houck 
notes scientific management provided the foundations for modern management 
planning and control, including accounting, which he suggests only came into its 
own with the industrial boom of the 1950s. 
  
Scientific management led directly to the work study movement, with the 
development of activity standards and the work effort required for the delivery of 
such activities to a standard. We can see a link to systems, quality, having a 
selection of activities with monitoring and control of activities and the work force. 
In theory, this is but a small step to PIs of those activities and selecting a basket to 
measure (a proto-BSC) with consideration of the contribution of different 
components of the system (an excellence model) with a quality component also 
present (TQM). Consideration of the whole brings in systems thinking. Many of 
today’s techniques and systems owe their genesis to scientific management.  
 
Money is a means of exchange and represents the purchase of ‘real’ resources 
and so budgeting is next. 
 
3.6 Budgeting 
Budgeting is principally the means by which financial resources are deployed to 
meet objectives, by providing other ‘material’ such as buildings, equipment and 
people. The amount of money can be monitored and ultimately controlled. 
Traditional budgeting is largely incremental, which recognises many activities 
continue period on period, with perhaps minor changes in the quantity delivered 
and adjustment for inflation. Zero based budgeting (ZBB) attempts to move from 
this incremental approach building services afresh each period, perhaps linked to 
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activity based costing, linking specific activity to unit costs. Jowett and Rothwell 
note the use of Programme Planning and Budgeting System (PPBS) in local 
government in the 1960s and 1970s, ‘…which defined overall objectives and 
identified methods by which these might be achieved, and ZBB which required 
justification for expenditure afresh each year.’ (Jowett and Rothwell, 1988, p. 21). 
Budgets lead to financial indicators which are a subset of PIs. 
 
3.7 Performance Indicators (PIs) 
PIs too have a long history. Jowett and Rothwell (1988, p. 6) provide a chronology 
of the main events in the measurement of health care starting at 1732 with Dr 
Clifton suggesting the collection of basic data for health evaluation. Smith (1990) 
described the use of PIs in the public sector noting their ubiquitous nature. One 
conclusion is that whilst the literature debates the difficulty of interpreting financial 
measures this is, ‘….dwarfed by the problems posed in presenting and 
understanding information about the performance of the non-trading public sector.’ 
(Smith, 1990, p. 70). In a later paper, Smith (1995) suggested indicators were being 
developed without a clear idea of final outcomes. Midwinter (1994) described the 
state of the art of developing indicators as ‘primitive and fraught with 
methodological problems’. 
 
A textbook on business performance measurement published in 1986 contained few 
non-financial PIs, although a variety of ratios were discussed, for example market 
share (Whiting, 1986). A number of academic papers in the 1990s were concerned 
with setting out the requirements for performance measurement (management). 
Palmer (1993) notes some requirements for performance measurement included 
consistency, comparability, clarity, controllability, contingency, comprehensiveness, 
boundedness, relevance and feasibility (after Jackson, 1988). She paints a picture 
of councils as poor at performance management with only 8% having a PMF similar 
to the private sector. There is a common saying as regards performance 
measurement, “what gets measured gets done/managed”, that seems to make 
rational sense. This is disputed by Emiliani (2000) as not applying in all 
circumstances, who has shown mathematically it is false when presented as an 
axiom. 
 
Stewart and Walsh (1994) noted the development of PIs poses difficult problems for 
the public sector; a focus on measurement could ignore quality, although surely not 
unique to the public sector. They suggested PIs need to be used to inform political 
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judgement; used almost as intelligence and individual indicators should not be 
considered in isolation. They note performance assessment is ultimately a 
judgement and must be placed within context – ‘an exercise in practical wisdom not 
measurement’. Public management is often ambiguous with obvious implications for 
performance management (Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003).  
 
Boyne (1997) used the ACPIs to compare the performance of councils. He found 
this difficult as only a small number corresponded with the concept of performance. 
He suggested external constraints on councils could explain some variation in 
performance. The Audit Commission (2000a) published a report explaining the 
practice of PIs, highlighting the introduction of BV and health PAF. They 
emphasised indicators should be used in a wider framework through a strategic 
approach. Propper and Wilson (2003) suggested there had been little assessment 
of whether the use of indicators brings about service improvements. Bevan and 
Hood (2006) examined indicators in the National Health Service (NHS), suggesting 
extensive gaming, partly or mainly, obscured the improvements or resulted in 
falling performance in areas of the service with no targets. 
 
Lemieux-Charles, McGuire and Champagne et al (2003) considered the factors 
affecting performance indicator (PI) development and use in healthcare (Table 
3.3). Using institutional and rational/goal theories, ‘The presence of a performance 
system is an insufficient condition for using indicators both for improvement 
purposes and accountability. Resources are needed to build both analytic capacity 
to understand the information and an ability to act on the information.’  (Lemieux-
Charles, McGuire and Champagne et al, 2003, p. 769). 
 
Greener (2003) considered the evolution of indicators in the NHS and concluded 
the regime implemented by the Labour government poorly conceived and in 
danger of causing distortions in healthcare. Comparing the public health services 
in the UK and Sweden; Ballantine, Brignall and Modell (1998) noted issues 
regarding the balance between financial and non-financial PIs. 
 
Marr and Creelman presented a case study of Northumbria Healthcare NHS 
Foundation Trust that combined clinical performance, customer service and 
financial control. They noted, ‘Understanding healthcare performance requires 
relevant performance metrics as well as the ability to integrate clinical data with 
administrative and financial data….’ (Marr and Creelman, 2010, p. 3). Bevan 
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(2006) rehearsed the problems of setting targets for healthcare PIs in which the 
centre creates a uniform set that process into the star ratings. Three key 
assumptions were noted: a scoring system can prioritise what matters, failures of 
performance not related to the scoring system do not matter and gaming can be 
ignored. Severe problems are noted developing indicators and targets to overcome 
these assumptions. 
 
Table 3.3: Summary of factors influencing indicator development and use 
(Lemieux-Charles, McGuire and Champagne et al, 2003, p. 764) 
                                                                                              Organisation level 
Quest for rationality 
Accreditation process 
Corporate goals and requirements 
Quality program structure 
Intent to benchmark 
Internal and external; benchmarking 






Technical/managerial and institutional  
Technical/managerial and institutional  
Technical/managerial and institutional  
Quest for legitimacy 











Technical/managerial and institutional 
Institutional 
Institutional                                                                            
Institutional 
 
Taylor and Godfrey (2003) considered the benchmarking of PIs in sports facilities 
in an English council suggesting it encouraged a positive attitude towards 
evidence-based decision making. Kemp (1995) researched the performance of 
housing management and described the welfare approach as providing a way of 
examining performance. It was argued without an ‘underpinning’, ‘….there is a 
danger that research on housing management will amount to little more than a 
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description of activities, workload, policies and procedures.’  (Kemp, 1995, p. 788). 
It may be added that this probably applies to most if not all services.  
 
Collier (2006) considered the police service in England and Wales. Police PIs are 
tied to the objectives of policing and the change in indicators reflected political 
priorities with a continual movement in focus. Hume and Wright (2006) made the 
point, in researching the Youth Justice Board in England that measurement in itself 
does not necessarily lead to improvement.  
Marr and Creelman (2009) described the improvement journey of North East 
Lincolnshire Council. The council had been assessed as ‘poor’ or ‘weak’ in CPA 
for a number of years with eventual government intervention. Strategic priorities 
were agreed but as important, data quality weaknesses were addressed making 
PI data reliable.  
 
In summary the literature describes a struggle in the public services to develop 
meaningful PIs and then integrate these within a formal PMF. Practice imported 
uncritically from the private sector is not always successful.  
 
3.8 Investors in People (IIP) 
IIP is a ‘kitemark’ which is validated every few years. Paton (2003, pp.102-103) 
gives a short introduction to IIP noting it was developed with leading private and 
public sector organisations in the UK, launched in 1991 and promoted by the British 
Government to improve economic performance.  It is essentially about developing 
the capabilities and capacity of employees.  
 
Bourne, Franco-Santos and Pavlov et al (2008) report on the impact of IIP on 
performance and suggest a link between the adoption of IIP and business 
performance as illustrated in Figure 3.2. They state, ‘Our research finds that 
adopting IIP sets up a chain of impact ending in better financial performance’ (p. 
5). HR policies create trust and cooperation and increase the skills and behaviours 
needed for change. 
 
Bourne and Franco-Santos (2010) considered the link between IIP, managerial 
capabilities and performance. They found evidence IIP enhances managerial 
capabilities, supports learning, improves management development practices, 
facilitates a high-performing environment and increases managers’ performance. 
Franco-Santos, Khilji and Bourne (2011) consider a social exchange approach to 
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the performance impact of IIP, noting it produces benefits for organisations due to 
the enhancement of long-term skills and employability. However, potential 
negatives of cost, bureaucracy, cultural damage and inhibition of 
experimental/unorganised learning were highlighted.  
 
Figure 3.2: How the IIP Standard affects business performance (Bourne, 














Cox, Higgins and Tamkin (2012) used case studies to investigate the engagement 
of firms with IIP. In adopting IIP firms introduce or modify appraisal systems, 
introduce a broader range of training and communicate much more around the 
business strategy. Major barriers were said to be a lack of people management 
expertise, limited management commitment, reluctance to delegate and the 
understanding of business strategy.  
 
3.9 International Organization for Standardization ISO9000 Standard 
ISO9000 like IIP is a ‘kitemark’, although with a different emphasis, being: 
 
….a set of procedural standards for quality management 
systems (also referred to as ‘quality assurance’). Such systems 
are based on a comprehensive set of documented procedures to 
which staff are expected to conform….the ISO9000 standards 
embody a conception of product and service quality in terms of 













organisations and/or their customers to set these specifications, 
which may be high or low.  
 
(Paton, 2003, p. 101) 
 
Again, accreditation is done by an external body and audits are carried out 
periodically to ensure the procedures continue to be followed. Paton (2003) notes 
the ‘pros and cons’ of kitemarks and suggests a key issue is the extent to which 
the award improves performance; is such improvement sustainable and do the 
benefit(s) outweigh the cost.   
 
3.10 Management by Objectives (MBO) 
The term MBO was coined by Drucker (1955) who stated to be effective 
management must be directed towards a goal which employees share. A key part 
of the theory is self-control that means wanting to achieve the best rather than just 
okay. McGregor (1960) contributed to MBO through his Theory Y:  
 
The central principle that derives from Theory Y is that of 
integration: the creation of conditions such that the members of 
the organisation can achieve their own goals best by directing 
their efforts towards the success of the organisation.  
 
(McGregor, 1960, quoted in Armstrong and Baron, 1998, p. 34) 
 
McGregor’s concept was not bureaucratic, rather practical and was contrary to a 
programme of target-setting and standardised forms and procedures he felt would 
inhibit management by integration and control. This echoes the views of Seddon 
(2003) over forty years later. 
 
Vedung (1997) noted three features of MBO as good practice: setting clear goals, 
participation in making decisions and objective feedback of results. MBO suffered 
a large decline after the euphoria of the 1970s and was subject to much criticism. 
The view is it’s impossible to manage by goals or results in government. Politicians 
are unable to determine clear goals because they lack knowledge or do not reveal 
their motivations.  
 
3.11 Organisation Report Cards and (Annual) Reports 
The literature generally considers annual reports from the perspective of 
accountability. However, the annual report can be used to assess performance. 
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The hypothesis being an organisation’s performance will be reflected in the 
content, which was tested using the BVPP (Chapter seven). 
 
Boyne and Law (1991) considered Welsh district council reports and found them 
of poor quality. Many indicators measured inputs and information about spending 
and staffing, so as Boyne and Law (1991, p. 192) comment: ‘If councils’ reports 
reflect their own views on the most important aspects of performance, then it might 
be inferred that they wish to be judged by their capacity to spend money and 
employ staff.’ They concluded consumerism in local government was weak and 
had not enhanced the concept of accountability for service standards.  
 
Thompson (1995) reports on the introduction of New Zealand’s accounting 
regulations to import private sector accounting into the public sector and include 
service performance as part of the annual report. He concludes quoting a paper by 
Broadbent and Guthrie (1992, p. 26), ‘….unevaluated reforms are being 
implemented with impunity and using the name of accounting as legitimation….’ 
(Thompson, 1995, p. 347).  In England the BVPP was tightly specified by 
government and policed by external auditors, providing in principle a level of 
accountability (Audit Commission, 2000c). 
 
Simply producing information does not guarantee it is read, least of all understood. 
Therefore, it is important communication and dissemination are considered and 
education is part of the agenda. Wall and Martin (2003, p. 507) considered public 
sector organisations were providing an, ‘….impressive amount of information 
which could be used to hold them to account.’ On the other hand, Steccolini (2004) 
viewing annual reports of Italian local government concluded they are prepared to 
comply with legal requirements and for internal stakeholders.  
 
3.12 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) 
BPR is ‘….the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes 
to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of 
performance, such as cost, quality, service and speed.’ Hammer and Champy 
(1994, pp. 32-36) then highlight four key words: fundamental, dramatic, radical and 
processes. Thus asking fundamental questions about the business; getting to the 
root of things – not superficial or tinkering and so radical. The changes required 
are not marginal or incremental so dramatic and finally processes which they 




Guha, Grover and Kettinger et al (1997) considered factors important in successful 
BPR and use a framework suggesting a strategic approach with top management 
leadership. They emphasise successful reengineering only happens by providing 
employees with quality work and actively engaging them in the change process.  
Altinkemer, Chaturvedi and Kondareddy considered the issues around BPR and 
organisational performance using content analysis of company annual reports. 
‘The results suggest that many companies were not implementing BPR alone but 
as one of the components of a set of change approaches that included less radical 
process improvement.’ (Altinkemer, Chaturvedi and Kondareddy, 1998, p. 382). 
Few companies sustained improvement in all performance measures, and in many 
cases improvements were short-lived.  
 
BPR was often portrayed at its purist level as the need for fundamental change, 
almost a clean-break with the past. This has, with time, given way to the recognition 
that it is not usually possible to dissolve an organisation and start afresh and 
therefore the present situation must be worked upon to a lesser or greater degree.    
 
3.13 Lean  
The underlying assumption of lean is organisations are made up of processes and 
acting on these is a route to efficiency. Further, a distinction is often made between 
lean thinking at the strategic and operational levels, with the former concerned with 
principles and the latter tools and techniques (Hines, Holweg and Rich, 2004). A 
literature review on lean thinking in the public services concluded, ‘There is little 
doubt of the applicability of Lean to the public sector…many of the processes and 
services in the public sector can gain greater efficiency by considering and 
implementing aspects of Lean’ (Radnor, Walley and Stephens et al, 2006, p. 85).  
 
Lean thinking has been said to draw from other quality ‘models’ such as just in time 
(JIT), TQM and BPR. TQM is described as a bottom-up approach and BPR top-
down and therefore which way does lean (predominantly) operate? Lean needs to 
be looked at from various perspectives including organisational change, 
sustainability of change, organisational learning and people issues. The link 
between the systems approach and lean thinking is evident since both are holistic 
and focused on processes, although the system level achieves far more (Seddon 




Antony (2011) compared lean and six sigma finding whilst both are focused on 
process and improvement, lean is a formalisation of experience and judgement. 
Six sigma focuses on variation and defects whilst lean emphasises speed and 
waste. Which may potentially produce higher performance is not considered. Orme 
and Clegg (2011) consider a systems approach for a deployment model to 
combine lean and six sigma, noting organisations tend to deploy lean or six sigma, 
rarely both.  
 
Robinson, Radnor and Burgess et al (2011) suggested lean and simulation could 
usefully be applied to healthcare services (SimLean). They noted simulation has a 
long history (from 1970s) in healthcare whilst lean has become more widespread 
since the turn of the century. Performance is not explicitly addressed but the 
purpose is clearly to produce superior outputs compared to the implementation of 
lean or simulation separately.  
 
Radnor and Holweg (2011) considered the use of lean in the UK public sector 
primarily to increase efficiency and reduce cost. They show implementations are 
mainly at the tool level but hit problems when more complex processes are 
addressed. The key difference in the public sector may be manifest, namely in the 
private sector customer and commissioner are the same so defining customer 
value is relatively easy.  
 
Carter, Danford and Howcroft et al (2011) considered the introduction of lean in 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and found it was leading to 
fragmentation of work, de-skilling and workforce demoralisation. It was compared 
to early 20th century factories under the ‘full assault’ of Taylorism. They conclude, 
‘If government plans to extend lean across the UK public service organisations 
come to fruition then “all they lack is a chain”, might seem an apt twenty first century 
refrain for a “modernised” public sector workforce.’ (Carter, Danford and Howcroft 
et al, 2011, p. 95). Radnor and Procter (2012) develop the arguments regarding 
the limits to lean in the public sector observing clear task segmentation as well as 
the expected horizontal integration across tasks. Lower level staff were not really 
involved in the service redesign. Although processes were mapped the emphasis 
was still very much on the individual, as in classic scientific management. 
 
Pedersen and Huniche (2011) investigated how negotiations between the different 
actors impacted on the implementation of lean in the Danish public sector. They 
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state, ‘Lean is not a neutral and value-free endeavour; rather it is a political process 
with interaction between numerous parties and resulting in multiple lean practices.’ 
(Pedersen and Huniche, 2011, p. 562).  
 
If the principles and practice of lean are so powerful, Bagley and Lewis (2008) pose 
the question: Why aren’t we all lean? They suggest ‘why’ include a lack of 
appreciation, limited understanding, unclear strategic priorities, cost-cutting rather 
than cost reduction, management and staff resistance. They caution lean is not a 
magic technique that will fix everything and anything; rather it should be seen as 
one component. It will also be noted that often improved organisational 
performance in implementations is pre-assumed and not (subsequently) 
demonstrated.  
 
3.14 Balanced Scorecard (BSC) 
Information on the BSC is available from the Palladium Group (2014). Kaplan and 
Norton (1992) are credited with introducing the BSC. In principle the concept is 
simple; having a balanced set of measures (financial, customer, production, etc.) to 
cover all activities of the organisation. In a further paper Kaplan and Norton (1996b) 
note BSC as a strategic management system to focus on more than just short-term 
financial results. They continue this theme (Kaplan and Norton, 2001) by way of 
elaboration, including a section on not-for-profit organisations and usefully repeat 
that a strategy is not just what an organisation intends to do but also what it intends 
not to do. Zanini (2003) reviewed the evolution of the BSC and found whilst the 
concept was widely accepted adoption trailed. De Waal (2003a) interviewed Robert 
Kaplan who attributed the success of the BSC as being down to the huge gap 
between the vision and strategy at the top and people on the frontline. He 
commented this was not new as Peter Drucker had recognised it 50 years earlier, 
hence MBO.  
 
Franco and Bourne (2003) interviewed 24 performance management practitioners 
considering factors that differentiate an organisation that manages through 
measures from one that doesn’t. Key factors were culture, management leadership/ 
commitment, linking measures to pay, education and understanding, communication 
and reporting, review and update, data processes and information technology (IT), 
the performance framework, the environment, development, involvement, 
accountability and people behaviours. Soderberg, Kalagnanam and Sheehan et al 
(2011) investigated the understanding of the BSC in 149 Canadian organisations. 
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They found the term was understood differently within, as well as across, 
organisations. They established different levels of implementation using a five level 
scheme, with 74.5% of organisations at level one (basic) whilst 24.2% were at level 
five (fully developed). So performance may vary depending on the level the 
organisation is at, which complicates interpretation. The same may also apply to 
other approaches.   
  
Malmi (2001) in Finland found the BSC was used in two ways; for MBO and as an 
information system. Early adopters did not appreciate the importance of linking 
measures together based on (assumed) cause and effect. Chang, Lin and Northcott 
debated whether the NHS PAF is an example of a BSC. They state, ‘The PAF 
reflects both outcome and process measures, aiming to achieve long-term health 
improvement via efforts put into raising results for process measures….However, 
the PAF is not identical to the BSC, rather the BSC approach has been transformed 
to suit the unique context of the NHS.’ (Chang, Lin and Northcott, 2002, p. 356). 
Radnor and Lovell (2003) noted use of the BSC in the NHS was rare although its 
general popularity is undoubted. Working with the NHS in Bradford they noted a 
number of pitfalls: conceptual barriers to adoption need to be addressed, resource 
and time issues must be considered and BSC implementation work needs reducing 
through a link with business plans but BSC must be the primary strategic 
management system. 
 
McAdam and Walker (2003) explored BSC as an approach by local government, 
in implementing BV, noting the Cabinet Office (2001) had identified BSC as a key 
public sector performance framework. They found BSC was often used with other 
techniques such as the (B)EM. The use of BSC led to improved strategic planning 
whilst the (B)EM provided a service level approach. Woods and Grubnic (2008) 
considered the linking of CPA to BSC using evidence from Hertfordshire CC, 
suggesting linkages as in Table 3.4. CPA provided focus especially on complex 
issues whilst BSC provided the mechanism to concentrate on outcomes rather 
than outputs. 
 
Hoque and James (2000) considered linkages of BSC to size and market factors 
and the potential impact on organisational performance in Australian 
manufacturing firms and find use of BSC associated with higher performance. De 
Geuser, Mooraj and Oyon (2009) showed BSC has a positive impact on 
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organisational performance, particularly improving the integration of management 
processes and empowering people. Wilson, Hagarty and Gauthier (2003) 
emphasised the strategic nature of BSC and note a common error is to view BSC 
as an operations level reporting mechanism.  
 
Aidemark (2001) considered the BSC in healthcare in Sweden and noted the 
financial perspective a constraint for not-for-profit organisations. Kollberg and Elg 
(2011) identified the main characteristics of BSC practice in Swedish healthcare, 
with BSC used for different purposes: clearer strategic direction, to structure 
management meetings and to make strategies more comprehensive.  
 
Table 3.4: Linking CPA Components to the Balanced Scorecard (Woods 
and Grubnic, 2008, p. 351) 
CPA Components BSC Components 
Corporate Assessment Mission 
Value/benefit of service 
Internal processes 
Support of voters/tax payers 
Service Assessments Value/benefit of service 
Operational efficiency 
Support of legislature, voters/tax 
payers 
Learning and growth 
Use of Resources Operational efficiency 
Internal processes 
Direction of Travel Learning and growth 
Internal processes 
Support of voters/tax payers 
Support of legislature 
 
 
Kloot and Martin (2000) found support in the literature for a strong link between 
strategic plans and performance measures. They found concentration on the results 
of council work, financial performance and to a lesser degree community views on 
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performance but less attention to the other parts of the BSC, such as innovation, 
learning and internal business processes.  
 
The literature demonstrates BSC has much to commend it as the defining 
characteristic of a PMF. However, it must still be designed and implemented in a 
holistic manner taking into consideration all the relevant factors inherent in the 
internal and external environments.  
 
3.15 Total Quality Management (TQM) 
‘Quality management’ covers a variety of approaches including TQM, total quality 
control, value adding management, common interest programme, employee 
involvement program, etc., so says Fisher (1990). Fisher was writing from an 
Australian perspective studying three companies implementing quality 
management, suggesting improvements were marginal in the short-term when 
compared to other factors such as financial control and product rationalisation. 
 
Rouse (1999, p. 2) explicitly linked performance and quality noting, ‘…the existence 
of multiple stakeholders and conflicting values within the public domain means the 
concept of good performance as “effectiveness” and “quality” becomes problematic’. 
Shrivastava, Mohanty and Lakhe (2006) considered the linkages between TQM and 
organisational performance in Indian firms using PCA with varimax rotation 
extracting five components (Table 3.5).  
 
Table 3.5: Correlation matrix of organisation’s performance with TQM factors 
(Shrivastava, Mohanty and Lakhe, 2006, p. 23) 










performance  ↓ 
1. Quality 0.250** 0.008 0.170* 0.010 
2. Customer 
satisfaction 
0.080* 0.040* 0.009 0.210** 
3. Business results 0.007 0.251** 0.005 0.008 
4.Human resource 0.008 0.053* -0.004 0.090* 
5.Time 0.011 0.081* 0.062* 0.009 
  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Zakuan, Yusof and Laosirihongthong et al (2010) proposed a relationship between 
TQM and organisational performance in a conceptual model (Figure 3.3). 
Organisational performance is measured using satisfaction (customer and 
employee) and business results (productivity, number of successful new products, 
cost performance and profitability). This model is similar to others although the detail 
varies. 
 
Al-Dhaafri, Yusoff and Al-Swidi (2013) reviewed the literature on organisational 
performance and consider the potential effects of TQM, enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) and organisational excellence (OE). They suggest, ‘….the effects of TQM, 
ERP and OE on the Organisational Performance are still inconsistent.’ (Al-Dhaafri, 
Yusoff and Al-Swidi, 2013, p. 78). Given organisational complexity and the ‘slippery’ 
nature of many of the concepts this inconsistency seems unsurprising.   
 
Figure 3.3: A proposed conceptual model of TQM practices (Zakuan, Yusof 

















Skelcher (1992) noted councils changed their relationships with customers, since 
the mid-1980s, to more like the commercial sector but remained distinct (Table 3.6). 























oriented. He concludes by suggesting strong parallels between the sectors in that 
getting it right for employees is as important as getting it right for customers.  
 
Table 3.6: Comparison of local government and commercial sectors 
(Skelcher, 1992, p. 464) 





Choice Wide value base 
Political process 
Customer also citizen 
Narrow value base 
Managerial process 
Limited influence of customer 
Purpose Multiple Narrow 
 
Lambert and Ouedraogo (2008) studied the impact of ISO9001 on organisational 
learning in French firms and the impacts on process performance. They note the 
differences between ISO9001 and TQM, with the latter having a much larger cultural 
dimension and less prescriptive. Sharma and Gadenne (2008) showed quality 
management factors (e.g. top management philosophy) have significant 
associations with business competitive position whilst market process improvement 
and training have significant associations with customer satisfaction. Tanninen, 
Puumalaimen and Sandström (2010) considered the power of TQM on profitability, 
productivity and customer satisfaction in a manufacturing firm and found TQM had 
a positive impact on all three. 
 
Soltani, Singh and Liao et al (2010) noted one of the ‘purposes’ of TQM is to control 
processes but the extent to which this is done by controlling the workforce is open 
to question. They showed control over the workforce is part of the mechanism by 
which processes are controlled, ‘….managers at various organisational levels in 
quality driven organisations do seek to tighten their managerial control in the name 
of TQM and follow the steps proposed by earlier management schools.’ (Soltani, 
Singh and Liao et al, 2010 p. 75). They noted academic and business-led research 
may effectively be ‘muddled’ in terms of what practitioners see as TQM and its 
purpose. Many managers, they comment, do not appear to see a quality workforce 
as a key determinant of TQM success. 
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Cowling and Newman (1995) used the case study approach to examine TQM in UK 
banks and noted the early nature of the change programmes. They identified key 
factors necessary for success as communications, recognition, motivation, 
involvement and leadership.  
 
Rahman and Bullock (2005) investigated the impact of hard and soft TQM on 
performance. They suggested soft TQM creates the environment for hard TQM to 
operate successfully. They conclude, generally, elements of soft TQM (workforce 
commitment, shared vision, customer focus, use of teams and cooperative supplier 
arrangements) are significantly related to organisational performance. For hard 
TQM; just in time principles, technology utilisation and continuous improvement 
enablers have significant relationships with soft TQM elements.  
 
Leonard and McAdam (2004) researched TQM and corporate strategy and 
suggested this relationship is key if TQM is to progress beyond an incremental 
contribution to performance. Moura e Sá and Kanji (2003) suggested TQM principles 
and core concepts are drivers of organisational excellence.  
 
Pannirselvam and Ferguson (2001) studied the relationships between the Malcolm 
Baldrige National Quality Award categories (leadership, information and analysis, 
strategic quality planning, HR management, management of process quality, 
business results and customer focus and satisfaction) and how these related to 
organisational performance. The results indicated leadership is significantly 
associated with performance but the greatest contribution was customer focus and 
relationship management. 
 
Boyne and Walker (2002, p. 127) considered the need for research on TQM and 
performance. They state, ‘….there is no systematic evidence on the validity of the 
TQM-performance hypothesis…the available evidence does not offer 
comprehensive support for the view that TQM is positively related to organizational 
success.’ They suggest there is an urgent need for longitudinal research.  
 
Soltani, Van der Meer and Gennard (2003) highlight the links between TQM and 
human resources management (HRM) supporting Krüger’s (2001) views regarding 
the importance of the individual to TQM. However, Soltani (2003) suggests, 
although performance evaluation (of individuals) is high in most organisations its 
impact on TQM programmes is low. Given this perspective Masterson and Taylor 
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(1996) note many proponents of TQM advocate the elimination of individual 
performance appraisal but other workers and many practitioners are not in favour. 
They argue TQM and appraisal are complementary.  This seems in being with the 
concept of performance management as being an integrative force in 
organisations, encompassing many different perspectives. If TQM is really a PMF 
and the ‘gurus’ underplayed the importance of individuals’ role then given the 
encompassing nature of performance management their views need to be 
modified.  
 
Iaquinto (1999) explored the relationship between winning a quality award and 
organisational performance and suggests for Japanese firms that have won the 
Deming award a negative association. Mann and Kehoe (1994) describe research 
on how quality initiatives impact on business performance and concluded all quality 
activities, especially TQM, had a beneficial impact on performance.  
 
Samson and Terziovski (1999) researched the effectiveness and validity of quality 
management systems in explaining variances in operational performance of 1,200 
Australian and New Zealand manufacturing firms. They found a positive 
relationship between TQM practice and organisational performance with the 
strongest significant predictors of performance being leadership, the management 
of people and customer focus. They conclude their results are consistent with the 




Innovation is often suggested as one means by which organisational performance 
can be improved and Lumpkin and Dess (1996) proposed a framework for 








Figure 3.4 Conceptual framework of entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin and 




















Macpherson (2001) notes public sector organisations are traditionally risk averse 
and process constrained and may find it difficult to innovate as this requires risk-
taking. It is suggested the use of excellence models (EFQM, Baldrige, BSC) provide 
a mechanism to promote innovation. The Strategy Unit of the Cabinet Office (2003) 
presented a framework for public sector organisations in promoting, implementing 
and the diffusion of innovation as shown in Figure 3.5. Whilst this is all relevant it 
neglects the point that typically the rewards for successful innovation in much of the 
public services are meagre whereas failures may be heavily punished. 
 
Figure 3.5: Framework to help understand how to foster innovation (Cabinet 
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Walker, Damanpour and Devece (2011) suggested management innovations are 
little researched in the public sector. Echoing earlier research the relationship 
between innovation and performance is complex and depends on many other 
characteristics of the organisation. Using English councils they found the impact of 
innovation is mediated by performance management that has a positive association 
with organisational performance. They find innovation itself does not have a direct 
impact on organisational performance, contrary to much of the literature.  
 
3.17 Organisational Culture/Climate 
Culture has been noted as important for organisational performance. Kangis, 
Gordon and Williams (2000) studied organisational climate and corporate 
performance and concluded a better climate resulted in better performance but were 
reluctant to claim a causal relationship and if so in which direction. Chew and 
Sharma (2005) considered the effects of culture and HR on firm performance in 
Singapore finding the type of leadership and HR practices influenced financial 
performance. 
 
Bititci, Mendibil and Nudurupati et al (2006) modelled the relationship between 
performance measurement, management styles and organisational culture. They 
found culture and management style were interdependent throughout the life of the 
PMF. An authoritative management style was critical in the initial implementation but 
changed as the system matured. Appiah-Adu and Singh (1999) researched 
marketing culture and performance of UK service firms and suggested the success 
of marketing leads to increased customer satisfaction. Toaldo and Luce (2011) 
considered the impact of the marketing strategy process (Brazilian medium and 
large firms) on organisational performance and found it had a significant impact on 
the strategy leading to increased market share and customer satisfaction. Studies 
by Tortosa, Moliner and Sánchez (2008) and Lings and Greenley (2009) suggest 
internal marketing has a positive influence on employees leading to improved 
organisational performance, including customer satisfaction.  
 
Den Hartog and Verburg (2004) state the HRM literature emphasises the importance 
of people in increasing performance and consider this further using a survey of high 
performance work systems (HPWS) and organisational performance in Dutch firms. 
They pose the question as to whether higher performance results in stronger, more 
coherent cultures and the extent to which different HR practices act in varying 
cultures. Pandey, Coursey and Moynihan (2007) considered how a model of 
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organisational effectiveness accounts for red tape and the effect of organisational 
culture, where a high development culture results in higher organisational 
performance and is less affected by increasing red tape. 
 
Lawson, Hatch and Desroches (2013) found three of six performance cultural criteria 
(taken from Dresner, 2010) were significant for organisational performance: 
alignment of the organisation with its vision and mission, the presence of 
transparency and accountability and effective conflict resolution. Mulgan (2012) 
reported on transparency and public sector performance suggesting, in particular 




Hartley and Allison (2000) considered leadership in the government’s drive for local 
government modernisation and improvement following the election of a Labour 
government in 1997. They found a leadership role for certain individuals in shaping 
council visions; not always the leader of the council or chief executive, rather others 
may have been nominated to lead, that can vary over time.  
 
Joyce (2004) considered the role of leadership in turning around a poorly performing 
council (Newham London Borough Council). The appointment of a new chief 
executive who led or ensured leadership on three major issues; strategy, 
performance management and HR/organisational development was a significant 
reason for the large improvement in three years.  
 
Boyne and Meier (2005) developed a turnaround model that added luck. They 
considered luck plays a significant role in organisational turnaround, often due to 
external factors. Andrews, Boyne and Enticott (2006) followed this up by suggesting 
performance regimes (e.g. CPA) assume poor performance is down to the 
organisation rather than external circumstances. Their analysis shows 
organisational failure may be attributable to difficult circumstances and management 
characteristics – misfortune and mismanagement. Of course it may be added it 
depends on the organisation, the environment and time; each acting in a complex 
mix making disentanglement tricky. Arikibe (2011) studying public service 
performance in Nigeria suggested executive leadership had a moderate positive 




Peterson, Smith and Martorana et al (2003) considered how the personality of 
leaders (often termed leadership charisma) may be related to organisational 
performance through top management teams. They find a positive relationship but 
suggest more research to explore the mediation role of top management team 
members. Entwistle, Martin and Enticott (2005) note the importance of leadership in 
public service modernisation and explore the potential conflict between political and 
managerial leadership. Andrews and Boyne (2010) suggest that leadership can 
further improve an already good management system; that is also linked to capacity. 
Michailidis and Charalamous (2012) examined the importance of leadership in the 
police and found leadership skills tended to increase police officers’ motivation 
leading to higher performance. 
 
Parry and Proctor-Thomson (2003) tested the relationship between leadership, 
culture and effectiveness in the public sector in New Zealand. They found 
transformational leadership had a direct and indirect impact on performance through 
affecting organisational culture and influence on innovation. McBain, Ghobadian and 
Switzer et al (2012) considered the business benefits of management and leadership 
development (MLD) and concluded there are strong links between management 
development and organisational performance. They showed 23% of the variance in 
organisational performance is explained by three factors (Figure 3.6).  
 
Figure 3.6: Factors which explain 23% variance in organisational 















Partnership working became increasingly important for local public services, 
perhaps best manifested by local area agreements (LAAs). Morgan and Djebarni 
(2012) investigated the leadership of community partnerships as predictors of 
performance finding both vertical and shared leadership were predictors of 
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partnership effectiveness. Earlier, Sullivan, Downe and Entwistle et al (2006) noted 
the requirements for local government to fulfil the community leadership role: engage 
citizens, strategic leadership and the development of the collaborative potential of 
other agencies. Meier and O’Toole (2002) researching Texas school districts 
concluded managerial quality (of which leadership is part) was positively correlated 
with ten of 11 PIs.  
 
De Waal (2003b and 2004) considered the behavioural factors important for the 
successful implementation and use of PMFs and concluded there are critical factors. 
In addition the ‘use’ stage in implementation has to be performed well to ensure the 
PMF is used. The present research tests some of these influences. 
 
Watson (2001) considered the psychological contract under NPM and concluded 
improved employee/employer relationships were important for the success of 
modernisation and change programmes, such as introducing performance 
management. O’Donnell and Shields (2002) carried out similar research in the 
Australian public sector with an emphasis on performance management. They 
suggested maintaining a positive psychological contract requires the employer to 
deploy a full range of HR techniques including good communications.  
 
3.19 Benchmarking 
Benchmarking is comparing features of an organisation with features in other 
organisation(s), or different parts of the same organisation. Longbottom (2000, p. 
113) undertook a questionnaire study to investigate benchmarking in the UK 
showing a large interest amongst practitioners, especially the public sector, with a 
high proportion of projects showing positive links to performance.  
 
Davis (1998) described the increasing use of benchmarking in British councils noting 
its rise parallels the use of strategic management and TQM. The use of strategic 
benchmarking to improve effectiveness was highlighted, ‘Strategic benchmarking 
can prompt the “unlearning” that is at the core of the scrutiny process. This 
unlearning requires challenging the implicit assumptions in current policy.’ (Davis, 
1998, p. 264).  This may be important in allowing criteria that contribute to high 
performance to operate. Davis (1998, p. 266) also highlights the view expounded by 
such as Cox and Thompson (1998) that benchmarking is actually sub-optimal in not 




Holloway, Francis and Hinton (1999) critiqued the notion that a single approach, 
such as benchmarking, can transform an organisation’s performance. They studied 
the NHS ambulance service in Warwickshire that was active in benchmarking 
including with the fire service and police, although not with the private sector due 
to commerciality issues. They suggest techniques such as benchmarking are only 
as good as the people who apply them and their compatibility with the 
organisational context.  
 
The Audit Commission (2000a) produced a guide to benchmarking identifying two 
characteristics leading to successful change: top management support and staff 
involvement. In 2001 the UK government launched the public sector benchmarking 
service producing a guide setting out its ethos to promote effective benchmarking, 
broker learning through shared practice and supply practical advice and 
information (Cabinet Office/HM Customs and Excise, 2001). Benchmarking is still 
facilitated for example by CIPFA for councils and fire services (Chartered Institute 
of Public Finance and Accountancy, 2014), for health through the Health & Social 
Care Information Centre (2014) and for police through Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of Constabulary (2014). Co-ordination of benchmarking is undertaken by the local 
authority association in Scotland (Improvement Service, 2014).  
 
Bowerman and Ball (2000) reviewed some of the history of benchmarking in local 
government and cast doubt on the usefulness of much of it. They noted it predates 
the popularity of the technique in the private sector; principally cross-council that was 
given an impetus by the establishment of the Audit Commission in 1983. Later, 
Bowerman, Francis and Ball et al (2002) argued the practice of benchmarking in 
councils was different, to in the private sector, used predominantly for defensive 
reasons (in response to central government imposition) rather than improve 
performance. They contend the compulsory approach is flawed and, ‘…yet despite 
the failure of benchmarks to drive performance, the government’s response is for 




Figure 3.7: Framework combining economic and institutional benchmarking 






Van Helden and Tillema (2005) suggest benchmarking is based on particular ideas 
about managing organisations and improving their performance. They develop a 
theoretical framework (Figure 3.7) which includes economic and institutional 
theories where the outcomes are improved organisational performance. 
 
Fong, Cheng and Ho (1998) considered benchmarking from the practical aspect 
by clarifying the term and describing the procedures for benchmarking (Table 3.7).  
 
Magd and Curry (2003) place benchmarking as an essential public sector tool but 
state to be successful there must be commitment to continuous improvement, an 
ability to learn from others and a willingness to implement. They discuss NHS trusts 
using benchmarking prior to market testing as a means to demonstrate vfm or to 
identify areas of competitive weakness in terms of cost.  
 
Triantafillou (2007) conceptualises benchmarking as a ‘normalising governing 
technology’ so the relations between different actors can be examined. He 
suggests the most important danger of benchmarking may not be its potentially 
‘perverse’ effects, or the potential to allow control by others, rather benchmarked 
Outcomes: 
 The average performance of organisations improves 
 Poorly performing organisations improve more than other organisations 
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organisations are subject to constant change in ‘a game’ some participants are 
bound to lose. 
 
Table 3.7: Classification of benchmarking (Fong, Cheng and Ho, 1998, p. 
410) 
Classification Type Meaning 
Nature of referent 
other 
Internal Comparing within one organisation 
about the performance of similar 
business units or processes 
Competitor Comparing with direct competitors, 
catch up or even surpass their 
performance 
Industry  Comparing with company in the same  
industry, including non-competitors 
Generic Comparing with an organisation that 
extends beyond industry boundaries 
Global Comparing with an organisation where 
its geographical location extends 
beyond country boundaries 
Content of 
benchmarking 
Process Pertaining to discreet work processes 
and operating systems 
Functional Application of the process 
benchmarking that compares particular 
business functions at two or more 
organisations 
Performance Concerning outcome characteristics, 
quantifiable in terms of price, speed, 
reliability, etc. 
Strategic Involving assessment of strategic 
rather than operational matters 
Purpose for the 
relationship 
Competitive Comparison for gaining superiority over 
others 
Collaborative Comparison for developing a learning 
atmosphere and sharing knowledge 
 
 
Maiga and Jacobs (2004) considered the association between benchmarking and 
performance in a study of US manufacturing. They established prior experience 
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with benchmarking, the commitment to benchmarking and preliminary competitive 
analysis are statistically associated with increased organisational performance.  
 
3.20 (Business) Excellence Model ((B)EM) 
The European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) BEM was introduced 
in 1991. It was renamed the EM to reflect its use in many organisations, not just 
private business. Detail on the EM is available from the EFQM (2014). The EM is 
based on nine criteria in two parts: Enablers and Results as shown in Figure 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.8 The EFQM Excellence Model (EFQM, 2014) 
 
 
Moeller, Breinlinger-O’Reilly and Elser (2000) highlighted the use of the EM in the 
German health sector and conclude it offers the potential to improve healthcare but 
caution on the effort needed. This mirrors Darlington BC’s experience, in using it as 
a framework for BV reviews, where it simply became too onerous to resource even 
in a simplified form. It was not clear what was lost as no evaluation was undertaken. 
 
Stahr, Bulman and Stead (2000) edited a book on the use of the EM in the health 
sector that illustrates successful implementation to drive service improvement. 
Zairi and Jarrar (2001) suggested self-assessment models such as the EM are 
useful in determining high performance but are unable to highlight best practices 
that deliver it.  
 
Eskildsen, Kristensen and Juhl (2004) considered how private and public sector 
organisations in Denmark achieve excellent results through holistic management 
models. They show public organisations use holistic management more and 
excellent results are not achieved in the same way in both sectors. Private 
companies emphasise ‘systems’ whereas public emphasise ‘people’. In particular 
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for the EM; private sector organisations place more emphasis on ‘leadership’ 
whereas for the public sector it is ‘policy and strategy’. 
 
Jacobs and Suckling (2007) researched the use of the EM in an English council 
(South Staffordshire), in particular as regards the assessment of customer focus. 
The EM enabled managers to accurately assess critical performance issues. The 
work was also linked to the Council’s use of the BSC to manage its performance 
and to score highly in CPA. Larsen (2001) notes the EM supports customer 
satisfaction surveys to promote continuous improvement and this is also true of 
other initiatives such as ISO9000. We may add appropriate information is 
necessary for evaluation and Larsen provides a useful reminder that 
measurements are not necessarily better than opinions since a great deal depends 
on interpretation. Therefore, the lack of appropriate analysis capacity can be a 
serious shortcoming. Not all of the quality/performance systems are equally 
applicable and context is likely to be important. 
 
3.21 Systems Thinking 
Boland and Fowler provide a systems perspective of performance management in 
public sector organisations. They suggest, ‘….that a fundamental framework based 
on systems-theory should underpin management issues such as performance 
improvement, using the terminology and tools of “systems thinking”.’ (Boland and 
Fowler, 2000, p. 418). They explore this using health, education and police. The 
control locations and resultant action model is represented by a matrix (Table 3.8). 
This has two dimensions, the first as to whether the control is exercised internally 
or externally. The second concerns the controlling action taken. Negative implies 
poor performance and the organisation is at fault whilst positive assumes good 
performance. They argue quadrant one is the preferred position for a public sector 
organisation. From our perspective it can be argued what determines an 
organisation’s performance may vary depending upon the level of external control. 
Not meeting externally composed targets, for example in councils not achieving 
standards for the speed at processing planning applications. Or more generally, 
under BV, the initial requirement to reach best quartile performance within five 





Table 3.8: Control locations and resultant action matrix model (Boland and 
Fowler, 2000, p. 422) 
RESULTANT ACTION 
CONTROL LOCATION 
      Positive action      Negative action 
Internal controls 1 3 
External controls 2 4 
 
Seddon and Brand (2008) reviewed systems thinking and public sector 
performance noting the difference from manufacturing with the customer involved 
in service delivery. They identify two major types of demand in services: value 
demand – can I have a service? Failure demand – it hasn’t happened! For 
example, it is contended in council call centres 80% of demand is of the failure 
kind. PIs and targets are causes of waste because managers are forced to focus 
on these at the expense of what they are trying to do.  
 
Table 3.9 shows the distinction between systems thinking and the conventional 
approach. Systems thinking is more integrative and ‘enables’ those who do the 
work. The distinction is economies of flow rather than economies of scale. In 
practice this would require frontline staff have the means to deal with demand.  
 
The proponents of systems thinking believe it has the potential to produce great 
efficiencies in public services, whilst improving customer experience and 
satisfaction. However, the systems approach is not widely practised and the 
question is, if the benefits are potentially so large, why? Under the NPM label 
performance management with a host of indicators and targets has been 
prioritised. It is not that government was blind to the systems approach. For 
example, the ODPM sponsored pilots and research to evaluate the use of systems 








Table 3.9: Command and control versus systems thinking (Seddon, 2003, p. 
11) 
Command and control 
thinking 
 Systems thinking 
Top-down, hierarchy Perspective Outside-in, system 
Functional Design Demand, value and flow 
Separated from work Decision making Integrated with work 
Outputs, targets, 
standards: related to 
budget 
Measurement Capability, variation: 
related to purpose 
Contractual Attitude to customers What matters? 
Contractual Attitude to suppliers Cooperative 
Manage people and 
budgets 
Role of management Act on the system 
Control Ethos Learning 
Reactive Change Adaptive 
Extrinsic Motivation Intrinsic 
 
 
There is a variant of the systems approach, developed by Peter Checkland and 
co-workers at Lancaster University, which is generally known as soft systems 
methodology (SSM) (Checkland, 2000). Jacobs (2004) considered the use of SSM 
for performance improvement in the English NHS.  Crawford, Costello and Polack 
et al (2003) promoted the virtues of the SSM approach and described an example 
from Australia. They conclude, ‘Systems thinking in general and SSM in particular 
were found to offer a rich source of theoretical and model-based contributions to 
development of project management practice….’ (Crawford, Costello and Polack 
et al, 2003, p. 447). 
 
Liu, Meng and Mingers et al (2012) developed a PMF using SSM. Figure 3.9 shows 
a conceptual model of performance management identifying the activities needed 
to specify the transformation that would be in the root definition. The key feature of 
the methodology was the, ‘….decomposition process from strategic goals right 
down to key performance indicators (KPIs) at low level of activity….these 




Figure 3.9: A conceptual model of performance management (Liu, Meng 

















Nandakumar, Ghobadian and O’Regan (2012) summarise the studies on strategic 
planning and organisational performance (Table 3.10) with the majority supporting 
a positive relationship. The relationship between strategic planning and the 
environment perhaps depends on the operating environment or other factors (e.g. 
Nandakumar, Ghobadian and O’Regan, 2010). 
 
Table 3.10: Studies investigating the link between strategic planning and 
performance (after Nandakumar, Ghobadian and O’Regan, 2012, p. 8) 




Positive impact of strategic planning on performance 46 68 
Partially supports the relationship 8 12 
No impact of strategic planning on performance 11 16 
Other results 3 4 














Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) considered strategic approaches and organisational 
performance using managerial perceptions from four industries and placed them 
within four strategy types: Defender, Prospector, Analyser and Reactor suggesting 
Defenders, Prospectors and Analysers (Miles and Snow, 1978) consistently 
outperform Reactors but not in a highly regulated industry. Porter (1980) developed 
generic strategies: differentiation, low cost and focus and Dess and Davis (1984) 
investigated these as a determinant of organisational performance concluding: 
 
….the research findings are generally consistent with 
Porter’s contention that commitment to at least one of the 
three generic strategies will result in higher performance 
than if the firm fails to develop a generic strategy (i.e., 
becomes stuck in the middle). 
(Dess and Davis, 1984, p. 484) 
 
Zajac and Shortell (1989) continued the theme using the Miles and Snow (1978) 
classification as to the extent to which changing generic strategies impact on 
performance. A change of strategy may be needed if the environment changes and 
organisations tend to change their strategy in response to major environmental 
changes, which can cause organisations to shift en masse. However, simply 
changing strategy does not maintain or improve performance over organisations that 
don’t change.  
 
Wooldridge and Floyd (1990) suggested middle manager involvement in the 
formation of strategy is associated with improved organisational performance. 
Thomas, Clark and Gioia (1993) considered the relationship between organisational 
performance and strategic sense-making noting the complex links. Walker, Andrews 
and Boyne et al (2010) suggest that service performance is shaped by the strategies 
used by the organisation and the networking behaviour of their managers. 
 
Pehrsson (2001) argues there is an optimum business strategy in each (strategic) 
state to reach high performance. Strategic states are a combination of dimensions 
and strategies leading to convergence or divergence and standardisation or 
adaptation. At any one time a firm will have a particular strategic state. Ittner and 
Larcker (1997) considered the impact of ‘quality control’ of strategic plans and found 
organisational performance consequences varied by industry. Several strategic 
control practices (formal/rigid plans, incomplete/incorrect goals, bureaucracy) 




Miller and Cardinal (1994) evaluated the impact of strategic planning on firm 
performance by synthesising over two decades of research. There has been 
criticism planning can be too rigid, given future uncertainties and perhaps the same 
can be said of the PMF. They conclude strategic planning does positively affect the 
performance of firms disputing the findings of other literature, for example Greenley 
(1986) and Mintzberg (1990).  
 
Phillips, Davies and Moutinho (1999) considered the effects of strategic planning on 
hotel performance and concluded competitive advantage is most improved when the 
planning is done close to the frontline. A point was that successful strategic plans 
didn’t rely solely on finance and marketing but were multi-disciplinary, ‘Accounting 
myopia can seriously damage a company’ (Phillips, Davies and Moutinho, 1999, p. 
284). 
 
Ghobadian, O’Regan and Thomas et al (2008) suggested links between the formality 
of strategic planning and organisational performance are tenuous. Rather, such 
planning enhances the firm’s survival not necessarily short-term performance. 
However, alignment of key strategies is regarded essential for consistent and higher 
organisational performance (Schniederjans and Cao, 2009). Gani and Jermias 
(2012) investigated the alignment of management control systems with strategy and 
confirm, as in other areas of strategy, misalignment demonstrates a negative 
correlation with organisational performance. Alavi and Karami (2009) considered the 
impact of mission statement in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) finding 
the existence of such statements positively associated with performance. Zbierowski 
and Bratnicki (2011) investigated the characteristics of SMEs associated with high 
performance. They found such firms had a clear vision, committed leadership and a 
flexible structure whilst balancing short- and long-term performance. 
 
Boyne and Gould-Williams (2003) found statistical evidence that favourable attitudes 
to planning are associated with higher organisational performance but performance 
is negatively related to the number of targets set. Boyne (2004) posed the question 
as to whether management matters in explaining public service performance. He 
suggests the evidence is ‘….thin and, in some respects rudimentary….’ but most 
statistical studies point to, ‘a significant impact of management on dimensions of 
public services such as quality, effectiveness and consumer satisfaction’ (Boyne, 




Ramaswamy, Thomas and Litschert (1994) investigated the influence of government 
regulation on organisational strategy and performance using the Miles and Snow 
(1978) typology in the US airline industry. They found despite regulation it was the 
managers of the organisation that ultimately determined performance. However, 
Porter (1996) stated operational effectiveness in itself is not a strategy and bemoans 
the fact management tools (TQM, benchmarking, etc.) have taken the place of 
strategy. He suggests all strategic positions require trade-offs and limit what a firm 
can do. Leadership is critical to developing a clear strategy that must be driven from 
the top.  
 
Sheaffer, Carmeli and Steiner-Revivo et al (2009) found downsizing strategies had 
a positive impact on short-term performance and a negative impact on long-term 
performance. Byrd and Marshall (1997) investigated the relationship between 
information technology investment and organisational performance and found a 
mixed picture. There was no significant relationship between the amount spent on 
IT staff training and organisational performance. Melville, Kraemer and Gurbaxani 
(2004) noted the uncertainty about the contribution of IT to organisational 
performance and developed an IT business model using the resource based view 
(RBV). They found IT is valuable, although dependent on a range of internal and 
external factors including other forms of resources and the competitive environment. 
Mithas, Ramasubbu and Sambamurthy (2011) undertook similar research and found 
IT positively developed three other attributes: customer management, process 
management and performance management, which are associated with 
organisational performance.  
 
A number of workers have considered the impact of knowledge management on 
organisational performance. Lee and Choi (2000) noted enablers of knowledge 
management and find variables such as organisational structure and organisational 
culture are significant in predicting the creation of knowledge. Van de Walle and 
Bovaird (2007) undertook a literature review for the Audit Commission on the use of 
information to drive improvement in local public services. They suggested four areas 
to be considered further: diffusion of information, information beliefs and 
assessment, environmental scanning and how can information be used 
productively? The effective use of knowledge management is therefore positively 




As part of the Public Services Programme, Walshe, Harvey and Skelcher et al (2009) 
considered the manner in which organisations respond to evidence about poor 
performance. They showed one of the reasons organisations perform poorly is the 
way they learn or rather, fail to learn. It was found knowledge acquisition was less of 
an issue in part because there is much about ‘performance’ available, although 
collection was often narrow and poor. For improvement the organisation must have 
the means to collect and use knowledge and be able to learn.   
 
Sawalha (2013) considered the role of business continuity management and 
organisational performance in Jordanian banks and suggested continuity is 
associated with higher performance. 
 
Labroukos, Lioukas and Chambers (1995) investigated the relationship between 
planning (decentralisation, formalisation, depth of analysis, monitoring/reviewing 
and plan content) and performance in state owned enterprises in Greece. They 
showed significant associations between specific aspects of planning and measures 
of process and output performance. However, planning also showed a negative 
association with innovation. Bolton and Leach (2002) noted strategic planning had 
experienced a revival in the British public sector. They studied Cardiff City Council’s 
introduction of strategic plans noting the impact was ‘reduced’ initially due to 
departmentalism. Poister, Edwards and Pasha et al (2013) researching public 
transport organisations in the US found strategic planning had a positive effect on 
performance. Nasimiyu (2013) considered the impact of strategic change on the 
performance of the Kenyan Revenue Authority and reported an influence. 
 
Boyne and Walker (2004) suggested there was a lack of understanding of the 
strategies of public service organisations with a confusion of strategy content and 
processes, as well as a lack of consideration of the constraints. They proposed a 
matrix classification of strategic stance (Prospector, Defender and Reactor) and 
strategic action (Change markets, Change services, Seeking revenues, External 
organisation and Internal organisation). They then test a number of hypotheses 
suggesting that public organisations have a narrow range of strategic positions, in 
particular Reactors rather than Prospectors or Defenders. Andrews, Boyne and 
Walker (2006) tested the proposition strategy content is a key determinant of 
organisational performance in the public sector using the dimensions: strategic 
stance and strategic actions. Their results suggest organisational performance is 
positively correlated with a Prospector stance and negatively correlated to a Reactor 
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stance and ‘….organisations that adopt a Defender stance are likely to face a rocky 
path to service improvement, and a Reactor stance is likely to result in performance 
that lags that of both Defenders and Prospectors.’ (Andrews, Boyne and Walker, 
2006, p. 58).  
 
Similarly, Walker and Boyne (2006) studied 117 English councils and concluded 
planning, organisational flexibility and user choice associated with higher 
performance. Andrews, Boyne and Law et al (2007) tested the joint effects of 
strategy and regulation on organisational performance in Welsh councils. They 
concluded a Prospector stance gives higher performance than Defender or Reactor. 
Further, regulation that is supportive strengthens the relationship but inspection 
events may be disruptive. The efficacy of strategies in the public sector, they 
suggest, are dependent upon regulatory frameworks. Meier, O’Toole and Boyne et 
al (2007) found that Defender is most effective for the primary mission of an 
organisation whilst Prospector and Reactor are superior for the powerful political 
elements of organisations’ environment.  
 
Further, developing their ideas, using Welsh local government, Andrews, Boyne and 
Law et al (2009) considered the effects of strategy formulation and strategy content. 
They find Prospector and Defender strategies are associated with higher 
organisational performance. An absence of strategy and an incremental approach 
are associated with lower performance. Boyne and Meier (2009) noted a turbulent 
environment is likely to adversely affect public sector performance. As turbulence 
often causes organisations to respond by restructuring they tested the links between 
turbulence, structural stability and organisational performance using a sample of 
public sector organisations. They found turbulence has a negative effect on 
performance, which is worsened by internal structural change, suggesting in times 
of turbulence managers should aim for structural stability. Ebinger, Grohs and Reiter 
(2011) investigated the effects of decentralisation strategies on performance in 
European localities finding: 
 
Direct relations between decentralisation strategies and 
performance effects on certain dimensions are not 
warranted. To the contrary, it became apparent that some 
classic hypotheses concerning the effects of certain 
decentralisation strategies have to be questioned…. 
 




Walker, Brewer and Boyne et al (2011) considered market orientation and public 
sector performance in English local government in terms of three stakeholder 
groups: citizens, officials and the Audit Commission. They found market orientation 
works best for enhancing citizen satisfaction with local services but impacts on 
performance judgements of local managers and the Audit Commission are very 
weak. Andrews, Boyne and Walker (2011) found that administrative performance 
data reflect the views of regulators and government whilst survey data reflect the 
views of public managers, service users and citizens. However, as regards citizen 
satisfaction, Stipak (1979) suggested there is potential for misuse as a PI since 
responses to surveys may not reflect actual service performance.  
 
The literature considers performance management ought to be most effective when 
it is introduced as part of an overall strategy. Almost by implication such a strategy 
has top management support and is seen as important throughout the organisation. 
It might be expected the literature would demonstrate a strong association between 
strategy and performance management (i.e. appropriateness in context).  
 
Bititci, Carrie and McDevitt (1997) argue performance management is a closed loop 
system which deploys policy and strategy and produces feedback to manage the 
business but also feed policy and strategy, to ensure things are on track. De Haas 
and Kleingeld (1999) see performance management as enhancing strategic 
dialogue throughout organisations and the development of a ‘collective mind’ can 
provide steer and glue to keep the organisation on track and together.  
 
The literature contends culture is important for performance management and 
Williams (2002) suggests embodied values are important for strategic direction. Also 
culture appears to be a major determinant of the success of performance 
management. It is clear from the literature performance management and 
strategy/policy are linked but the relationship is complex.  
 
3.23 Human Resources 
Wright, Dunford and Snell (2001) suggest the HR function has consistently had to 
justify itself in many organisations, a thesis far from new. They consider the RBV 
and the strategic application of HR to deliver organisational performance: 
 
…comes from aligning skills, motives and so forth with 
organizational systems, structures and processes that 
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achieve capabilities at the organizational level. Too 
frequently, HR researchers have acted as if organizational 
performance derives solely from the (aggregated) actions 
of individuals. 
 
(Wright, Dunford and Snell, 2001, p. 710). 
 
De Sáa and Garcia-Falcón (2002) take a similar RBV approach suggesting a 
strategic model (Figure 3.10). They researched Spanish savings banks, subject to 
intense competition, putting an emphasis on the effective use of resources. The 
difference in the banks’ performances could be partially explained by HR policies 
impacting on managerial capabilities and the strategic development of HR. 
 
Figure 3.10: A strategic model of human resources (De Sáa and Garcia- 



















Arcand, Bayad and Fabi (2002) reviewing the literature suggested the link between 
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research into Canadian cooperatives finds some HR practices seem to confer 
competitive advantage. Researchers are active in this area, exploring the “black 
box” considering a variety of different HR practices, for example Branton, Sheehan 
and De Cieri et al (2011) and Arifin (2012). Chowhan (2013) looked specifically at 
training and found it to be positively associated with organisational performance. 
Storey (2002) also researched training (in medium-sized UK firms) and found a 
complex picture. Individual training and development practices had a weak 
association with organisational performance but collectively they were more 
strongly associated with organisational performance. The “black box” was also 
noted by Alagaraja (2013) after undertaking a literature review on the relationship 
between HR and organisational performance. It might be suggested HR practices 
of importance vary by a multitude of factors, perhaps mediated by culture.  
 
Rondeau and Wager (2001) reported growing evidence to suggest HR practices 
influencing firm performance may be synergistic and yet dependent on certain 
factors, such as workplace climate. Gelade and Ivery (2003) also investigated the 
relationships between HR, work climate and organisational performance and found 
significant correlations. The best explanation is the effects of HRM on performance 
are mediated by the workplace climate. Coldwell and Callaghan (2012) noted 
organisational citizen behaviour has generally been associated with organisational 
effectiveness. 
 
Gyan-Baffour (1999) looked at the effects of employee participation and work 
design on firm performance and suggested firms with higher levels of employee 
participation, a more flexible organisation structure and flexible work designs 
outperformed other firms. However, not all parts of these necessarily lead to higher 
performance, for example, ‘….the acquisition of skills and tools necessary for 
effective participation is very critical to employee participation.’ (Gyan-Baffour, 
1999, p. 10). Summers and Hyman (2005) reviewed the literature on employee 
participation and company performance and reported much of the literature found 
no association between participation and organisational performance but noted 
there are many forms of participation.  
 
Ghafoor and Qureshi (2013) found HPWS did not mediate between conflict 
resolution skills and organisational performance but did so between organisational 
commitment, relational coordination and organisational performance. Farndale, 
Hope-Hailey and Kelliher (2011) found for high performance HR practices not only 
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was trust important but organisational justice seemed to be even more so. Yang 
and Holzer (2006) considered the relationship between government performance 
and trust noting a positive relationship was not supported in some of the literature. 
They suggested much of this is down to the difficulty of defining and then 
measuring government performance. Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2003) noted 
trust in government may have a positive impact on perceptions of performance and 
as noted elsewhere perceived performance is not the same as actual performance. 
Simply introducing HR practices may be ineffective without an appropriate 
workplace climate. 
 
Kalleberg and Moody (1994) find a basket of related HR practices enhance 
organisational performance.  Hoppas and Worrall (2012), using data from firms in 
Cyprus, proposed HR improves organisational performance by strengthening 
human capital, employee attitudes and behaviour. Andrews (2010a) suggests that 
certain aspects of organisations’ social capital are positively associated with 
performance especially cognition and relations but structure is not. Further, 
Andrews states, ‘The balance of the available evidence tends to suggest that better 
performance and high levels of social capital may go hand in hand’ (Andrews, 
2012, p. 61), whilst noting that much more research is needed. In a later article 
Andrews and Brewer (2013) link social capital with management capacity finding 
social capital linked with higher performance that is enhanced by strong 
management capacity.  
 
Bartram, Stanton and Leggat et al (2007) using data from Australian healthcare 
organisations, found a “mismatch” of perceptions of the potential strategic use of 
HR between top managers and HR managers, with larger organisations having a 
larger mismatch. Nevertheless, they found some support for a positive relationship 
between HR and improved organisational performance. 
 
Sparrow and Cooper (2014) introduced the launch of a new journal dedicated to 
organisational effectiveness, basically the relationship of people and HR to 
organisational performance. They suggest HR should be combined with a range of 
disciplines all influencing organisational performance. Schuler and Jackson (2014) 
considered the history of research on organisational effectiveness and HR 
suggesting the difference now is the presence of multiple stakeholders. Kaše, 
Paauwe and Batistič (2014) offer a future review of the HR and performance 
relationship. They note the use of RBV, social exchange theory, human capital 
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theory and so on, with one of the current dominant approaches being HPWS. New 
domains may be e-HRM, talent management and positive psychology. However, 
many recent papers have been review studies and meta-analyses and reflections 
on practice. What does this tell us about the HR-organisational link? Perhaps, 
things are complex and we should not expect there is a single solution. Rather, 
there is a need to be multidisciplinary recognising organisational performance may 
be the result of many factors varying both spatially and temporally. 
 
This section has demonstrated the potential importance to improved organisational 
performance of a variety of HR factors. The contribution of such factors is not 
necessarily consistent across all organisations and seems to be highly context 
specific. It may be unless certain factors are present together the impact is 
negligible or none. Of course the reverse could be the case where certain HR 
factors (done badly) may negatively impact organisational performance. This 
appears not to have been considered much in the literature. 
 
3.24 Computer Software Systems 
Kaplan and Norton (2000b) suggested if you are having trouble with your strategy 
then you should map it. They use the analogy of an army in foreign territory needing 
detailed topographical maps to enable navigation. Without this the general would not 
be able to communicate a campaign strategy to soldiers. They then suggest this is 
exactly what is occurring in many organisations, there is no map showing the 
direction, even if the destination is known. 
 
Bititci, Nudurupati and Turner et al (2002) consider the design and implementation 
of a web-enabled PMF by means of an empirical case study. They note three 
independent research projects (Hudson, Bennett and Smart et al, 1999; Bititci, 
Nudurupati and Turner et al, 2002 and Bourne and Neely, 2000) identified one of the 
barriers to implementation of successful performance measurement systems as 
being they are time consuming to develop and maintain, as well as cumbersome. 
Research by Begemann and Bititci (1999) found the use of information technology 
makes performance data more accessible, visible and easier to maintain. However, 
Bititci, Nudurupati and Turner et al note: 
 
…there is little empirical research that supports the 
proposition that a fully integrated IT-supported 
performance measurement system would promote a more 
proactive and agile management style by providing 
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dynamic, accurate and readily accessible information to aid 
decision making.  
 
                       (Bititci, Nudurupati and Turner et al, 2002, p. 1276) 
 
They refer to several IT performance measurement systems from a paper by 
Coleman (1998), one of which is PerformancePlus. Darlington BC (and the other two 
case study authorities in 2005) used PerformancePlus and it was operational in all 
departments and the area’s LSP, (Goodchild, 2004a and 2004b). However, on the 
abolition of the national framework its use has been discontinued.  
 
Marr and Neely (2003) consider the automation of the BSC and how to select an 
appropriate IT software performance measurement package. They note automation 
is almost essential if a coherent system is to be implemented across the organisation 
and used by all employees to achieve, ‘goal congruence and strategic focus’ (Marr 
and Neely, 2003, p. 29). The need for a strategic approach has already been noted 
and is further reinforced by Marr who maintains: 
 
The good news is that software companies are producing 
packages to help you implement a Balanced Scorecard. 
The bad news is that there is still no substitute for the hard 
work of the initial strategic analysis.   
 
(Marr, 2001, p. 30) 
 
It seemed likely the use of performance measurement (indeed management) 
software would become more extensive as functionality and utility improved. 
However, proprietary software has been replaced by the use of Excel in a number 
of organisations, as the key driver of the national imperative has been removed. This 
research considers proprietary software. 
 
3.25 Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) 
In the UK the Conservative Party was elected in 1979 with an ideology to ‘roll back’ 
the frontiers of the state and introduce a private sector ethos into public 
management (for example Hood, 1991; Painter, 1999 and Pollitt, 2000).  
 
CCT was an important part of this agenda with respect to local government as 
noted by Smith (1988, p. 235) with two principal objectives. Firstly, to reduce 
council expenditures and of most interest for our purposes, secondly, to improve 
the efficiency of service delivery. Note the emphasis was on efficiency (doing 
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things well) and not effectiveness (doing the right things). Smith (1988, p. 236) 
noted the concept of competition may be somewhat problematic in the public 
sector, compared to the private sector, where objectives are multifarious, 
outcomes complicated and often contested by different stakeholders. The 
particular concern with outcomes was considered by Enticott and Entwistle (2007). 
  
Fenwick, Shaw and Foreman (1994) posed the question of whether CCT heralded 
NPM and noted its introduction required new skills of public managers and new 
ways of working. Additionally, some considered CCT had the potential to fragment 
a council. The limitations of government by contract were considered by Stewart 
who suggested, “Government cannot be reduced to a series of contracts” (Stewart, 
1993, p. 12), also Greenwood and Wilson (1994). 
         
Bartlett, Corrigan and Dibben et al (1999) describe the emergence of BV in two 
councils and concluded potentially it offered greater strategic choice but identified 
political and technical problems. Voluntary tendering though as part of ‘testing the 
market’ was to be an important part of BV as one of the four Cs: Challenge, 
Competition, Consultation and Comparison, although competition has been the 
least used (Grace, Fletcher and Martin et al, 2007, p. 18).  
 
3.26 Best Value (BV) 
Vincent-Jones (1999, pp. 273-274) notes BV retained the unequal power 
relationship between central and local government. Wilson (1999) considered the 
extent to which the experience of CCT informed the debate around the likely 
success of BV. Although CCT improved efficiency it may have done so due to 
inferior working conditions. Wilson found the experience of CCT and the prospect 
of BV may have encouraged in officers, ‘….a willingness to adopt a more 
commercial approach to financial management….that “new managerialism” is no 
longer rhetoric but the reality of local government officers’ employment in the 
1990s’. (Wilson, 1999, p. 49). 
 
Martin (1999) considered the capacity of councils to implement BV and finds 
fundamental improvements to local services depend on a strategic approach to 
capacity. Martin and Hartley (2000) summarised the capacity of local government 
to implement BV and note the role of markets and performance management. 
Martin and Davis (2001) contend BV is rooted in a rational model of strategic 
planning with an emphasis on performance management and inspection that 
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downgrades representative democracy. Davis and Martin (2002) suggested BV 
can deliver improvements but the difficulties of measuring the extent and level of 
service improvement with precision may be problematic and have implications for 
future development. CPA would take on that role and evolve over time to become 
more rigorous.  
 
Midwinter and McGarvey (1999) considered the development of BV in Scotland 
and suggest it was not a radical break from the past as competitive tendering was 
still heavily expected. However, as in Wales, the Scottish Office seemed keen to 
work in partnership with councils. Downe, Grace and Martin et al (2008) describe 
the BV Audits in Scotland which are seen as credible and unlike CPA in England 
recognised for considering local priorities and contexts.  
 
James and Field (1999) describe how one Welsh council tackled BV and the 
corporate approach. It included the development of a performance management 
strategy so objectives were achieved. However, they concluded the authority had 
not embraced competition and so competiveness was not assured. Grace, Fletcher 
and Martin et al (2007) in a report for the Audit Commission echoed that competition 
was not used much by councils and this was of concern given strategic 
commissioning had been given a high priority by government. Entwistle (2005) 
considered the reasons councils were reluctant to externalise services suggesting 
five (public service ethos, control, supply-side problems, good and big employer 
and core competence) but could not determine justifications. 
 
Freer (1998) considered the requirements for BV to be a success and noted it was 
a strategic approach but at the time it was an open question whether local variation 
would be allowed to flourish or central determination would be dominant. In 
retrospect this was perhaps a surprising (or diplomatic!) view from a serving local 
government officer. It can now be confirmed to have been a strongly driven central 
system….although this was evident to practitioners throughout the time. 
 
Boyne, Gould-Williams and Law et al (2000a) considered lessons from the BV 
pilots in Wales noting the picture was mixed with some councils seeming to do well 
and others less so. However, there was a significant issue with a lack of progress 
in some authorities that were tied up in bureaucracy and with an unreceptive 
culture. There was also a lack of political and managerial leadership. The final 
report on the evaluation of BV in Wales (Boyne, Gould-Williams and Law et al, 
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2000b) suggested implementation was slower and more difficult than originally 
anticipated.  
 
Keenan (2000) describes BV as a PMF and attempts to compare it with two 
approaches to budgeting: PPBS and ZBB. He concludes, while PPBS forced 
organisations to look at objectives it was unsuccessful because it was inflexible and 
resource intensive. ZBB ensured organisations looked closely at budgets and that 
they justify expenditure but it too was resource intensive. Kennan suggests BV is 
similar and if it wasn’t backed by legislation would meet the same fate. In a similar 
vein Boyne (2000) was concerned the costs of BV could outweigh the benefits. 
Boyne, Gould-Williams and Law et al (2002a) argue BV is a form of TQM and has 
synergy with other initiatives such as ISO9000, IIP and Charter Mark.  
 
Enticott, Walker and Boyne et al (2002), on a survey of English councils regarding 
BV, focused on implementation (processes), outcomes and performance. Key 
messages were implementing BV was a major challenge, a driver for change and 
performance improvement. Even though evidence on outcomes is mixed, PMFs 
improved and service reviews were producing ambitious improvement targets. 
Particular areas for concern were: application of the 4Cs (compare, challenge, 
consult and compete), with competition being especially problematic, the role of 
inspectors was criticised with the costs too high. The level of councillor involvement 
was generally low and the corporate centre led. There was little evidence of a link 
between a council’s approach to BV or ‘corporateness’ and its performance. They 
show how the ‘theory of change’ as applied to BV leads to performance improvement 
(Figure 3.11). Drivers of performance improvement were identified as central 
government policies by 78% of officers, the demands of users and citizens (75%), 
new technologies (66%) and pressure from external auditors and inspectors (64%). 
Andrews, Cowell and Downe (2008) found that councils promoting the 
understanding of citizenship in their area tend to be higher performing but those 
engaging citizens in governance have lower performance in deprived locales.  
 
Workforce surveys (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2004a and 2004b) 
reported that even though service departments thought they were performing well, 





Figure 3.11: Best Value and the ‘Theory of Change’ (Enticott, Walker and 












Entwistle, Dowson and Law (2003) reporting on evaluation of the BV regime 
caution firm conclusions about the link between organisational change and 
performance are difficult. Good quality BV reviews lead to change and poor 
reviews lead to less change. Inspection is noted as being a driver of change even 
where reviews have been poor. They also report leadership really matters whilst 
appropriate councillor involvement pays dividends.  
 
A baseline report on the long-term evaluation of the BV regime (Martin, Walker and 
Enticott et al, 2003; Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2003 and 2004c) noted 
PMFs appear to have improved in most authorities. Many officers and councillors 
felt this would lead to improved services, said to be reflected in BVPPs. 
 
Boyne, Martin and Walker (2004) developed a framework for public management 
improvement and applied it to BV. They note the implicit assumptions of policy 
makers that changes, due to the BV regime, will drive improvement. They found little 
evidence on the determinants of performance improvement or deterioration in the 
public sector. Also, although there is some private sector evidence it did not cover 
the dimensions of reform in the public sector (determined by policy makers) driving 
organisational improvement.  
 
There are therefore various approaches to performance management but those 
outlined above are similar in many respects. The literature emphasises the need for 























system takes time to have an impact on performance. The CPA in essence provided 
an inspection framework to assess the effectiveness of BV, whilst CAA moved this 
to an area-based assessment of multiple public services. 
 
3.27 Local Government Improvement Programme (LGIP) 
The LGIP programme (Improvement and Development Agency, 1999a and 1999b, 
Jones, 2005, p. 662) was voluntary and used a model of the ‘ideal’ council; in effect 
a benchmarking of effectiveness characteristics. An authority would be reviewed 
by a team established by the I&DeA, containing local government officers, 
councillors, representatives from other sectors and a consultant or academic. 
However, Jones (2004) notes there is no consensus on how to evaluate whether 
performance has improved quoting Boyne (1997) and Hartley, Rashman and 
Storbeck (2001) by way of corroboration.  
 
Authorities with a well-resourced strategic management capacity were able to 
respond more effectively to the LGIP specifically, and the improvement agenda 
generally. Jones (2005) concludes central government performance initiatives 
(imposed on councils) are deficient in a number of respects and the LGIP was best-
placed to improve performance given theories of change management. The Local 
Government Association (2009) highlighted the improvements made in English 
local government. 
 
The LGIP contained many elements key to an effective PMF and shows quite 
clearly the importance of context. Many authorities, for example Darlington 
Borough Council (Goodchild, Green and Newton et al, 1999 and Improvement and 
Development Agency, 2000) went through the LGIP. 
 
3.28 Beacon Scheme 
The Beacon Scheme was part of the UK Government’s modernisation agenda 
being established in 1999 (Department of Environment, Transport and the 
Regions, 1999) with the aim of rewarding and sharing good practice to improve 
services. The scheme was reviewed by Rashman, Downe and Hartley (2005) who 
concluded it was generally successful but learning could be better. Entwistle and 
Downe (2005) concurred suggesting its success was primarily due to its impact on 
aspiration and morale. Hartley and Downe (2007) discussed the proliferation of 
award schemes in the public sector and examined in detail the Beacon Scheme in 
England. They suggest Beacon met the criteria for an effective award scheme but 
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noted council size was one factor in a successful application, raising the question 
of capacity in smaller councils (see also Withers and Hartley, 2007). 
 
Wilford (2007) argued such awards are more about meeting award criteria than 
excellence so awards should not necessarily be seen as evidence of high 
performance. It may be organisations that win are already high performing and 
able to easily provide the data and evidence for successful assessment. The call 
is for research on unsuccessful organisations as this may highlight deficiencies 
that could hinder performance.  
 
3.29 Partnerships’ Working  
Public sector organisations were increasingly required to work in partnership with 
each other and other sectors, for example social care and Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs). Peck (2004) summarised governance, 
partnerships and performance and suggested these links are poorly supported by 
empirical evidence. Also, it was easier to realise the implications for democratic 
governance than performance in partnerships (Skelcher and Mathur, 2004). 
Huxham (2003) provides an overview of the theory of competitive advantage that is 
a consideration of the potential advantages of joint working. However, the other side 
of joint working is competitive inertia relating to the potential disappointing output in 
reality. Wildridge, Childs and Cawthra et al (2004) reviewed the literature on how to 
create successful partnerships. They conclude; ‘Successful partnership working is 
all about human interaction and requires a long and complex process….Partnerships 
can provide significant benefits….However, partnerships are not a panacea and are 
not appropriate in all contexts.’  (Wildridge, Childs and Cawthra et al, 2004, p. 4). 
McMurray (2007) noted the drive for partnership working to increase care standards 
in the NHS but suggested perpetual organisational reform undermines joint working.    
 
Although, Johnson and Osborne (2003) do not specifically address performance 
management in their discussion of governance in LSPs there is clearly an emphasis 
to deliver to a pre-determined (largely central government) agenda. Geddes, Davies 
and Fuller (2007) evaluated the success of LSPs using a theory of change approach 
and showed major variation in progress. LSPs that had not developed a PMF were 
unable to demonstrate performance improvement. Jacobs (2009) investigated the 
development of performance management in the City of Stoke-on-Trent LSP and 
noted it ‘was a rationalising and corporate approach to management’.  The Quality 




Jobin (2008) considered a transaction cost-based approach to evaluating 
partnership performance and noted the potential to open the ‘black box’ of 
partnerships. Skelcher and Sullivan (2008) reported a theory-driven approach to the 
analysis of partnership performance with five domains: democratic, integrative, 
transformative, policy and sustainability. This takes a wider approach than the 
consideration of a few performance metrics and is, ‘….more sympathetic to the 
subjective and contested nature of performance as a concept….Yet without a 
theoretical understanding, it is difficult to know what steps to take if performance is 
to be improved…’   (Skelcher and Sullivan, 2008, p. 768).  
 
Marchington, Cooke and Hebson (2003) researched the outsourcing of a London 
council’s housing benefit operations to the private sector. They describe a fraught 
contractual arrangement with a clash of ‘culture’ in a complex area of work, with the 
cost of managing the contract outweighing any efficiency gains. This experience is 
reinforced by Vangen and Huxham (2004) who note rhetoric about the benefits of 
partnership working are legion but so are the complaints and the difficulties.  
 
Sundaram and Kasabov (2012, p. 4) suggested for LSPs, ‘….their effectiveness for 
performance and agenda setting are significantly affected by the historical legacies 
of the key stakeholders….’  Kelman and Hong (2012) considered the use of ‘hard’ 
or ‘soft’ approaches, pressuring or nurturing as the means to improve performance 
in English and Welsh CDRPs. They find a mix of the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ approaches 
produces the best performance, what they have termed ‘tough love’. They view this 
as contrary to the literature which suggests the ‘soft’ approach produces superior 
results. Still on the topic of crime, Barton and Valero-Siva (2011) considered 
improving police performance through a partnership approach using Nottingham 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership as the case study.  They found effective 
partnership working can have a positive impact on reducing crime in local 
communities. Kelman, Hong and Turbitt (2013) considered managerial practices 
(such as trust, power sharing, information sharing) associated with outcomes in 
British CDRPs. They established certain practices have a positive impact but only if 
circumstances are favourable for collaboration. If circumstances are unfavourable 
then performance may be worse than without collaboration. Andrews and Entwistle 
(2010, 2014b) found that the type of partnership (public-public, public-private and so 




De Waal, Goedegebuure and Hinfelaar (2012) describe five high performance 
organisation factors: management quality, openness and action orientation, long-
term orientation, continuous improvement and renewal and the quality of employees. 
Looking at partnerships, factor analysis was used which resulted in five factors being 
retained: openness, mutual interest, equality, conflict management and closeness of 
the partners. Entwistle summarising some of the evidence for collaboration and 
public service improvement concludes that difficult issues and times make 
partnership working, ‘….an inevitable and desirable fact of contemporary public 
management.’ (Entwistle, 2014, p. 9). 
 
From the literature reviewed it is not possible to ascertain whether performance in 
partnerships is a special case, or simply a more complex variant. However, we might 
expect given the difficulties in a single organisation boundary effects would 
exacerbate these. The current research investigated stakeholders and partnership 
working. 
 
3.30 The Ethical Dimension 
Performance management is a process by which services can be actively managed 
and so has a direct impact on employees, citizens, customers and clients. For some 
public services there is effectively no choice as regards provider so does this impose 
particular obligations? Also under the influence of NPM services may not necessarily 
be delivered in an equitable manner (Chapman, 1998). In addition PMFs are often 
imposed either by higher-up management or externally, for example BV as regards 
local government and fire services, by the Home Office for police and the 
Department of Health for PCTs. The literature examines potential dilemmas and 
raises ethical issues. 
 
Winstanley and Stuart-Smith (1996) defined the ethical principles that should govern 
performance management including respect for the individual, mutual respect, 
procedural fairness and transparency. They do not suggest honesty and integrity as 
ethical principles but perhaps this is covered by ‘procedural fairness’. They conclude 
ethical issues in performance management can be addressed by bringing together 
group and individual concerns.  
 
Gregory (2003) supports Winstanley and Stuart-Smith, when it is suggested active 
stakeholder involvement in formulating a mission and determining management 
priorities can promote ethical performance management. Stanwick and Stanwick 
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(2003) considered the relationship between ethical reputation, chief executive officer 
pay and performance. This has relevance here in suggesting leadership (in 
performance management) can be a major determinant of ethical behaviour.  
 
There is debate in the literature over whether the rise of NPM and private sector 
practices within the public sector has increased the likelihood of unethical behaviour. 
Batty and Hilton (2003) discuss an example from Doncaster council where 
‘command and control leadership’ allowed corruption to flourish and the move to a 
more assertive style of collaboration. Performance management is often depicted as 
‘command and control’ especially if it is centrally driven. This puts a premium on 
leadership and having appropriate checks and balances in place as well as self-
confident people running PMFs. Lere and Gaumnitz (2003) suggest an important 
role of codes of ethics is to influence decision-making but suggest the little research 
done finds limited impact.  
 
Adserà (2003) considered the relationship between the quality of government and 
political accountability and suggests two factors are important. Firstly, free and 
regular elections and secondly, and of interest to this work, the amount of information 
to which the citizen has access. PMFs may have a role in promoting ethical 
behaviour by making performance information widely available. Andrews and Van 
de Walle (2013) noted that performance management was likely to positively 
influence citizens’ views of local public services. 
 
Moving to the specific case of performance measurement in the police service, 
Rogerson suggested the police were the last major institution in the UK to be subject 
to NPM. He concludes, ‘Performance measures have the potential to be a very 
useful servant, but they can easily become an unwelcome master.’ (Rogerson, 1995, 
p. 29). Collier (2001) raised the question as to whether a performance culture in the 
police may be in conflict with human rights legislation.  
 
This brief review of some of the literature on ethics and performance management 
suggests it is an underdeveloped area of research. This research includes ethical 
behaviour from the angle of the misrepresentation of financial and performance 






3.31 Other Considerations  
A variety of other considerations may be relevant when considering determinants of 
performance and the effectiveness of performance management. Some are noted 
in this section as ‘pointers’ but not reviewed further. For example, equity is often 
deemed to be a problem with performance management. However, Hood comments 
supporters of NPM suggest ‘…efficiency can be conceived in ways that do not 
fundamentally conflict with equity…’ and values of equity can be built into 
performance management given political will (Hood, 1991, p. 10). Simmons (2003) 
demonstrates the need for stakeholder involvement to protect equity.  
 
Many researchers have considered what causes variations in organisational 
performance, a number of examples illustrate the range. Hayes and Clark (1986) 
asked why some manufacturing factories are more productive than others. They 
found many of the measurement systems were defective and, ‘….the metrics they 
used made their task like that of watching a distant activity through a thick, fogged 
window.’ (Hayes and Clark, 1986, p. 67). They found capital investment crucial to 
maintaining performance and indeed generating growth. Reducing waste and cutting 
work-in-process were important. Expensive computerisation was often an issue, 
since old inefficient systems were simply computerised with no changes. Taking this 
further, Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989) considered the relative importance of 
economic (mainly external market) and organisational (behavioural and sociological) 
factors as determinants of performance. They found both sets of factors significant 
and the two effects roughly independent, although organisational factors explained 
twice as much variance in profit rates as economic factors.  
 
Tvorik and McGivern (1997) undertook an extensive literature review and identified 
five key determinants of performance: organisational alignment and culture, 
organisational capabilities and learning, industry structure and strategic group, 
organisational resources and leadership and vision. They suggest, ’….the firm is a 
repository of skills and capabilities exhibiting aligned resources and leadership styles 
that mobilise the firm through the creation of a shared vision.’ (Tvorik and McGivern, 
1997, p. 428).   
 
Carmeli (2001) considered whether high and low performance Israeli firms have 
different profiles. Table 3.11 shows simplified results for intangible resources. High 
performance firms have a distinct profile of valuable, rare, difficult to imitate and non-
substitutable intangible resources. They emphasise organisational strategy, 
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managerial competence, know-how, ability to manage change and human capital. 
Low performance firms emphasise know-how (along with high performance firms but 
they then deviate), product/service reputation, business development, intellectual 
property and the ability to raise funds. The high performance firms appear to 
demonstrate a distinctly strategic approach whereas low performance firms more of 
a marketing approach. Yet, Gray, Matear and Matheson (2002) note growing 
evidence of links between market orientation and performance. In their study they 
compare manufacturing with service firms and find service firms tend to have a 
greater level of marketing which is associated with higher performance. This implies 
sector differences may be of some importance.  
 
Table 3.11: Intangible resources in high and low performance firms (tabulated 
from Carmeli, 2001, pp. 666-668) 
Intangible Resources Performance Rank of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
Most valuable  High performance A B C D E 
Low performance F G H C I 
Rarest High performance C B D G A 
Low performance H C G J K 
Most difficult to imitate High performance D B C G L 
Low performance H C J K I 
Most non-substitutable High performance D B G A C 
Low performance C H J K l 
Codes (Number of High performance, Number of Low performance) 
A – Organisational strategy (3,0) 
B – Managerial competence (4,0) 
C – Know-how (4,4) 
D – Ability to manage change (4,0) 
E – Organisational culture (1,0) 
F – Marketing and selling (0,1) 
G – Human capital (3,2) 
H – Product/service reputation (0,4) 
I – Business development (0,3) 
J – Intellectual property (0,3) 
K – Ability to raise funds (0,3) 
L – Research and development (1,0) 
 
 
Osborne and Cowen (2002) took a similar approach suggesting high performing 
companies have a distinctive profile, in particular of corporate culture, people and 
management systems. Galbreath (2005) addressed the question using RBV 
suggesting a firm’s success is largely due to resources possessing certain special 
characteristics. The results suggested intangible resources contribute more to 
performance than tangible resources. López (2003 and 2006) considered intangible 
resources as drivers of performance in Spanish firms. Through a PCA certain 
intangible resources, including firm reputation, human capital and organisational 
culture were positively associated with performance. Douglas, Jenkins and Kennedy 
(2012) found in an English council, managers felt intangible assets were essential 
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for high performance. Reputation and partnership were also important, although 
leadership was deemed necessary to bring ‘everything’ together.   
 
Simpson (2006) looked at productivity in public services (see HM Treasury, 2002) 
and in common with many others noted the difficulties, especially because the output 
of public services is often unpriced and services consumed collectively. Public 
services may have other objectives that over-ride a concern for productivity.  
 
Goldeng, Grünfeld and Benito (2008) investigated the performance differential 
between competing private and state owned enterprises in Norway. They found 
private owned enterprises had a higher level of performance as measured by return 
on assets and cost but these are particular measures of performance. In addition 
differences in the two ownership modes may explain (some of) the variation, such 
as the level of incentives, possibly related to risk-taking and state-owned firms 
having some different (non-economic) objectives. 
 
The Audit Commission (2002a) published a report to demonstrate improvement in 
the public sector. They identified reasons why managing performance is difficult: 
leaders aren’t interested, no time to learn, too many priorities, no understanding of 
what needs to change, system problems and some people don’t perform. They then 
illustrate what are described as eight ‘breakthroughs to improved performance’ 
addressing some of the issues as to why performance is difficult. These included 
demonstrating the importance of performance, act on what matters most, develop 
staff commitment and measure what matters. This covers such as leadership, 
appropriate systems development and use, and prioritisation. Balaguer-Coll, Prior 
and Tortosa-Ausina (2004) considered the performance of local governments in 
Spain finding many inefficiencies were due to the allocation of resources. However, 
they note such inefficiencies were not always due to poor management, rather fiscal 
and policy issues both internal and external played a role. 
 
The word ‘Political’ has been used numerous times throughout this review and this 
reflects the important role politicians play in the characteristics of public services 
PMFs. Chang and Ku (2009), referring to the NHS star rating system, argue the use 
of performance management cannot be separated from the political context, 
suggesting the formulation of the mechanism to produce star ratings reflected the 
political objectives of the Blair government. The performance measures send 
messages of coercion as well as trying to influence public opinion. Aucoin (2012) 
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discussed the possible performance issues where civil services were (in danger of) 
becoming increasingly politicised under new political governance and concluded 
clarity of roles and independence were essential. Fenwick and Miller (2012) 
considered the reform of local government and the relationship to organisational 
performance. They found abolishing the committee system and its replacement with 
an executive system did not improve performance.  
 
3.32 Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) 
In December 2002 the Audit Commission (2002b) published a report highlighting 
early lessons from CPA. The CPA framework as implemented is shown in Figure 
3.12.   
 
Figure 3.12: The CPA framework - CPA brings together a range of evidence 
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The report described the characteristics of a ‘typical’ council in CPA categories 
(Table 3.12). Authorities categorised as poor need external assistance to improve 
whilst authorities categorised as weak have some capacity and capability to 
improve. 
 
Table 3.12: Characteristics of the typical council in CPA 2002 (tabulated from 
the Audit Commission, 2002b, pp. 8-9) 
Characteristic CPA Rating 









Yes Partly No No No 










Strong Strong Good Poor Inadequate 
Ability to 
improve 
Yes Yes Limited No Needs 
external 
support 
Prioritisation Clear Mostly Partly Unclear None 
Local needs 
addressed 
Yes Partly No No No 
Management of 
finances 









Partly Poor No 
 
The Improvement and Development Agency (2003) commissioned a survey of 
council employees to assess the impact of employee motivation on organisational 
performance. They found a relationship between employee responses and CPA 
Rating for certain characteristics. They found no significant difference between 
employees working in authorities rated excellent and those rated poor for: ability to 
do interesting work and feelings of accomplishment,  access to training, acceptable 
workload and job security There were differences in the following characteristics: 
ability to have an input into planning work, opportunities to show initiative, managers 
willingness to listen to ideas, the council keeps them well informed and the reasons 




Whilst the 2003 survey was of top-tier councils only, shire district councils were 
surveyed later (Improvement and Development Agency, 2005). There was no 
significant difference for the following characteristics: ability to do interesting work 
and feelings of accomplishment, (un)satisfactory basic pay/benefits package, 
available departmental resources and attitudes to change. Again, there were 
differences between authorities rated excellent or good compared to others for: 
greater input into decision making, more freedom in undertaking work, feeling 
valued, the council keeps them well informed, a greater understanding of corporate 
issues and their contribution and greater confidence in senior managers. 
 
Boyne and Enticott (2004) assessed whether councils placed in the five CPA 
categories exhibit differences in their internal characteristics. Using a large scale 
survey of council officers they conclude:  
 
Our statistical results suggest that the internal 
characteristics of the five CPA groups are mostly the same. 
Only around a quarter of the tests indicate significant 
differences in their organizational attributes. The clearest 
differences were in the areas of performance management 
and clarity of organizational priorities….measures of 
organizational characteristics suggest that there are not 
five CPA groups but two: one which scores highly on 
‘management and priorities’ (the excellent and the good), 
and one with lower scores on these variables (the fair, 
weak and poor).  
 
(Boyne and Enticott, 2004, pp. 17-18) 
 
They conclude, ‘….organizational attributes of councils are weak predictors of CPA 
outcomes. The view that different councils ended up in different CPA grades 
because of their internal characteristics is therefore highly questionable.’ (Boyne and 
Enticott, 2004, p. 18). They note their results are similar to those found for ratings in 
health (Smith, 2002) and by Cutler and Waine (2003) for social services. 
 
The Audit Commission (2002c, p. 3) stated the CPA framework had taken account 
of local factors like deprivation. However, councils and academics questioned 
whether this was the case. Andrews (2004) used regression analysis to consider the 
relationship between deprivation and PIs. Well over half of the PIs had a significant 
(p<0.05) influence on performance. The negative impact of deprivation on children’s 
education had been well rehearsed in the past and the negative impact on benefits 
and revenue is no surprise. Thus authorities in deprived areas are likely to find it 
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more difficult to improve key services, ‘If CPA ignores the impact of external 
constraints some councils may be falsely labelled as “underperforming”. This could 
have particularly detrimental effects on the prospects for improvement among those 
authorities requiring the greatest support and encouragement.’ (Andrews, 2004, p. 
24). 
 
The Audit Commission commissioned a review of CPA and its relationship to 
deprivation (Palmer and Kenway, 2004). Authorities with a higher level of deprivation 
tended to have a lower CPA score. There was however no significant relationship 
with the corporate assessment result. The strongest relationship was with education 
PIs but not with inspection judgements. There were three community considerations 
discussed: fractionalisation, turnover and the capacities and capabilities of people in 
the community. They conclude there is no easy solution although well-informed 
inspections may be key.   
 
Andrews, Boyne and Law et al (2005) considered the external constraints on council 
performance further. They found ten constraint variables explained 35% of inter-
authority differences in core service performance with ethnic and social class 
diversity, lone parent households, population change, population and discretionary 
resources being important. Andrews, Boyne and Meier et al (2009) also found that 
migration from the European Union (EU) A8 countries was associated with lower 
local authority (LA) performance, reflecting a more difficult local environment. 
 
Haubrich and McLean (2006a) and McLean, Haubrich and Gutiérrez-Romero 
(2007) looked at CPA results between 2002 and 2004 and tested the extent to which 
the process was invulnerable to categorisation errors, gaming, consistency with 
other government policies and how it deals with uncontrollable factors. Their analysis 
found CPA failed all four tests.  
 
Game (2006) noted the majority of councils rated good or excellent and as councils 
improved the need to raise the bar, and where does it stop?  Further, as we have 
seen, it has been argued external constraints appear to have been inadequately 
considered in CPA. Game (2006, pp. 474-475) also noted the weak link between 
CPA results and citizen satisfaction but the stronger link between increases in 




The Audit Commission published annual reports on CPA showing overall progress 
(e.g. Audit Commission, 2008a and 2009b); with the latter also describing the move 
to CAA. In 2009 the Audit Commission (2009c) published a report highlighting the 
impact of CPA from 2002 to 2008. They noted the decline in public satisfaction 
contrasting with improvements in performance as measured by CPA. Grubnic and 
Woods (2009) considered the extent of bureaucratic or hierarchical control in BV and 
CPA concluding the latter was the case, ensuring closer alignment to government 
priorities, a view supported by Entwistle and Enticott (2007).  Entwistle, Downe and 
Guarneros-Meza et al (2014) considered governance in central-local relations with 
respect to hierarchy and networks finding mixed results for the impact of the power 
of the centre.  Although, experience suggests organisational performance was 
directed and LAAs powerfully reinforced this. Sullivan and Gillanders (2007) 
provided a critical review of the introduction of the central-local agreement to improve 
performance that became the LAA framework and review (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2007a and 2008). 
 
Yet, despite all the uncertainties and doubts, contrary to the expectations of many, 
if not most, academics it was found CPA did drive up council performance: 
 
To the casual reader or the practitioner in central and local 
government the success of a management reform might 
seem unremarkable. But when put against the large 
international academic literature that suggests that in 
general performance management systems do not work, 
CPA is paradoxical….Whilst the literature asserts that 
performance management systems do not work the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment did work. Our 
argument goes beyond the established argument that 
performance management systems run down over time, 
and lose their capacity to discriminate between successful 
and failing organizations (Meyer and Gupta 1994). Rather, 
we argue that the CPA made a substantive difference to 
the performance of local authorities, especially to those at 
the bottom end of the league table. 
 
(Boyne, James and John et al, 2010, pp. 224-225) 
 
The Audit Commission (2007a) set out the principles for developing CAA to replace 
CPA from 2009 onwards. The key change being an area assessment and 
organisational assessments of key public service providers: councils, fire services, 




3.33 Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) 
The Audit Commission (2010) produced a report summarising the results from the 
first year of CAA. It highlighted the innovative way local public services were tackling 
difficult problems but despite this reported patchy performance with some areas 
struggling to improve. Problems of unemployment, crime and homelessness were 
proving especially difficult. 
 
Because CAA only lasted one year there is little academic literature. An evaluation 
of the first year was led by Shared Intelligence (2010) with Cardiff University and 
Ipsos MORI. They found wide support for the principles of CAA with a focus on 
outcomes, a reduced burden of more focused inspection whilst giving more 
emphasis to local contexts and priorities and with a focus on risk rather than past 
performance. The emphasis on local partnership working was also welcomed. 
Although CAA did not tend to reveal any new strengths and weaknesses, ‘….many 
assessed bodies believed that CAA would lead to improvements in their own 
organisation, in local services and in local outcomes.’ (Shared Intelligence, 2010, p. 
49). It is perhaps unsurprising there was little emphasis on performance given the 
newness of the process.  
 
The new government swept away CAA as soon as it came to power in May 2010, to 
be replaced by a much reduced regime which for councils was to be sector-led. 
Police would continue to be scrutinised by HMIC while PCTs were to be abolished. 
Research is starting to consider the new arrangements, for example Downe and 
Martin (2012) and Martin, Downe and Grace et al (2013).   
 
3.34 Performance Management - Does it Deliver? 
Is all the effort devoted to performance management worth it and if so how can 
success be guaranteed? What are the relevant prerequisites or criteria and how (and 
when) do we know if they are working and what are the timescales? Behn (2003) 
pointed out measurement of performance is not an end in itself. There needs to be 
a motivation to use the data to make change happen or to confirm actions to deliver 
goals. Holloway (2001) noted the lack of empirical evidence performance 
measurement in itself impacts positively on performance. She notes much of the 
literature is descriptive and prescriptive with a plethora of tools and techniques 
although, with a lack of theoretical underpinning. Grace and Martin (2008) assessed 
the prospects for ongoing improvement in local government. They suggested whilst 
good improvement had been made significant challenges remain, requiring 
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transformational change. The move from CPA to CAA they pose would not be 
sufficient; it would require innovation and greater joint working. A less top-down 
national performance framework would require councils to think for themselves, ‘The 
spectre of responsibility without power may be about to raise its head to a much 
greater degree than before.’ (Grace and Martin, 2008, p. 5) 
 
The literature attempts to evaluate the success of performance management. It is 
clear many factors need to be considered and as shown performance management 
consists of techniques that can be applied within (not to is perhaps part of the 
problem) an organisation. A further complication is how success is measured and 
over what timescale, can be critical for many of the ‘wicked issues’ public services 
deal with. 
 
McAdam and Saulters (2000) investigated the use of quality management 
frameworks in the public sector to gauge their effectiveness. From a postal survey 
respondents ranked the frameworks (top to bottom): IIP, Charter Mark, EFQM EM, 
ISO9000, benchmarking and the BSC. The majority of initiatives do not achieve all 
the expected benefits but a relationship exists between the time the initiative has 
been in use and benefits. 
 
McKevitt and Lawton (1996, p. 49) suggested, from a wide range of public sector 
organisations, the introduction of PMFs using a top-down implementation approach 
has, ‘…led to middle manager disenchantment and does not meet user needs’. In a 
later paper Lawton, McKevitt and Millar (2000) suggested there was also a lack of 
customer focus. The current research has evaluated both of these criteria the latter 
from the point of view of involvement.  Yet, there appears the need for a strategic 
approach providing direction to performance management. 
 
Chapter 11 in Armstrong and Baron (1998, pp. 204-213) summarised the impact of 
performance management. They note research shows performance management 
has a positive impact in raising awareness of the pressures on the organisation to 
perform. They quote McDonald and Smith (1995) who established a connection 
between performance management and measures of organisational performance, 
such as higher profits, better cash flow, higher sales per employee and lower growth 
in employee numbers. Armstrong and Baron are however not so sure, stating: 
 
…it is a matter of speculation whether the most effective 
companies were those created by performance 
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management or whether the most effective companies 
were the ones most likely to introduce performance 
management.  
 
                      (Armstrong and Baron, 1998, p. 205) 
 
A key finding from McDonald and Smith (1995) was in successful companies 
managing employees seems to be a ‘mainstream business issue’. Perhaps 
surprisingly, Armstrong and Baron suggest the belief performance management will 
increase organisational effectiveness is to an extent an ‘act of faith’ certain actions 
will produce certain results. They then note research by Latham and Locke (1979) 
that motivating people is likely to have a positive impact (goal and expectancy 
theories). Clearly, one of central tenets of performance management is the setting 
of goals (aims, targets) at several levels in the organisation and placing employees’ 
contribution in a framework may give them something to aim at. Perhaps key issues 
are involvement in setting targets and a realistic prospect of achievement. The 
contention motivation (and morale) may be associated with organisational 
performance is tested in this research. Verbeeten (2008) studying Dutch public 
sector organisations found the definition of clear and measurable goals positively 
associated with quantity and quality performance. The use of incentives was 
positively related to quantity but not quality while institutional factors were important.   
 
Jackson (1993) is surely correct when he writes in a democracy evaluation of 
government performance is essential and accountability necessary at all levels. He 
suggests: 
 
Performance evaluation in public service organisations is 
fraught with theoretical, methodological and practical 
problems, which run deep in any democracy.   
 
(Jackson, 1993, p. 9) 
 
Key questions are therefore what are the origins of the evaluation criteria, who sets 
them and whose interests does the process serve? There is a clear implication 
alluded to previously that the process is political and far from value free. It is further 
noted the dominant ideology (NPM), with an emphasis on efficiency and markets, 




Likierman (1993) suggests some lessons for PI managerial use based on research 
conducted with a sample of 500 managers from the public sector, broken down into 
four areas: concept, preparation, implementation and use. From our perspective of 
particular importance in concept is politics and accountability so any evaluation of 
success is contextual. Preparation is about involvement of interested parties and 
avoiding a short-term focus whilst the key implementation lesson would seem to be 
a recognition ‘things change’. As regards ‘use’ a key is interpretation and feedback 
may make the system relevant. He also notes the different interpretations and 
concerns of academics (implications and consequences) and practitioners (technical 
issues and cost of implementation). Twenty years later these messages appear just 
as relevant. 
 
Ezzamel and Watson (1993) considered the relationship between structure and firm 
performance. They suggest control structures have a direct impact on firm 
performance but the main impact is indirect. This supports the view a PMF will impact 
on performance but it is complex and context is important.  
 
Similarly, Pollitt (2009) looked at structural change, not just internal to organisations 
but changes to boundaries and the creation of new organisations, and public service 
performance. Unfortunately, systematic evaluations have been rare and so evidence 
is therefore somewhat lacking. Pollitt (2009, pp. 289-290) makes four key reflections: 
the lack of hard scientific evidence, the UK may be vulnerable to structural change 
given the lack of control on government, the scale of structural change may be 
important with perhaps smaller scale being easier (and easier to evaluate). Fourthly, 
it is unrealistic to expect neither precise, operational lessons nor a big idea that can 
be transported across all organisations. Hence, it is unlikely there will be a simple 
relationship between structural change and performance. Entwistle (2011) 
considered the theories around structural change and the possible impact on 
performance suggesting understanding requires acknowledging the intermingling of 
these. 
 
Although formal corporate planning in the public services declined from the 1980s it 
is argued there is still a strategic perspective. Indeed during the mid to late 1990s 
and onward corporate planning became more of a mainstream activity (even if not 
called that); practised by top management teams rather than a separate unit. It is 
thus more integrated and perhaps its real manifestation is in performance 
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management. The research tests this hypothesis in particular by looking at strategic 
direction and the use of evidence-based policy.  
 
In the UK there was increasing concern regarding a lack of vfm criteria in assessing 
performance with Boyne, Gould-Williams and Law et al (2001) noting this as a 
potential outcome of BV. It is no surprise therefore CPA 2005 included use of 
resources, with a vfm component (Audit Commission, 2005).  
 
Entrepreneurship and innovation are characteristics NPM suggests the public sector 
should take from private sector practice. Hence performance management should 
be able to capture the extent and contribution of innovation to performance. Ennew, 
Whynes and Jolleys et al (1998) report a particular example within the NHS requiring 
the management of performance against budgets for such as the dispensing of 
drugs. They conclude the impact of fund-holding was patchy with some doctors 
ideologically opposed, who could offer considerable resistance. Grice, Wilson and 
Foster et al (1998) reported a more positive picture from North West England where 
some emphasis was placed on encouraging fund-holding practices in business 
planning. 
 
The potential importance of culture has been noted. Loveday (1999) considered the 
introduction of performance management (affecting culture) on criminal justice 
agencies in England and Wales concluding performance management had been 
inconsistent, not delivering on its promise. It was the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) that ultimately struggled despite top management support for performance 
management whilst the police, whose leaders were less convinced, perhaps played 
the game rather better.  
 
Andrews, Boyne and Law et al (2003) did a comparison of council performance in 
England and Wales. They found, despite the views of the UK government and the 
Audit Commission that Welsh performance was worse, performance levels and rates 
of improvement were similar in English and Welsh councils. They suggest the 
‘London’ judgement is due to the fact Welsh authorities did not conform to a specific 
managerial model. They conclude, ‘….that local councils and other public sector 
agencies, need to be judged on their service achievements, not on their adoption of 
the latest management fads promulgated by central policy makers.’  (Andrews, 




In a later study Haubrich and McLean (2006b) compared the local government 
assessment regimes in England, Scotland and Wales. They noted only England had 
CPA and the Scottish and Welsh approaches were less prescriptive. Their analysis 
suggests no relation between self-assessment and improvement in performance 
scores and it appears that councils, in England, which did improve were not those 
expected to do so from previous CPA rounds. This implies that what drives 
improvement was not adequately captured by the assessment process. Downe, 
Grace and Martin et al (2007) undertook a similar piece of research highlighting 
similarities between CPA in England, BV Audit in Scotland and the Wales 
Programme for Improvement. These included their initial statutory basis, the use of 
audit and inspection and a theory of change stating performance improvement 
needs leadership and widespread performance management.  
 
Hodgson, Farrell and Connolly (2007) reviewed the literature on improvement in the 
UK public sector and classified it into seven categories (number of papers in 
brackets): competition (2), leadership/management (11), strategic change (22), 
participation (5), quality (6), resources (4) and organisation size (5). However, it is 
noted the categories are not watertight and in some cases leakage is considerable. 
Drawing conclusions is difficult: firstly, the studies show a diversity of approaches 
and services included. Secondly, it may not be possible to identify what triggered the 
improvement and isolate it from other triggers. Thirdly, the studies are mainly 
snapshots in time and perhaps high performance doesn’t endure. Fourthly, 
improvement in an organisation may not be universal and declines in other parts 
may not be captured. Fifthly, many of the studies concern improvement in processes 
which does not necessarily translate to services. It is concluded evidence on 
improvement is limited. Sole (2009) considered the factors driving performance 












Figure 3.13: Summary of main factors influencing the successful 
implementation of a performance management system (Sole, 2009, p. 9) 
 
 
De Waal, Goedegebuure and Geradts (2011) considered the impact of performance 
management on the results of a non-profit organisation in the Netherlands, finding it 
was not always positive. Boyne, Gould-Williams and Law et al (1999) reported on 
progress and prospects for BV in Welsh local government. They noted a distinctive 
nature due to the involvement of the Welsh Office with the Welsh Local Government 
Association and progress had been faster in England. Further, Boyne, Gould- 
Williams and Law et al (2001) looked at the impact of BV on the Welsh pilot 
authorities. An early key finding was perceptions of the impact of BV were 
significantly more positive in those authorities adopting a corporate approach. 
 
McAdam and O’Neill (2002) used building control services to evaluate BV using 
benchmarking, a technique promoted by government. The data revealed a wide 
variation in performance and suggested a need to reduce costs and increase the 
quality of the service. The researchers were critical of performance management in 
some authorities for providing poor quality data or no data at all. Learning was not 
taking place and therefore performance management was relatively ineffective 
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because of this, coupled with a lack of leadership and commitment. Assessing 
organisational learning is an element of this research.  
 
Boyne, Gould-Williams and Law et al (2002b) considered the accountability of 
authorities through the reporting of performance data in the BVPP. This had 
previously been undertaken for Welsh plans by Boyne, Gould-Williams and Law et 
al (1998) who noted there were data omissions and little performance comparison 
in the plans but nevertheless, substantial progress had been made on BV. 
Accountability not just to the public but a variety of stakeholders is an important 
criterion that would be expected, perhaps partly, to determine the effectiveness of 
performance management. Does it deliver what stakeholders need to make a 
judgement on the performance of services? Boyne, Gould-Williams and Law et al 
(1998) felt there was some way to go before this is the case. This research evaluates 
BVPPs against a set of pre-determined criteria (Chapter seven). 
 
Higgins, James and Roper (2004) considered the extent to which BV resulted in 
service improvements. They note BV has been described as an idealised form of 
TQM, tailored for local government suggesting there is some truth in this but the 
practice of BV cannot be assumed to improve services simply because it is a form 
of TQM. In addition due to the government’s emphasis on BV, the skewing of BV 
towards certain services and the use of PIs, resources were being directed towards 
certain services and away from others. They suggested CPA covering all services 
may counteract this and also reduce the ability of authorities’ to play games. Further, 
unlike a proper TQM approach council employees have not benefited from BV and 
so continuous service improvement, even if occurring consistently at the present, 
may not be sustainable. 
 
3.35 Conclusions 
This review has identified there is an extensive and varied literature on performance 
management and the factors associated with organisational performance. The 
difficulty of the concept, given the complexity of organisations and settings, has 
perhaps generated more ‘heat than light’. Research is mainly quantitative 
considering various factors but in many cases the number included is relatively 
small. Given many of the factors are likely to be related there would seem to be merit 
in considering them together. Context almost seems to exert a controlling influence 
which limits the transferability of findings. Little of the research is longitudinal which 
limits the ability to attribute causality. There would appear to be a lack of any 
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framework to classify, collect and analyse these. Even a checklist would be useful 
and the questionnaire developed for this research perhaps provides such an 
embryonic list. 
 
On a practical level, research tends not to identify actions organisations need to take 
to improve their performance and therefore a method to facilitate this (Goodchild, 
2006). The present research does this due to the large number of criteria considered 
providing a template for consideration that can lead to directed action. The next 
chapter explains the methodology employed to deliver this. 
 
Appendix 3.1 provides a summary of the literature with respect to the derivation and 
relevance of the statements used in the survey questionnaire. The statements 
(factors possibly associated with organisational performance) were developed at the 
commencement of the research and the relevant literature has been added 
throughout the period of the research. The literature noted is indicative of a large 
volume that investigates organisational performance. 
 
The research has identified those criteria that appear to contribute to organisational 
performance, in particular supporting the literature on the importance of strategy and 
human resources. However, the literature appears to be less forthcoming on the 
contribution of performance management. This research has identified performance 
management, in an organisation, as an important factor in delivering that 
organisation’s performance. This is especially the case for public service 
organisations where the measure(s) of success is, perhaps, open to greater 
interpretation than for private sector firms.  
 
The groups into which the statements are placed were likewise decided at the 
beginning of the research. The literature suggests that these broad headings are the 
factors associated with organisational performance although, it is recognised that 
many of the statements are able to fit into more than one category. The placement 
of strategy, policy, finance and HRM as a single group reflect the literature which 
suggests that these are all best considered in a strategic manner. Performance 
management was placed on its own to differentiate many of the operational 
elements, although, clearly, it has an important strategic component.  The use of a 
range of approaches and techniques, such as the BSC, TQM and MBO are included 
within the performance management group, although there are overlaps with other 
groups especially strategy/policy/finance/HRM. Administration concerns the basic 
126 
 
operations of the organisation, in particular the degree of centralisation (so related 
to structure) and the unity of operations, perhaps heavily influenced by leadership, 
the next group. In these public service organisations the political influence is 
important and therefore the level of political as well a managerial leadership is 
investigated.  
 
The literature suggests that resources (of various kinds) are associated with 
organisational performance. A difficulty, though, is that resources cover a wide 
variety of potential organisational activities with an important link to the management 
of the human resources, as demonstrated by the literature. Questions arise not only 
about the absolute (or relative, for example, as in benchmarking) level of resources 
but also regarding how effectively they are deployed. The literature considers 
stakeholders and partnership working as important for public service organisations 
with, potentially, important consequences for outcomes, especially for the so called 
‘wicked issues’ such as health and crime. Thus a leisure service could have a greater 
impact on a person’s health than a doctor, so health services do actually provide 
access to leisure facilities. 
 
The literature discusses the concept that organisations having a relationship with 
users of their services can result in improved services because the organisation 
better understands needs. Communication is therefore important and a number of 
statements tested this including the relationship with the media that may be closely 
linked with reputation. Associated with communication is the reporting of 
organisational performance, both internally and externally. Reporting is used by 
managers to direct effort to improve performance to meet targets, by political 
representatives to ensure overall aims are being achieved and to hold managers to 
account and by other stakeholders to ensure the organisation is accountable. Finally, 
the literature notes the culture of the organisation as being an important element of 
organisational performance, with some cultures being more effective, that may vary 
with circumstances including the external environment. 
 
Table 3.13 uses these groups and compares them with the categories used in the 
meta-review work of Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle (2010) reported at the 
beginning of this literature review section. Also indicated in the final column are the 
summary factors identified as a result of this research. 
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Table 3.13: Comparison of the groups used in the survey questionnaire with 
those categories noted in Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle (2010) and the 
summary factors identified in this research linked to organisational 
performance  
Groups into which the 
statements in the survey 
questionnaire were included 
From Ashworth, Boyne 
and Entwistle (2010) (In 
italics may be linked to 
performance) 
This research 














Strategy/Policy/Finance/HRM Human resources 
management 
Human resources 
Organisational Culture Culture Culture 








Organisation environment Physical 
infrastructure 
Stakeholders and Partnerships Organisation environment Reputation 
Leadership Leadership Leadership 
  Risk 
 
It will be evident that the similarities outweigh the differences, although both the 
meta-review and this research differentiate strategy from human resources. Finance 
is not represented on its own perhaps reflecting the fact that it is means of exchange 
for other activities, especially the human resource, whilst Policy is subsumed within 
Strategic planning and Strategy.
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4. Methodology                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
4.1 Introduction 
Streib, Slotkin and Rivera (2001) summarised the literature regarding public 
administration research with much identified as being of limited practical relevance. 
Part of the reason is the potential area for research is very broad and multi-
disciplinary. They suggest links between practitioners and academics need to be 
strengthened. Pollitt (2006) addressed the provision of academic advice to 
practitioners and suggests it needs to be more systematic. Earlier, Tranfield 
questioned the relevance of much management research, ‘….there was a strong 
view that much management research was unreliable for use by both the academic 
community and particularly practising managers in providing a basis for justifying 
their decision-making and actions.’  (Tranfield, 2002, p. 378).  
 
This research is designed to provide a coherent view of the factors important in 
determining organisational performance, whilst recognising the inherent 
complexities. It is designed to be practical in identifying where organisations can 
direct effort to improve performance not forgetting the practical realities of success 
in the local public sector. For example, Percy-Smith, Burden and Darlow et al (2002) 
have noted the non-statutory nature and low priority of research in local government. 
 
The research is largely quantitative backed up by case studies, interviews and a 
content analysis of a key corporate document. Through such triangulation it is 
intended to bring different dimensions to bear on the research question promoting 
richness in the final results and greater confidence in the conclusions. 
 
4.2 Ethical Conduct 
The research was undertaken in accordance with Teesside University’s principles 
for the ethical conduct of research as ratified by the University Research Ethics 
Committee (Teesside University, 2012). Participants were informed about the 
purpose of the research and its longitudinal nature meaning data they supplied 
may be used several years into the future but would not be attributable to 
individuals.  
 
In particular all those contacted were free not to participate and were informed that 
if they wished; no further contact would be made, for example reminders to 
surveys. Participants were assured of confidentiality unless they positively agreed 
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their details could be used. At the commencement of the focus groups voluntary 
participation was confirmed and agreement reached for notes to be taken and 
quotes used. The interviews in 2012/13 were recorded with permission and 
agreement for the use of quotes confirmed. To protect confidentiality the employing 
organisations of the interviewees are not identified. 
 
All data collected has been stored and used in compliance with appropriate 
legislation and guidelines and will be likewise disposed of at the conclusion of the 
research. 
  
4.3 Population and Sampling Requirements 
A census of all principal councils was undertaken by means of a postal questionnaire 
in 2005 and using email in 2009 and 2010 adding fire services, police forces and 
PCTs (Appendix 4.1). In the 2005 survey the response rate was 48.2% and broadly 
representative by size of council, geographic, etc. but with a slight bias towards 
larger authorities and those better performing in CPA. Efforts were made to obtain a 
high response rate by means of various approaches such as addressing the 
questionnaire to named officers and sending out a reminder (Brennan, 1992). Table 
4.1 shows the number sent out and returned as well as the return rate. The total 
number of authorities by CPA Rating at the 2005 survey were in order of poor to 
excellent: 10, 42, 120, 141 and 75. One authority did not have a CPA Rating. The 
return rate varied from 30% for authorities rated poor to 61% for those rated 
excellent, although the return rate for those rated weak (45%) was higher than for 
those rated fair (40%).  
 
The 2009 and 2010 surveys were sent by email containing a link to Survey Monkey 
and a pdf copy of the questionnaire that could be completed and returned by email 
or post. The use of Survey Monkey proved problematic as a number were returned 
partially completed and several emails were received commenting on problems. For 
the 2009 survey the CPA measures for police and PCT are the equivalent as 
calculated by the researcher.  
 
It was felt at the height of CPA; in the lead-up to the ‘harder test’ there would be a 
significant level of interest as regards the research. In the 2009 and 2010 surveys 
the response rate was much lower and this may be due to a number of factors. 
Firstly, a lower level of interest due to the end of CPA and its replacement; CAA likely 
to be short-lived due to the national political situation. Secondly, the 2005 survey 
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was undertaken using the resources of Darlington Borough Council including 
sending it on headed notepaper with a return envelope.  
 
Table 4.1: Returns for the questionnaire surveys 
























Only the organisational profile section of the 
questionnaire was completed for the year 2000 









220 (49%) $ 
187 (48%) 







































































































# One council had recently been created under local government restructuring and no CAA 




The 2009 and 2010 surveys were administered electronically allowing completion by 
Survey Monkey. Whilst this may well have been easier to complete in practice it 
meant respondents were tied to a computer whereas a paper questionnaire can be 
taken away and completed, almost at leisure. This may be important given the 
requested respondent was of a high rank in the organisation.   
 
4.4 Hypotheses 
The literature review identified a large number of factors that may be associated with 
organisational performance. A limitation of much previous research identified has 
been the consideration of a limited number of factors or indeed a single factor. 
Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle (2010) summarised previous work on factors 
associated with organisational performance including supporting theories. This 
research takes an integrative approach by considering many factors using a variety 
of criteria through the testing of a number of hypotheses. These are predominantly 
based on theoretical considerations through the literature. The hypotheses are 
appropriately introduced in the relevant sections  
The hypotheses test the following factors: Strategy, Performance management, 
Human resources, Innovation, Culture, Leadership, Resources and Engagement. 
Most of these are considered through multiple criteria recognising the complex 
nature of organisational performance. Further, the factors are ranked in order of their 
contribution to organisational performance.  
 
Additionally the content of a corporate document is hypothesised to be associated 
with organisational performance including some of the factors noted previously.  
 
A post-bureaucratic orientation under NPM has been postulated as associated with 




There are a large number of methods that can be used in social research and many 
texts comprehensively discuss the ‘pros and cons’ of each. Ghauri and Crønhaug 
(2002) cover the full range of activities in carrying out research thus placing the 
methods into context. De Vaus (1991) covers the same ground in four parts: the 
scope of the research, collecting data, analysing data and the process of analysis 
and provides many examples. Douglas (2003) argues management research must, 
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‘…take into account the complex processes of enterprise activity and the inherent 
contextual issues that affect managerial behaviour’. It has been noted the literature 
takes the view context is all-important. The research methods were designed to 




Desk research established the criteria that may be associated with organisational 
performance, whilst recognising that how performance is manifested and measured 
may be contested.  
 
Desk research of the literature collated the results of other evaluations of 
performance management as being a particular characteristic of organisations, so 
the extent to which it is planned and implemented. This included the public, private 
and voluntary sectors as outlined in the literature review (Chapter three). For 
example, Humphrey (2003) carried out desk research into New Labour and 
regulation in social care and a comparison of performance across authorities. 




A postal questionnaire to all principal councils in England, Scotland and Wales in 
2005 to establish the scores against a series of criteria, which also collected 
organisational profile data for the year 2000. For England only an email survey of all 
principal councils, fire services, police forces and PCTs. It was intended three 
additional waves of survey would be undertaken in 2009, 2010 and 2011. However, 
in the event the election of a new government in May 2010 removed CAA and so it 
was decided no further surveys would be undertaken, after 2010. The option to use 
another means of measuring performance such as asking respondents or using 
publically available performance data was considered. However, it was concluded 
whilst such an approach would be feasible it would not add significantly to answering 
the key research question. The applicability of this approach was confirmed by 
feedback received following the presentation of a development paper at the BAM 





Content analysis of BVPP 
Content analysis has been used in a wide variety of disciplines and some related 
to this work are: corporate social responsibility, sustainability and environmental 
reporting (Jose and Lee, 2007; Clarkson, Li and Richardson et al, 2008; Holder-
Webb, Cohen and Nath et al, 2009; Herrera, Bigné and Currás-Pérez et al, 2011 
and Roca and Searcy, 2012), the clinical content of NHS trust board meetings 
(Watkins, Jones and Lindsey et al, 2008) and quality of tourism research (Page, 
2003). Koys (2000) analysed the content of 530 organisations’ formal business 
strategies and HR strategies with the aim to evaluate the extent to which HR was 
strategically integrated into the overall business.  
  
With regard to organisational performance; research utilising content analysis has 
been undertaken on a range of related topics including corporate reporting, 
environmental management practices (Montabon, Sroufe and Narasimham, 2007), 
the effects of culture and HRM practices (Chew and Sharma, 2005), planning 
processes (Labroukos, Lioukas and Chambers, 1995), business process 
reengineering (Altinkemer, Chaturvedi and Kondareddy, 1998), chief executive 
officer commitment (McClelland, Liang and Barker, 2010) and strategic group 
theory and mental models (Osborne, Stubbart and Ramaprasad, 2001).  
 
Boyne, Gould-Williams and Law et al (2002b) considered the utility of BVPPs with 
respect to performance information and accountability. Krippendorff (2004) 
describes content analysis as potentially one of the most important research 
techniques in the social sciences. He goes on to note that it originated as a formal 
discipline in the 1940s, although it actually has a much longer history, being used 
by the Church for inquisitional purposes in the 17th century (p. 3). ‘The modern 
view distinguishes from the historical in being an empirically grounded method that 
cuts across traditional notions of symbols, contents and intents and has developed 
a particular methodology’ (Krippendorff, 2004, pp. xvii-xxii).   
 
‘Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use’ 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 18). As a technique it needs to be reliable, replicable and 
valid. He goes on to explain three basic definitions of content analysis as a 





1. Definitions taking content to be inherent in a text.  
2. Definitions taking content to be a property of the source of a text.  
3. Definitions taking content to emerge in the process of a 
researcher analyzing a text relative to a particular context 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 19, emphasis in original).  
 
Stemler (2001) provides a succinct summary of definitions and practical 
applications of content analysis and with reference to Weber (1990) notes it is a 
useful technique to describe the focus of individual, group, institutional, or social 
attention. Krippendorff, (2004, p. 54) notes measurements are made against 
standards for three reasons. Firstly, to identify what the phenomena are 
(identifications), secondly to evaluate how good or bad they are (evaluations) and 
thirdly, how close they come to expectations (judgements).  
 
The methodology consisted of the development of a pro forma (Appendix 4.2) 
containing 21 criteria that could be rated. The definition being used from the three 
discussed, previously, is the content is believed to be a property of the source of a 
text. Thus the content of the BVPP is determined by the performance of the 
organisation. A high performing organisation would be expected to have a 
comprehensive mission statement, a good selection of local PIs, a clear statement 
of objectives and prioritisation, a description of its performance framework and so 
on.   
  
A content analysis was undertaken of 76 councils’ BVPPs; the detail of which were 
correlated with CPA results. The BVPPs were selected to give a representative 
sample by CPA Rating, authority type and a good geographic spread (Appendix 
4.3).  
 
Case studies  
In 2005 case studies were undertaken in Chester-le-Street District Council, 
Darlington Borough Council and Durham County Council to explore the ‘applicability’ 
of the scores for the individual statements obtained from the questionnaire survey, 
using a pro forma (Appendix 4.4). The case studies consisted of interviews of four 
officers and a focus group of five to seven front-line staff. It was decided not to record 
the interviews and focus groups given the purpose that was in the main to obtain 
scores. In the focus group participants were encouraged to come to a consensus. 
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Yin (1981) notes the case study approach does not imply a particular type of 
evidence nor a particular data collection method. The interviews were of two service 
managers, a policy type officer from the department and a policy type officer from 
the corporate centre. For the case studies of Chester-le-Street DC and Durham CC 
the council in question selected the participating officers. For Darlington BC the 
officers to be interviewed were selected by the researcher and the focus group by 
managers who had been contacted by the researcher. All three authorities agreed 
to be identified; although the interviews and focus groups were carried out on a 
confidential basis therefore names and job titles are not stated.    
 
Interviews 
In late 2012 and early 2013 interviews of senior officers at the corporate centre were 
undertaken in two councils, a fire service, a police force and a PCT (interview 
schedule at Appendix 4.5). These interviews explored issues in some detail and 
were conducted on condition of anonymity.  
 
4.6 Comparative Datasets  
The four organisation types were assessed using different performance frameworks 
not directly comparable. Therefore, it was necessary to match individual components 
of the different assessments. This requires interpretation and is to some extent 
subjective but consistency was maintained. Table 4.2 shows the comparisons used 
for the 2009 survey. The basis of the comparison is the CPA 2008 performance 
classes; firstly the overall CPA Rating on a five point scale of zero to four stars. This 
scale used in the CPA harder test, is stated not to be equivalent to the previous five 
point scale of poor, weak, fair, good and excellent because of the changes made to 
CPA. Secondly, using the Performance Management Score on a four point scale of 
one to four. Thirdly, Service Score reflects the composite performance of services 
provided by the organisation. Fourthly, Corporate Assessment measures the 
corporate capacity and capability of the organisation.  In terms of the dates for the 
CPA performance assessment data used with the survey data; the nearest to the 
2008 CPA data was selected without intruding into the data used for the 2010 CAA 
survey. Unfortunately, the 2007/08 data for PCTs is no longer available from the 
CQC as confirmed to the researcher. Indeed the 2006/07 data appears only 
available because the BBC appended the report to one of their news articles. The 
Audit Commission (and appointed auditors) carried out the inspection/audit work for 
councils and fire services and the data used for services score and corporate 
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assessment for police and PCTs. HMIC provided the other data for the police and 
the Healthcare Commission for the PCTs.  
 
Table 4.2 Comparative data sets used with the 2009 survey data 
Organisation 
Type 
CPA Performance Measure 















































for Money  
Audit 
Commission 























Since CAA did not rate individual organisations this was calculated by combining the 
use of resources, managing performance scores and any other appropriate 
assessment.  
 
4.7 Method of Analysis     
Questionnaire survey 
IBM SPSS Statistics 20 was used for analysis of the questionnaire. The principal test 
used is Pearson correlation with the use of PCA to explore key contributions to 
organisational performance. PCA was used as an appropriate data reduction 
technique for exploring the grouping of factors having a statistical significance 
(p<0.05) with organisational performance. 
 
The survey questionnaire was tested for reliability and validity. Cronbach’s Alpha 
was calculated through SPSS producing a result of 0.965. A figure above 0.7 is 
regarded as acceptable (De Vaus, 2002, p. 20) therefore we can conclude the 




Validity is the extent to which the survey measures the things it purports to. De Vaus 
summarises the position well: 
 
We must be somehow confident that our relatively concrete 
questions actually tap the concepts we are interested in. 
The real problem, however, is that there is no conclusive 
way of establishing validity. 
 (De Vaus, 2002, p. 25) 
 
One way of testing validity is to examine the correlation of responses of the 
statements against each other. We would expect statements that are considered to 
be related would tend to have a high degree of correlation (convergent validity). For 
example, statements attempting to assess the level of innovation in the approach to 
service planning (4.10) and service delivery (4.11). These statements have a 
Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.597** (p<0.01). Discriminant validity considers 
factors that would not be expected to be related. An example is the extent 
performance management is focused on learning (5.51) and the extent performance 
is constrained by central government action (5.55) with a correlation of 0.000. There 
would seem to be no (valid) reason why the extent of learning in performance 
management should (in reality) be constrained by central government action. We 
can be confident the questionnaire has a good degree of validity.  
 
Non-response is potentially a serious issue in surveys. Therefore tests were 
undertaken by comparing the initial responses with those arriving after the issue of 
reminders. An example of this analysis is included in Appendix 4.6, which is 
representative. This shows non-response bias does not appear to have been a 
particular issue in 2005 and 2009, although the numbers in 2010 were too low to 
provide this test. 
 
The results of these surveys were correlated with national ratings given to these 
organisations under CPA (for 2005 and 2009) and CAA for 2010. The data used was 
2004 CPA results for the 2005 survey, 2008 CPA results for the 2009 survey and 
2009 CAA results for the 2010 survey. For police forces and PCTs it was necessary 
to convert other data (from the Audit Commission, HMIC and the Healthcare 
Commission) to a CPA equivalent. In addition to facilitate comparison the five point 
scale of CPA was matched to the four point scale of CAA. The CAA Rating was 
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calculated from data compiled by the Audit Commission and published on the 
oneplace website (Audit Commission, 2013d). 
 
Similar methods have been used by others, for example by Ittner and Larcker (1997) 
to examine the use of strategic control systems and organisational performance. 
Although the CPA and CAA were not without their critics (Wilson, 2004 and Andrews, 
Boyne and Law et al, 2005) the assumption they represent valid measures of an 
organisation’s performance is reasonable. Indeed, Boyne, James and John et al 
(2010) found CPA a success in improving organisational performance. The 
categorisation of councils played a part in this, as it was fundamental to CPA, 
providing a marker for all stakeholders. 
 
A computer software company did an exercise to compare shire district councils’ 
BVPI results and CPA Rating and found the relationship to be ‘surprisingly loose’ 
(Covalent, 2004). It is however, arguable; CPA represents a better measurement 
of organisational performance as it includes the results of external audit and 
inspections.  
 
Cardiff University had used a series of questionnaires as part of a long-term 
evaluation of BV sponsored by government (Martin, Walker and Enticott et al, 
2003). The current research is similar but focuses on criteria likely to be associated 
with organisational performance. A survey, for the I&DeA by MORI, identified that 
perceptions vary significantly across authorities. Employees from councils with a 
higher CPA Rating are more likely to say their authority is ‘above average’ while 
those from councils with a lower rating are more likely to say it is ‘below average’ 
(Improvement & Development Agency, 2005, p. 9). This provides support for both 
the questionnaire and case study parts of this research by suggesting employee 
perceptions are reasonably accurate. 
 
The correlation used was the parametric Pearson coefficient as the data meets the 
requirements, in particular a normal distribution. PCA was selected as an appropriate 
statistical technique, given the nature of the data and in particular the small number 
of cases compared to the large number of variables in 2009 and 2010, making 
various regression techniques inappropriate. Thus PCA was used in an exploratory 
manner and direct oblimin (oblique) rotation was utilised for component extraction, 
rather than the more commonly used varimax (orthogonal). This rotation was chosen 
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following Field (2013) since many of the criteria are correlated, in some cases very 
strongly. Field comments: 
 
In practice, there are strong grounds to believe that 
orthogonal rotations are a complete nonsense for 
naturalistic data, and certainly for any data involving 
humans (can you think of any psychological construct that 
is not in any way correlated with some other psychological 
construct?). As such some argue that orthogonal rotations 
should never be used.  
(Field, 2013, p. 681) 
 
However, in the literature review many studies were identified using varimax rotation. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2013, p. 664) suggest the level of correlation should be 
considered and if not too great then using an orthogonal solution is acceptable 
versus the difficulties of dealing with the interpretation of an oblique rotation. Costello 
and Osborne (2005) noted of a survey of over 1,700 studies that used some form of 
exploratory factor analysis, over half used PCA with varimax rotation and 
eigenvalues greater than one.  
 
For the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy a minimum of 0.5 
is recommended with values of 0.5 to 0.7 being described as mediocre, 0.7 to 0.8 
good, 0.8 to 0.9 great and above 0.9 superb whilst a determinant of greater than 
0.00001 is specified meaning multicollinearity should not be problem (Field, 2013, 
pp. 684-685). The significance level used is p<0.05. 
 
Field (2013) describes principal component analysis (PCA), under the heading factor 
analysis (although differences between PCA and factor analysis are noted), as a 
technique for identifying groups or clusters of variables. The technique has three 
main uses; firstly, ‘to understand the structure of a set of variables’; secondly, ‘to 
construct a questionnaire to measure an underlying variable’ and thirdly, ‘to reduce 
a data set to a more manageable size while retaining as much of the information as 
possible.’ (Field, 2013, p. 666). PCA is concerned with how particular variables 
contribute to a component and has similarities to discriminant analysis. This research 
is concerned with identifying (discriminating between) variables associated with 
organisational performance and determining a ranked list of summary factors. The 
statements used in the questionnaire are a long list of variables, from the literature, 
associated with organisational performance. However, because many of these are 
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likely to be interrelated it is necessary to establish the relative importance of these 
and group them into coherent categories. This was done from the literature review 
hence the overall headings in the questionnaire. Previously, Table 3.13 provides a 
comparison between these and the results of the PCA, illustrating the similarities. 
 
In this research not all the statements (variables) are used in the PCA as correlation 
was first used to establish those variables that have a statistically significant 
correlation (p<0.05) with organisational performance.  The first and third usages, of 
PCA as identified by Field (2013), are being used so that a manageable number of 
factors is produced, with a structure, enabling an understanding of the relationship(s) 
between the factors. PCA produces a matrix showing the relationship between 
variables with eigenvalues being used to calculate the linear components (factors). 
Not all factors are maintained in the analysis and it is necessary to determine which 
to retain, usually those with larger eigenvalues. In the PCA analysis sections the 
extraction of components is explained with output from SPSS reproduced in the 
appendices showing the eigenvalues (for example Appendix 5.32). Rotation 
improves interpretation by maximising, ‘….the loading of each variable on one of the 
extracted factors whilst minimising the loading on all other factors. This process 
makes it much clearer which variables relate to which factors.’ (Field, 2005, p.644). 
As noted, given the relatively high levels of correlation between some of the 
statements oblimin rotation was more suitable for the analyses except for the BVPP 
where correlations between the criteria were found to be much lower.  
 
Each component is represented by a statement, or more generally a number of 
statements, which are logically combined by the researcher to produce a summary 
factor, a total of eleven being defined. The precise numerical weight of each 
summary factor is not emphasised as it is recognised that interpretation is an 
important part of PCA and organisational performance is a complex construct that is 
likely to vary by organisational and environmental factors and over time. The ranking 
of the summary factors is therefore preferred as having greater utility in theoretical 
work and practical use.   
 
Content analysis of BVPPs  
Mack and Ryan (2004) concluded the annual report is an important source of 
information but its importance and use varied. Boyne and Law (1991) considered 
annual reports published by Welsh district councils and regarded them as generally 
of poor quality. Although BVPPs were public documents and originally for all 
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audiences they became much more focused towards central government, auditors 
and inspectors. A summary was usually done for wider circulation and regarded as 
more suitable for the general public. From the current research, in the ‘best’ 
authorities the BVPP was not only an informative document (events had moved on 
since Boyne and Law’s 1991 study) regarding the council’s current performance and 
its plans for future performance but also of high quality. However, some authorities’ 
plans did not contain the necessary information to be informative and thus useful. 
 
The content analysis was an objective consideration of each of the 21 criteria. For 
example, for item 12 Comparative data, it considered the extent and detail of the 
data and did it result in any analysis showing where the authority was by quartile 
for example.  
 
As noted previously the use of standards is important in undertaking content 
analysis. This research used the standards explained by Krippendorff, (2004, p. 
54) in identification of the phenomena; being the 21 criteria listed in Appendix 4.2 
(also used as the template to record scores). The second standard was evaluation, 
using a scale between zero and five with five being best, converted to a percentage 
for ease of comparison. Thirdly, how close did the plans come to the expectations 
(judgement) as regard to the performance of the organisations? CPA results 
provided the judgement in an objective and consistent manner for all councils.  
 
The majority of plans were for 2004/05 although a very small number were 2003/04 
due to the difficulty of obtaining the 2004/05 edition. Each plan was visually 
scanned for 10-15 minutes or so to give an idea of content. The 21 criteria were 
then searched for and evaluated in detail and a score assigned, this taking about 
a further 30 minutes per plan. It is important to note only the authority’s BVPP (or 
equivalent since some were known by a different name) was considered. In cases 
where an authority combined their BVPP physically with another document such 
as a corporate plan then this was also evaluated. However, other documents were 
not taken into consideration. Authorities rated excellent and good were permitted 
to reduce the content of their BVPP. 
  
Case studies/Interviews 
Three initial case studies were undertaken as part of the first tranche of this 
longitudinal research in 2005 followed-up by interviews after the preliminary analysis 
had been undertaken in 2012/13. The case studies employed the services of a note-
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taker to facilitate data collection whilst the interviews were recorded (with 
permission) and then transcribed. Rowley (2002) and Patton and Appelbaum (2003) 
describe the application of the case study approach to management research, noting 
it utilises a range of techniques.  
 
4.8 Limitations of Research Method 
All research has limitations and recognition of the limitations is necessary in order to 
consider the value of the research. In other words the anticipated limitations should 
not overly impact on the reasonable likelihood of achieving the aims and objectives 
of the research. A number of potential specific limitations were identified, briefly 
discussed below. 
 
The questionnaire to the organisations is the basis for a large amount of the data as 
regards the determinants of organisational performance. It may be a richness and 
valid assessment requires more detailed research (see Martin, Walker and Enticott 
et al, 2003). The case studies and interviews were undertaken to address this. 
 
The questionnaire collects the views of one officer in each organisation; even though 
it is felt it is an informed view. Ketokivi and Schroeder (2004, p. 262) have cautioned 
against the use of single informant studies but also assert the use of perceptual 
measures is valid. It is believed the results of this research show the use of a single 
informant can be appropriate. Again, the case studies collected data from more 
organisational members in order to provide a check. However, we are more 
interested in which view is likely to be more accurate rather than representative. 
 
The validation case studies were of three councils and further a limited number of 
individuals so may not be sufficiently representative of the population to be 
particularly meaningful. The interviews were of one individual in a small number of 
organisations. The research collected the views of those it was felt would be in the 
best position to provide the most applicable data so representativeness was not 
desired.  
 
The importance of the criteria may not be brought out due to the wide-ranging nature 
of this research or it may not be possible to identify levels of importance, if any. Since 
performance management itself was measured by CPA, analysis was undertaken 




A selection of BVPPs were analysed and is only about 20% of the total possible and 
they may not be representative nor capture the richness of the documentation 
produced by councils. A representative sample of authorities was selected. 
 
The CPA and CAA scores may not reflect the true performance of the organisations 
(Boyne and Enticott, 2004 and Andrews, Boyne and Law et al, 2005). The question 
then becomes what is ‘true’ performance? By no means an easy question to answer 
because it depends on so many factors and is contestable. Nevertheless a 
considerable amount of effort was expended by the Audit Commission on developing 
and then refining CPA. Also note Boyne, James and John et al (2010) comments 
regarding the success of CPA. 
 
The conversion of 2009 results to comparable CPA is an approximate process and 
has the potential to introduce an unknown amount of error. Likewise a similar 
exercise, for the 2010 survey, required the production of organisational performance 
ratings that demanded an element of interpretation. However, consistency was 
maintained. 
 
The above limitations do not significantly impact on the results of the research and 
reasons for the most important have been alluded to above and elsewhere. The 
results are now presented.                                                  
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5.  Results 1 – Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) 
5.1 Introduction 
The following sections consider the results of the questionnaire for the 2005 and 
2009 surveys with respect to the hypotheses. Each statement on the questionnaire 
contributes to the testing of one or more hypotheses utilising the four different 
measures of performance.  
 
Where there are a large number of statements they are discussed in sections of CPA 
Rating (CPAR), Performance Management Score (PMS), Service Score (SS) and 
Corporate Assessment (CA), otherwise they are considered together. Generally, 
only the three highest and lowest coefficients will be noted. The most important 
variations between the results for the different types of organisation will be 
considered, as well as over time. A table showing a summary of the statistically 
significant correlations is at Appendix 5.1. The organisation’s respondent scores for 
each statement are correlated with the Audit Commission CPA assessment of 
organisational performance for that organisation using SPSS.  
 
The data tables are shown in Appendix 5.2 to 5.32 but reference is not required for 
immediate appreciation. In some cases SPSS did not calculate a correlation for 
example, where there is no difference in the response from all organisations.  A small 
number of statements were not included in both surveys.   
 
A following section will then use the correlations (p<0.05) in a PCA to identify the 
summary factors associated with organisational performance. The PCA indicates 
the amount of variance explained by each of the statements to be included in 
respective summary factors. 
 
Strategy/Policy/Finance/HRM 
5.2 Hypothesis A1: That an organisation that has a high level of strategic 
direction will have higher performance than one that has a lower level. 
Appendix 5.2 shows the correlation coefficients for the statements applying to 
strategic direction. It is hypothesised an organisation with a high level of strategic 
direction will exhibit higher performance than an organisation with less. The rationale 
for this is that with direction comes a focus on the achievement of outcomes and it 
also provides a clarity of purpose for employees. This hypothesis is tested by 56 
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statements with a slight difference for 2005 (5.9 Use corporate planning excluded) 
compared with 2009 (B57 Collect all quality of life indicators excluded). 
 
CPA Rating 
For CPAR there were 36 statements significant at p<0.01 and four significant at 
p<0.05 in the 2005 survey. All were positive therefore a higher level of strategic 
direction is associated with a higher CPAR except for 4.15 Political issues tend to 
‘blow’ strategy off course (-0.333**), 5.34 Performance management is regarded as 
a method of control (-0.163*) and 6.5 The extent to which organisation departments 
operate independently (-0.245**). It would be expected these criteria would militate 
against strategic direction, although it is interesting the use of performance 
management as a control method appears. It may be the case that performance 
management, as a method of control, is relatively ineffective at giving strategic 
direction in itself and needs to operate in context. As is evident from the review of 
the literature context is regarded as crucial for successful performance 
management. 
 
The three statements with the strongest statistical significance are 4.29 The extent 
to which policy decisions are based on evidence (0.493**), 4.19 The extent to which 
the organisation thinks strategically (0.456**) and 4.26 The extent to which strategies 
and plans are linked together (0.449**). An organisation that does these things would 
tend to have a high level of strategic direction and it is especially interesting the 
extent to which evidence-based policy is regarded as important. Plans and strategies 
being linked would tend to provide a framework for direction. 
 
There are 16 statements not significant. The three lowest correlations were 4.4 
Agreed formal mission/vision statement (-0.001), 5.7 Use Management by 
Objectives (0.001) and 9.3 Strategic partnership with provider of many services 
(0.011). As regards techniques, the use of EFQM (0.268**) and strategy mapping 
(0.197**) seem to be significant but TQM (0.134), the balanced scorecard (0.038), 
benchmarking (0.079) and management by objectives (0.001) were not. 
Interestingly, the possession of an agreed formal mission/vision statement (4.4, -
0.001), a published medium term financial plan (4.6, 0.032) or a top down approach 
to strategic planning (4.16, -0.036) did not appear to be significant. 
 
The number of statistically significant correlations was much smaller in 2009, which 
is not surprising given the lower number of respondents. First, taking all four 
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organisation types together, ten statements were significant and whilst six of these 
were so in 2005, there were some differences. These were for 4.2 Written service 
plans (0.229*), 4.48 Extent of separation between strategy and implementation (-
0.267*), 5.6 Use of benchmarking (0.222*) and 9.3 Strategic partnership with a 
provider of many services (-0.240*). The others significant as for 2005 were: 4.15 
Political issues ‘blow’ strategy off course (-0.218*), 4.17 Central policy/BV direction 
(0.216*), 4.29 Policy decisions based on evidence (0.280**), 4.55 Aims/objectives 
corporate body and service providers linked (0.337**), 5.59 Extent context 
considered in analysis (0.226*) and 9.25 Extent partnerships making strategies more 
meaningful (0.302*). 
 
For councils in 2009 there were seven significant statements all of which were also 
significant in 2005. The top three were: 4.17 Central policy/BV direction (0.496**), 
4.20 Service improvements implemented strategically (0.454**) and 4.55 
Aims/objectives corporate body and service providers linked (0.363**). For fire 
services there were four significant statements: 4.18 Corporate strategy linked to 
community strategy (-0.507*), 4.29 Policy decisions based on evidence (0.541*), 
4.48 Extent of separation between strategy and implementation (-0.632**) and 9.25 
Extent partnerships making strategies more meaningful (0.519*). Notice, 4.18 and 
4.48 are negative. There were no significant statements for police forces although 
the strength of the coefficients tends to mirror the other organisation types. There 
was one significant correlation for PCTs: 5.8 Use of strategy mapping, which is 
however negative. This statement was also significant for councils in 2005 but 
positive. PCTs exhibited more differences than other organisation types. For 
example, exhibiting a negative correlation for 4.36 Employee’s goals aligned with the 
organisation’s and 4.29 Policy decisions based on evidence with a zero coefficient 
whereas, all other organisation types show a positive correlation. 
 
Performance Management Score 
Twenty-eight statements were significant at p<0.01, ten at p<0.05 and 18 not 
significant for the 2005 survey statements and PMS. The three strongest correlations 
were 4.29 The extent to which policy decisions are based on evidence (0.405**), 
4.26 The extent to which strategies and plans are linked together (0.366**) and 4.19 
The extent to which the organisation thinks strategically (0.319**). These are the 
same as for CPAR although 4.29 is first in both, the order of the other two is reversed. 
Of the ten statements not significant the strongest is for 5.5 Use of TQM (0.142), 
4.45 Probity is valued (0.138) and 4.5 Published organisational development 
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strategy (0.133). Of these both 4.45 and 4.5 are significant (p<0.01) as regards 
CPAR. The lowest correlations are for 9.3 Strategic partnership with provider of 
many services (-0.013), 5.6 Published medium term financial plan (-0.019), and 5.6 
Use of Benchmarking (0.024) and none of these are statistically significant as 
regards CPAR either.  
 
There were 11 significant correlations for the four organisation types combined in 
2009. The three strongest correlations were 4.54 Team/individual goals aligned to 
strategy (0.420**), 4.55 Aims/objectives corporate body and service providers linked 
(0.370**) and 4.5 Published organisational development strategy (0.348**). For 
councils there were ten significant statements; the three strongest were 4.5 
Published organisational development strategy (0.450**), 4.44 Service planning is 
optimum (0.450**) and 6.5 Extent to which organisation departments operate 
independently (-0.412**). There were four significant correlations for fire services:  
4.3 Corporate strategy planned in advance with stakeholders (0.579*), 4.47 Aims 
and objectives shared across organisation (0.588**) 4.54 Team/individual goals 
aligned to strategy (0.677**) and 10.4 Extent strategic direction widely 
communicated (0.587**), two for police (5.32 Are targets ambitious, 0.750* and 5.34 
Performance management method of control, 0.750*) and none for PCTs.  
 
Thus although, for 2005, there were some detailed differences between the 
correlations for CPAR and PMS there is a correspondence in that a higher level of 
strategic direction correlates with a higher PMS. There were two significant negative 
correlations (4.15 Political issues ‘blow’ strategy off course, -0.274** and 6.5 Extent 
to which organisation departments operate independently, -0.232**) and these are 
the same statements as in CPAR, although for PMS, 5.34 Extent to which 
performance management is regarded as a method of control is not significant, 
unlike for CPAR. 
 
Service Score 
For councils in the 2005 survey there were 24 statements significant at p<0.01 with 
SS, ten at p<0.05 and 22 not significant. The strongest correlations were for 5.37 
Level of departmental involvement in developing performance management 
(0.336**), 5.38 Level of departmental involvement in running performance 
management (0.309**) and 5.3 Use of the EFQM EM (0.272**). These are also 
significant (p<0.05) in the CPAR and PMS analyses. The involvement of services in 
performance management therefore would appear to promote strategic direction 
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presumably because this provides the link(s) with corporate (organisation-wide) 
objectives. There were significant correlations as regards 4.26 Strategies and plans 
linked together (0.264**), 5.66 Extent to which ‘use’ stage of performance 
management is successful (0.267**) and 5.67 Extent to which EFQM/BSC is an 
integral part of strategic planning (0.259**) that support this view. The use of the 
EFQM EM, in particular, would tend to provide a focus on services and emphasise 
the link with the strategic direction of the organisation. There were no statistically 
significant negative correlations, both 4.15 Political issues ‘blow’ strategy off course 
and 6.5 Extent to which organisation departments operate independently not being 
so at p<0.05. 
 
There was only one significant correlation for all four organisation types combined in 
2009 which is 4.48 Extent of separation between strategy and implementation (-
0.273*), although it was not significant for any of the organisation types individually. 
It is negative, as for all organisation types individually and for councils in 2005. 
Taking the organisation types separately, for councils there is one significant 
correlation: 4.26 Strategies and plans linked together (0.288*) which is also 
significant in 2005. The pattern of correlation sizes is similar to 2005. For fire services 
there were six significant correlations; three strongest being: 4.3 Corporate strategy 
planned in advance with stakeholders (0.711**), 4.47 Aims and objectives shared 
across organisation (0.764**) and 10.4 Extent strategic direction widely 
communicated (0.696**). For police there were two significant correlations: 4.9 Took 
part in I&DeA’s Local Government Improvement Programme or equivalent (0.727*) 
and 12.19 Extent to which organisation operates independently in provision of 
services (-0.728*). There were seven significant correlations for PCTs, the three 
strongest: 4.42 Organisation focuses on service provision (-0.899**), 5.66 Extent to 
which ‘use’ stage of performance management is successful (-0.758*) and 10.4 
Extent strategic direction widely communicated (-0.784**). 
 
Corporate Assessment 
The CA assesses the strength of an organisation’s corporate capability and capacity 
and therefore may be important in providing cohesiveness: strategic direction, 
shared objectives, prioritisation and clarity of operations. In 2005 there were 33 
statements significant at p<0.01, nine at p<0.05 and 14 not significant. The strongest 
correlations were 4.29 Extent policy decisions are based on evidence (0.443**), 4.19 
Extent that the organisation thinks strategically (0.398**), 5.66 Extent to which the 
’use’ of performance management is successful (0.394**) and 4.26 Strategies and 
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plans linked together (0.385**). There is an emphasis on evidence-based policy, 
strategic thinking, linking the disparate plans and strategies together and the use of 
performance management. Such activities would be expected to have a relatively 
large impact on strategic direction. There are four statements with significant 
negative correlations: 4.15 Political issues ‘blow’ strategy off course (-0.365**), 6.5 
Extent to which organisation departments operate independently (-0.280**), 5.34 
Performance management is regarded as a method of control (-0.210**) and 12.19 
Extent to which the organisation operates independently in service provision (-
0.157*). All are understandable in terms of inhibiting strategic direction, except 
perhaps 5.34, although ‘over control’ may translate into limited involvement thus not 
promoting joint working and practical direction. The word ‘control’ tends to have 
negative connotations in many organisations. 
 
There were nine significant correlations for all types of organisations combined in 
2009. The three strongest were 4.48 Extent of separation between strategy and 
implementation (0.268*), 4.55 Aims/objectives corporate body and service providers 
linked (0.309**) and 5.66 Extent to which ‘use’ stage of performance management 
is successful (0.271*). 
 
For councils in 2009 there were eight significant correlations, the top three were: 
4.48 Extent of separation between strategy and implementation (-0.341*), 5.59 
Extent context is considered in analysis (0.347*) and 5.66 Extent to which ‘use’ stage 
of performance management is successful (0.451**). For fire there were six with the 
strongest three being: 4.9 Took part in I&DeA’s Local Government Improvement 
Programme or equivalent (0.600*) and 5.68 Extent strategy maps are used (0.586*), 
6.9 Extent to which governance needs are discussed (0.555). For police there were 
two significant correlations: 5.32 Are targets ambitious (0.750*) and 5.34 
Performance management method of control (0.750*). As, perhaps, expected this 
was positive for police forces; organisations having a command structure. For PCTs 
there were no significant correlations.   
 
Although, there are some differences between organisations, and over the two 
surveys, there would appear to be strong evidence a higher level of strategic 
direction is associated with higher organisational performance. This includes for the 
planning and implementation of activities in a strategic manner as well as links with 
finance. The strategic use of HR would also appear to be important.  The hypothesis 
should be accepted based on the number and strength of the correlations. The next 
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section considers whether implementing service planning in a strategic manner may 
impact on organisational performance.    
 
5.3 Hypothesis A2: That an organisation that has a high level of strategic and 
service planning will have higher performance than one that has a lower 
level. 
This hypothesis is closely related to that discussed in the preceding section in that a 
higher level of strategic and service planning would tend to promote more strategic 
direction than a lower level. It is not suggested the relationship is linear or more is 
always better since there may be an optimum level and the law of diminishing returns 
may apply. Indeed level is assumed to cover not just the amount but also 
involvement. The hypothesis is tested using 15 statements (Appendix 5.3). 
 
CPA Rating 
In the 2005 survey for CPAR there were ten statements significant at p<0.01, one at 
p<0.05 and four not significant. The strongest correlations were for 4.11 Level of 
innovation in service planning (0.464**), 4.24 Departmental involvement in service 
planning (0.378**) and 4.47 Aims and objectives shared across the organisation 
(0.363**). Not significant were 4.2 Written service plans (0.047), 4.4 Agreed formal 
mission/vision statement (-0.001), 4.16 Extent of top-down approach to strategic 
planning and 6.3 The level of centralisation of service planning (0.004).  
 
For all four organisation types combined in 2009 there were five significant 
correlations, the strongest: 4.23 Level of departmental involvement in development 
service planning (0.302**), 4.24 Departmental involvement in service planning 
(0.314*) and 4.55 Aims/objectives corporate body and service providers linked 
(0.337**). There were also five significant correlations for councils in 2009, the 
strongest: 4.23 Level of departmental involvement in development service planning 
(0.334*), 4.55 Aims/objectives corporate body and service providers linked (0.363**) 
and 10.2 Extent communication on corporate/service planning (0.311*). All of these 
were also significant in the 2005 survey. There were two significant correlations for 
fire services: 4.23 Level of departmental involvement in development service 
planning (0.567*) and 4.24 Departmental involvement in doing service planning 
(0.314*). There were no significant correlations for police forces or PCTs.  
 
This evidence would tend to suggest the level of strategic and service planning is 
important, in particular it is innovative with wide involvement and shared aims and 
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objectives thus perhaps providing a corporate framework. This is supported by 
Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) who considered the implementation of performance 
management innovations, with context and culture being crucial. Less important 
would appear to be whether the approach is top-down or not (4.16); there is a 
mission/vision statement (4.4) (perhaps regarded more as words that on its own is 
insignificant), centralisation (6.3) and such plans are written (4.2). This latter point is 
perhaps surprising in these complex organisations as without something written 
there may not be focus. However, the counter argument is well known in having 
service plans (and other documents) sitting on a shelf.  
 
It therefore may be the case that what matters most is not they are written but rather 
are understood and ‘actioned’. But a written corporate strategy (4.1) is significant 
(p<0.05) (0.160*). This view is further supported by statements 4.3 Corporate 
strategy planned in advance with stakeholders (0.266**), 4.55 Aims/objectives 
corporate body and service providers linked (0.342**) and 10.2 Extent of 
communication on corporate/service planning (0.207**). The weakest correlations 
(not significant) are for 4.4 Agreed formal mission/vision statement (-0.001), 6.3 
Level of centralisation of service planning (0.004) and 4.16 Extent of top-down 
approach to service planning (-0.036). 
 
Performance Management Score 
For PMS in 2005 seven statements were significant at p<0.01, two at p<0.05 and six 
not significant. Again, 4.11 Level of innovation in service planning (0.322**) exhibits 
the strongest correlation followed by 4.24 Departmental involvement in service 
planning (0.244**). 10.2 Extent communication on corporate/service planning is not 
significant (0.123), unlike for CPAR. There were no significant negative correlations. 
The weakest correlations are for 6.3 Level of centralisation of service planning 
(0.012), 4.4 Agreed formal mission/vision statement (0.078) and 4.16 Extent top-
down approach to strategic planning (-0.081) and this mirrors the results for CPAR. 
Departmental involvement in planning tends to promote higher levels of 
performance.  
 
There were six significant correlations for all four organisation types combined in 
2009, the three strongest being: 4.47 Aims and objectives shared across 
organisation (0.339**), 4.55 Aims/objectives corporate body and service providers 
linked (0.370**), 5.9 Use corporate planning (0.272*). There were five for councils, 
the strongest being: 4.24 Departmental involvement in doing service planning 
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(0.345*), 4.55 Aims/objectives corporate body and service providers linked (0.450**) 
and 10.2 Extent communication on corporate/service planning (0.373). This 
compares with two for fire: 4.3 Corporate strategy planned in advance with 
stakeholders (0.579*) and 4.47 Aims and objectives shared across organisation 
(0.588*). There were none for police and one for PCTs: 8.12 Extent information 
available for corporate/service planning (-0.762*). 
 
Service Score 
In terms of correlation of statements with SS in 2005 there were four significant at 
p<0.01, five at p<0.05 and six not significant. The strongest correlations were for 
5.67 Extent that EFQM/BSC is an integral part of strategic planning (0.259**), 4.11 
Level of innovation in service planning (0.252**) and 4.24 Extent of departmental 
involvement in doing service planning (0.246**). All were also significant (p<0.01) for 
CPAR and PMS but in neither case is 5.67 the strongest. Presumably, this is 
because the use of the EFQM EM and to a lesser degree the BSC (as evidenced by 
other statements – 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8) has a relatively large(r) impact on 
delivering good services (resulting in a higher SS). 4.47 Aims/objectives corporate 
body and service providers linked is not significant (0.084) that may well be regarded 
as surprising suggesting SS depends more on other factors and again 4.2 Written 
Service plans was also not significant (-0.020). In 2009 there were no significant 
correlations for all organisations combined, councils or police but two for fire: 4.3 
Corporate strategy planned in advance with stakeholders (0.711**) and 4.47 
Aims/objectives corporate body and service providers (0.764**) and one for PCTs, 
8.12 Extent information available for corporate/service planning (-0.841**).  
 
Corporate Assessment  
In 2005 there were nine statements significant at p<0.01 for CA and six not 
significant. The strongest correlations were 4.11 Level of innovation in service 
planning (0.417**), 8.12 Extent of information available for corporate\service 
planning (0.360**) and 4.55 Aims/objectives of corporate body and service providers 
linked (0.291**). These were all significant at p<0.01 for CPAR, PMS and SS except 
for 4.55 not significant (p<0.05) (0.084) for SS. The lowest correlations are similar to 
CPAR. In the 2009 survey there were no significant correlations for police and PCT 
with two for councils, being 4.44 Service planning is optimum (0.311*), 4.55 
Aims/objectives of corporate body and service providers linked (0.319*) and two for 
fire; 4.44 Service planning is optimum (0.553*) and 6.3 Level of centralisation of 
service planning (0.607*). There were three significant correlations for all 
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organisation types combined in 2009: 4.24 Extent of departmental involvement in 
doing service planning (0.224*), 4.44 Service planning is optimum (0.354**) and 4.55 
Aims/objectives of corporate body and service providers linked (0.309**). 
 
The hypothesis should be accepted since a higher level of strategic and service 
planning correlates strongly with CPAR, PMS, SS and CA in a positive manner for 
critical statements. That a higher level of strategic and service planning should be 
associated with higher organisational performance is understandable since it will 
promote prioritisation and provide a focus on important ‘issues’, as well as a link 
between the corporate centre and services. 
 
5.4 Hypothesis A3: That an organisation with a high level of performance 
management policy and practice will have higher performance than one that 
has a lower level. 
This hypothesis would seem to be common sense since performance management 
is about managing performance to deliver desired outcomes, which may be 




In 2005 for CPAR of the 86 statements 47 were significant at p<0.01, nine at p<0.05 
and 30 not significant. All the significant correlations were positive apart from 5.34 
Performance management regarded as a method of control (-0.163*), 5.61 Extent 
of focus on what is measured rather than what matters (-0.216**) and 11.3 Extent to 
which publishing performance data has been detrimental (-0.288**). It might be 
expected having (a large amount of) these attributes would be inversely correlated 
with higher organisational performance. 
 
The three strongest correlations (at p<0.01) were 5.66 Extent to which the ‘use’ stage 
of performance management is successful (0.445**) and 5.58 Extent that 
performance management is integrated into strategy (0.405**), 5.59 Extent that 
context is considered in analysis (0.404**). The weakest correlation coefficients were 
for 5.7 Use of management by objectives (0.001), 5.25 Appraisal competency based 
(0.003) and 5.60 Extent that focus is on national indicators to the detriment of local 
indicators (-0.004). It is evident from a consideration of these statements, when 
performance management is considered in a wider context rather than as a series 
of issues, it has impact on the organisation. Thus techniques appear to be relatively 
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unimportant except for the use of the EFQM EM (5.3, 0.268**) and the use of 
strategy maps (5.68, 0.209**) but systems are much more so, for example 5.35 
Innovative approach to performance management (0.382**) and 5.39 Adequacy of 
systems for collecting national indicators (0.299**). Good systems appear to have a 
greater impact on performance than simply the use of techniques that may well be 
uncoordinated. This could be interpreted as ‘make sure you get the basics of 
performance management right first’.  
 
For the 2009 survey, for all organisation types combined, there were five significant 
correlations, the strongest three: 5.13 Hold Investor in People (-0.429**), 5.54 Extent 
organisational performance rated more highly than democratic (-0.316**) and 8.11 
Level of resources to do performance management in service departments (0.280*). 
Eight statements were significant for councils in 2009 with the three strongest: 4.12 
Effectiveness more important than efficiency (0.420**), 5.13 Hold Investor in People 
(-0.405**) and 8.11 Level of resources to do performance management in service 
departments (0.454**).  
 
The fire service has three statements with a significant correlation with CPAR: 5.10 
Use outcome based accountability (0.645*), 5.51 Extent performance management 
focused on learning (0.616*) and 11.3 Extent publishing performance data 
detrimental (0.577*). The police had two significant statements: 5.13 Hold Investor 
in People (-0.690*) and 11.5 Extent of publishing performance data externally 
(0.693*). PCTs had three statements: 5.8 Use strategy mapping (-0.655*), 5.47 
Extent performance management produces perverse incentives (-0.784**) and 5.61 
Extent focus on what measured rather than what matters (-0.791**).  
 
Statement 5.13 Hold Investor in People was not included in the 2005 survey and it 
was reasoned the default in the survey was an organisation not holding IIP or for 
only part of the organisation. Therefore a negative correlation means possession of 
IIP is associated with high organisational performance.  However, strategy mapping 
appears not to be associated with high performance in PCTs, unlike for councils in 
the 2005 survey.  
 
Performance Management Score 
It might be expected PMS would exhibit the largest number of statements with 
significant correlations, for this hypothesis, and this is marginally the case. For the 
2005 survey there were 47 significant correlations at p<0.01, ten at p<0.05 and 29 
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statements not significant. The strongest correlations were for 5.35 Innovative 
approach to performance management (0.473**), 5.66 Extent to which ‘use’ stage 
in performance management is successful (0.405**) and 4.50 Extent to which critical 
success factors (key PIs) are used (0.387**). 
 
The weakest correlations were 9.10 Use of external audit to improve performance 
(0.008), 9.24 Extent partnerships fragmenting effort on performance management 
(0.008) and 5.55 Extent performance constrained by central government action 
(0.009). Interestingly the use of external audit (9.10) contrasts with 9.9 Extent internal 
audit involvement in performance management, significant at p<0.01 (0.209**). 
External auditors will tend to have a greater level of up-to-date experience with a 
variety of organisations, than internal audit, and might therefore be an opportunity 
waiting to be exploited to improve performance management. Although the extent to 
which the use of inspection improves service delivery (9.12) is not significant for 
PMS, it is for CPAR at p<0.05 (0.152*). Thus, although there are detail differences 
there is more of a similarity with CPAR than not.   
 
In 2009 for all organisations combined there were eight significant correlations, the 
three strongest: 4.50 Extent to which critical success factors used (0.309**), 5.13 
Use EFQM Excellent Model or variant (-0.289*) and 5.57 Extent performance 
management agent of accountability (0.283**). For councils in 2009 there were 11 
statements with significant correlations, the strongest being: 4.12 Effectiveness 
more important than efficiency (0.372**), 5.43 Extent performance managed not just 
measured (0.399**) and 5.57 Extent performance management agent of 
accountability (0.365**). 
 
For fire in 2009 there were two significant correlations: 5.52 Extent performance 
management focused on qualitative measures (0.654**) and 5.55 External 
performance constrained by central government action (0.722**) and there were also 
two for police; 5.32 Are targets ambitious (0.750*) and 5.34 Performance 
management method of control (0.750*). In the case of PCTs there were three 
significant correlations: 5.41 Extent of employee rewards for good performance (-
0.667*), 8.10 Level of resources to do performance management at the centre (-





There are similarities and differences, although as expected in this section many of 
the significant statements are to do with performance management. For example, in 
the PCTs it was regarding resources although not in the other organisation types. 
For police it was about targets and control. For councils there were issues regarding 
accountability, democracy and equity. However, notwithstanding these differences 
there is a general pattern of stronger correlation coefficients for the same criteria 
across all organisation types, as seen previously.   
 
Service Score 
It might be expected the number of correlations would be lower with the SS and 
although this is the case, 50% of the 86 statements are significant at p<0.01 (31) or 
p<0.05 (12) in the 2005 survey. The strongest correlations are for 5.37 Level of 
departmental involvement in performance management (0.336**), 5.57 Extent that 
performance management is an agent of accountability (0.310**) and 5.38 Level of 
departmental involvement in running performance management (0.309**). These 
statements provide a link between services and performance management and 
accountability for delivery of services. 
 
The weakest correlations are 6.4 Level of centralisation of performance 
management (0.009), 9.24 Extent partnerships fragmenting effort on performance 
management (0.013), 5.47 Extent performance management produces perverse 
incentives (-0.014) and 5.7 Use of management by objectives (0.014). Again this list 
is unsurprising, although given objectives are generally a key element of service 
plans it is interesting MBO does not correlate more highly. One possibility is MBO is 
being practiced but under the umbrella of performance management.  Is not the 
management of objectives in service plans using PIs MBO? This might be even more 
of the case when objectives are linked together in a hierarchy, with associated PIs, 
to form a causal map, so achievement of PIs lower in the hierarchy result in higher 
level objectives being achieved. 
 
There were seven significant correlations for all organisation types combined in the 
2009 survey, the strongest: 5.13 Hold Investor in People (-0.385**), 5.17 Quality 
accreditation (ISO9000) (0.280*), 5.22 Performance related pay for senior managers 
(chief executive/directors) (-0.283**), 5.24 Appraisal linked to financial reward (-
0.300**) and 9.11 Extent of use of consultants in centre (-0.296**). This is the only 
instance in which statement 5.17 Quality accreditation (ISO9000) is significant, with 
the correlation being high but not significant for fire services. It is also positive for 
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police and PCTs but slightly negative for councils. For the latter there are two 
significant correlations: 5.13 Hold Investor in People (-0.322*) and 8.11 Level of 
resources to do performance management in service departments (0.340*). For the 
fire service there were five significant correlations, the three strongest: 5.52 Extent 
performance management focused on qualitative measures (0.635*), 5.53 Extent 
performance management is optimum (0.635*), 9.24 Extent partnerships 
fragmenting effort on performance management (-0.749**) and 12.33 Extent of the 
misrepresentation of performance information (-0.663*). For police the number was 
two: 5.22 Performance related pay for (senior managers) chief executive/directors 
(0.824*) and 12.11 Extent to which organisation driven by the achievement of targets 
(0.667*). 
 
For SS, in 2009 PCTs had the largest number of significant correlations at 16, the 
strongest were: 5.45 Extent managers have access to quality timely performance 
information (-0.763*), 5.62 Extent performance management has local political 
commitment (-0.840**) and 6.4 Level of centralisation of performance management 
(-0.885**). Again, PCTs appear to stand out somewhat in terms of resources being 
more prominent than for other types of organisation. 
 
Corporate Assessment 
For councils in 2005 there were 45 statements having significant correlations at 
p<0.01, 11 at p<0.05 and 30 not significant for the CA. The strongest correlations 
were 4.50 Extent to which critical success factors (key PIs) are used (0.394**), 5.31 
Innovative approach to performance management (0.381**), 5.59 Extent context is 
considered in analysis (0.356**) and 5.58 Extent performance management 
integrated into strategy (0.352**). This list is similar to for CPAR as is that for the 
weakest correlations. In the 2009 survey there were four significant correlations for 
all four organisation types combined: 4.12 Effectiveness more important than 
efficiency (0.247*), 5.32 Are targets ambitious (0.236*), 5.66 Extent to which ‘use’ 
stage of performance management successful (0.271*), 10.3 Extent of 
communication on service performance (0.248*). 
 
In 2009 there were nine significant correlations for councils with the strongest being: 
4.12 Effectiveness more important than efficiency (0.396**), 4.52 Extent to which 
management (BV) reviews result in service improvement (0.318*), 5.43 Extent 
performance managed not just measured (0.427**), 5.66 Extent to which ‘use’ stage 
of performance management successful (0.451**). A focus on results seems 
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important as well as the active use of performance management, with employee 
involvement. 
 
The fire service had 11 significant correlations, the strongest were: 5.28 
Performance management increase accountability to central government (0.607*), 
5.68 Extent strategy maps are used (0.586*), 9.10 Extent use of external audit to 
improve performance management (0.716**), 9.11 Extent use of consultants at 
centre (0.774**). The use of consultants is noteworthy as is the use of the BSC, 
although the coefficient for the latter was the joint lowest of the significant.  
 
The police had none but PCTs again had more with five statements being significant, 
the strongest: 5.10 Use outcome based accountability (1.000**), 5.19 Managers 
formally appraised by subordinates (0.816**) and 8.11 Level of resources to do 
performance management in service departments (-0.745*). Again, PCTs appear to 
be different in some regards with the use of outcome based accountability being 
strong and appraisal of managers by subordinates. 
 
The hypothesis should be accepted. However, it should be noted ‘level’ does not just 
necessarily mean quantity, rather it is factors such as the involvement of service 
departments and links to service and corporate (strategic) planning that appear to 
be important.  
 
5.5 Hypothesis A4: That an organisation with a formal published 
organisational development strategy (ODS) will have higher performance 
than one without such an ODS. 
An ODS is generally regarded as a means to improve particular aspects of the 
organisation and is often expressed in terms of a psychological contract setting out 
the duties and responsibilities of the organisation and employees, as regards each 
other. This hypothesis is tested using 29 statements (Appendix 5.5) of which one of 
these statements (4.5) asks if such a strategy exists. It was however considered 
important to consider the likely constituent components of such a strategy, hence 
the number of statements.   
 
CPA Rating 
In 2005 of the 29 statements, 22 correlate with CPAR at p<0.01, one at p<0.05 and 
six are not significant at p<0.05. Statement 4.5 Published organisational 
development strategy is significant at p<0.01 (0.191**) but is not the strongest 
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correlation. These are 12.16 Level of employees’ morale (0.391**), 8.4 Level of 
motivation displayed by employees (0.386**), 12.1 Extent that organisation is a 
learning organisation (0.366**) and 4.47 Aims and objectives shared across the 
organisation (0.363**). The weakest correlations (not significant) are 4.4 Agreed 
formal mission/vision statement (-0.001), 5.25 Appraisal competency based (0.003) 
and 5.19 Managers formally appraised by subordinates (0.007). 
 
Of interest are the statements evaluating employee rewards for good performance 
and sanctions for poor performance. 5.22 Performance related pay for chief 
executive/directors is not significant (0.110), although PRP for other senior 
managers is (B69, 0.227**). 5.24 Appraisal linked to financial reward (0.242**) and 
5.41 Extent of employee rewards for good performance (not necessarily financial) 
(0.254**) are at p<0.01. However, 5.42 Extent of sanctions against employees for 
poor performance is not significant (0.137). These results are suggestive an ODS 
will tend to have a positive impact on performance. Also B69 highlights the 
importance of middle managers to an organisation and perhaps further how they are 
rewarded. Generally, ‘rewarding’ employees for good performance appears to be 
important. 
 
There is one significant negative correlation (p<0.01): I187 Extent to which 
organisation has a blame culture (-0.238**). A blame culture would tend to work 
against high performance. The weakest correlations (not significant) are 4.4 Agreed 
formal mission/vision statement (-0.001), 5.25 Appraisal competency based (0.003) 
and 5.19 Managers formally appraised by subordinates (0.007).  
 
In the 2009 survey there were two significant correlations for all organisation types 
combined: 4.21 Extent of active management of HRM (0.347**) and 4.51 Extent to 
which HRM is important for organisational performance (0.275**). For councils there 
were eight significant correlations, the strongest were: 4.5 Published organisational 
development strategy (0.344*), 4.21 Extent of active management of HRM (0.454**), 
4.51 Extent to which HRM is important for organisational performance (0.419**), 8.4 
Level of motivation displayed by employees (0.353*). There were three significant 
correlations for the fire services: 4.21 Extent of active management of HRM (0.543*), 
4.51 Extent to which HRM is important for organisational performance (0.505*) and 
5.51 Extent performance management focused on learning (0.616*). There were no 
significant correlations for police forces or PCTs. The motivation and morale of 
employees seem to be important as is the active management of HR.  
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Performance Management Score 
In the 2005 survey, of the 29 statements 11 correlate with PMS at p<0.01, seven at 
p<0.05 and 11 were not significant. There were thus some differences compared to 
the results for CPAR; in particular 4.5 Published organisational development 
strategy was not significant (0.133). The strongest correlations were 12.16 Level of 
employees morale (0.325**), 5.51 Extent performance management focused on 
learning (0.281**) and 8.4 Level of motivation displayed by employees (0.279**) and 
these are the same as for CPAR. 
  
The principal differences (CPAR stronger) were for 4.13 Extent to which 
effectiveness is more important than efficiency (0.154), 4.21 Extent of active 
management of human resources (0.111), 4.34 Delegation practiced within 
organisation (0.110), 4.47 Aims and objectives shared across organisation (0.189*), 
8.14 Extent employee creativity is harnessed (0.163*) and (PMS stronger) 5.18 
Team based appraisal (0.149*), 5.42 extent of sanctions against employees for poor 
performance (0.151*).  The weakest correlations were similar to for CPAR. 
 
In 2009 there were 14 significant correlations for all organisation types combined 
with the strongest being: 4.5 Published organisational development strategy 
(0.348**), 4.13 Extent to which effectiveness more important than efficiency 
(0.334**), 4.21 Extent of active management of human resources (0.347**), 4.47 
Aims and objectives shared across organisation (0.339**) and 4.54 Team/individual 
goals aligned to strategy (0.420**). Councils had ten significant correlations, the 
strongest: 4.5 Published organisational development strategy (0.450**), 4.51 Extent 
to which HRM is important for organisational performance (0.407**), 8.3 Extent to 
which employees are well trained (0.425**), 8.4 Level of motivation displayed by 
employees (0.388**) and 12.5 Extent to which organisation has a blame culture (-
0.387*). The complete list is similar to the 2005 survey.  
 
There were three significant correlations for the fire services: 4.47 Aims and 
objectives shared across the organisation (0.588*), 4.54 Team/individual goals 
aligned to strategy (0.677*) and 10.4 Extent strategic direction widely communicated 
(0.587**). There were no significant correlations for police forces and only 5.41 






Service Score  
In 2005 for the 29 statements six correlate with SS at p<0.01, ten at p<0.05 and 13 
are not significant. The strongest correlations were 5.41 Extent of employee rewards 
for good performance (0.270**), B69 Performance related pay for senior managers 
(0.219**) and 8.4 Level of motivation displayed by employees (0.215**). The 
statement (4.5) regarding a published ODS is significant at p<0.05 (0.162*). These 
statements are clearly about service delivery and are somewhat different from the 
strongest correlations for CPAR and PMS.  
 
The weakest correlations (not significant) were 4.4 Agreed formal/mission statement 
(0.003), 5.25 Appraisal competency based (0.015), 12.5 Extent to which 
organisation has a blame culture (0.020) and 5.18 Team based appraisal (0.032). 
The odd one out here is 12.5, significant at p<0.01 for CPAR (-0.238**) and PMS (-
0.325**). SS is focussed on delivery and this tends to be supported by the 
statements exhibiting the strongest correlations such that the existence of a blame 
culture may not be considered material in this respect. 
 
In 2009 there were two significant correlations for all organisation types combined: 
5.22 Performance related pay for chief executive/directors (-0.293**) and 5.24 
Appraisal lined to financial reward (-0.300**) and two for councils; 4.21 Extent of 
active management of HRM (0.295*) and 8.4 Level of motivation displayed by 
employees (0.283*). There were three for fire: 4.47 Aims and objectives shared 
across organisation (0.764**), 4.54 Team/individual goals aligned to strategy 
(0.684**), 10.4 Extent strategic direction widely communicated (0.696**) and one for 
police; 5.22 Performance related pay for chief executive/directors (0.824*). 
 
PCTs have the highest number of significant correlations in 2009 numbering six with 
the three strongest: 5.24 Appraisal linked to financial reward (-0.726*), 5.25 
Appraisal competency based (-0.703*) and 10.4 Extent strategic direction widely 
communicated (-0.784**).  
 
Corporate Assessment 
In 2005 of the 29 statements, 18 correlate with CA at p<0.01, four at p<0.05 with 
seven not significant. This is not too dissimilar to for CPAR. 4.5 Published 
organisational development strategy is significant at p<0.05 (0.181*) but is not the 
strongest correlation. These are 12.16 Level of employees’ morale (0.373**), 8.4 
Level of motivation displayed by employees (0.343**) and 12.1 Extent that the 
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organisation is a learning organisation (0.316**) and are the same top three as for 
CPAR. 
 
In 2009 there were seven significant correlations for all four organisation types 
combined, the strongest: 4.21 Extent of active management of HRM (0.334**), 8.3 
Extent to which employees are well trained (0.381**) and10.2 Extent communication 
on corporate/service planning (0.300*). 
 
There were eight significant correlations for councils, the strongest being: 4.21 
Extent of active management of HRM (0.334**), 8.3 Extent to which employees are 
well trained (0.448**), 8.4 Level of motivation displayed by employees (0.419**), 12.5 
Extent to which organisation has a blame culture (-0.340*). The fire service has one 
significant correlation; 4.5 Published organisational development strategy (0.516*), 
police forces none and PCTs one; 5.19 Managers formally appraised by 
subordinates (0.816**).   
 
The hypothesis that an organisation having a formal published ODS will be higher 
performing should be accepted. An ODS will tend to provide focus for effective and 
efficient service delivery by linking the organisation and its employees into shared 
aims and objectives. One outcome of this may be increased employee morale and 
motivation. Of course, high performance may be likely to promote high morale and 
motivation - a virtuous circle perhaps.  Practicing the activities inherent in an ODS 
without formality could also have an impact on performance. 
 
5.6 Hypothesis A5: That an organisation that uses proprietary performance 
management software will have higher performance than an organisation 
that uses none or its own software.  
Organisations are increasingly using software to manage performance and there are 
a number of proprietary systems available (Marr and Neely, 2003). A statement 
assessed the use of such proprietary systems. As Appendix 5.6 shows there are no 
significant correlations for CPAR, PMS, SS or CA for either 2005 or 2009. Indeed a 
number of the correlations are negative. The hypothesis should therefore be 
rejected.  
 
The author has practical and anecdotal evidence that where the basics of 
performance management are not in place then software will do little, if anything, to 
enhance performance management. Rather software, including proprietary, will 
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allow an organisation to build on an already good system but will not remedy 
deficiencies. In military parlance such software would be regarded as a ‘force 
multiplier’ enhancing the quality and value of other assets.  
 
5.7 Hypothesis A6: That an organisation that involves employees more in 
performance management will have higher performance than an 
organisation that involves employees less. 
Seven statements assess this hypothesis (Appendix 5.7). For CPAR, in 2005, five 
of these were significant at p<0.01, one at p<0.05 and one is not significant (4.16 
Extent top-down approach to strategic planning, -0.036). The strongest correlations 
were for 4.34 Delegation practiced within the organisation (0.362**), 4.41 
Organisation focuses on employees (0.353**) and 4.6 Employees goals aligned with 
organisation’s (0.351**). There is only a single significant correlation in 2009 for 
councils: 4.41 Organisation focuses on employees (0.322*), although some of the 
correlations for others are relatively strong.  
 
In 2005 there was a similar pattern for PMS, although 4.34 Delegation practiced 
within organisation is not significant (0.110), which is different from CPAR, for which 
this is the strongest correlation. The strongest correlation is for 4.41 Organisation 
focuses on employees (0.249**). In 2009 there is one significant correlation for 
councils; 4.34 Delegation practiced within the organisation (0.280*) and two for all 
four organisation types combined; 4.34 Delegation practiced within the organisation 
(0.221*) and 4.36 Employee’s goals aligned with organisation’s (0.297**). 
 
There is one significant correlation (p<0.01) with SS that is 4.34 Delegation practiced 
within organisation (0.203**), with the weakest being 4.43 Extent performance is 
focused on group processes (0.029) not significant. In 2009 the only significant 
correlations are for PCTs of which there are two: 4.16 Extent top-down approach to 
strategic planning (-0.693*) and 4.41 Organisation focuses on employees (-0.637**). 
  
The correlations for CA are similar to those for CPAR with the exception that 4.43 
Extent performance management focused on group processes is not significant 
(0.113). In 2009 the only two significant correlations were for councils: 4.22 Extent 
of front-line employee involvement in service planning (0.288*) and 10.5 Extent use 




Overall, this hypothesis should be accepted. Although, there are few significant 
correlations for 2009 many are quite high, which coupled with the analysis for 2005 
lead to this conclusion.   
 
5.8 Hypothesis A7: That an organisation that uses the 
BSC/EFQM/TQM/MBO/Benchmarking/Strategy mapping will have higher 
performance than an organisation that does not. 
This hypothesis states organisations which use certain management techniques will 
be higher performing than those that do not (Appendix 5.8). In 2005 the extent to 
which the technique is an integral part of strategic planning (5.67) is significant at 
p<0.01 for CPAR (0.218**), PMS (0.239**), SS (0.259**) and CA (0.195**). 
 
As for the individual techniques: in the 2005 survey, the strongest correlation for 
EFQM EM (5.3) is with SS (0.272**), although CPAR is close behind (0.268**), both 
at p<0.01. The only significant correlation for BSC (5.4) is with SS (0.229**) at p<0.01 
and TQM (5.5) is only significant at p<0.05 with respect to CA (0.173*). 
Benchmarking (5.6) and MBO (5.7) are not significant with any of the CPA measures. 
The use of strategy mapping (5.8) is significant (p<0.01) with CPAR (0.197**), PMS 
(0.238**) and SS (0.245**). Strategy mapping is significant (p<0.05) with CA 
(0.190*).  
 
In the 2009 survey there were only three significant correlations at p<0.05. One with 
the CPAR for all four types of organisations combined: 5.6 Use benchmarking 
(0.222*) and one for PCTs: 5.8 Use strategy mapping (-0.655*). There is a significant 
correlation for fire services with the CA: 5.4 Use balanced scorecard or variant 
(0.518*). 
 
The picture as regards the use of these techniques is therefore mixed. The EFQM 
EM and strategy mapping would appear to have the largest impact on performance 
and then more so if used strategically. The number of statistically significant 
correlations is low, although interestingly there are a fair number of negative 
correlations. We can only partly accept the hypothesis since performance appears 
to depend on the technique(s) utilised and implementation is likely to be critical, 





5.9 Hypothesis A8: That an organisation that is more innovative will be 
higher performing than an organisation that is less innovative. 
Appendix 5.9 contains the correlation coefficients for statements assessing 
innovation. For 2005 there were significant correlations mainly at p<0.01 for all four 
statements and CPA measures, except for 12.20 Extent to which the organisation is 
change oriented and SS (0.143) and 12.32 Extent of inclination for experimentation 
within the organisation and SS (0.106). The strongest correlation (p<0.01) was for 
4.10 Level of innovation in service delivery and CPAR (0.469**) followed by 4.11 
Level of innovation in service planning and CPAR (0.464**).  
 
In 2009 there was one significant correlation (p<0.05) for all organisation types 
combined with PMS being 12.32 Extent of inclination for experimentation within 
organisation (0.238*).  For councils in 2009 there was one significant correlation: 
4.10 Level of innovation in service delivery (0.342*) with CPAR, although some of 
the other correlations are fairly high. For fire services there were two significant 
correlations: both for 12.20 Extent to which organisation is change oriented, firstly, 
for CPAR (0.530*) and secondly, CA (0.535*). The police have no significant 
correlations whereas there were two for PCTs: both for 12.32 Extent of inclination 
for experimentation within the organisation, for CPAR and SS, both coefficients 
being 0.688*. Again some of the other coefficients are fairly high. 
 
On balance this hypothesis should be accepted, whilst noting innovation is generally 
regarded as a characteristic of high performing organisations, it can take a number 
of forms. It may also not be uniform across the whole organisation.  
 
5.10 Hypothesis A9: That an organisation that has a higher level of 
citizen/service user focus will be higher performing than one that focuses on 
citizens/service users less. 
This hypothesis is assessed by 12 statements (Appendix 5.10). There are a large 
number of p<0.01 correlations. 
 
CPA Rating 
In 2005 for CPAR all but one of the statements are significant at p<0.01, the 
exception being 9.21 Transactions with citizens rather than relationships, negative 
and not significant (-0.067). The strongest correlations are: 4.46 Extent to which 
organisation gives vfm (0.468**), 4.35 Extent of responsiveness of the organisation 
to service users (0.443**) and 4.42 Organisation focuses on service provision 
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(0.407**). In 2009 there are two significant correlations both for 4.40 Extent to which 
organisation focuses on customers, for councils (0.364**) and fire services (0.561*). 
That the extent of vfm is the strongest correlation may suggest an organisation 
balancing service provision and (local) taxation in the ‘correct’ proportion is regarded 
as the highest performing. 
 
Performance Management Score 
Eleven of the statements in 2005 were significant at p<0.01 and one is significant at 
p<0.05. The strongest correlations are 9.23 Extent citizens participate in 
performance management (0.363**), 4.35 Extent of responsiveness of the 
organisation to service users (0.354**) and 4.37 Extent organisation is citizen 
centred (0.346**). In 2009 there were three significant statements for all four 
organisation types combined: 4.40 Extent to which organisation focuses on 
customers (0.233*), 4.46 Extent to which organisation gives vfm (0.327**) and 12.24 
Extent service to public a high priority (0.228*).  There were two for councils: 4.46 
Extent to which organisation gives vfm (0.304*) and 5.65 Extent ‘equity’ a driver of 
service performance (0.306*). 
 
Service Score 
For SS, in 2005, eight statements are significant at p<0.01, three at p<0.05 and one 
is not significant: 9.21 Transactions with citizens rather than relationships (0.018). 
The strongest correlations are for 9.20 Extent of service users consultation (0.320**), 
4.46 Extent to which organisation gives vfm (0.300**) and 9.23 Extent to which 
citizens participate in performance management (0.292**). In 2009 there was a 
single significant correlation with SS for all four organisation types combined: 9.23 
Extent to which citizens participate in performance management (-0.232*). For the 
individual organisation types the police had none and there was one for each of the 
others. For councils it was 4.40 Extent to which organisation focuses on customers 
(0.539*), for fire 4.46 Extent to which organisation gives vfm (0.300**) and for PCTs 
4.42 Organisation focuses on service provision (-0.899**). 
 
Corporate Assessment 
As regards CA there were 11 significant correlations at p<0.01 with 9.21 
Transactions with citizens rather than relationships being the exception, not 
significant (-0.103). The strongest correlations were for 4.35 Extent of 
responsiveness of the organisation to service users (0.428**), 4.40 Extent to which 
organisation focuses on customers (0.395**) and 4.46 Extent to which organisation 
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gives vfm (0.379**). In 2009 there were two significant correlations with all 
organisation types combined: 4.42 Organisation focuses on service provision 
(0.239*) and 4.46 Extent to which organisation gives vfm (0.305**), with none at all 
for the individual organisation types. 
 
Given the large number of significant correlations in 2005 we can be confident in 




5.11 Hypothesis B1: That an organisation with a comprehensive approach 
to employee appraisal will have higher performance than an organisation 
with a less comprehensive approach. 
 
CPA Rating 
Appendix 5.11 contains 13 statements assessing this hypothesis. In 2005 for 
CPAR there were six statements for which the correlation is significant at p<0.01 
and seven not significant. The strongest correlations are for 4.36 Employees’ goals 
are aligned with the organisation’s (0.351**), 4.53 Extent to which employee 
incentives are financial (0.264**) and 5.41 Extent of employee rewards for good 
performance (0.254**). None of the statements specifically mentioning appraisal 
are significant apart from 5.24 Appraisal linked to financial reward, significant at 
p<0.01 (0.242**). There would appear to be a link between reward (not necessarily 
financial) and performance, although it may be complex. 
 
In 2009 there was one significant correlation for councils: 8.3 Extent to which 
employees are well trained (0.322*) and one for police; 12.10 Extent to which an 
employee’s role is determined by their job description (0.681*). 
 
Performance Management Score 
In 2005 four statements were significant at p<0.01 with PMS, three at p<0.05 and 
six not significant. The strongest correlations were for 4.53 Extent to which 
employee incentives are financial (0.295**), 5.41 Extent of employee rewards for 
good performance (0.245**) and 4.36 Employees’ goals aligned with organisation’s 
(0.244**). The weakest correlations were for 12.9 Extent to which an employee’s 
level in the organisation determines their contribution (-0.019), 5.25 Appraisal is 
competency based (0.019) and 5.19 Managers formally appraised by subordinates 
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(0.050). Interestingly, 8.3 Extent to which employees are well trained is not 
significant for PMS, although it is for CPAR, CA (p<0.01) and at p<0.05 for SS. 
 
In 2009 two statements were significant for all organisation types combined: 4.36 
Employees’ goals aligned with organisation’s (0.299**) and 8.3 Extent to which 
employees are well trained (0.272*). There is one significant correlation for 
councils (8.3 Extent to which employees are well trained, 0.322*) and police (5.41 
Extent of employee rewards for good performance, -0.667*). 
 
Service Score 
For SS, in 2005, there were three statements significant at p<0.01: 5.41 Extent of 
employee rewards for good performance (0.270**), B69 Performance related pay 
for other senior managers (0.219**) and 5.42 Extent of sanctions against 
employees for poor performance (0.196**). Five statements were significant at 
p<0.05 and five were not significant. 
 
In 2009 there were two significant correlations with all organisation types 
combined: 5.22 Performance related pay for (senior managers) chief 
executive/director (-0.293**) and 5.24 Appraisal linked to financial reward (-
0.300**). There was one significant correlation each for police (5.22 Performance 
related pay for (senior managers) chief executive/director, 0.824*) and PCTs; 5.25 
Appraisal competency based (-0.703*).  
 
Corporate Assessment 
In 2005, six statements had correlations with CA at p<0.01, one at p<0.05 and six 
were not significant. The strongest correlations were for 4.36 Employee’s goals are 
aligned with organisation’s (0.287**), 4.53 Extent to which employee incentives are 
financial (0.270**) and 5.24 Appraisal linked to financial reward (0.229**). In 2009 
there was a single significant correlation for all four organisation types combined: 
8.3 Extent to which employees are well trained (0.381**). There were two for 
councils: 8.3 Extent to which employees are well trained (0.488**) and 12.10 Extent 
to which an employee’s role determined by job description (-0.342*). There was 
one significant correlation for PCTs; 5.19 Managers formally appraised by 
subordinates (0.816**).  
 
The hypothesis is a comprehensive approach to employee appraisal will produce 
higher performance. Given the variation in this set of statements and the 
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statistically significant correlations being principally for (financial) reward we may 
conclude this hypothesis can, at best, only be partially accepted.  
 
5.12 Hypothesis B2: That an organisation that heavily involves service 
departments in service planning and performance management is higher 
performing than an organisation that involves them less.  
The hypothesis on the involvement of departments in service planning and 
performance management is assessed by seven statements (Appendix 5.12). In 
2005, there were a large number of correlations (p<0.01) for all four CPA 
measures. However, statement 5.36 Approach to performance management top-
down is not significant for all four measures (0.107, -0.066, 0.077 and 0.008) and 
8.11 Level of resources to do performance management is not significant for PMS 
(0.140) and SS (0.138). 
 
The strongest correlations are for CPAR and 4.24 Extent of departmental 
involvement in doing service planning (0.378**), SS with 5.37 Level of 
departmental involvement in developing performance management (0.336**) and 
5.38 Level of departmental involvement in running performance management 
(0.309**).  
 
In 2009 there were three significant correlations for all four organisation types 
combined: 4.23 Level of departmental involvement in development of service 
planning (0.302**), 4.24 Extent of departmental involvement in doing service 
planning (0.314**) and 8.11 Level of resources to do performance management in 
service departments (0.280*). Also for councils: 4.23 (0.334*), 4.24 (0.304*) and 
8.11 (0.454**) and fire (4.23, 0.567* and 4.24, 0.511*) but none for police or PCTs. 
The pattern is similar for the other three measures. Given these correlations the 
hypothesis should be accepted. 
 
Administration 
5.13 Hypothesis C1: That an organisation that exhibits a higher level of 
decentralisation will be higher performing than one that is more centralised. 
In 2005, eight statements (Appendix 5.13) test this hypothesis. This is unlike others 
considered so far in that there are relatively few statistically significant correlations 
for key statements. There are significant correlations at p<0.01 for 6.5 Extent to 
which departments operate independently and (CPAR, -0.245**; PMS, -0.232** 
and CA, -0.280**), 6.6 Consistency of the level of practices/routines (0.375**, 
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0.244**, 0.205** and 0.316**). However, these statements do not necessarily 
measure the level of decentralisation per se rather, perhaps, the imposition of 
practices (6.6) and the corporate dimension to the organisation (6.5). 
 
In 2009 the pattern was very similar but with the fire service showing some level of 
centralisation with SS (6.1 Level of centralisation of control, 0.609* and 6.3 Level 
of centralisation of service planning, 0.607*). 
 
The statements relating directly to centralisation: 6.1 Level of centralisation of 
control, 6.2 Level of centralisation of administration, 6.3 Level of centralisation of 
service planning and 6.4 Level of centralisation of performance management 
provide little support for the hypothesis which should be rejected.  
 
5.14 Hypothesis C2: That an organisation with a higher level of 
decentralised service planning will be higher performing than one with a 
lower level. 
This hypothesis should also be rejected (Appendix 5.14). However, the position of 
the fire service appears to be anomalous with respect to the CA. 
 
5.15 Hypothesis C3: That an organisation with a higher level of 
decentralised performance management will be higher performing than one 
with a lower level. 
Two statements assess this hypothesis (Appendix 5.15). For the key statement 6.4 
Level of centralisation of performance management the correlations are not 
significant (0.053, 0.015, 0.009 and 0.011). Statement 5.34 Performance 
management method of control considers the extent to which performance 
management is a means of control. Again, this is not necessarily decentralisation 
(although it could be) and so this hypothesis is rejected. 
 
5.16 Hypothesis C4: That an organisation with a consistency of rules and 
practices throughout will be higher performing than an organisation with 
less consistency. 
Five statements (Appendix 5.16) assess this hypothesis, and in 2005 most had a 
significant correlation (p<0.01) with all four measures. The exceptions are PMS 
with 4.45 Extent to which probity is valued not significant (0.138), as is SS and 6.7 
Extent to which the need for ‘control’ tends to subvert ‘purpose’ (0.020). There were 
two correlations significant at p<0.05: CPAR and 6.7 Extent to which the need for 
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‘control’ tends to subvert ‘purpose’ (-0.173*) and PMS with 6.9 Extent to which 
governance needs are discussed (0.168*). 
 
The strongest correlations are for CPAR with statement 6.6 Consistency of level of 
practices/routines (0.375**), CA with 6.6 Consistency of level of practices/routines 
(0.316**) and CPAR with 6.8 Extent to which administrative policies and practices 
are based on evidence (0.284**). 6.7 Extent to which ‘control’ tends to subvert 
‘purpose’ exhibits significant negative correlations with CPAR (-0.173*, p<0.05), 
PMS (-0.221**) and CA (-0.218**), both significant at p<0.01. However, 6.7 Extent 
to which ‘control’ tends to subvert ‘purpose’ is not significant with SS (0.020). 
 
Statements 4.45 Extent to which probity is valued, 6.8 Extent to which 
administrative policies and practices are based on evidence and 6.9 Extent to 
which governance needs are included here because it is felt high scores on these 
are likely to promote consistency of behaviour, practices and operations. As 
regards 6.7 Extent to which ‘control’ tends to subvert ‘purpose’, this statement tests 
for a rigidity of control within the organisation irrespective of desired outcomes. 
This therefore illustrates the rules and practices are not regarded as controlling 
operations in a detrimental manner. 
  
There are few significant correlations in 2009, although for all four organisation 
types combined, 6.7 Extent to which ‘control’ tends to subvert ‘purpose’ is 
significant with CPAR (-0.259*) and 6.6 Consistency of the level of 
practices/routines is significant with both PMS (0.342**) and CA (0.378**). 
 
Given the large number of significant correlations we should accept the hypothesis. 
It may be for police and fire, likely to have a high consistency, the test is 
superfluous. However, note the fire service significant correlation of CA with 6.9 
Extent to which governance needs are discussed. This hypothesis may be 
regarded as sympathetic with Hypothesis A1, testing the level of strategic direction. 
 
Leadership 
5.17 Hypothesis D1: That an organisation that exhibits a high level of 
political and managerial leadership will be higher performing than one that 
shows a lower level. 
Leadership is often regarded as a key determinant of organisational performance, 
whatever the sector (Humphreys, 2001 and Bryman, 2004). In councils, in 
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particular, there is distinct leadership from councillors (political) and leadership 
from officers (managerial) but this also applies in varying degrees to the other 
organisations. Four statements (Appendix 5.17) assess this; for 2005 all are 
significant except for one: PMS and 4.45 Extent to which probity is valued (0.138). 
The correlations for the statements directly assessing the level of political and 
managerial leadership are all positive with higher levels of leadership 
corresponding with higher performance. The strongest correlations are for political 
rather than managerial leadership: 7.2 Level of political leadership in the 
organisation with CA (0.293**) and with PMS (0.278**), both significant at p<0.01. 
 
There are few significant correlations in 2009 although 7.2 Level of political 
leadership shows up for fire services with CPAR (0.725**) and CA (0.782**). The 
police exhibit a significant correlation of 7.3 Level of officer leadership in the 
organisation with SS. PCTs exhibit a significant negative correlation for SS with 
4.45 Extent to which probity is valued (-0.667*) 
 
The statements on probity (4.45) and governance (6.9) are included here because 
it is felt the results for these will depend to a significant extent on leadership and 
indeed there would appear to be similarity of correlations supporting this 
contention. We should therefore accept the hypothesis. The next section assesses 
whether leadership of politicians or officers is more important in delivering high 
performance. 
 
5.18 Hypothesis D2: That an organisation where officer leadership is more 
pronounced than that from the politicians will be higher performing than 
one where the reverse is the case. 
It has already been established an organisation with high levels of political and 
officer leadership is likely to be higher performing than one with lower levels and 
further leadership of politicians has the stronger correlations (statements 7.2 and 
7.3). Appendix 5.18 contains these statements and also two others addressing 
whether the organisation is characterised as officer led (7.1) and the level of 
empowerment of officers (7.4). For the 2005 survey, in terms of 7.1 there were two 
significant correlations at p<0.05: with PMS (-0.157*) and SS (0.159*). This 
suggests in an officer led organisation performance management is associated 
with lower performance whilst it is positively associated with SS. Characterisation 




However, the level of empowerment of officers is significant when correlated with 
CPAR (0.332**), PMS (0.232**), SS (0.159*) and CA (0.333**). There are few 
significant correlations in the 2009 survey although 7.4 Level of empowerment of 
officers is significant for SS in fire services (0.685*). 
 
The results suggest the hypothesis should be rejected and it is rather, an 
organisation where political leadership is more pronounced than officer leadership, 
which will be the higher performing. It does; however, seem to be important this 




5.19 Hypothesis E1: That an organisation with a higher level of resources 
will be higher performing than an organisation with a lower level 
It may seem self-evident that a higher level of resources will deliver higher 
performance. Twelve statements (Appendix 5.19) test this hypothesis considering 




In 2005, three statements correlate with CPAR at p<0.01: 8.12 Extent information 
available for corporate/service planning (0.344**), 8.9 Level of research capacity 
(0.277**) and 8.13 Quality of organisation’s physical infrastructure (0.249**). A 
further three are significant at p<0.05: 8.15 Extent strategic capacity is overloaded 
(-0.186*), 4.8 Reviews using work measurement (0.174*) and 8.16 Extent 
operational capacity is overloaded (0.159*). The weakest correlations are 4.32 
extent of organisational slack in service departments (0.012), 4.31 Extent of 
organisational slack in central functions (0.030) and 8.18 Extent of budgetary slack 
in the organisation (0.068).  
 
In 2009 councils had one significant correlation (8.9 Level of research capacity, 
0.366**), fire services had two (8.6 Extent other employees are overloaded with 
work, 0.522* and 8.15 Extent strategic capacity is overloaded, 0.742**) whilst 
police had one (4.8 Reviews using work measurement, -0.681*). There were none 
for PCTs and only one for all four organisation types combined: 8.9 Level of 




Performance Management Score 
In 2005 there were five correlations with PMS at p<0.01. The strongest were 8.12 
Extent information available for corporate/service planning (0.308**), 8.15 Extent 
strategic capacity is overloaded (-0.252**) and 8.5 Extent managers overloaded 
with work (-0.226**). The weakest correlations, not significant at p<0.05, were 4.31 
Extent of organisational slack in central functions (-0.001) and 4.32 Extent of 
organisational slack in service departments (-0.032). In 2009 there was only one 
significant correlation which was for PCTs: 8.12 Extent information available for 
corporate/service planning (-0.762*). 
 
Service Score 
In 2005, for SS the pattern is a little different. There were three correlations at 
p<0.01: 8.12 Extent information available for corporate/service planning (0.215**), 
4.8 Reviews using work measurement (0.199**) and 8.9 Level of research capacity 
(0.194**). It will be noticed 4.8 is included and this could be interpreted as the 
impact of organisational (BV) reviews although there is little anecdotal evidence of 
traditional work measurement being practiced in many councils. The weakest 
correlations not significant at p<0.05 were: 4.32 Extent of organisational slack in 
service departments (0.031), 8.18 extent of budgetary slack in the organisation 
(0.056) and 4.31 Extent of organisational slack in central functions (-0.068). In 
2009 there was one significant correlation, again for PCTs: 8.13 Quality of an 
organisation’s infrastructure (-0.758*) although for all four types of organisations 




There were four correlations at p<0.01 with CA in 2005. The strongest correlations 
were 8.12 Extent of information available for corporate/service planning (0.360**), 
8.15 Extent strategic capacity is overloaded (-0.236**) and 8.9 Level of research 
capacity (0.235**). The weakest correlations were 4.32 Extent of organisational 
slack in service departments (0.010), 4.31 Extent of organisational slack in central 
functions (0.022) and 8.6 extent other employees are overloaded with work (-
0.084). In 2009 there were no significant correlations for all four types of 
organisation combined or councils. There were three for fire services: 8.5 Extent 
managers overloaded with work (-0.590*), 8.6 Extent other employees are 
overloaded with work (0.518*) and 8.15 Extent strategic capacity is overloaded 
(0.561*). There were three significant correlations for PCTs; 8.6 Extent other 
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employees are overloaded with work (-0.781**), 8.15 Extent strategic capacity is 
overloaded (-0.640*) and 8.18 Extent of budgetary slack in the organisation 
(0.692*) 
 
Key messages are the level of organisational (4.31, 4.32) or budgetary (8.18) slack 
does not appear to have a significant impact on performance, apart from for PCTs. 
There is however some evidence both strategic (8.15) and operational (8.16) 
capacity are overloaded. The extent managers are overloaded with work (8.5) is 
only significant for PMS (-0.226**) and CA for fire (0.590*) and 8.6 Extent other 
employees are overloaded with work is significant for all the measures except 
PMS. What appears to be important is information is available for corporate and 
service planning (8.12) and the level of research capacity (8.9), and these are likely 
to be related. Strategic capacity appears to be important and the quality of 
infrastructure may have an impact. 
 
In terms of the hypothesis it is not entirely clear it can be accepted or rejected and 
it should, perhaps, be accepted in part. It may be it is not the level of resources per 
se that is the important factor but how they are utilised; in particular for research 
and providing information for corporate and service planning. The overloading of 
managers and other employees seems to have a negative impact on performance, 
although the fire service appears to be anomalous in this regard.  
  
5.20 Hypothesis E2: That an organisation with a relatively higher level of 
resources devoted to activities at the centre than in services will be higher 
performing than an organisation with the reverse. 
Building on the previous hypothesis (E1) we consider whether an organisation with 
a relatively higher level of resources devoted to activities at the centre than in 
services will be higher performing. (Appendix 5.20). There are six statements 
evaluating this. In 2005, for two statements there are no significant correlations 
with the four measures: 8.7 Amount of resources deployed at corporate centre 
(0.052, 0.037, -0.094, and 0.065) and 8.17 Extent policy analysis capacity is 
overloaded (-0.091, -0.120, -0.108, -0.088).  
 
The strongest correlations are for 8.12 Extent information available for 
corporate/service planning (0.344**, 0.308**, 0.215** and 0.360**) and although it 
might be expected the centre would usually do a substantial amount of work, some 
would invariably be done in departments. It is not therefore conclusive regarding 
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the hypothesis. Similarly, 8.10 Level of resources to do performance management 
at the centre and 8.11 Level of resources to do performance management in 
service departments are not conclusive. The stronger correlation for CPAR and CA 
with 8.11 over 8.10 may suggest having a certain (sufficient) level of resources in 
departments is more critical than at the centre but this could depend on having a 
framework to give corporate direction. The 2005 case studies tend to support this 
and Durham County Council appears the best example. In 2009 the majority of 
significant correlations are for PCTs: 8.10 Level of resources to do performance 
management at the centre, 8.11 Level of resources to do performance 
management in service departments and 8.12 Extent information available for 
corporate/service planning. The strength of the correlations with PMS, SS and CA 
are similar, although negative in most instances. 
 
Given the lack of a statistically significant correlation between 8.7 Amount of 
resources deployed at the corporate centre it would be difficult to accept this 
hypothesis. Indeed there may be some evidence resources deployed in 
departments, at least as regards performance management, are more associated 
with high performance than those deployed at the centre. On balance the 
hypothesis should be rejected but this is clearly an area where more research is 
likely to be informative. 
 
5.21 Hypothesis E3: That an organisation with a higher level of resources 
spent on service planning will be higher performing than an organisation that 
spends less. 
Three statements (Appendix 5.21) assess this hypothesis. In 2005 there were 
significant correlations for two but not for the third. There was no significant 
correlation between the four measures of performance and 8.7 Amount of 
resources deployed at the corporate centre (0.052, 0.037, -0.094 and 0.065). 
However, it would be expected a significant amount of service planning would be 
done in service departments. 8.2 Allocation of resources formally determined by 
priorities would be expected to be statistically significant with corporate/service 
planning as being the means by which priorities are assigned resources. There 
were correlations at p<0.01 for 8.2 with CPAR (0.192**) and PMS (0.196**) and at 
p<0.05 for CA (0.171*). 
 
It might be expected the amount of resource spent on service planning would 
determine in some way the amount of information available for service planning. 
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This is assessed by 8.12 Extent information available for corporate/ service 
planning and is significant for all four measures at p<0.01: CPAR 0.344**, PMS 
0.308**, SS 0.215** and CA 0.360**. In 2009 the fire service had a statistically 
significant correlation with CA for 8.7 Amount of resources deployed at the 
corporate centre (0.551*). The only others were for PCTs and 8.12 Extent 
information available for corporate/service planning and PMS (-0.762**) and SS (-
0.841**). 
 
Although, the hypothesis should be accepted we should also caution it may not be 
the level of resources that matters but how they are deployed so there is an implicit 
assumption built into the hypothesis (probably at least partly incorrect). 
 
5.22 Hypothesis E4: That an organisation with a higher level of resources 
spent on performance management will be higher performing than an 
organisation that spends less. 
Performance management per se is related to service planning in that service 
plans will have a series of PIs (and associated actions) to measure achievement 
of objectives by. It might be expected service planning and performance 
management go together as regards criteria in organisations (delivering high 
performance). Three statements (Appendix 5.22) consider this. We have 
previously seen the amount of resources deployed at the corporate centre is not 
significant with any of the four measures. In 2005, statement 8.10 Level of 
resources to do performance management at the centre is significant (p<0.01) with 
CPAR (0.202**) and CA (0.206**) and at p<0.05 with PMS (0.183*) but not with SS 
(0.050). As regards the level of resources to do performance management in 
service departments (8.11) this is significant (p<0.01) with CPAR (0.250**) and CA 
(0.254**) but not (p<0.05) PMS (0.140) or SS (0.138). In 2009 for councils the 
situation appears to be similar, although police show no significant correlations and 
fire only one: 8.7 Amount of resources deployed at corporate centre and CA 
(0.551*). For PCTs there are significant correlations for 8.10 Level of resources to 
do performance management at the centre and 8.11 Level of resources to do 
performance management in service departments for PMS (-0.768** and -0.745* 
respectively), SS (-0.697* and -0.745*) and CA (-0.640* and -0.745*). 
 
This  hypothesis should be accepted but in doing so note the level of resources in 
service departments appears to be statistically more significant than at the centre 
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for CPAR and CA (i.e. the overall measures of performance) but not for PMS, 
where it would appear it is resources at the centre that are more important. 
 
5.23 Hypothesis E5: That an organisation that has well trained and motivated 
employees will be higher performing than an organisation whose employees 
are less well trained and motivated. 
It is an axiom that well trained and motivated employees deliver higher 
performance. This is tested using the statements in Appendix 5.23. In 2005, two 
statements have no or limited significant correlations whilst three have a large 
number of significant correlations. Having an organisation-wide training 
programme including management training (4.7) is not significant with any of the 
four measures (0.138, 0.005, 0.073 and 0.067). Statement 4.37 Extent to which 
training improves the organisation’s performance is only significant at p<0.05 with 
CPAR (0.174*). It therefore looks as if training is not a significant driver as regards 
organisational performance. However, 8.3 Extent to which employees in 
organisations are well trained was significant (p<0.01) with CPAR (0.241**) and 
CA (0.198**) and at p<0.05 with SS (0.189*) but not with PMS (0.141). 
 
Turning to motivation, all the correlations were significant at p<0.01 for 8.4 Level 
of motivation displayed by employees (CPAR, 0.386**; PMS, 0.279**; SS, 0.215** 
and CA, 0.343**) and 4.39 Organisation regarded as competitive in terms of 
achievement (0.411**, 0.303**, 0.311** and 0.369**). It is clear motivation is a 
stronger driver of performance than training which is understandable in terms of 
training being rather a passive device whereas motivation may be regarded as 
active. The picture is similar for 2009, although councils appear to be somewhat 
dissimilar to the other three organisation types.  
 
The hypothesis should be accepted but note the level of training would appear to 
be of less importance than the level of motivation. 
 
5.24 Hypothesis E6: That an organisation where resources follow priorities 
will be higher performing than one where resources are allocated historically 
and not prioritised. 
Two statements (Appendix 5.24) test this hypothesis. In 2005, there were 
correlations at p<0.01 for 8.2 Allocation of resources formally determined by 
priorities with CPAR (0.192**), PMS (0.196**) and at p<0.05 for CA (0.171*), with 
SS not being significant (0.131). Statement 8.1 Departmental under/overspends 
179 
 
carried over one year to next is only significant (p<0.01) for SS (0.208**).  In the 
2009 survey there is only one significant correlation; PMS and councils for 8.1 
Departmental under/overspends carried over one year to next (-0.307*). 
 
The evidence appears contradictory and perhaps rather weak and similar to 
hypothesis E1. On balance we should accept the hypothesis but caution, once 
again, deployment of resources may be rather critical. 
 
5.25 Hypothesis E7: That an organisation that uses ICT more will be higher 
performing than an organisation that uses it less 
The use of ICT is often seen as important in terms of organisational performance 
(Appendix 5.25). In 2005, statement 8.8 Use of ICT in the organisation correlates 
with higher performance at p<0.01 for CPAR (0.231**) and at p<0.05 for CA 
(0.185*), although it is not significant for PMS (0.133) or SS (0.096). As we have 
seen 5.1 Use of proprietary performance software is not significant for any of the 
CPA measures. There were no significant correlations in the 2009 survey. Given 
the correlations the hypothesis should be accepted, although the strength is quite 
weak. There is the need for more work to investigate the relationship, in particular 
the impact of ICT on service performance (evidenced through the SS). Deployment 
is probably a critical issue. 
 
Stakeholders and Partnerships 
5.26 Hypothesis F1: That an organisation that more actively engages with 
auditors, inspectors and other stakeholders will have higher performance 
than an organisation that has a lower level of engagement. 
There is a commonly held view that one sign of a high performing organisation is 
it engages widely with its stakeholders and by doing so it enhances its learning, 
capability and reputation. Appendix 5.26 contains 17 statements to test this. 
 
CPA Rating 
In 2005, for CPAR, 12 statements are significant at p<0.01, one at p<0.05 and four 
are not significant. The strongest correlations (p<0.01) are 9.5 Inspectors 
supportive of organisation (0.422**), 9.18 Extent of use of internal networks by the 
organisation (0.351**) and 9.19 Extent of use of external networks by the 
organisation (0.326**). The weakest correlations are for 9.11 Extent of use of 
consultants in the centre (-0.074), F158 Extent of use of consultants in services (-
0.119) and 9.10 Extent of use of external audit to improve performance 
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management (0.124). Interestingly, the use of consultants (9.11 and 9.13) are 
negative suggesting the use of consultants’ works against high performance (or 
lower performing organisations use consultants more). Although, the correlations 
are not significant (p<0.05), it is stronger for the use of consultants in services than 
in the centre. In 2009 there were five significant correlations for councils: 9.4 
Government supportive of organisation (0.330*), 9.5 Inspectors supportive of 
organisation (0.385**), 9.15 Level of engagement with inspectors (0.299*), 9.16 
Level of engagement with central government (0.285*) and 9.25 Extent 
partnerships making strategies more meaningful (0.316*). Of the other 
organisation types the only other significant correlation was for the fire service and 
9.25 Extent partnerships making strategies more meaningful (0.519*). This was 
also the statement correlating significantly (p<0.01) with all four organisation types 
combined (0.302**). 
 
Performance Management Score 
In 2005, there were seven correlations at p<0.01 with PMS, two at p<0.05 and 
eight where the correlations were not significant. The strongest correlations 
(p<0.01), were 9.23 Extent to which citizens participate in performance 
management (0.363**), 9.5 Inspectors supportive of organisation (0.296**) and 
9.22 Extent to which stakeholders participate in performance management 
(0.277**). The weakest correlations (not significant) are 9.10 Extent use of external 
audit to improve performance management (0.008), 9.12 Extent use of inspection 
improves performance at service delivery (0.018) and 9.11 Extent of use of 
consultants at centre (-0.040). For 2009 there were more significant correlations 
than for CPAR, with four for all organisation types combined: 9.5 Inspectors 
supportive of organisation (0.413**), 9.6 External auditors supportive of 
organisation (0.335**), 9.13 Extent of use consultants in services (-0.265*) and 
9.15 Level of engagement with inspectors (0.249*). There were three for councils: 
9.5 Inspectors supportive of organisation (0.414**), 9.6 External auditors 
supportive of organisation (0.476**) and 9.15 Level of engagement with inspectors 
(0.291*), one for fire services; 9.5 Inspectors supportive of organisation (0.521*), 




In 2005 there were eight correlations at p<0.01 with SS, three at p<0.05 and six 
where the correlations were not significant. The strongest correlations were 9.23 
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Extent to which citizens participate in performance management (0.292**), 9.17 
Level of engagement with professional organisations (0.288**) and 9.5 Inspectors 
supportive of the organisation (0.278**). The weakest correlations, not significant, 
were 9.11 Extent of use of consultants in centre (-0.014), 9.13 Extent of use of 
consultants in services (-0.047) and 9.4 Government supportive of organisation 
(0.103). In the 2009 survey there were two significant correlations for all four 
organisation types combined: 9.11 Extent of use of consultants in centre (-0.296**) 
and 9.23 Extent to which citizen’s participate in performance management (-
0.232*). There were none for councils or police and one each for fire services (9.14 
Extent of involvement of external stakeholders in organisation, 0.583*) and PCTs 
(9.18 Extent of use of internal networks by organisation, -0.775*). 
 
Corporate Assessment  
There were nine correlations at p<0.01 with CA, three at p<0.05 and five where the 
correlations were not significant. The strongest correlations, in the 2005 survey, 
were 9.5 Inspectors supportive of the organisation (0.347**), 9.23 Extent to which 
citizens participate in performance management (0.326**) and 9.18 Extent of use 
of internal networks by the organisation (0.272**). The weakest correlations, not 
significant, were 9.12 Extent the use of inspection improves performance at service 
delivery (0.057), 9.10 Extent use of external audit to improve performance 
management (0.073) and 9.11 Extent of use of consultants in centre (-0.093). 
 
In 2009 there were three significant statements for all four organisation types 
combined: 9.5 Inspectors supportive of organisation (0.235*), 9.15 Level of 
engagement with inspectors (0.230*) and 9.18 Extent of use of internal networks 
by organisation (0.247*). Councils had two significant correlations: 9.5 Inspectors 
supportive of organisation (0.367*) and 9.6 External auditors supportive of 
organisation (0.287*). There were no significant correlations for police or PCTs, 
however there were nine for fire services, the three strongest being: 9.11 Extent of 
use of consultants in centre (0.774**), 9.10 Extent use of external audit to improve 
performance management (0.716**) and 9.16 Level of engagement with central 
government (0.671**). 
 
There were a number of statements significant at p<0.01 for all four CPA 
measures: 9.5 Inspectors supportive of the organisation, 9.14 Extent of the 
involvement of external stakeholders in the organisation, 9.22 Extent to which 
stakeholders participate in performance management and 9.23 Extent to which 
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citizens participate in performance management. In addition the number of 
significant correlations for fire services in 2009 is noteworthy. 
 
This hypothesis should be accepted given the strength of the correlations for many 
statements. However, it should be noted the strength varies depending upon the 
stakeholder and this would seem to be an area for further research. In particular, 
for the involvement of stakeholders including citizens in performance management, 
the use of external auditors to improve performance management, engagement 
with professional organisations and engagement with government. The extent to 
which strategies appear to make partnerships more meaningful (9.25) is noted.  
 
5.27 Hypothesis F2: That an organisation that has outsourced more services 
(by cost) will be higher performing than an organisation that has outsourced 
less (by cost). 
Three statements are used to evaluate this hypothesis (Appendix 5.27). There are 
three correlations (p<0.05) with only 9.1 Outsourced any central services being 
positive for SS and the fire service (0.556*) in 2009. The other two are also in 2009 
for all four organisation types combined and 9.3 Strategic partnership with provider 
of many services for CPAR (-0.240*) and CA (-0.217*). Interestingly, 9.3 raises 
doubt on the efficacy of strategic partnerships in terms of delivering improved 
performance, although there may be other reasons, such as cost reduction, for 
such partnerships. On the above basis this hypothesis should be rejected. 
 
5.28 Hypothesis F3: That an organisation that has greater involvement of 
stakeholders and citizens in performance management will have higher 
performance than an organisation that has lower involvement. 
There are 12 statements (Appendix 5.28) used to assess whether an increased 




For the 2005 survey, there were nine correlations at p<0.01 with CPAR, one at 
p<0.05 and two not significant. The strongest correlations (p<0.01) were 9.20 
Extent of consultation with service users (0.360**), 9.18 Extent of the use of internal 
networks by the organisation (0.351**) and 9.19 Extent of the use of external 
networks by the organisation (0.326**). The weakest correlations, not significant 
were: 9.21 Transactions with citizens rather than relationships (-0.067) and 9.24 
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Extent partnerships are fragmenting effort on performance management (-0.102). 
In 2009 there were no significant correlations for police forces or PCTs and one 
each for councils and fire services; both 9.25 Extent partnerships making strategies 
more meaningful (0.316* and 0.519* respectively). For the four organisation types 
combined this is also the only significant correlation (0.302*) 
 
Performance Management Score 
In 2005 there were five correlations at p<0.01 with PMS, four at p<0.05 and three 
not significant. The strongest correlations (p<0.01), were 9.23 Extent to which 
citizens participate in performance management (0.363**), 9.20 Extent of 
consultation with service users (0.279**) and 9.22 Extent to which stakeholders 
participate in performance management (0.277**). The weakest correlations, not 
significant, were 9.24 Extent partnerships are fragmenting effort on performance 
management (0.008), 9.17 Level of engagement with professional organisations 
(0.079) and 9.8 Views of politicians formally collected (0.136). In the 2009 survey 
only PCTs showed any significant correlation: 9.8 Views of politicians formally 




Of the 12 statements, in 2005, there were six correlations at p<0.01 with SS, one 
at p<0.05 and five not significant. The strongest correlations (at p<0.01) were: 9.20 
Extent of consultation with service users (0.320**), 9.23 Extent to which citizens 
participate in performance management (0.292**) and 9.17 Level of engagement 
with professional organisations (0.288**). The weakest correlations, not significant, 
were 9.24 Extent partnerships are fragmenting effort on performance management 
(0.013), 9.21 Transactions with citizens rather than relationships (0.018) and 9.7 
Views of organisation employees formally collected (0.053). In 2009 there were no 
significant correlations for councils. The fire services had two: 9.14 Extent of 
involvement of external stakeholders in the organisation (0.583*) and 9.24 Extent 
partnerships are fragmenting effort on performance management (-0.749**); police 
forces one (9.8 Views of politicians formally collected, -0.675*). The PCTs had two: 
9.8 Views of politicians formally collected (-0.857**) and 9.18 Extent of use of 
internal networks by organisation (-0.775*). There was one significant correlation 
for all four types of organisation combined: 9.23 Extent to which citizens participate 





Of the 12 statements, in 2005, there were seven correlations at p<0.01 with CA, 
three at p<0.05 and two not significant. The strongest correlations were 9.23 Extent 
to which citizens participate in performance management (0.326**), 9.20 Extent of 
consultation with service users (0.320**) and 9.18 Extent of the use of internal 
networks by the organisation (0.272**). The weakest correlations were 9.24 Extent 
partnerships are fragmenting effort on performance management (-0.048), 9.21 
Transactions with citizens rather than relationships (-0.103); both not significant 
although the next statement was: 9.8 Views of politicians formally collected 
(0.151*). 
 
In 2009 there were no significant statements for councils, police or PCTs. For all 
four organisation types combined only 9.18 Extent of the use of internal networks 
by the organisation was significant (driven by the results for fire services). There 
were three significant correlations for the fire service: 9.14 Extent of involvement 
of external stakeholders in organisation (0.523*), 9.18 Extent of the use of internal 
networks by the organisation (0.605*) and 9.25 Extent partnerships making 
strategies more meaningful (0.551*). 
 
There were several statements significant (p<0.01) for all four CPA measures: 9.14 
Extent of involvement of external stakeholders in the organisation, 9.20 Extent of 
consultation with service users, 9.22 Extent to which stakeholders participate in 
performance management and 9.23 Extent to which citizens participate in 
performance management. Given the strength of correlations the hypothesis 
should be accepted. This is the case even though the picture is less clear for 2009; 
the result for 9.25 Extent partnerships making strategies more meaningful may be 
regarded as indicative. Although there appears to be a strong correlation it is not 
clear whether it is high performance leading to involvement or involvement leading 
to high performance. This perennial issue warrants further investigation even 
though, in this instance, we may suspect the latter given the CPA measures used.   
 
Communication 
5.29 Hypothesis G1: That an organisation that has a higher level of 
communication will be higher performing than an organisation that has a 
lower level 
Five statements (Appendix 5.29) test this hypothesis, including internal and 
external communication. For the 2005 survey the strongest correlations (p<0.01) 
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are for CPAR with 10.3 Extent of communication on service performance (0.315**) 
and 10.1 Extent organisation’s relationship with the media is good (0.305**), 
followed by CA with 10.3 Extent of communication on service performance 
(0.275**). The weakest correlations (not significant) are for SS with 10.2 Extent of 
communication on corporate service planning (0.057), with 10.3 Extent of 
communication on service performance (0.099) and with 10.5 Extent of employees’ 
use of performance management (0.113). 
 
The only statement significant for all four CPA measures is 10.1 Extent the 
organisation’s relationship with the media is good. It might be conjectured the 
relationship with the media is good because performance is high and thus there is 
perhaps more good news than bad news. In the 2009 survey the pattern is 
repeated although with fewer significant correlations. Given the many statistically 
significant correlations this hypothesis should be accepted.  
 
REPORTING PERFORMANCE 
5.30 Hypothesis H1: That an organisation that has a higher level of 
performance reporting will be higher performing than an organisation that 
has a lower level of reporting. 
This hypothesis considers the reporting of performance, tested with seven 
statements (Appendix 5.30). In 2005, the strongest correlations (p<0.01) were: 
PMS with 11.7 Feedback to external stakeholders on strategy/performance 
management (0.294**), CPAR with 11.3 Extent to which publishing performance 
data has been detrimental (-0.288**) and CA with 11.7 Feedback to external 
stakeholders on strategy/performance management (0.279**). Notice 11.3 exhibits 
a negative relationship with higher performing authorities scoring lower on this 
characteristic. The weakest correlations (not significant) are for SS with 11.4 Extent 
of publishing performance data internally (0.031), 11.2 Performance reported on 
the organisation’s website (-0.034) and 11.1 Performance reported on the 
organisation’s Intranet (0.080). Only two statements are significant (p<0.01) for all 
four CPA measures: 11.6 Feedback to internal stakeholders on 
strategy/performance management and 11.7 Feedback to external stakeholders 
on strategy/performance management.  
 
In 2009 the picture is more mixed with two significant correlations for CPAR (fire 
service with 11.3 Extent publishing performance data detrimental, 0.577* and 
police 11.5 Extent publishing performance data externally, 0.693*), none for PMS, 
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three for SS and three for CA. The three for SS are for all organisation types 
combined: 11.3 Extent publishing performance data detrimental (-0.263*) and 
PCTs; 11.4 Extent publishing performance data internally (-0.635*) and 11.6 
Feedback to internal stakeholders on strategy/performance management (-
0.722*). For CA one is for councils (11.2 Performance reported on the 
organisation’s website (-0.314*), two for fire services; 11.4 Extent publishing 
performance data internally (0.561*) and 11.6 Feedback to internal stakeholders 
on strategy/performance management (0.551*). 
 
The situation is quite complex although on balance it appears this hypothesis is 
more supported than not. In particular the negative correlations for 11.3 Extent 
publishing performance data detrimental and the support of 11.6 Feedback to 
internal stakeholders on strategy/performance management and 11.7 Feedback to 
external stakeholders on strategy/performance management. Deployment as part 
of strategy may be more effective. 
 
Organisational Culture 
5.31 Hypothesis I1: That an organisation with a high supportive and learning 
culture that encourages innovation and non-blame will be higher performing 
than one where this kind of culture is less so. 
 
CPA Rating 
In 2005, there were 24 statements with a correlation at p<0.01 with CPAR, three 
at p<0.05 and nine not significant (Appendix 5.31). The strongest correlations 
(p<0.01) were with: 12.3 Extent to which a high degree of mutual trust exists 
between parts of the organisation (0.419**), 12.9 Level of employees’ morale 
(0.391**), 12.24 Extent to which service to the public is a high priority (0.373**), 
12.1 Extent to which the organisation is a learning organisation (0.366**) and 12.14 
Extent to which officers and politicians have distinct and clear roles (0.365**). The 
weakest correlations (not significant) were 12.15 Extent to which power lies more 
in the centre than departments (-0.002), 12.18 Extent to which the organisation is 
driven by rules (-0.012) and 12.10 Extent to which an employee’s role is 
determined by job description (0.013). Of note are the negative correlations for 
12.5 Extent to which the organisation has a blame culture, three being significant 





In the 2009 survey there were many fewer significant correlations with one for all 
four organisation types combined: 12.15 Extent to which power lies more in the 
centre than departments (-0.284*). The largest number (three) was for fire 
services: 12.7 Extent to which organisation has good relations trade unions 
(0.542*), 12.15 Extent to which power lies more in the centre than departments (-
0.577*), and 12.20 Extent to which organisation is change oriented (0.530*). There 
were two for police forces: 12.10 Extent to which employee’s role determined by 
job description (0.681*) and 12.34 Extent of misrepresentation of financial 
information (-0.693*). One significant correlation was for councils: 12.16 Level of 
employees’ morale (0.303*). There were no significant correlations for PCTs. 
 
Performance Management Score 
Of the 36 statements, in 2005, 19 had correlations at p<0.01 with PMS, three at 
p<0.05 and 14 were not significant. The strongest correlations (p<0.01) were 12.16 
Level of employees’ morale (0.325**), 12.14 Extent to which officers and politicians 
have distinct and clear roles (0.318**), 12.3 Extent to which there is high degree of 
mutual trust between parts of the organisation (0.308**) and 12.21 Extent to which 
the organisation is results orientated (0.298**). The weakest correlations (not 
significant at p<0.05) were with 12.9 Extent to which an employee’s level in the 
organisation determines their contribution (-0.019), 12.15 extent to which power 
lies more in the centre than departments (0.021) and 12.17 Extent to which 
organisational position determines contribution to teams (-0.031). 
 
In 2009 there were more significant correlations than there were for CPAR but 
none for the fire services. There were eight for all organisation types combined, 
the strongest being: 12.1 Extent that organisation is a learning organisation 
(0.283*), 12.7 Extent to which organisation has good relations trade unions 
(0.243*), 12.16 Level of employees’ morale (0.288*) and 12.26 Extent to which 
management creates a supportive culture (0.244*). Councils had seven significant 
correlations, the strongest: 12.1 Extent that organisation is a learning organisation 
(0.322*), 12.2 Extent to which a psychological contract exist between employees 
and the organisation (0.338*), 12.5 Extent to which the organisation has a blame 
culture (-0.387**) and 12.16 Level of employees’ morale (0.374*). All of these were 
also significant in 2005.  
 
Police had two significant correlations: 12.18 Extent to which organisation driven 
by rules (0.688*) and 12.25 Extent to which ideology drives organisation activities 
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(0.686*). PCTs also had two significant correlations: 12.31 Extent of learning from 
voluntary sector (0.683*) and 12.32 Extent of inclination for experimentation within 
organisation (0.688*). There are clearly some similarities but also differences in 
2009 reflecting the different types of organisation, for example the extent to which 
the police are driven by rules, which is not significant for any other organisation 




Of the 36 statements, in the 2005 survey, there were three correlations at p<0.01 
with the SS, eight at p<0.05 and 25 not significant. The three correlations at p<0.01 
were: 12.3 Extent to which a high degree of mutual trust exists between parts of 
the organisation (0.238**), 12.4 Extent to which decision making is by consensus 
(0.218**) and 12.14 Extent to which officers and politicians have clear and distinct 
roles (0.213**). The weakest correlations, not significant, were 12.6 Extent to which 
management create a sense of urgency (0.002), 12.22 Extent to which barriers to 
cooperation exist between service areas (-0.016) and 12.5 Extent to which the 
organisation has a blame culture (0.020).  
 
The SS correlations were somewhat different to those for the other CPA measures, 
as there were many fewer significant at p<0.01. It may be because services stand 
somewhat divorced from the organisation, perhaps especially in an organisation 
providing a diverse range of services, as a whole (or perhaps a function of the SS 
or how respondents have scored services). However, in the 2009 survey the higher 
number of significant correlations are for police and PCTs which is rather different 
than for the PMS and CA. Indeed there are no significant correlations for all four 
organisation types combined, that may be suggestive of differences between them. 
There is one significant correlation for councils: 12.16 Extent to which management 
create a sense of urgency, 0.320* (this is the only significant correlation for this 
statement) and one for fire services; 12.33 Extent of misrepresentation of 
performance information (-0.687*).  
 
There were four significant correlations for police forces: 12.11 Extent to which 
organisation driven by achievement of targets (0.667*), 12.19 Extent to which 
organisation operates independently in provision of services (-0.728*), 12.25 
Extent to which ideology drives organisation activities (0.775*) and 12.34 Extent of 
misrepresentation of financial information (-0.687*). PCTs had six significant 
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correlations: 4.45 Extent to which probity is valued (-0.667*), 12.7 Extent to which 
organisation has good relations trade unions (-0.705*), 12.8 Level of ‘good’ ethical 
behaviour (-0.683*), 12.12 Extent to which people come first in the organisation (-
0.871**), 12.25 Extent to which ideology drives organisation activities (-0.671*) and 
12.32 Extent of inclination for experimentation within organisation (0.688*). These 
results for PCTs may seem surprising. For example for 12.8 Level of ‘good’ ethical 
behaviour; PCTs are the only organisation type to have negative correlations and 
this is also the case for 12.12 Extent to which people come first in the organisation 
and 4.45 Extent to which probity is valued. Could this be due to the so called 
‘targets and terror’ influences (Bevan and Hood, 2006) which perhaps impacted 
the NHS more than other services? 
 
Corporate Assessment 
Of the 36 statements, in the 2005 survey, there were 19 correlations at p<0.01 with 
the CA, six at p<0.05 and 11 not significant. The strongest correlations (p<0.01) 
were with 12.14 Extent to which officers and politicians have clear and distinct roles 
(0.386**), 12.3 Extent to which a high degree of mutual trust exists between parts 
of the organisation (0.381**) and 12.16 Level of employees’ morale (0.373**). The 
weakest correlations, not significant, were 12.25 Extent to which ideology drives 
the organisation’s activities (0.019), 12.15 Extent to which power lies more in the 
centre than departments (0.025) and 12.17 Extent to which organisational position 
determines an employee’s contribution to teams (-0.046). 
 
In the 2009 survey there were many fewer significant correlations. For all 
organisation types combined there were four: 12.8 Level of ‘good’ ethical behaviour 
(0.271*), 12.16 Level of employees’ morale (0.209*), 12.22 Extent of barriers to 
cooperation between service areas and 12.34 Extent of misrepresentation of 
financial information (-0.229*). For councils there were also four: 12.5 Extent to 
which organisation has a blame culture (-0.340*), 12.10 Extent to which an 
employee’s role determined by job description (-0.342*), 12.16 Level of employees’ 
morale (0.365*) and 12.30 Extent of learning from the private sector (0.374*). The 
largest number of significant correlations in 2009 was for the fire service at six, the 
strongest: 12.7 Extent to which organisation has good relations with trade unions 
(0.549*), 12.20 Extent to which organisation is change oriented (0.535*) and 12.21 




There were two significant correlations for police forces: 12.18 Extent to which 
organisation driven by rules (0.688*) and 12.25 Extent to which ideology drives 
organisation activities (0.686*). Finally, PCTs had one significant correlation: 12.27 
Extent internal environment has impact on organisation’s performance (0.705*).  
 
The hypothesis should be accepted, although the results suggest some differences 
by organisation type. 
 
5.32 Hypothesis I2: That an organisation where power is more diffused 
throughout the organisation will be higher performing than an organisation 
where power is more concentrated. 
Previous hypotheses considering involvement would tend to support this 
hypothesis. Four statements (Appendix 5.32) test this hypothesis. Budgets 
devolved to departments (4.33) supports the diffusion of power. A high level of 
mutual trust (12.3) would tend to support the diffusion of power and this statement 
is correlated (p<0.01) with all four CPA measures in 2005. Delegation (4.34) is in 
effect giving power to others and this statement is significant (p<0.01) with CPAR, 
SS and CA in 2005, although not in 2009. Finally, the empowerment of officers 
(7.4) is a practical indication of the diffusion of power and is significant (p<0.05) for 
all four CPA measures, although there is limited support in the 2009 survey. There 
appears to be some differences by organisation type in 2009. 
 
Given the above, the hypothesis should be accepted. This is perhaps 
understandable in the sense ‘power’ can then be better used by those closer to 
services and indeed in support activities. However, we may expect other factors to 
be important, for example strategic direction allows the diffusion.  
 
In summary, there is significant support for a number of statements (criteria) being 
important in delivering organisational performance and yet others appear not to be 
so (See Appendix 5.1). Many of the statements considering 
Strategy/Policy/Finance/HRM are significantly correlated with organisational 
performance as assessed by CPA. For example having a corporate strategy 
planned in advance with stakeholders, the corporate strategy linked to the 
community strategy, service developments linked strategically with strategies and 
plans linked together. Further, political issues tend not to impact adversely on the 
strategy. For Policy having directed policy (Best Value) direction appears to be 
important with policy decisions based on evidence. As regards Finance it seems 
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important that the budget is linked to (strategic) priorities. For Human Resource 
Management the active management of people with a focus on employees, the 
wide discussion of organisational values, with appropriate delegation and involving 
employees in such as service planning appears to be important. 
 
Many of the statements addressing Performance Management are likewise 
significantly correlated with organisational performance including the use of the 
EFQM Excellence Model, having arrange of quantitative and qualitative indicators, 
being innovative, having good systems to collect data and providing good quality 
performance information to managers and local politicians. Measuring things that 
matter, accountability, equity and the commitment of top management are also 
important.  
 
For Administration the consistency (throughout the organisation) of practices and 
routines appears to be important along with an evidence-based approach and wide 
discussion of governance issues. All the Leadership statements are significantly 
correlated with organisational performance excepting the characteristic of an 
officer (manager) (as opposed to politician) led organisation. So the level of political 
and officer leadership should both be high, with political leadership empowering 
officers.  
 
A number of Resources statements are concerned with people and these seem 
especially important, for example well-trained and motivated. The allocation of 
resources should be determined by the organisation’s priorities. The level of 
research capacity and information available for corporate/service planning are 
important. Further, the amount of resources to undertake performance 
management at the centre and in service departments is highlighted. Interestingly 
the quality of the organisation’s physical infrastructure is also significant. 
 
The research shows the importance of Partnership working and of Stakeholder 
involvement. In particular this appears to make strategies more meaningful and 
improves performance management, probably by making it more relevant and thus 
useful. An organisation that has the support of government, external auditors and 
inspectors appear to be higher performing. This seems to involve networking with 
a range of different stakeholders and organisations thus perhaps being more 




All five Communication statements are significantly associated with organisational 
performance including having a good relationship with the media, communicating 
service planning and performance information and using the knowledge of 
employees effectively. Closely related is Reporting Performance with feedback to 
stakeholders especially important.  
 
The final grouping is Organisational Culture containing a large number of 
statements. Being a learning organisation and having a psychological contract with 
employees are important with a high degree of mutual trust between different parts 
of the organisation and good ethical behaviour. Having a blame culture operates 
counter to high performance. Having an achievement-driven culture pays 
dividends with a change orientation also important. The next section takes these 
significant correlations and analyses them using exploratory PCA. 
 
5.33 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
PCA was undertaken using IBM SPSS Statistics 20 utilising the statements 
(criteria) with significant (p<0.05) correlations. A number of runs were carried out 
to explore the data. As explained in the methodology section because there are a 
number of strong cross correlations between the statements, as would be expected 
with this kind of data, direct oblimin rotation was selected. The number of 
components extracted was determined by the default eigenvalue of one with the 
scree plots being examined to consider further. Where this showed a significant 
breakpoint then this number of components was selected for extraction. In terms 
of the pattern matrix a value of 0.40 (after Field, 2013) was chosen as the threshold 
for consideration. 
 
Table 5.1 summarises where a PCA could be undertaken, although some were 
especially weak the appropriate statistics are quoted throughout.  
 
Eleven summary factors were identified using the descriptions of the statements 
when grouped. These are Strategy, Human resources, Performance management, 
Resources, Engagement, Innovation, Physical infrastructure, Leadership, Culture, 
Risk and Reputation. Invariably there is an element of overlap between these 





Table 5.1 Summary of PCA undertaken with CPA for the 2005 and 2009 
surveys (√ included, X not included in analyses) 




2005 LA √ √ √ √ 
2009 All  √ √ √ √ 
2009 LA √ √ √ √ 
2009 Fire X √ √ X 
2009 Police √ X √ X 
2009 PCT √ √ X √ 
 
 
5.34 PCA for 2005 Survey with CPA Rating 
The first PCA was for the 2005 survey. The resulting SPSS Total Variance 
Explained is reproduced at Appendix 5.33 truncated to show the 39 components 
extracted. The KMO is satisfactory at 0.699, above the minimum 0.500 
recommended, and the result is significant at p<0.05. There are 2.0% of non-
redundant residuals with absolute values >0.05; lower than the recommended 
maximum of 50.0% (Field, 2013, p. 696). However, the determinant is very low, 
under the 0.00001 threshold suggesting collinearity may be an issue. Checking 
and removing some of the statements, using the reproduced correlation matrix, 
made little practical difference to the determinant, although it did increase the KMO 
statistic. Tabachnick and Fidell (2013, p. 91) suggest several options for dealing 
with collinearity including if the goal of analysis is prediction then it can be ignored. 
Since we have already established which criteria (statements) are associated with 
high performance and are using PCA to explore how they group this approach is 
acceptable.  
 
Thirty-nine components explain 76.475% of the variance. Table 5.2 provides a 
grouping of the components listed in order of strength for the first component. 
Within each summary factor the components are listed in strength order with the 






Table 5.2: Contribution to organisational performance by various summary 
factors in 2005 as measured by CPA Rating 




Strategy 12, 25, 35, 2, 16, 1, 5, 
31,15, 7 
11.759 (7.785, 
7.736, 7.614, 7.273, 
7.220, 5.292, 2.629, 
2.490, 2.423) 




24, 22, 8, 38, 36, 18, 3, 23, 
26 
10.249 (8.178, 
8.127, 6.045, 5.078, 
4.754, 3.095, 3.038, 
1.973) 
Resources 20, 6 9.130 (6.774) 
Engagement 21, 33, 34, 19 8.894 (7.746, 5.977, 
5.673) 
Innovation 14 8.824 
Physical infrastructure 29 8.612 
Culture 28, 37, 13, 39 7.772 (6.276, 5.555, 
4.166) 
Leadership 11 7.053 
Risk 30 5.824 
Reputation 27, 9 4.943 (2.950) 
 
The PCA shows that the development and implementation of a strategy is the 
strongest contribution to performance followed by active management and use of 
people. The management of performance is clearly important. Resources is ranked 
fourth in the list and would be stronger if Physical infrastructure is included. It 
includes employees being overloaded so it’s also about capacity. Physical 
infrastructure appearing was a little surprising as it is not often thought of as related 
to performance. Although providing a good working environment, of which Physical 
infrastructure is a part, may well have a positive influence on other factors. The 
management of risk could be regarded as strategic in identifying potential issues 
and problems, allowing corrective action before they manifest. 
 
5.35 PCA for 2005 Survey with Performance Management Score 
Thirty-six components, explaining 75.498% of the variance were extracted in the 
PCA using the statements significant at p<0.05 with PMS. The KMO was 0.746 
and the result is significant. There were 3.0% of non-redundant residuals with 
absolute values >0.05. Again, the determinant was very low. The resulting SPSS 
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Total Variance Explained output is reproduced at Appendix 5.34, truncated to show 
the 36 components extracted.  
 
Table 5.3 provides a grouping of the components listed in order of strength for the 
first component. Within each summary factor the components are listed in strength 
order with the numbers shown in the final column. The first component is Strategy 
followed by Performance management and Engagement.  Again, Physical 
infrastructure is high with Human resources being rather lower than for CPAR. 
 
Table 5.3: Contribution to organisational performance by various summary 
factors in 2005 as measured by Performance Management Score 








18, 14, 33, 16, 17, 2, 6, 15, 
23, 28, 20, 22, 26 
10.508 (10.495, 
9.034, 7.391, 6.657, 
6.372, 5.838, 5.350, 
4.336, 4.229, 3.191, 
3.172, 2.703) 
Engagement 3, 27, 7, 19, 1, 30 9.443 (6.939, 6.486, 
6.074, 4.499, 2.538) 
Physical infrastructure 36 9.071 
Resources 10, 25, 4 8.343 (7.757, 4.334) 
Culture 31, 13 7.179 (6.439) 
Reputation 27, 9 6.939  (4.453)  
Human resources 5, 21 6.017 (4.506) 
Leadership 24, 12 4.612 (3.211) 
Risk 32 3.031 
Innovation   
 
 
5.36 PCA for 2005 Survey with Service Score 
Twenty-seven components, explaining 72.292% of the variance were extracted in 
the PCA using the statements significant at p<0.05 with SS. The KMO was 0.832 
and the result is significant. There were 7.0% of non-redundant residuals with 
absolute values >0.05. Again, the determinant was very low. The resulting SPSS 
Total Variance Explained output is reproduced at Appendix 5.35, truncated to show 
the 27 components extracted. 
 
Table 5.4 provides a grouping of the components listed in order of strength for the 
first component. Within each summary factor the components are listed in strength 
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order with the numbers shown in the final column. This list is rather different to the 
previous two (for CPAR and PMS) with Strategy near the foot and Performance 
management third. Innovation takes first place (it didn’t even appear in the PMS 
list) from Engagement, although the difference appears to be relatively small.  
 
Table 5.4: Contribution to organisational performance by various summary 
factors in 2005 as measured by Service Score 




Innovation 24 8.551 
Engagement 6, 16 8.323 (5.983) 
Performance 
management  
25, 18, 9, 23, 27, 19 7.604 (7.437, 7.305, 
7.267, 6.353, 4.362) 
Resources 1, 17 7.143 (4.248) 
Reputation 10, 13, 7 6.367 (3.682, 2.145) 
Human resources 11, 12 6.035 (4.394) 
Culture 3, 4 5.465 (4.295)  
Leadership 14, 22 5.391 (4.768) 
Strategy 15, 20, 21, 2, 5 5.135 (4.659, 4.454, 
4.072, 2.433) 
Risk 8 4.556 
Physical infrastructure   
 
 
5.37 PCA for 2005 Survey with Corporate Assessment 
Thirty-nine components, explaining 77.186% of the variance were extracted in the 
PCA using the statements significant at p<0.05 with the CA. The KMO was 0.735 
and the result is significant. There were 2.0% of non-redundant residuals with 
absolute values >0.05. Again, the determinant was very low. The resulting SPSS 
Total Variance Explained output is reproduced at Appendix 5.36 truncated to show 
the 39 components extracted. 
 
Table 5.5 provides a grouping of the components listed in order of strength for the 
first component. Within each summary factor the components are listed in strength 
order with the numbers shown in the final column. This list also has Innovation at 
the top with Performance management second, followed by Engagement, so not 





Table 5.5: Contribution to organisational performance by various summary 
factors in 2005 as measured by Corporate Assessment 




Innovation 1 12.862 
Performance 
management  
30, 31, 14, 10, 25, 28, 21, 
26, 19, 6, 37 
10.561 (9.679, 
8.384, 8.339, 6.713, 
5.850, 5.844, 5.359, 
3.887, 2.893, 2.861) 
Engagement 9, 7, 3 9.521 (6.647, 6.156) 
Culture 24, 34, 39 9.311 (7.498, 5.809) 
Leadership 22, 18 8.480 (4.435) 
Strategy 33, 38, 13, 15, 32, 2, 27, 17, 
36 
8.404 (6.991, 6.973, 
5.694, 5.477, 3.814, 
3.107, 2.475, 2.153) 
Reputation 29, 23, 8, 11 7.922 (6.345, 2.798, 
2.430) 
Resources 35, 5 7.483 (4.765) 
Human resources 16, 4 5.871 (4.598) 
Physical infrastructure   
Risk   
 
 
Table 5.6 summarises the ranking for the four CPA measures by the loading of the 
strongest component only, as described above. The top three ranks are dominated 
by Performance management, Engagement, Strategy and Innovation with only 
Human resources taking the second spot in CPAR. Human resources is very much 
in the lower ranks for PMS and CA. Resources is mid-table for all except CA where 
it is next to bottom. Leadership is also near the bottom of the list except for SS. 
Physical infrastructure only appears in the CPAR and PMS lists. Innovation doesn’t 
appear under PMS and Risk doesn’t appear under CA. However, the results can 
also be considered in another way by adding the components in each summary 
factor. 
 
Table 5.7 ranks the summary factors by adding the components (or sub-factors) 
together to produce a numeric total for each. This must be regarded as indicative 
only because technically, since they correlate with each other, there may be some 
‘double counting’. Comparison of Table 5.7 with Table 5.6 immediately shows 
some clear differences with Performance management and Strategy becoming 
dominant. Only Engagement disrupts this appearing second in the PMS list.  This 




Table 5.6: Summary of rankings of summary factors for four CPA measures 
in 2005 by loading of strongest component only 
Rank CPA Rating Performance 
Management 
Score 
Service Score Corporate 
Assessment 












4 Resources Physical 
infrastructure 
Resources Culture 
5 Engagement Resources Reputation Leadership 





Reputation Culture Reputation 
8 Culture Human 
resources 
Leadership Resources 
9 Leadership Leadership Strategy Human 
resources 
10 Risk Risk Risk  
11 Reputation    
 
Table 5.7: Summary of rankings of summary factors for four CPA measures 
by numeric addition of all components in the factor (technically they should 
not be added so indicative only) 















Engagement Strategy Strategy 
3 Engagement Strategy Engagement Culture 
4 Human 
resources 
Resources Reputation Engagement 
5 Culture Culture Resources Reputation 
6 Resources Reputation Human 
resources 
Leadership 








9 Reputation Leadership Innovation Human resources 
10 Leadership Risk Risk  
11 Risk    
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5.38 PCA for 2009 Survey with CPA Rating 
As noted the response rates for the survey conducted in 2009 were much lower 
than in 2005 and this invariably has an impact on the analyses possible. In 
particular the number of statistically significant correlations is much lower reducing 
the number included in the PCAs. Some of the PCAs do not meet the accepted 
statistical thresholds; five have not been included across all four measures as they 
are not ‘valid’ analyses (Table 5.1). 
 
Appendix 5.37 shows the SPSS output for all four organisation types combined in 
2009 with CPAR. Seven components, explaining 65.331% of the variance were 
extracted in the PCA. The KMO was 0.718 and the result is significant. There were 
40.0% of non-redundant residuals with absolute values >0.05. Again, the 
determinant was very low. 
 
Unlike the analyses for 2005 there is more overlap of the statements in this 
analysis, for example component two contains statements fitting into both the 
Strategy and Performance management summary factors. Also because the 
number of statements included in the PCA was much smaller than 2005, as 
expected, the number of summary factors produced is lower. As previously the 
summary factors are shown in the order of their largest component (Table 5.8).  
  
Table 5.8: Contribution to organisational performance by various summary 
factors in 2009 for all four organisation types combined as measured by 
CPA Rating 




Human resources 1, 4 4.218 (1.818) 
Resources 1 4.218 
Strategy 2, 7, 5, 3, 6 3.928 (2.316, 2.144, 
2.042, 1.254 ) 
Performance 
management  
2, 5 3.928 (2.144) 
Engagement   
Culture   
Leadership   
Innovation   
Physical Infrastructure   
Reputation   





However, adding the numeric value of the components together places Strategy 
first followed by Performance management, then Human resources and finally 
Resources. Since four organisation types are being taken combined there may be 
individual differences masked by the combination. 
 
Next is considered councils against the CPAR, with nine components extracted, 
explaining 74.181% of the variance. The KMO was 0.688 and the result is 
significant. There were 31.0% of non-redundant residuals with absolute values 
>0.05. Again, the determinant was very low. The resulting SPSS Total Variance 
Explained output is reproduced at Appendix 6.38 truncated to show the nine 
components extracted. 
 
Table 5.9 has a wider range of summary factors represented, with Human 
resources first followed by Strategy and then Resources. Using the total summary 
factor score would place Performance management above Resources. 
 
Table 5.9: Contribution to organisational performance by various summary 
factors in 2009 for councils as measured by CPA Rating 




Human resources 1, 8, 4 7.126 (2.842, 2.063) 
Strategy 6, 5, 7 5.873 (3.175, 2.185) 
Resources 3 4.687 
Performance 
management  
2, 5, 7 4.347 (3.175, 2.185) 
Engagement 2 4.347 
Culture 9 2.571 
Reputation 4 2.063 
Innovation   
Leadership   
Physical Infrastructure   
Risk   
 
The PCA for fire services is not included. For police forces two components, 
explaining 74.053% of the variance were extracted in the PCA using the 
statements significant at p<0.05 with the CPAR. The KMO was 0.613 and the 
significance was 0.189, not meeting p<0.05. There were 60.0% of non-redundant 
residuals with absolute values >0.05. The determinant was 0.023. The resulting 
SPSS Total Variance Explained output is reproduced at Appendix 5.39 truncated 
to show the two components extracted. 
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As seen in Table 5.10 Human resources is the number one summary factor, 
followed by Culture and then Performance management, although this is a non-
significant (p<0.05) result. 
 
Table 5.10: Contribution to organisational performance by various 
summary factors in 2009 for police forces as measured by CPA Rating 




Human resources 1, 2 3.050 (2.285) 
Culture 1 3.050 
Performance management  2 2.285 
Engagement   
Innovation   
Leadership   
Physical Infrastructure   
Reputation   
Resources   
Risk   
Strategy   
 
For PCTs and CPAR three components, explaining 96.39% of the variance, were 
extracted in the PCA .The KMO was 0.776 and the result is significant at 0.006.  
There were 16.0% of non-redundant residuals with absolute values >0.05 and the 
determinant was 0.070. The resulting SPSS Total Variance Explained output is 
reproduced at Appendix 5.40 truncated to show the three components extracted. 
Table 5.11 shows the summary factors for PCTs using CPAR with Culture 
appearing to be relatively important.  
 
Table 5.11: Contribution to organisational performance by various 
summary factors in 2009 for PCTs as measured by CPA Rating 




Performance management  1 2.736 
Culture 3 2.285 
Strategy 2 1.596 
Engagement   
Human resources   
Innovation   
Leadership   
Reputation   
Resources   
Risk   




5.39 PCA for 2009 Survey with Performance Management Score 
Considered next is PMS which is not available for police. First, for all four 
organisation types combined 11 components explaining 70.86% of the variance 
were extracted in the PCA using the statements significant at p<0.05 with PMS. 
The KMO was 0.787 and the result is significant. There were 23.0% of non-
redundant residuals with absolute values >0.05. Again, the determinant was very 
low. The resulting SPSS Total Variance Explained output is reproduced at 
Appendix 5.41, truncated to show the 11 components extracted. 
 
Table 5.12 suggests Strategy, Human resources and Reputation are important 
summary factors. Again, summing the components places Human resources first 
with Strategy and Performance management vying for second place. 
 
Table 5.12: Contribution to organisational performance by various 
summary factors in 2009 for all four organisation types combined as 
measured by Performance Management Score 




Strategy 1, 2, 5 7.412 (2.758, 
2.579) 
Human resources 4, 7, 11, 2 7.198 (6.930, 
6.312, 2.758) 
Reputation 7, 3 6.930 (3.892) 
Performance 
management  
9, 11 6.374 (6.312) 
Culture 10 4.527 
Engagement 8, 6 3.930 (1.814) 
Innovation   
Leadership   
Physical Infrastructure   
Resources   
Risk   
 
 
Appendix 5.42 is truncated to show just the 11 components extracted for councils 
with PMS. They explain 76.639% of the variance. The KMO was 0.477, so below 
the minimum accepted value of 0.500 and the result is significant. There were 
21.0% of non-redundant residuals with absolute values >0.05 and the determinant 




Table 5.13: Contribution to organisational performance by various 
summary factors in 2009 for councils as measured by Performance 
Management Score 









4, 10, 9 7.306 (5.622, 
4.390) 
Human resources 1, 8, 5, 7 6.905 (6.089, 
4.704, 3.297) 
Culture 1 6.905 
Reputation 10 5.622 
Engagement 11 1.915 
Innovation   
Leadership   
Physical Infrastructure   
Resources   
Risk   
 
 
The statements making up the components were quite ‘mixed-up’ when matched 
with the summary factors as shown in Table 5.13. However, the dominance of 
Strategy, Performance management and Human resources is again evident.  
 
Fire services and PCTs had many fewer statistically significant statements and this 
is reflected in the number of components extracted. As shown in Appendix 5.43 for 
the fire services two components, explaining 71.106% of the variance, were 
extracted in the PCA. The KMO was 0.820 and the result is significant at 0.004. 
There were 47.0% of non-redundant residuals with absolute values >0.05 and the 
determinant was 0.020. As Table 5.14 shows this is rather different to previously 
as, although Strategy is first, Reputation and Leadership are the other two 
summary factors. Note the absence of Performance management. 
 
Again, two components were extracted for PCTs explaining 79.059% of the 
variance (Appendix 5.44). The KMO was rather low at 0.516 and the result is 
significant at 0.076, so not meeting p<0.05. There were 70.0% of non-redundant 
residuals with absolute values >0.05, which is high. The determinant was just 





Table 5.14: Contribution to organisational performance by various factors 
in 2009 for fire services as measured by Performance Management Score 




Strategy 1, 2 3.725 (2.464) 
Reputation 1 3.725 
Leadership 2 2.464 
Culture   
Engagement   
Human resources   
Innovation   
Performance management   
Physical Infrastructure   
Resources   
Risk   
 
 
Table 5.15 is different from those previous; in PMS with Resources, Engagement 
and Innovation being prominent with quite an even spread. The Resources 
statements though are specifically concerned with those available to do 
performance management. The next section looks at the statements with respect 
to SS, for which the PCA is not available for PCTs.  
 
Table 5.15: Contribution to organisational performance by various 
summary factors in 2009 for PCTs as measured by Performance 
Management Score 




Resources 1, 2 4.396 (3.795) 
Engagement 1 4.396 




Human resources 2 3.795 
Culture   
Leadership   
Physical Infrastructure   
Reputation   
Risk   







5.40 PCA for 2009 Survey with Service Score 
The SS represents the performance of organisations at delivering services to the 
community.  Appendix 5.45 shows the SPSS output for all four organisation types 
combined in 2009 when assessed by SS. Four components, explaining 63.949% 
of the variance were extracted in the PCA. The KMO was barely acceptable at 
0.500 and the result is significant at 0.001 with a determinant of 0.391. There were 
58.0% of non-redundant residuals with absolute values >0.05.  
 
Table 5.16: Contribution to organisational performance by various 
summary factors in 2009 for all four organisation types combined as 
measured by Service Score 




Resources 1 1.686 
Human resources 4, 2 1.473 (1.377) 
Performance management 2 1.377 
Strategy 3 1.361 
Culture   
Engagement   
Innovation   
Leadership   
Physical Infrastructure   
Reputation   
Risk   
 
As shown by Table 5.16 there appears to be a fairly even spread in the importance 
of these four summary factors with Resources being first although replaced by 
Human resources if the components are summed. Perhaps this is no surprise as 
in delivering the services; resources of varying kinds may well be more critical in 
determining the level of performance (as measured by SS). 
 
Appendix 5.46 shows the SPSS output for councils with SS. Three components 
were extracted, explaining 71.307% of the variance. The KMO was 0.692 and the 
result is significant with a determinant of 0.146. There were 76.0% of non-
redundant residuals with absolute values >0.05, which is high.  
 
Again, the components spread a number of summary factors with Human 
resources, Strategy and Culture being important (Table 5.17). The resources issue 




Appendix 5.47 shows the SPSS output for fire services with four components, 
explaining 79.530% of the variance in the PCA. The KMO was 0.501 and the result 
is significant with a low determinant. There were 40.0% of non-redundant residuals 
with absolute values >0.05.  
 
Table 5.17: Contribution to organisational performance by various factors 
in 2009 for councils as measured by Service Score 




Human resources 1, 2 2.456 (1.212) 
Strategy 1 2.456 
Culture 3 2.256 
Performance management 2 1.212 
Resources 2 1.212 
Engagement   
Innovation   
Leadership   
Physical Infrastructure   
Reputation   
Risk   
 
As Table 5.18 shows Strategy and Performance management are prominent for 
fire services that may reflect a focus on a few specific activities needing to be 
delivered to a high standard thus, perhaps, putting a premium on the management 
of performance within a coherent planning framework. 
 
Table 5.18: Contribution to organisational performance by various 
summary factors in 2009 for fire services as measured by Service Score 




Strategy 2, 1, 3 5.093 (5.005, 3.093) 
Performance management 2, 4 5.093 (3.511) 
Culture 3 3.093 
Engagement   
Human resources   
Innovation   
Leadership   
Physical Infrastructure   
Reputation   
Resources   





Appendix 5.48 shows the SPSS output for police forces. Two components, 
explaining 82.972% of the variance, were extracted in the PCA. The KMO was 
0.504 and the result is significant at 0.055 with a determinant of 0.018. There were 
60.0% of non-redundant residuals with absolute values >0.05. 
 
Interestingly, Leadership appears for the police perhaps not unexpected for 
organisations run on hierarchical command lines (Table 5.19). Surprisingly neither 




Table 5.19: Contribution to organisational performance by various 
summary factors in 2009 for police forces as measured by Service Score 




Human resources 1 2.939 
Leadership 1 2.939 
Culture 2 2.588 
Engagement   




Physical Infrastructure   
Reputation   
Resources   
Risk   
Strategy   
 
 
5.41 PCA for 2009 Survey with Corporate Assessment 
The CA measures the capacity and capability of the corporate body to perform and 
provide an organisational environment for the successful achievement of the 
organisation’s aims and objectives. This analysis could not be completed for fire 
services and police forces. Appendix 5.49 shows the SPSS output for all four 
organisations combined for the CA. Eight components were extracted explaining 
67.972% of the variance. The KMO was 0.829 and the result is significant, although 
the determinant is below the normally acceptable threshold required. There were 




As Table 5.20 illustrates summary factors may be expected to be important 
corporately dominate including Human resources, Strategy and Reputation. 
Culture is perhaps the surprising omission. 
 
Table 5.20: Contribution to organisational performance by various 
summary factors in 2009 for all four organisation types combined as 
measured by the Corporate Assessment 




Human resources 8, 1, 3, 7 5.896 (5.578, 
3.333, 2.720) 
Strategy 8, 2, 4, 6 5.896 (3.984, 
1.970, 1.352) 
Reputation 5, 1 5.637 (5.578) 
Engagement 5 5.637 
Performance management 5 5.637 
Leadership 1 5.578 
Culture   
Innovation   
Physical Infrastructure   
Resources   
Risk   
 
 
Appendix 5.50 shows the SPSS output for councils and CA. Ten components were 
extracted explaining 76.725% of the variance. The KMO was 0.697 and the result 
is significant with a very low determinant. There were 25.0% of non-redundant 
residuals with absolute values >0.05. 
 
Again, a number of components are spread amongst the summary factors (Table 
5.21). Culture now appears and unsurprisingly Reputation is quite important with  
Innovation also making a show.  Human resources and Performance management 
appear to be the two dominant summary factors with Strategy being lower in the 








Table 5.21: Contribution to organisational performance by various 
summary factors in 2009 for councils as measured by the Corporate 
Assessment 




Human resources 1, 5, 8, 10 6.709 (4.066, 
3.986, 3.212) 
Culture 1, 8 6.709 (3.986) 
Reputation 1 6.709 
Performance 
management 
2, 5, 4, 3 5.317 (4.066, 
3.152, 2.438) 
Strategy 2, 7 5.317 (2.578) 
Innovation 9 2.506 
Engagement   
Leadership   
Physical Infrastructure   
Resources   
Risk   
 
 
Appendix 5.51 shows the SPSS output for PCTs with CA. Six components, 
explaining 99.330% of the variance, were extracted in the PCA. The KMO was 
below the acceptable level at 0.307 and although the result is significant the 
determinant is also very low. There were 0.0% of non-redundant residuals with 
absolute values >0.05. 
 
Table 5.22: Contribution to organisational performance by various 
summary factors in 2009 for PCTs as measured by the Corporate 
Assessment 








1, 5 6.563 (0.875) 
Human resources (HR) 6, 3, 4 3.473 (2.913, 2.650) 
Strategy (ST)   
Innovation (IN)   
Engagement EN)   




Reputation (RP)   
Risk (RI)   
Culture (CU)   
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The surprise, in Table 5.22, is Resources tops the list, although it has appeared for 
PCTs previously. The applicable statements are mainly about a lack of resources 
including strategic capacity and to do performance management, although the 
latter figures as the second summary factor, with Human resources third. 
 
5.42 PCA for 2005 and 2009 Summary 
This section provides a summary of the PCA by rankings for the summary factors. 
Table 5.23 shows the rankings (using the codes in Table 5.22) according to the 
largest component in each summary factor. Where the PCA is not reported N/A is 
used in the table. Not all 11 summary factors appear in each analysis. Taking 
CPAR first, Human resources is prominent except for PCTs. Strategy is next, 
although doesn’t appear for PCTs. Performance management is middling in the list 
overall although takes top spot for PCTs. Culture appears to be important for police 
forces and PCTs. Comparing councils from 2005 and 2009 the top four are the 
same in both years although the order is different, with Human resources trading 
places with Strategy for top spot and Resources with Performance management 
for third. Performance management may have particular prominence in 2005 due 
to the impending introduction of the CPA ‘harder test’. 
 
Considering PMS; Strategy is ranked first for both years and all instances except 
PCTs where it is replaced by Resources. After this the differences outweigh 
similarities. Fire and PCTs do not have a single summary factor in common.  
 
The summary factors by SS ranks are rather different with Strategy only taking first 
place for fire services and second place for councils in 2009. For councils in 2005 
it was ranked nine out of ten. For all organisations combined in 2009 Resources 
was ranked first, although it only appeared for councils and then at the foot of the 
list. The PCA for PCTs is not reported individually but is part of the ‘All’ and so may 
have contributed significantly to this, noting Resources is ranked first for PCTs in 
PMS and CA to which we now turn. 
 
PCAs for fire services and police forces are not reported for the CA. The order of 
summary factors is different for councils in 2005 and 2009 with Innovation ranking 
first in 2005 and Human resources in 2009, which was last in 2005. As previously 






Table 5.23: Summary of rankings of summary factors in 2005 and 2009 for 
four CPA measures by loading of strongest component only 
Rank CPA Rating Performance Management Score 
2005 2009 2005 2009 
LA All LA Fire Police PCT LA All LA Fire Police PCT 
1 ST HR HR N/A HR PM ST ST ST ST N/A RS 
2 HR RS ST  CU CU PM  HR PM RP  EN 
3 PM  ST RS  PM ST EN RP HR LE  IN 
4 RS PM PM    PH PM CU   PM 
5 EN  EN    RS CU RP   HR 
6 IN  CU    CU EN EN    
7 PH  RP    RP      
8 CU      HR      
9 LE      LE      
10 RI      RI      
11 RP            
 
Rank Service Score Corporate Assessment 
2005 2009 2005 2009 
LA All LA Fire Police PCT LA All LA Fire Police PCT 
1 IN RS HR ST HR N/A IN HR HR N/A N/A RS 
2 EN HR ST PM LE  PM  ST CU   PM 
3 PM  PM CU CU CU  EN RP RP   HR 
4 RS ST PM    CU EN PM    
5 RP  RS    LE PM ST    
6 HR      ST LE IN    
7 CU      RP      
8 LE      RS      
9 ST      HR      
10 RI            
11             
 
 
Table 5.24 shows the summary factors ranked in order when the components 
within them are summed. In this table there are a number of joint rankings indicated 
by $. This may provide an improved representation of the importance of each of 
the summary factors’ contributions to organisational performance; although 
technically in an oblimin rotation they should not be added to give a total variance. 
For CPAR; Strategy, Human resources and Performance management are 
dominant, although for police and PCTs Culture ranks second. The same three 
also run across the top ranks for councils in 2005 and 2009, although in 2005 
Engagement is ranked third. As regards PMS, there is more variation although for 
councils in 2009 the order of the top three is the same as for CPAR.  Resources is 





For SS; Strategy, Performance management and Human resources occupy top 
spots, although Culture is in third place for councils, fire and police in 2009. 
Leadership appears in joint first place with Human resources for police forces. 
Finally, for CA, a similar pattern is evident but with Resources claiming top spot for 
PCTs. Culture is third for councils in 2005 and 2009. 
 
Table 5.24: Summary of rankings of factors in 2005 and 2009 for four CPA 
measures by numeric addition of all components in the summary factor 
(technically they should not be added so indicative only) 
Rank CPA Rating Performance Management Score 
2005 2009 2005 2009 
LA All LA Fire Police PCT LA All LA Fire Police PCT 
1 ST ST HR N/A HR PM PM HR HR ST N/A RS 
2 PM PM ST  CU CU EN ST ST RP  PM$ 
3 EN HR PM  PM ST ST PM PM LE  EN$ 
4 HR RS RS    RS RP CU   IN$ 
5 CU  EN    CU EN RP   HR 
6 RS  CU    RP CU EN    
7 IN  RP    HR      
8 PH      PH      
9 RP      LE      
10 LE      RS      
11 RI            
 
Rank Service Score Corporate Assessment 
2005 2009 2005 2009 
LA All LA Fire Police PCT LA All LA Fire Police PCT 
1 PM HR HR ST HR$ N/A PM HR HR N/A N/A RS 
2 ST RS ST PM LE$  ST ST PM   HR 
3 EN PM CU CU CU  CU RP CU   PM 
4 RP ST RS$    EN PM
$ 
ST    
5 RS  EN$    RP EN
$ 
RP    
6 HR      LE LD IN    
7 LE      IN      
8 CU      RS      
9 IN      HR      
10 RI            
11             
$ indicates joint rank 
 
 
These results suggest there are some summary factors more associated with 
organisational performance than others, in particular Strategy, Performance 
management and Human resources. Resources, Engagement and Leadership 
appear to play a lesser role although any one, or others, may take prominence. 
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The CPAR is an overall measure of performance including the PMS, SS and CA. 
These latter measures actually show a similarity in summary factors of most 
importance. For example, in Table 5.24, the summary factor ranked first for 
councils in 2005 for all three is Performance management and in 2009 is Human 
resources. For CPA in 2005 though Strategy is top whilst for 2009 it is the same 
as the three measures, Human resources. This also reinforces the view that the 
definition and measurement of performance is indeed a complex undertaking and 






6. Results 2 – Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) 
6.1 Introduction 
CPA ended in 2008 and was replaced by the CAA. Unlike CPA the CAA formally 
assessed four local organisation types; councils, fire services, police forces and 
PCTs here given a CAA Rating (CAAR). In theory this provided a more coherent 
mechanism than CPA where the rated performance of the non-council 
organisations (police forces and PCTs) had to be converted from other measures 
to CPA equivalents.  
 
Unfortunately, as the number of questionnaires returned in 2010 was much lower 
than 2005 and 2009 the analysis could not be done for police and PCTs as the 
numbers were too low. Appendix 5.1 shows the significant (p<0.05) correlations. 




6.2 Hypothesis A1: That an organisation that has a high level of strategic 
direction will have higher performance than one that has a lower level. 
Appendix 6.1 contains the statements testing this hypothesis. There were five 
statistically significant correlations; one for councils, one for fire services and three 
for all four organisation types combined. For councils it was 5.48 Extent performance 
management skews organisation’s priorities (-0.495**) and for fire services 4.5 
Published organisational development strategy (-0.641*). The three for all four 
organisation types combined were: 4.49 Extent of organisation focus on ‘ends’ rather 
than ‘means’ (0.376*), 5.48 Extent performance management skews organisation’s 
priorities (-0.415**) and 5.49 Extent performance management measures things that 
matter (0.344*). Since there are also relatively high correlations for some of the other 
statements on balance this hypothesis should be accepted. 
 
6.3 Hypothesis A2: That an organisation that has a high level of strategic and 
service planning will have higher performance than one that has a lower level. 
This hypothesis is closely related to that in the preceding section and is tested using 
16 statements (Appendix 6.2). There were no significant correlations although some 
are quite high which might lead to acceptance of the hypothesis. On balance it may 




6.4 Hypothesis A3: That an organisation with a high level of performance 
management will have higher performance than one that has a lower level. 
This hypothesis is tested using 86 statements (Appendix 6.3). There were two 
significant correlations for councils: 5.48 Extent performance management skews 
organisation priorities (-0.495**) and 11.3 Extent publishing performance data 
detrimental (-0.397*). For fire services there were four significant correlations: 5.33 
Range of qualitative and quantitative indicators (-0.672*), 5.63 Extent performance 
management has commitment top-level management (0.672*) 5.43 Extent 
performance managed not just measured (0.750*) and 12.35 Extent performance 
management sympathetic with organisational culture (0.693*). For all four 
organisation types combined there were three significant correlations: 5.48 Extent 
performance management skews organisation priorities (-0.415**), 5.49 Extent 
performance management measures things that matter (0.344*) and 12.35 Extent 
performance management sympathetic with organisational culture (0.324*). On 
balance this hypothesis should be accepted although there are apparent 
inconsistencies meriting further research. For example, the impact of management 
reviews (4.52) versus the use of techniques such as the EFQM EM (5.3), BSC (5.4) 
and TQM (5.5).  
6.5 Hypothesis A4: That an organisation with a formal published 
organisational development strategy (ODS) will have higher performance than 
one without such an ODS 
This hypothesis was tested using 29 statements (Appendix 6.4) of which one is 
significant for fire services; 4.5 Published organisational development strategy (-
0.641*) and one for all organisations combined; 12.5 Extent to which organisation 
has a blame culture (-0.369*). It is not clear why a published ODS (4.5) should be 
negative, this is the reverse of the results for CPA where all the results were positive. 
Although there are some quite high correlations on balance this hypothesis cannot 
be accepted from these results. 
 
6.6 Hypothesis A5: That an organisation that uses proprietary performance 
management software will have higher performance than an organisation that 
uses none or its own software.  
There was no significant correlation (p<0.05) for the extent to which such proprietary 
software delivers higher performance and CAAR (Appendix 6.5), which is as for 




6.7 Hypothesis A6: That an organisation that involves employees more in 
performance management will have higher performance than an organisation 
that involves employees less. 
Seven statements assess this hypothesis (Appendix 6.6). There is one significant 
correlation; for councils 4.22 Extent of front-line employee involvement in service 
planning (0.423*) which offers some support for the hypothesis, as do other 
statements (4.41 Organisation focuses on employees and 10.5 Extent use of 
employees’ knowledge in performance management), which is therefore accepted.   
 
6.8 Hypothesis A7: That an organisation that uses the 
BSC/EFQM/TQM/MBO/Benchmarking/Strategy mapping will have higher 
performance than an organisation that does not. 
There were no significant correlations (Appendix 6.7) although those for 5.3 Use 
EFQM EM or variant and 5.5 Use Total Quality Management were highest. The 
correlation could not be calculated for 5.6 Use Benchmarking because it was used 
by all organisations. On the basis of these results the hypothesis should be rejected 
but, as previously, it seems as though some techniques appear to have greater 
impact than others. 
 
6.9 Hypothesis A8: That an organisation that is more innovative will be higher 
performing than an organisation that is less innovative. 
Innovation is tested using the statements in Appendix 6.8. One of these is significant 
and for all organisations combined: 12.32 Extent of inclination for experimentation 
within organisation (0.349*). Although, not significant many of the other correlations 
are fairly high and so on balance this hypothesis should be accepted. 
 
6.10 Hypothesis A9: That an organisation that has a higher level of 
citizen/service user focus will be higher performing than one that focuses on 
citizens/service users less. 
This hypothesis is assessed by 12 statements (Appendix 6.9) of which none are 








6.11 Hypothesis B1: That an organisation with a comprehensive approach to 
employee appraisal will have higher performance than an organisation with 
a less comprehensive approach. 
Thirteen statements (Appendix 6.10) test this hypothesis. None of the correlations 
are significant, although some are quite large such as 5.25 Appraisal competency 
based. On balance this hypothesis should be rejected. 
 
6.12 Hypothesis B2: That an organisation that heavily involves service 
departments in service planning and performance management is higher 
performing than an organisation that involves them less.  
None of the seven statements (Appendix 6.11) are statistically significant although 
again there are a number fairly high, for example 4.23 Level of departmental 
involvement in developing service planning. However, on the basis of all the 
statements the hypothesis should be rejected. 
 
ADMINISTRATION 
6.13 Hypothesis C1: That an organisation that exhibits a higher level of 
decentralisation will be higher performing than one that is more centralised. 
Eight statements (Appendix 6.12) are used to test this hypothesis. Again, none of 
these have a significant correlation with CAAR, although many of the highest 
coefficients are negative. Interestingly, 6.6 Consistency of the level of 
practices/routines is quite high and positive suggesting an organisation-wide 
(corporate) approach for certain activities is likely to be beneficial. On balance this 
hypothesis should be rejected, as it was in the CPA analysis.  
 
6.14 Hypothesis C2: That an organisation with a higher level of 
decentralised service planning will be higher performing than one with a 
lower level. 
The statement in Appendix 6.13 is not significant with CAAR and so the hypothesis 
should be rejected. Although, the coefficient is negative perhaps suggestive of the 
need for central direction and a framework to support the delivery of high 






6.15 Hypothesis C3: That an organisation with a higher level of 
decentralised performance management will be higher performing than one 
with a lower level. 
Two statements (Appendix 6.14) assess this hypothesis.  None have a significant 
correlation with CAAR and so the hypothesis is rejected. The same comment as 
made for Hypothesis C2 may have some applicability here too. 
 
6.16 Hypothesis C4: That an organisation with a consistency of rules and 
practices throughout will be higher performing than an organisation with 
less consistency. 
There are no significant correlations (Appendix 6.15) although the largest is for 6.6 
Consistency of the level of practices/routines suggesting there may be some truth to 
this hypothesis although not sufficient for acceptance. 
 
LEADERSHIP 
6.17 Hypothesis D1: That an organisation that exhibits a high level of political 
and managerial leadership will be higher performing than one that shows a 
lower level. 
As noted in the CPA analysis the statements on probity (4.45) and governance 
(6.9) are included because it is felt the results for these will depend to a significant 
extent on leadership and indeed there would appear to be a similarity of 
correlations supporting this contention. There is one significant correlation and it is 
for fire services: 7.2 Level of political leadership in organisation (-0.709*). The 
coefficient is also quite high for fire services for 4.45 Extent to which probity is valued 
although not for councils (Appendix 6.16). The hypothesis is not accepted. 
 
6.18 Hypothesis D2: That an organisation where officer leadership is more 
pronounced than that from the politicians will be higher performing than one 
where the reverse is the case. 
Statement 7.2 Level of political leadership in organisation (-0.709*) also appears in 
Appendix 6.17 and is the only significant correlation and for fire services. It is not 
clear why a high level of political leadership should appear to equate to lower 
organisational performance. There seems to be no impact for councils. The result is 








6.19 Hypothesis E1: That an organisation with a higher level of resources 
will be higher performing than an organisation with a lower level 
Twelve statements test this hypothesis (Appendix 6.18). There were no significant 
correlations although the highest for councils was 8.13 Quality of organisation’s 
physical infrastructure, which mirrors the finding for the CPAR, previously 
considered. This was also the highest correlation for fire services although in this 
case negative. There appears to be some relationship between resources and 
organisational performance (for example, 8.18 Extent of budgetary slack in the 
organisation), although not sufficient to accept the hypothesis. 
 
6.20 Hypothesis E2: That an organisation with a relatively higher level of 
resources devoted to activities at the centre than in services will be higher 
performing than an organisation with the reverse. 
Building on the previous hypothesis (E1) we now consider this hypothesis tested 
by six statements (Appendix 6.19) with none significant. The strongest and most 
consistent is 8.11 Level of resources to do performance management in service 
departments suggesting there may be some support but on its own, with the 
coefficients exhibited, not sufficient to accept the hypothesis. 
 
6.21 Hypothesis E3: That an organisation with a higher level of resources 
spent on service planning will be higher performing than an organisation that 
spends less. 
Three statements (Appendix 6.20) test this hypothesis with none significant. 8.12 
Extent information available for corporate/ service planning suggests information 
may be important for service planning but insufficient to accept the hypothesis. 
 
6.22 Hypothesis E4: That an organisation with a higher level of resources 
spent on performance management will be higher performing than an 
organisation that spends less. 
Three statements (Appendix 6.21) consider the impact of the level of resources 
used in performance management on performance. No statements are significant, 
with 8.11 Level of resources to do performance management in service departments 
being the strongest. Again, the results are suggestive but insufficient to allow 




6.23 Hypothesis E5: That an organisation that has well trained and 
motivated employees will be higher performing than an organisation whose 
employees are less well trained and motivated. 
The statements in Appendix 6.22 evaluate this hypothesis. There are two 
significant correlations both for 4.14 Extent to which training improves organisation’s 
performance at -0.611* for fire and -0.305* for all organisation types combined. The 
results for the other statements show a positive direction and are fairly high, 
especially 8.3 Extent to which employees are well trained and 8.4 E131 Level of 
motivation displayed by employees. It is not clear why 4.14 Extent to which training 
improves organisation’s performance is negative. In the CPA analysis the coefficient 
was positive for all four measures for councils and fire excepting for CPAR for the 
latter. It was also negative in the case of PCTs for CPAR and SS although none of 
these were significant. The correlations suggest this hypothesis should be accepted. 
 
6.24 Hypothesis E6: That an organisation where resources follow priorities 
will be higher performing than one where resources are allocated 
historically and not prioritised. 
Two statements test this hypothesis (Appendix 6.23). The correlations are not 
significant. All, but one, being negative contradicts the results for 2005 and 2009 
with CPAR, although the coefficients are quite low. The hypothesis should be 
rejected. 
 
6.25 Hypothesis E7: That an organisation that uses ICT more will be higher 
performing than an organisation that uses it less 
ICT is often seen as important in terms of performance and five statements test 
this. Appendix 6.24 shows no significant correlations, although those for 8.8 Use 
of ICT in the organisation are quite high. This mirrors the CPAR results, excepting in 
2009 for councils the coefficients were somewhat lower. Although there are no 
significant correlations, given the relatively high coefficient for 8.8 Use of ICT in the 
organisation, it is suggested, as for CPA, this hypothesis should be accepted using 
CAA also. 
 
STAKEHOLDERS AND PARTNERSHIPS 
6.26 Hypothesis F1: That an organisation that more actively engages with 
auditors, inspectors and other stakeholders will have higher performance 
than an organisation that has a lower level of engagement. 
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This hypothesis is tested using 17 statements (Appendix 6.25). There are no 
significant correlations with most being fairly low. Exceptions are 9.25 Extent 
partnerships making strategies more meaningful and 9.6 External auditors 
supportive of organisation and 9.18 Extent of use of internal networks by 
organisation. Again, 9.25 Extent partnerships making strategies more meaningful 
shows negative correlations whereas for the CPAR in both 2005 and 2009 the result 
was strongly positive, and statistically significant, for councils and fire services. 
Indeed many of the statements had stronger correlations for CPA than for CAA. This 
could be due to something having changed in the organisations and/or the national 
framework or CAA was actually measuring some things differently to CPA. Certainly, 
the area nature of CAA made the ‘assumption’ of partnership working perhaps more 
explicit than under CPA. On the basis of these results the hypothesis should be 
rejected. 
 
6.27 Hypothesis F2: That an organisation that has outsourced more services 
(by cost) will be higher performing than an organisation that has outsourced 
less (by cost). 
Three statements test this hypothesis (Appendix 6.26) and none are significant. 
The correlation for fire services for 9.2 Outsourced any customer services is quite 
high, although it is unclear what this means when the other statements are 
considered. The hypothesis should be rejected.  
 
6.28 Hypothesis F3: That an organisation that has greater involvement of 
stakeholders and citizens in performance management will have higher 
performance than an organisation that has lower involvement. 
Twelve statements (Appendix 6.27) assess whether an increased involvement of 
stakeholders in performance management results in higher performance. There 




6.29 Hypothesis G1: That an organisation that has a higher level of 
communication will be higher performing than an organisation that has a 
lower level 
Five statements (Appendix 6.28) test this hypothesis. There is one significant 
correlation with 10.1 Extent organisation’s relationship with media is good (0.694*) 
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but for councils there appears to be almost no effect. Although there are some 
relatively strong correlations on balance the hypothesis should be rejected. 
 
REPORTING PERFORMANCE 
6.30 Hypothesis H1: That an organisation that has a higher level of 
performance reporting will be higher performing than an organisation that 
has a lower level of reporting. 
Seven statements (Appendix 6.29) test this hypothesis. There is a single significant 
correlation, 11.3 Extent publishing performance data detrimental (-0.397*), which is 
for councils. This does not support the acceptance of this hypothesis, although there 
is a hint publishing internally may be more beneficial than publishing externally. 
 
ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
6.31 Hypothesis I1: That an organisation with a high supportive and learning 
culture that encourages innovation and non-blame will be higher performing 
than one where this kind of culture is less so. 
Appendix 6.30 contains 36 statements testing this hypothesis. There were two 
significant correlations for councils: 12.14 Extent to which officers and politicians 
have distinct and clear roles (0.470*) and 12.30 Extent of learning from private sector 
(0.468*). There were also two significant statements for fire services: 12.8 Level of 
‘good’ ethical behaviour (0.750*) and 12.35 Extent performance management 
sympathetic with organisational culture (0.693*). These four were also significant 
for all organisation types combined 12.14 (0.380*), 12.30 (0.336*), 12.8 (0.376) 
and 12.35 (0.324*). In addition 12.5 Extent to which organisation has a blame 
culture (-0.369*) and 12.32 Extent of inclination for experimentation within 
organisation (0.349*) were also statistically significant for all organisation types 
combined. There are also some relatively high, if non-significant (p<0.05), 
correlations supporting the hypothesis. For example, 12.22 Extent of barriers to 
cooperation between service areas and 12.23 Extent of barriers to cooperation 
between centre and service areas are both negative suggesting fewer barriers leads 
to higher organisational performance. The hypothesis should be accepted. 
 
6.32 Hypothesis I2: That an organisation where power is more diffused 
throughout the organisation will be higher performing than an organisation 
where power is more concentrated. 
Four statements (Appendix 6.31) assess the extent to which the diffusion of power 
throughout an organisation leads to higher performance. None of these statements 
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are significant and there seem to be differences between councils and fire services 
for all except 7.4 Level of empowerment of officers. On this evidence the hypothesis 
should be rejected. 
 
In summary statements significantly associated with organisational performance, 
as assessed by CAA, are training improving performance, a focus on ends rather 
than means, measuring what matters, having a range of qualitative and 
quantitative indicators and the active management of performance. Also important 
are top-management commitment to performance management, political 
leadership, a good relationship with the media, the lack of a blame culture, good 
ethical behaviour and learning from others. 
 
The next section puts the statistically significant statements through a PCA to 
establish an order of effect of summary factors contributing to organisational 
performance. 
 
6.33 Principal Component Analysis 
A PCA using oblimin rotation has been undertaken using IBM SPSS Statistics 20 
utilising the correlations significant to p<0.05. A number of runs were carried out to 
explore the data. The number of components extracted was determined by the 
default eigenvalue of one with the scree plots being examined to consider further. 
In terms of the pattern matrix a value of 0.40 was chosen for consideration. 
 
A PCA could only be undertaken for all four organisation types combined, councils 
and fire services. As for the CPA PCA analysis, the 11 summary factors will be 
used: Strategy, Human resources, Performance management, Resources, 
Engagement, Innovation, Physical infrastructure, Leadership, Culture, Risk and 
Reputation. As noted previously there is, invariably, an element of overlap between 
these summary factors reflecting the nature of organisational performance. 
 
6.34 PCA for 2010 Survey with CAA Rating 
The first PCA was for all organisation types combined. The resulting SPSS Total 
Variance Explained is reproduced at Appendix 6.32, truncated to show the three 
components extracted explaining 63.819% of the variance with a determinant of 
0.060. The KMO was 0.686 and the result is significant. There were 63.0% of non-
redundant residuals with absolute values >0.05. Table 6.1 shows Culture and 
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Strategy ranked joint first followed by Performance management. Culture is placed 
first by virtue of the addition of the second component. 
 
Appendix 6.33 shows the SPSS Total Variance Explained extract, for councils, 
truncated to the two components extracted explaining 75.962% of the variance and 
the determinant was 0.132. The KMO was 0.526 and the result is significant. There 
were 70.0% of non-redundant residuals with absolute values >0.05. In Table 6.2 
five summary factors are identified with Performance management ranked first by 
the addition of component two. Reputation and Strategy are joint second with 
Culture and Engagement joint third. 
 
Table 6.1: Contribution to organisational performance by various summary 
factors in 2010 for all four organisation types combined as measured by 
CAA Rating 




Culture 1, 2 2.988 (2.338) 
Strategy  1 2.988 
Performance management  2 2.338 
Human resources  3 1.144 
Engagement   
Innovation    
Leadership   
Physical Infrastructure   
Reputation   
Resources   
Risk   
 
 
Table 6.2: Contribution to organisational performance by various summary 
factors in 2010 for councils as measured by CAA Rating 




Performance management 1,2 2.231 (1.190) 
Reputation 1 2.231 
Strategy 1 2.231 
Culture 2 1.190 
Engagement 2 1.190 
Human resources    
Innovation    
Leadership   
Physical Infrastructure   
Resources   
Risk   
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Finally, Appendix 6.34 shows the SPSS Total Variance Explained, for fire services, 
truncated to show the two components extracted explaining 73.720% of the 
variance and the determinant was 0.00006381. The KMO was 0.646 with a 
significance of 0.723 so not meeting p<0.05. There were 72.0% of non-redundant 
residuals with absolute values >0.05. Table 6.3 ranks the summary factors for fire 
services and CAAR with Human resources and Performance management joint 
first by virtue of the contribution of component two. Leadership and Reputation are 
joint second with Culture third.  
 
Table 6.3: Contribution to organisational performance by various summary 
factors in 2010 for fire services as measured by CAA Rating 




Human resources 1, 2 4.571, 3.747 
Performance management 1, 2 4.571, 3.747 
Leadership 1 4.571 
Reputation 1 4.571 
Culture 2 3.747 
Engagement   
Innovation   
Physical Infrastructure   
Resources   
Risk   
Strategy   
 
Although, there are statistical issues with the PCAs they have a consistency as 
shown by Table 6.4 with Performance management, Reputation and Culture being 
shared by councils and fire services. 
 
 For all four organisation types together Culture and Strategy are joint first followed 
by Performance management and then Human resources. Adding the components 
together in each summary factor does not change the order for all organisation 
types combined; Culture is ranked first and Strategy second (i.e. not now joint first 
rank). For councils Performance management is ranked first on its own with 






Table 6.4: Rankings of summary factors for CAA Rating by loading of the 
strongest component only 
Rank All organisations Councils Fire services 








Strategy $a Leadership$ 
4 Human resources Culture $b Reputation$ 
5  Engagement $b Culture 




7. Results 3 – BVPP Content Analysis ‘Can the content analysis of a 
corporate document be used to determine the performance of the 
organisation that produced it?’  
  
7.1 Introduction  
The hypothesis is the content, and ‘quality’ of the content, of a council’s BVPP is 
positively associated with their score achieved in CPA awarded by the Audit 
Commission. 
 
7.2 Background  
The requirement for councils to publish a BVPP was part of the BV regime 
introduced to replace CCT (see Martin and Hartley, 2000 and Martin and Davis, 
2001 for a discussion). Russell Barter (1999) reviewed the early experiences within 
eight councils of their BVPPs. She noted authorities had adopted a variety of 
approaches to content and presentation within a ‘hierarchical’ template. This 
template contained vision, priorities, performance information (both targets and 
actual performance) and service specific plans. Boyne (2000) identified BVPPs as 
one of the internal management processes intended to produce continuous 
improvement in performance.  
  
The Audit Commission reported on lessons from early BVPPs including 
performance information, managing performance, involving councillors, aspects of 
consultation, challenge and to retain a focus on service delivery (Audit 
Commission, 2000b, p. 34). BVPPs therefore contained some content by law but 
authorities had some latitude. The BVPP was audited by the authority’s external 
auditor (see Percy, 2001 for a discussion of auditing) to ensure it complied with 
legislation. Additionally the BVPP was a key document for use by inspectors in 
CPA.   
  
Boyne, Gould-Williams and Law et al (2002b) evaluated Welsh BVPPs from the 
point of view of the quality of information contained and accountability to 
stakeholders and the needs of various users. They concluded few of the BVPPs 
contained relevant data. The principal reasons given for this were a lack of PIs 
prior to BV and the limited expertise of officers in performance management. Over 
the years since their introduction, it is clear the BVPP is less of a document for the 
public (as originally intended – a mantra was ‘…the duty of BV owed to local 




BVPPs were required to contain data for the full suite of BVPIs including some 
measures of satisfaction supplemented with local PIs. However, Boyne, Gould-
Williams and Law et al (2001) suggested councillors needed to become more 
involved in BV by, for example, using data published in BVPPs to hold managers 
to account.  
  
Ryan, Stanley and Nelson (2002) noted, in the Australian context, the quality of 
reporting by local government improved over time but there were gaps in the 
information reported, including performance data. In addition their results indicated 
a correlation between the size of the local authority and the quality of reporting but 
quality is not correlated with the timeliness of the reports. Still in Australia, Mack 
and Ryan (2004) noted the increased emphasis on performance and accountability 
over the past 25 years has led to the increased prominence of the annual report. 
However, as in Britain, the requirement for local government to produce such a 
report arose from legislation. The results of their research indicated the annual 
report as an important source of information for many stakeholders, although the 
importance varied.   
  
Steccolini (2004) found, for Italian local government, annual reports are designed 
to comply with detailed statutory requirements and are used mainly by internal 
stakeholders. In the case of New Zealand, Thompson (1995) suggests the 
essential requirements for a service performance report: a linked hierarchy of 
objectives and a clearly stated reliable and appropriate set of PIs for assessing 
those objectives have been difficult to achieve. He attributes this to the lack of 
know-how to make it work.  
  
Bart, Bontis and Taggar (2001) considered the impact of mission statements on 
firm performance in North American corporations. It was found mission statements 
can affect firms’ financial performance but this was most evident through positive 
employee behaviour. The mission (or vision) statement within the remit of strategic 
or corporate planning is often found in BVPPs and was made one of the 
assessment criteria.   
  
The use and usefulness of performance measures in the public sector is 
considered by Propper and Wilson (2003). They quote Kravchuk and Schack 
(1996), with approval, as regards ten design principles for an effective performance 
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measurement system. These include having a clear coherent mission, develop an 
explicit measurement strategy, involve key users and avoid excessive aggregation 
of information. Rutherford (2000) considers practices of reporting may undermine 
desirable factors of PIs, such as being understandable, comparability and 
perceived importance. This work is useful for consideration of how it may well 
translate across to the components of BVPP content.    
 
7.3 Results  
The individual criteria scores were scored by the researcher on a scale of zero to 
five for each BVPP using a template (Appendix 4.2).  From this the total percentage 
score was calculated for each council. In addition it was hypothesised those 
authorities rated more highly in CPA would have a relatively larger number of 
criteria scoring four and five and those authorities rated lower would have a 
relatively high number of criteria scoring zero and one. Appendix 4.3 contains the 
overall total percentage scores, the highest being for Dorset County Council at 
90% and the lowest Kingston-upon-Hull City Council at 18%.  
  
Appendix 7.1 shows the Pearson correlations for the 21 criteria with the four CPA 
measures. Of the 21 criteria ten have significant correlations with CPAR, nine with 
PMS, nine with SS and seven with CA (p<0.05). For CPAR the strongest 
correlation is with priority PIs being shown, for PMS it is prioritisation is evident, 
with SS as for CPAR (priority PIs) and for CA, a selection of local PIs included. A 
paper reported these results to the BAM conference in 2012 (Goodchild, 2012). 
  
A PCA using varimax rotation was undertaken using CPAR and the 21 criteria. 
This converged in 13 iterations producing six components explaining 62.33% of 
the variance (Appendix 7.2). 
  
The first component explaining 16.8% of the variance is strategy (for example 
having a mission/vision statement) or corporate planning (including prioritisation of 
objectives). This is understandable since having a strategic approach would tend 
to emphasise the corporate nature of the organisation and reduce the tendency for 
‘silo’ working. The second component, explaining 11.0% of the variance, is 
reviewing including BV reviews of services and review of the strategy, including 
the link with the community strategy. Again, it was important under BV and CPA 
that authorities’ critically considered their services and the strategic fit. The third 
component, explaining 10.4% of the total variance, is concerned with planning 
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below the strategic level; so service planning including the involvement of 
employees and associated performance management. It can be appreciated how 
this service planning neatly follows on from corporate planning, where top level 
objectives and priorities are decided, feeding down into service plans to be 
supplemented by service objectives and indicators.   
  
The fourth component, explaining 9.4% of the total variance, is ‘analysis’ including 
the reasons for performance variances and the use of comparative data. The level 
of analysis will be important in the authority for learning as to the effectiveness of 
its strategic direction and decisions, planning and operations and may influence 
the allocation of resources, for example to effect service improvement. The fifth 
component, explaining 8.3% of the variance, concerns the use of local 
performance indicators (LPIs), other than national PI sets and linked to 
prioritisation. Thus, having a selection of LPIs may have provided additional focus 
and prioritisation, with enhancement to analyses produced, aiding strategic and 
service understanding. The sixth component, explaining 6.4% of the variance is 
HR, including leadership. This links with the previous five components in having a 
strategy providing direction feeding through to service delivery through the 
planning process.  
 
 Figure 7.1: Diagrammatic representation of the PCA showing the top six 






Strategy   - prioritisation  
(16.8%)  
Reviewing (11.0%)   
Analysis (9.4%)   
Service Planning (10.4%)   
Local indicators  -  
prioritisation (8.3%)   
Human Resources   -
Leadership   (6.4  )   
PERFORMANCE (62.3%)   
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Figure 7.1 illustrates the PCA results with the arrows showing possible influences.  
Thus strategic decisions (Strategy – prioritisation) feed service planning. HR and 
leadership are important in ensuring employee involvement and commitment thus 
creating appreciation. Reviewing is important to test whether the strategy and 
service plans are delivering the required results, and suggesting possible 
alternative approaches.   
 
Table 7.1 shows the average percentage score by CPAR for all authorities. It also 
shows the average percentage score, only counting those criteria scoring four and 
five (high scores) and zero and one (low scores). The table shows there is an 
increase in percentage score moving from poor to excellent in CPAR. The same 
applies for the percentage of criteria scoring four and five. Conversely excellent 
rated authorities have the lowest percentage of criteria scoring zero and one.       
  
             
 Table 7.1: BVPP content analysis by local authority CPA Rating  
CPA Rating  Total %  4 & 5 %  0 & 1 %  
Excellent  55%  42%  29%  
Good  48%  32%  31%  
Fair  44%  31%  39%  
Weak  38%  23%  48%  
Poor  35%  17%  50%  
All  46%  31%  37%  
  
  
Figure 7.2 shows the graph produced using Excel and the Pearson correlation 
(p<0.001) for CPAR and BVPP percentage score.   
 
Table 7.2 shows the Pearson correlations produced using SPSS for the total 
percentage, the percentage scoring four and five and the percentage scoring zero 
and one for the same data (CPAR). Note the percentage content analysis score 
for criteria scoring zero and one is inversely correlated with a higher CPAR as 
expected. As well as CPAR the table also shows the content of BVPPs is correlated 
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may suggest authorities lack some key attributes and given the CA correlation it 
may be corporate capacity is a significant issue (see Andrews and Boyne, 2011). 
The PMS appears to be somewhat counter-intuitive, although given the discussion 
in the literature as to whether it is the use of performance management producing 
high performing organisations or high performing organisations using performance 
management (Armstrong and Baron, 1998, p. 208) this may not be surprising.     
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8. Results 4 - Organisational Profiles 
8.1 Introduction 
The surveys asked organisations to mark their position on a chart between ten 
pairs of statements, after Kernaghan (2000, p. 93) and Kernaghan, Marson and 
Borins (2000, pp. 1-14 and 266-286). Kernaghan used the model (a 
bureaucratic/post-bureaucratic framework) to assess how far an organisation 
meets the tenets of NPM. He was thus able to compare different organisations 
such as privatised utilities and those remaining in the public sector or those 
organisations still in the public sector given greater freedoms. This organisational 
profile concept can also be used to assess how organisations moved over time. 
The pairs of statements are: 
 
 Organisation Centred to Citizen Centred 
 Position Power to Leadership 
 Rule Centred to People Centred 
 Independent Action to Collaboration 
 Status-Quo Oriented to Change Oriented 
 Process Orientated to Results Oriented 
 Centralisation to Decentralisation 
 Departmental Form to Non-Departmental Form 
 Budget Driven to Revenue Driven 
 Monopolistic to Competitive 
In the survey these statements were scored by the respondents on a (relative) scale 
of one to ten. An organisation exhibiting post-bureaucratic characteristics would tend 
to score more highly against the statements. Also it would be expected an 
organisation moving its practices in line with NPM would tend to increase its scores 
over time. Increased use of performance management and associated practices is 
generally considered one of the defining characteristics of NPM. It has been argued 
the modernisation agenda of local government, which began strongly in the late 
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1970s and arguably accelerated sharply under the Labour Government from 1997 
(BV and then CPA), is a particularly strong example of NPM. Other parts of the public 
sector, including other local public services, were also subject to the same 
influences. For example, Andrews (2010b) suggests that modernisation of the fire 
service in England did indeed improve performance, especially noting the 
introduction of the Integrated Personal Development System and Integrated Risk 
Management Plans. 
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It has already been noted, in line with NPM, public organisations are generally 
considered to be less bureaucratic and more market orientated than previously. 
Table 8.1 illustrates modes of control and the strategy, organisational form and 
performance management arrangements considered to apply (Flynn, 2002). This 
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is important since it potentially identifies the type of strategy depending on the 
internal and external environment, particularly the latter, the organisation operates 
in. 
 
Martin and Bovaird (2004) have reported on a meta-evaluation of local government 
modernisation suggesting the performance of councils (in terms of service delivery) 
has improved and those originally rated poor and weak in CPA have improved the 
most, a finding supported by later work (Boyne, James and John et al, 2010). They 
especially identify leadership, performance management and devolution to frontline 
staff as strong drivers of improvement, supported by the research reported here. 
 
The data available to test the overall hypothesis that a lower level of bureaucracy is 
associated with higher organisational performance covers the years 2000, 2005, 
2009 and 2010. The 2005 survey asked respondents to complete the organisational 
profile as at that date but also do the same looking back to the year 2000. This needs 
to be borne in mind in interpretation as respondents may have assumed an increase 
in score was to be ‘expected’ given the explanation of the organisational profile. The 
data for 2000 and 2005 is for principal English, Scottish and Welsh councils. Since 
CPA did not apply in Scotland or Wales their data cannot be correlated with 
organisational performance but does provide a perspective given the differences 
between the three countries, in particular due to devolution. The data for 2009 and 
2010 is for England only covering principal councils, fire services, police forces and 
PCTs. It is also necessary to consider the response rates to the surveys as the 
number returned for police and PCTs was very low in 2010.  
 
From the data in the questionnaires means were calculated for each of the ten 
organisation factors for 2000, 2005 and 2009 by CPAR and graphed using Microsoft 
Excel 2013. CAA data was used for 2010 and in order to facilitate comparison the 








Table 8.2: Conversion of CPA Ratings to CAA Ratings 
CPA Ratings CAA Ratings 
Poor (0) Poor 
Weak (1) 
Fair (2) Adequate 
Good (3) Well 
Excellent (4) Excellent 
 
PCA was calculated using varimax and oblimin rotation through IBM SPSS Statistics 
20. Following Field (2013, p. 681), and the results of the PCA runs, as previously, it 
was concluded oblimin rotation better reflected the nature of the data. 
 
The first hypothesis considered is an organisation higher for all of the organisation 
factors will be more ‘post bureaucratic’, more in-line with the principles of NPM and 
hence higher performing, since NPM is meant to improve all round performance. 
 
8.2 Hypothesis J1: That an organisation that exhibits higher scores in the 
organisational profile will be higher performing than an organisation that 
scores lower. 
Figure 8.1 shows the organisational profile for all organisation types combined for 
2000, 2005, 2009 and 2010. In the statements the first term refers to a total score of 
one whilst the second refers to a total score of ten. For example, for the statement 
Organisation to Citizen Centred a score of seven is more citizen centred than 
organisation centred and so on. The 2000 and 2005 scores are for English councils 
only with 2009 and 2010 being all four types of organisation (councils, fire services, 
police forces and PCTs). The scores for 2000 stand out as being lower across the 
board for all ten statements. The profiles for 2009 and 2010 are virtually identical 
whilst 2005 has the highest scoring profile, although this shows the same profile 
shape as 2009 and 2010 except with a divergence for the last three statements. This 
starts at Centralised to Decentralised, being largest for the final statement 
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8.4 Summary so far 
More organisations appear to have progressed in score (to being more ‘post-
bureaucratic’) because the picture is complex, interpretation is difficult. For example, 
for the statement Organisation to Citizen centred, councils rated excellent have a 
higher score in both 2000 and 2005 and indeed increased the lead, although this fell 
back in 2009 (Table 8.3). However, note for all three years the scores increase with 
an increase in CPAR, except for the anomalous position of the poor rating in 2000. 
There is a similar but not as clear-cut distribution for other statements. The difference 
in score from 2000 to 2005 appears to show a clear picture. Also, the difference 
between the 2005 scores appears to follow a pattern compared to a less distinct 
pattern for the 2000 scores. As noted, it is suspected the 2000 scores are less 
soundly based. Considering the mean organisational profile scores tends to suggest 
that as organisational performance increases the organisational profile score also 
increases.  Therefore, overall it would seem the hypotheses are supported. Next is 
considered the correlation between the organisations’ scores in the organisational 
profile and performance ratings. 
Table 8.3: Organisational profile mean score by CPA Rating for English 
councils for the statement Organisation (1) to citizen centred (10) 
CPA Rating Score in 2000 Score in 2005 Score in 2009 
Excellent (4) 4.86 9.22 7.09 
Good (3) 3.03 7.07 6.47 
Fair (2) 3.24 6.63 5.75 
Weak (1) 2.64 6.15 N/A 
Poor (0) 3.67 4.33 N/A 
All 3.52 6.88 6.57 
 
8.5 Correlation 
The scores for the organisational profile were correlated (using IBM SPSS Statistics 
20) with CPAR, PMS, SS and CA for 2005 and 2009 and CAAR for 2010.  Table 8.4 
shows the Pearson correlations for the organisational profile statements and CPAR 
for 2005 and 2009 and CAAR for 2010 for councils.  
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The difference in sample sizes needs to be borne in mind in interpretation. The 
largest correlation for 2005 is Organisation to Citizen centred (p<0.01). The next 
three largest (p<0.05) are Independent action to Collaboration, Rule to People 
centred and Position power to Leadership. For 2009 only a single statement is 
significant (p<0.05), which is also the largest in 2005; Organisation to Citizen 
centred. The next two largest are within the top four in 2005. Considering 2010 and 
correlation with CAAR none of the profile statements is significant (p<0.05). The 
largest is for Status quo to Change oriented followed by Process to Results oriented, 
Organisation to Citizen centred and then Rule to People centred. There is clearly an 
element of consistency here which suggests certain of the profile statements are 
more likely to be associated with organisational performance than others. 
 
Table 8.4: Correlations between CPA/CAA Rating for councils and 
organisational profile statements for 2005, 2009 and 2010 








Organisation to Citizen Centred  0.272** 0.321* 0.261 
Position Power to Leadership 0.186* 0.216 0.234 
Rule to People Centred 0.221* 0.209 0.252 
Independent Action to Collaboration 0.260* 0.140 0.130 
Status Quo to Change Orientated 0.151 0.174 0.291 
Process to Results Orientated 0.153 0.130 0.274 
Centralised to Decentralised 0.145 0.059 0.025 
Departmental to Non-Departmental Form 0.116 0.186 -0.060 
Budget to Revenue Driven 0.093 0.128 0.125 
Monopolistic to Competitive 0.046 0.039 0.140 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
         
Next is considered the three other types of organisation; fire services, police forces 
and PCTs in 2009 and 2010. First, is considered the CPAR; for comparison the 
organisation results are repeated in the tables. 
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Table 8.5 shows the Pearson correlations for CPAR 2009 for all organisation types 
combined and then the four organisation types separately. The only significant 
correlation (p<0.05) is for councils, Organisation to Citizen centred, encountered 
previously. Taking all the organisations combined the largest correlation is for 
Departmental to Non-departmental form followed by Organisation to Citizen centred, 
then Position power to Leadership. For fire services the largest correlation is for 
Status quo to Change oriented followed by Rule to People centred and Position 
power to Leadership. For police forces the largest correlation is Departmental to 
Non-departmental form followed by Budget to Revenue driven although this is 
negative and Process to Results oriented.  
Table 8.5: Correlations between CPA Rating (or equivalent) for the four 




Pearson correlations with CPA Rating 2009 
All LA Fire Police PCT 
Organisation to Citizen Centred  0.174 0.321* 0.196 0.262 -0.067 
Position Power to Leadership 0.148 0.216 0.329 0.065 -0.040 
Rule to People Centred 0.125 0.209 0.359 -0.012 -0.189 
Independent Action to 
Collaboration 
0.066 0.140 0.205 -0.074 0.155 
Status Quo to Change 
Orientated 
0.101 0.174 0.447 0.117 0.036 
Process to Results Orientated 0.071 0.130 0.226 0.302 0.408 
Centralised to Decentralised 0.032 0.058 -0.019 -0.042 0.444 
Departmental to Non-
Departmental Form 
0.186 0.186 0.304 0.579 0.235 
Budget to Revenue Driven 0.124 0.128 0.038 -0.405 -0.189 
Monopolistic to Competitive 0.107 0.039 -0.093 -0.227 -0.106 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
 
The largest correlation for PCTs is Centralised to Decentralised followed by Process 
to Results oriented and Departmental to Non-departmental form. Some of the 
differences may be due to the nature of the organisation types, for example the 
commissioning agenda especially prevalent for PCTs, and fire services being 
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increasingly driven to change, for example the increased emphasis on community 
relations and fire prevention activities. The next section considers PMS (or 
equivalent) correlations with the organisational profile statements. 
Table 8.6 shows the PMS results. There are a number of significant correlations 
(p<0.05), interestingly most are for all organisations combined, although one is for 
fire. Taking all organisations combined the largest correlation is for Organisation to 
Citizen centred followed by Process to Results oriented, Independent action to 
Collaboration (p<0.01) and Status quo to Change oriented (p<0.05).  
Table 8.6: Correlations between Performance Management Score (or 
equivalent) for the four organisation types and organisational profile 




Pearson correlations with Performance 
Management Score 2009 
All LA Fire Police PCT 
Organisation to Citizen 
Centred  
0.298** 0.230 0.146 0.271 -0.023 
Position Power to 
Leadership 
0.188 0.138 0.223 -0.036 0.396 
Rule to People Centred 0.053 0.109 -0.255 -0.069 -0.009 
Independent Action to 
Collaboration 
0.251** 0.183 0.513* 0.041 0.096 
Status Quo to Change 
Orientated 
0.238* 0.114 0.307 0.230 0.565 
Process to Results 
Orientated 
0.254** 0.137 0.233 0.313 0.275 
Centralised to 
Decentralised 
0.059 0.168 -0.130 0.110 -0.067 
Departmental to Non-
Departmental Form 
0.127 0.161 -0.072 0.566 -0.196 
Budget to Revenue Driven -0.155 -0.017 -0.108 -0.543 -0.103 
Monopolistic to Competitive -0.170 0.050 -0.343 -0.235 -0.210 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 




The largest correlation for councils is Organisation to Citizen centred followed by 
Independent action to Collaboration and then Centralised to Decentralised. Fire 
services have a significant (p<0.05) correlation for Independent action to 
Collaboration with the next largest correlation for Monopolistic to Competitive 
(although this is negative) then Status quo to Change oriented.  
The largest correlation for police forces is Departmental to Non-departmental form 
followed by Budget to Revenue driven (negative) then Process to Results oriented. 
Finally, the largest correlation for PCTs is for Status quo to Change oriented followed 
by Position power to Leadership and then Process to Results oriented. Next is 
considered the SS. 
Table 8.7 shows the correlations for the SS with the organisational profile 
statements. The correlations for all organisations together are low, with the largest 
(-0.136) for Rule to People centred with the next largest being Process to Results 
oriented (0.098). For councils the largest correlation is for Departmental to Non-
departmental form followed by Process to Results oriented and then Budget to 
Revenue drive. Two of the profile statements are significant for fire services: 
Independent action to Collaboration (p<0.01) and Organisation to Citizen centred 
(p<0.05) with the next largest correlation being Status quo to Change oriented.  
There are two correlations (at p<0.05) for police forces: Process to Results oriented 
and Departmental to Non-departmental form. The next largest is Status quo to 
Change oriented. Finally, the largest correlations for PCTs are for Rule to people 
centred and Departmental to Non-departmental form followed by Organisation to 
Citizen centred, with all of these being negative. The CA (or equivalent) measures 









Table 8.7: Correlations between Service Score (or equivalent) for the four 




Pearson correlations with Service Score 
2009 
All LA Fire Police PCT 
Organisation to Citizen 
Centred  
0.094 0.133 0.604* 0.417 -0.280 
Position Power to 
Leadership 
0.023 0.077 0.293 -0.156 0.015 
Rule to People Centred -0.136 0.099 -0.046 -0.221 -0.381 
Independent Action to 
Collaboration 
0.037 0.122 0.667** 0.141 -0.150 
Status Quo to Change 
Orientated 
0.065 0.098 0.509 0.517 0.137 
Process to Results 
Orientated 
0.098 0.203 0.346 0.613* 0.030 
Centralised to 
Decentralised 
0.061 0.082 -0.120 0.044 -0.087 
Departmental to Non-
Departmental Form 
-0.060 0.232 0.037 0.605* -0.357 
Budget to Revenue Driven 0.030 0.180 0.208 -0.193 0.174 
Monopolistic to Competitive -0.087 0.102 -0.325 0.025 -0.227 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
 
 
There are a number of correlations (p<0.05) between the CA (or equivalent) for 2009 
as shown in Table 8.8. Taking all four organisations combined the largest correlation 
is for Position power to Leadership (p<0.01), Organisation to Citizen centred 
(p<0.05) followed by Budget to Revenue driven that is negative. The largest 
correlation (p<0.01) for councils is for Position power to Leadership. The next largest 
are Rule to People centred and Organisation to Citizen centred. There are four 
correlations (p<0.05) for the fire services which are Monopolistic to Competitive 
(negative), Organisation to Citizen centred, Position power to Leadership and 
Budget to Revenue driven (negative). None of the profile statements are significant 




The largest correlation for police is for Departmental to Non-departmental form, 
followed by Budget to Revenue driven (negative) and Process to Results oriented. 
For PCTs the largest correlation is also for Departmental to Non-departmental form, 
although in this case it is negative. The next largest correlations are Centralised to 
Decentralised and Organisation to Citizen centred, both also negative. Next is 
considered the data for 2010 where the correlation is with the CAAR. 
Table 8.8: Correlations between Corporate Assessment (or equivalent) for 




Pearson correlations with Corporate 
Assessment 2009 
All LA Fire Police PCT 
Organisation to Citizen 
Centred  
0.220* 0.219 0.534* 0.262 -0.214 
Position Power to 
Leadership 
0.309** 0.415** 0.520* 0.065 0.108 
Rule to People Centred 0.092 0.227 0.117 -0.012 -0.189 
Independent Action to 
Collaboration 
0.069 0.187 0.213 -0.074 -0.210 
Status Quo to Change 
Orientated 
0.094 0.138 0.172 0.117 0.169 
Process to Results 
Orientated 
0.090 0.096 0.023 0.302 0.213 
Centralised to 
Decentralised 
0.148 0.191 0.141 -0.042 -0.299 
Departmental to Non-
Departmental Form 
0.053 0.173 0.060 0.579 -0.389 
Budget to Revenue 
Driven 
-0.170 0.090 -0.511* -0.405 -0.189 
Monopolistic to 
Competitive 
-0.061 0.191 -0.592* -0.227 -0.105 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 





Table 8.9 shows the correlation coefficients for the organisational profile statements 
and CAAR. Data is not available for police and PCTs as the number of responses is 
too small. However, their data will contribute to the results of the four organisation 
types combined. For this none are significant with the largest correlation being for 
Status quo to Change oriented followed by Organisation to Citizen centred and 
Position power to Leadership. Taking the individual organisation types: for councils 
the largest correlations are Status quo to Change oriented followed by Process to 
Results oriented, Organisation to Citizen centred and Rule to People centred. The 
largest correlation for fire services; Departmental to Non-departmental form is 
significant (p<0.05). The next largest are Centralised to Decentralised and 
Monopolistic to Competitive. 
 
Table 8.9: Correlations between CAA Rating for the four organisation types 




Pearson correlations with CAA Rating 2010 
All LA Fire Police PCT 
Organisation to Citizen 
Centred  
0.237 0.261 0.125 N/A N/A 
Position Power to Leadership 0.229 0.234 0.091 N/A N/A 
Rule to People Centred 0.195 0.252 -0.125 N/A N/A 
Independent Action to 
Collaboration 
0.149 0.130 0.120 N/A N/A 
Status Quo to Change 
Orientated 
0.250 0.291 -0.087 N/A N/A 
Process to Results Orientated 0.205 0.274 0.016 N/A N/A 
Centralised to Decentralised 0.137 0.025 0.238 N/A N/A 
Departmental to Non-
Departmental Form 
0.104 -0.060 0.764* N/A N/A 
Budget to Revenue Driven 0.055 0.125 0.020 N/A N/A 
Monopolistic to Competitive 0.161 0.140 0.154 N/A N/A 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
 
This analysis suggests some organisational profile statements are more associated 
with high performance in organisations than others and the type of organisation has 
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an influence. Also using the different measures of CPA suggests, as many authors 
note, performance is context dependent and as much definitional as measurable. 
However, there are certain organisational factors likely to be associated with high 
performance as regards CPA and CAA. Being citizen centred, working in 
partnership, focusing on people and being willing to change are prominent. Despite 
the complexity it would seem, from this data, an organisation scoring higher on 
organisational factors is likely to be higher performing than an organisation scoring 
lower. Even though there are some differences between individual factors there is a 
clear pattern and so the hypotheses should be accepted. The data is explored further 
using PCA to establish which organisational profile statements explain the most 
variation in performance. 
 
8.6 Principal Component Analysis 
PCA was undertaken, using the organisational profile data, for the four data sets 
(2000, 2005, 2009 and 2010) for all organisation types combined and individual 
organisations using IBM SPSS Statistics 20. Further, using the last three sets an 
analysis was done by CPA measures and CAAR where there were sufficient cases. 
This will give an indication of whether organisational performance (as measured by 
CPA and CAA) is associated with different organisational profile statements being of 
greater importance in explaining the variation. The PCA analysis undertaken 
extracted components with Eigenvalues of greater than 0.7 and used oblimin rotation 
since all the statements are correlated with each other at p<0.05 in 2000 and 2005. 
In 2009 and 2010 there are a large number of correlations mainly at p<0.01. 
Appendix 8.1 shows the PCA statistical checks for the 2000 and 2005 datasets. Each 
dataset has been marked as valid (or not) and for those the detail of the PCA analysis 
will be presented. The comments made previously regarding the use of exploratory 
PCA apply here too. 
 
Appendices 8.2 and 8.3 do the same for 2009 and 2010 datasets respectively. In 
some of the analyses sample sizes were insufficient for PCA to be performed 
(indicated by N/A). 
 
The maximum number of components extracted is five and so the organisational 
profile statements were allocated to one of the 11 summary factors (Table 8.10). 
Invariably there is an element of judgement involved in this given the complexity of 
organisational performance. The first component is designated as Human resources 
and contains the statements concerning an organisation becoming more citizen 
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oriented and secondly, being less concerned with rules and more people oriented. 
The second component is concerned with the Leadership of the organisation: 
operating more leadership rather than relying on position power and also included in 
this component becoming more competitive. The third component has only a single 
statement which is about the organisation working more collaboratively and hence 
Engagement. The fourth component is Strategy and is about an organisation more 
open to change than remaining static, is becoming more concerned with results than 
processes and is driven more by revenue generation than a budget. The final 
component, Culture, concerns the organisation becoming more decentralised and 
also moving from departmental to non-departmental forms.  
 
Table 8.10: Organisational profile statements placed in their PCA summary 
factors 
Organisational Profile Statements Summary factor 
1. Organisation to Citizen Centred Human resources  
2. Position Power to Leadership Leadership  
3. Rule to People Centred Human resources  
4. Independent action to Collaboration Engagement  
5. Status-Quo to Change Orientated Strategy  
6. Process to Results Orientated Strategy  
7. Centralised to Decentralised Culture  
8. Departmental to Non-Departmental Form Culture  
9. Budget to Revenue Driven Strategy  
10. Monopolistic to Competitive Leadership  
 
As noted previously it is important to reiterate that organisations are complex and 
the concept of organisational performance is multi-dimensional and open to varied 
interpretation. This will have impacted on how the surveys were completed and thus 
feed through to these results. However, we have already seen from the analysis of 
other parts of the survey these results are robust and open to consistent 
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interpretation. The following sections will report and consider in detail the results of 
the PCA.  
Table 8.11 shows the results of the PCA with oblimin rotation for 2000 (shading 
serves to separate components in the top part and denotes valid analyses in the 
lower). As noted previously this data was recorded in the 2005 survey by requesting 
respondents to think back five years what they thought their profile would be. There 
would generally be the assumption over the period (2000 to 2005) that scores would 
increase as part of the methodology. The data for all councils combined, England 
and Scotland are valid and highlighted (Appendix 8.1), whereas the sample size for 
Wales was small and SPSS did not perform a PCA. Two components were extracted 
for England explaining 66.16% of the variance whilst three components were 
extracted for Scotland explaining 81.79% of the variance. The rotated totals however 
cannot be added together to give a percentage although it is clear the results are 
similar excepting component three for Scotland contributes more to the variance 
than component two. Since the number of authorities from England dominates the 
total, it will be more like the English result although with the addition of a third 
component. The HRM component is dominant followed by Leadership. 




Table 8.12 shows the equivalent results for 2005. This time three components are 
extracted for England; HRM, Strategy and Culture. Scotland is similar except the first 
component is Engagement and not HRM. Strategy appears to have replaced 
Leadership in importance and this is what would be expected as the need to achieve 
high scores in CPA became more critical to English councils, although this is also 


















1 2 3 4 5 Total 1 2 3 4 5
56.10 9.19 7.06 72.35 5.089 4.012 0.877
56.77 9.40 66.16 5.208 3.993
59.02 13.99 8.78 81.79 5.075 1.292 4.362
59.11 23.13 10.53 92.76 4.675 3.351 3.990
Extracted % Rotated Totals
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was attempting to drive up standards by the use of PIs and inspection through the 
Accounts Commission/Audit Scotland.  
 




We can now consider the extent to which the CPAR and scores in its constituent 
parts (PMS, SS and CA) are reflected in the PCA. As only English councils were 
rated this analysis does not include Scotland and Wales. 
 
8.7 PCA for 2005 Datasets with CPA Rating 
Table 8.13 shows the PCA results for the CPARs of poor, weak, fair, good and 
excellent.  SPSS did not calculate a PCA for the rating poor and the determinant for 
the weak analysis was less than 0.0001 with a KMO statistic of 0.569. This extracted 
three components explaining 83.71% of the variance with components one and two 
explaining similar variances on rotation. The PCAs for those authorities rated fair, 
good or excellent extracted four components explaining between 75.20% (good) and 
81.30% (excellent) of the variance. Using the rotated totals the Strategy component 
is the largest for excellent authorities followed by Leadership and then Culture, with 
HRM as the smallest. For authorities’ rated as good HRM is the largest followed by 
Strategy. These results are different to authorities rated fair or weak where Strategy 
is less prominent. Organisational performance as measured by the CPAR appears 
to be reflected in the organisational profiles. We now consider the three other CPA 







2005 England LA N/A
2005 Scotland LA







Dataset 1 2 3 4 5 Total 1 2 3 4 5





52.36 10.12 7.07 69.54 4.458 3.320 2.440
50.966 10.025 7.807 68.80 4.130 3.119 2.747
42.270 17.957 10.953 71.18 4.169 2.595 2.650
63.751 16.381 8.964 89.10 5.573 1.987 4.183
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8.8 PCA for 2005 Datasets with Performance Management Score 
Councils were awarded a PMS depending on their arrangements for performance 
management, which would encompass such as knowledge, systems, a range of 
indicators, although perhaps, more importantly implementation of a PMF to produce 
results in the organisation, especially through measured PIs. Table 8.14 shows the 
PCA results by PMS. Only the results for PMSs two and three meet the criteria for 
validity both extracting three components explaining 69.12% and 74.29% of the 
variance respectively. In both cases HRM is the largest component with PMS three 
showing more balance across the three rotated components than PMS two. The 
Strategy component is also larger for a score of three than two. The picture for PMS 
thus differs from CPAR. SS is considered next also measured on a scale of one to 
four. 
 






2005 England LA CPA Poor
2005 England LA CPA Weak Culture
2005 England LA CPA Fair Culture
2005 England LA CPA Good








Dataset 1 2 3 4 5 Total 1 2 3 4 5
Extracted % Rotated Totals
2005 England LA CPA Poor
2005 England LA CPA Weak
2005 England LA CPA Fair
2005 England LA CPA Good
2005 England LA CPA Excellent
71.781 28.219 100.00 6.300 4.895
60.027 16.054 7.634 83.71 5.152 4.525 0.848
49.826 11.266 10.275 7.328 78.70 3.813 3.368 2.552 0.884
48.497 10.821 8.793 7.086 75.20 3.038 2.935 3.316 2.219
50.571 13.410 8.902 8.475 81.36 4.022 2.112 1.927 3.501
Dataset Components
2005 England LA CPA PM 1 Leadership
2005 England LA CPA PM 2 Strategy
2005 England LA CPA PM 3










8.9 PCA for 2005 Datasets with Service Score 
The SS measures the performance of council services as opposed to, for example, 
its corporate capacity and capability. Table 8.15 shows these results. Very few 
authorities scored one so the PCA was not calculated although it was successfully 
for scores of two, three and four. For a SS of two, three components were extracted; 
Engagement, Leadership and Culture. For SSs of three and four; four components 
were extracted explaining 74.78% and 81.54% of the variance respectively. 
Engagement appears to be important in the SS which is perhaps unsurprising given 
councils working in partnership with others to provide services is often considered to 
improve service effectiveness. The largest component for SS four is Culture which 
is about moving to non-departmental forms and becoming more decentralised. HRM 
is the second largest (in the rotated) followed by Leadership and then Engagement, 
the latter being the largest for SSs of two and three. Interestingly, Strategy doesn’t 
appear, which as we have seen, is important for a high CPAR. Finally, for 2005 the 
CA is addressed. 
 
Table 8.15: PCA results for the 2005 datasets by Service Score 
 






Dataset 1 2 3 4 5 Total 1 2 3 4 5
Extracted % Rotated Totals
2005 England LA CPA PM 1
2005 England LA CPA PM 2
2005 England LA CPA PM 3
2005 England LA CPA PM 4
56.03 16.13 11.54 83.70 5.189 2.958 1.403
49.377 10.961 8.783 69.12 3.855 2.302 3.398
54.045 11.127 9.118 74.29 3.882 3.594 3.621
42.216 23.909 11.926 10.708 88.76 2.766 3.131 2.269 2.424
Dataset Components
2005 England LA CPA SS 2
2005 England LA CPA SS 3 Culture




Dataset 1 2 3 4 5 Total 1 2 3 4 5
Extracted % Rotated Totals
2005 England LA CPA SS 2
2005 England LA CPA SS 3
2005 England LA CPA SS 4
56.256 12.561 8.602 77.42 4.211 3.491 3.278
48.031 10.876 8.472 7.404 74.78 3.034 3.158 3.093 1.713
49.783 12.947 10.763 8.049 81.54 3.674 2.015 2.648 2.878
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8.10 PCA for 2005 Datasets with Corporate Assessment 
The CA measures the capacity and capability of the corporate organisation. The 
PCA was not calculated for a CA of one and the sample size was too small for a CA 
of two, leaving scores of three and four providing valid PCA results (Table 8.16).  
 
Table 8.16: PCA results for the 2005 datasets by Corporate Assessment 
 
                    
  
For a CA of four the largest component after rotation is Strategy followed by 
Leadership. It will be recalled Leadership covers the move from position power to 
leadership and also becoming more competitive. This attribute would lead an 
organisation to apply for awards and so on thus boosting its prestige and reputation, 
if successful. The largest component, Strategy, would show an inclination towards 
change and being more orientated towards results than processes, although there 
may well be direction within the organisation and so a consistency of approach and 
systems. Engagement is also important as it is with a CA of three. The CA results 
appear to be more similar to those for PMS than SS. Next we consider the 2009 
survey which also included fire services, police forces and PCTs.  
 
The 2009 survey was administered in England to councils, fire services, police forces 
and PCTs. The response rate was smaller than in 2005. Due to this smaller sample 
size the number of PCAs calculated is reduced (Appendix 8.2).  
 
Table 8.17 shows the PCA results for all four organisation types combined and then 
individually. The analyses for police and PCTs do not meet the validity criteria; 
although for PCTs it’s more marginal with a KMO of 0.594 but a determinant lower 
than 0.00001. The PCA for councils extracted three components explaining 76.31% 
of the variance whilst for fire services four components were extracted explaining 
82.29% of the variance. The largest component (rotated) for councils is Culture 
Dataset Components
2005 England LA CPA CA 2
2005 England LA CPA CA 3 Culture




Dataset 1 2 3 4 5 Total 1 2 3 4 5
Extracted % Rotated Totals
2005 England LA CPA CA 2
2005 England LA CPA CA 3
2005 England LA CPA CA 4
69.014 17.783 86.80 6.436 3.615
48.595 10.006 8.475 7.651 74.73 3.657 3.091 1.479 3.120
51.150 13.121 8.846 8.250 81.37 4.243 2.150 3.457 1.873
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followed by Leadership and then HRM. For fire services the largest rotated is for 
HRM followed by Culture then Strategy and Leadership. Next we consider the PCAs 
where the analysis is differentiated by organisational performance, firstly for all four 
organisation types combined. 
 
Table 8.17: PCA results for the 2009 datasets overall and by organisation 






8.11 PCA for 2009 Datasets for all organisation types combined by CPA 
measures 
Table 8.18 shows the PCA results for 2009 for all organisation types combined 
according to CPA measures. Of the 14 analyses SPSS performed successfully, only 
six meet the criteria to be valid. Turning first to the CPAR there are valid PCAs for 
the fair (two stars) and good (three stars) ratings. For a fair rating four components 
were extracted explaining 82.55% of the variance and for a good rating three 
components explaining 74.68% of the variance. Culture is the largest rotated 
component for a good rating whilst HRM is the largest for a fair rating. Strategy is 
the second largest for a good rating with Culture for a fair rating.  
 
For PMS only a single analysis meets all the validity criteria; a score of three although 
a score of two fails by virtue of having a determinant of less than 0.00001. The PMS 
of three extracted three components explaining 74.62% of the variance with the 
largest component being HRM followed by Culture and then Strategy. 
 
Dataset Components
2009 England All Organisations









Dataset 1 2 3 4 5 Total 1 2 3 4 5
Extracted % Rotated Totals





47.555 15.977 8.287 71.82 4.246 1.988 3.315
53.62 13.46 9.22 76.31 4.849 2.837 1.841
37.998 20.236 14.158 9.901 82.29 2.523 2.645 1.836 2.552
44.60 21.74 18.06 9.41 93.80 3.642 2.472 2.191 2.570
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46.565 15.848 12.447 7.693 82.55 2.940 2.344 2.634 3.167
46.805 17.018 10.856 74.68 4.078 1.791 3.457
51.053 16.881 9.360 8.309 85.60 3.588 1.948 3.719 2.591
51.706 35.344 12.950 100.00 4.411 4.326 2.406
51.959 15.094 10.327 8.746 86.13 4.426 2.346 1.400 3.281
50.695 16.222 7.705 74.62 4.439 2.313 3.203
35.273 22.181 16.252 10.603 84.31 35.273 57.454 73.707 84.309
65.053 17.144 82.20 5.933 3.689
56.249 13.146 10.557 7.014 86.97 3.993 1.734 4.288 3.450
50.277 12.545 9.708 72.53 4.323 2.535 3.256
45.137 27.009 13.146 85.29 4.198 2.662 2.789
51.913 20.486 9.103 81.50 4.689 3.303 1.473
44.829 16.144 8.958 7.254 77.19 3.960 2.001 1.266 3.124
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2009 England LA CPA Fair
2009 England LA CPA Good
2009 England LA CPA Excellent
2009 England LA CPA PM 2
2009 England LA CPA PM 3
2009 England LA CPA PM 4
2009 England LA CPA SS 2
2009 England LA CPA SS 3
2009 England LA CPA CA 2
2009 England LA CPA CA 3
2009 England LA CPA CA 4
52.99 21.05 9.00 83.04 4.243 3.166 3.653
56.241 19.128 9.876 85.25 4.447 3.705 2.881
51.897 15.173 9.855 8.902 85.83 3.738 2.155 3.728 2.304
53.366 17.452 10.940 8.106 89.86 4.572 2.094 1.845 3.433
59.766 13.789 8.490 82.05 5.343 4.284 1.074
47.153 26.922 15.074 9.975 99.12 3.341 2.795 2.373 3.402
63.006 25.836 9.781 98.62 4.943 4.351 3.043
56.419 13.685 10.263 80.37 4.770 4.020 1.525
54.163 24.952 8.234 87.35 4.339 3.584 3.333
52.349 14.579 10.965 77.89 5.010 2.419 1.273
68.915 23.590 7.495 100.00 6.339 2.217 3.528
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Next is considered the PMS of which scores two and three are valid. A PCA was not 
calculated for a score of one whilst for a score of four although the calculation was 
done no KMO or other statistics were produced. For a PMS of two; four components 
were extracted, explaining 89.96% of the variance, in the rotated order (largest first) 
Culture, Strategy, Leadership and HRM. Three components were extracted for a 
score of three explaining 82.05% of the variance with the components in the rotated 
order; Strategy, Culture and HRM. Four components were extracted for the (non-
valid) PMS of four, being in rotated order (largest first); Strategy, Leadership, HRM 
and Culture. Table 8.20 summarises a comparison of the order of the components 
for 2009 with 2005 for CPAR and Table 8.21 for PMS.  Strategy is again an important 
component but more so for PMSs three and four. It can be seen for a PMS four in 
2009 the rotated totals for Leadership and Strategy are very close. It does appear 
Strategy has become more important in explaining the variance moving from 2005 
to 2009. Next we consider the SS. 
 
Table 8.21: A comparison in the order of the PCA rotated components for 













2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 
1 (largest) HRM Culture HRM Strategy Strategy Leader- 
ship 
2 Culture Strategy Strategy Leader- 
ship 
Culture Strategy 











For the SS SPSS did not calculate a PCA for scores of one and two and for scores 
three and four neither is valid, although a SS of three has a KMO of 0.732 and a 
determinant of less than 0.00001. The PCA extracted three components for a SS of 
three being (rotated) Strategy, Culture and HRM explaining some 80% of the 
variance. For comparison in 2005 four components were extracted in rotated order 
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(largest first); Leadership, HRM, Engagement and Culture. Finally, for councils the 
CA is considered. 
 
The PCA was calculated for CAs of two, three and four, although only a score of 
three is valid. The CA two has a KMO of 0.482 but the determinant is less than 
0.00001. For a score of three the PCA extracted three components explaining 
77.89% of the variance, in the rotated order (largest first) Strategy, Leadership and 
HRM. For a score of two three components were also extracted explaining 87.35% 
of the variance with the components (largest first); Leadership, Strategy and Culture. 
Table 9.22 summarises a comparison of the order of the components for 2009 with 
2005.  Notwithstanding the concern regarding the PCA validity of some of the 
analyses; there would appear to be an increase in the size of the Strategy 
component as the CA increases. The importance of Strategy may also have 
increased from 2005 to 2009. The next section considers the PCA results for fire 
services.  
 
Table 8.22: A comparison in the order of the PCA rotated components for 










2005 2009 2005 # 2009 # 2005 # 2009 
1 (largest) HRM Leader- 
ship 
HRM Strategy Strategy Strategy  








3  Culture Strategy HRM Engage- 
ment 
HRM 
4 (smallest)   Culture  HRM  












??? ??????????????? ??? ???????? ????????? ??? ????? ? ???????? ??? ???????????????
































2009 England Fire CPA Fair
2009 England Fire CPA Good
2009 England Fire CPA PM 3
2009 England Fire CPA PM 4
2009 England Fire CPA SS 3
2009 England Fire CPA SS 4
2009 England Fire CPA CA 3
2009 England Fire CPA CA 4
44.164 30.639 13.915 11.281 100.00 4.196 3.095 1.994 1.520
41.918 18.766 13.069 10.745 7.373 91.87 3.532 2.073 1.245 2.585 1.918
48.703 19.513 14.576 10.410 93.20 3.795 3.196 1.638 2.722
55.101 32.618 12.281 100.00 4.568 4.155 3.264
36.694 25.460 20.707 13.829 96.69 3.577 2.509 2.111 1.614
54.723 23.747 12.433 90.90 5.415 2.366 1.718
31.483 22.361 14.865 10.584 8.639 87.93 2.389 1.744 2.126 1.870 1.874






























2009 England Police CPA Good
2009 England Police CPA PM 3
2009 England Police CPA SS 3
2009 England Police CPA CA 3
43.660 23.747 18.039 11.173 96.62 3.656 2.291 2.241 2.687
41.277 24.784 19.023 10.529 95.61 3.621 2.463 2.349 1.985
74.484 25.516 100.00 6.691 4.406













2009 England PCT CPA Fair
2009 England PCT CPA Good
2009 England PCT CPA PM 2
2009 England PCT CPA PM 3
2009 England PCT CPA SS 2
2009 England PCT CPA SS 3
72.069 17.488 8.720 98.28 5.718 4.578 4.237
57.513 21.722 12.289 91.52 5.724 2.063 1.631
71.473 28.527 100.00 6.758 3.827
67.853 15.428 7.561 90.84 5.841 2.419 4.738
65.053 17.144 82.20 5.933 3.689





??? ???????????? ?????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ????? ???? ?? ??????? ??????????
?????????? ?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ?????? ????????????????? ??? ???????? ????????????? ?????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????















??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ?????
???????? ???? ???????? ????????? ???? ??????????
????????? ????????? ??????????? ???? ???????? ????????
??????????? ??????????? ???? ???????? ????????? ????
? ??????????? ? ? ??????????? ???????????
? ???????? ? ? ? ?
??? ???????????????????
?






2010 England All Organisations
2010 England LA
2010 England Fire
47.903 11.294 9.257 7.941 7.003 83.40 2.825 1.959 2.982 3.389 1.355
51.131 11.526 10.264 72.92 3.804 3.706 2.720
42.191 18.958 15.711 10.226 87.09 2.901 3.013 2.058 2.218
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2010 England All Organisations CAA Adequate
2010 England All Organisations CAA Well
2010 England All Organisations CAA Excellent
32.79 21.20 16.42 12.72 7.30 90.43 2.488 1.928 1.927 2.412 1.496
52.772 11.446 9.839 7.835 81.89 3.428 3.593 3.467 2.361
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2010 England LA CAA Adequate
2010 England LA CAA Well
2010 England LA CAA Excellent
35.893 24.685 17.802 13.173 91.55 2.895 2.340 2.210 2.444
54.41 13.23 10.61 7.76 86.01 2.984 3.877 3.396 2.799





2010 England Fire CAA Adequate
2010 England Fire CAA Well
48.893 29.373 21.733 100.00 4.147 3.419 3.023




It has been shown the two hypotheses (J1 That an organisation that exhibits higher 
scores in the organisational profile will be higher performing than an organisation 
that scores lower and J2 That an organisation that has moved the furthest along the 
scales will be higher performing than an organisation that has moved less) are 
supported by the extensive analysis of the organisational profile statements. The 
second part of this chapter considered the data further using exploratory PCA in an 
attempt to identify which of the ten statements contribute most to explaining 
performance using CPA (2005 and 2009) and CAA (2010). Although the detail 
appears complex, the analysis suggests the Strategy component explains a larger 
proportion of the organisational performance variance than the other components, 
followed by HRM. Further, the importance of Strategy in explaining organisational 
performance appears to increase as organisational performance increases. 
289 
 
9. Results 5 – Case Studies and Interviews 
9.1 Case Studies in 2005 
In order to consider the validity of the data collected by the 2005 survey 
questionnaire a small case study was undertaken in three councils representing a 
convenience sample: Chester-le-Street District Council, Darlington Borough 
Council and Durham County Council. Chester-le-Street DC and Durham CC were 
chosen to include a small authority (shire district), a large authority (shire county) 
respectively and to cover the ends of the CPAR. Chester-le-Street DC was rated 
poor in CPA and was undergoing the improvement process aided and funded by 
the ODPM. Durham CC was rated excellent. Darlington BC (also rated excellent) 
was included as a unitary authority. Chester-le-Street DC was abolished becoming 
part of the new Durham County Council unitary in 2009. 
 
Appendix 9.1 shows the scores for the top 15 strongest correlations with CPAR (all 
p<0.01) for Darlington BC. The scores are shown for the officer who completed the 
questionnaire, individual interviewees, focus group and then the mean for all (not 
including the questionnaire respondent). A difference in score of one equates to a 
16% variance. The average difference of 14 statements (excluding 9.5) is a score 
of 0.93 (15.5%). As regards statement 9.5 Inspectors supportive of organisation all 
except the focus group of front line employees considered inspectors were 
supportive of the authority. The largest differences were for 4.10 Level of 
innovation in service delivery (difference 2.2) scored low by the officer who 
completed the questionnaire and much higher by front-line employees but also the 
central policy/BV officer. The extent to which the council gives vfm (4.46) with a 
difference of 1.8 was also scored low by the officer who completed the 
questionnaire but given the maximum score by front-line employees and high 
scores by the two other policy/BV officers, with somewhat lower scores given by 
the two service managers. 
 
Statement 12.3 Extent to which a high degree of mutual trust exists between 
different parts of the council also had a difference of 1.8 but this time with the officer 
completing the questionnaire giving the highest score and front-line employees the 
lowest score. Service managers and policy/BV officers allocated scores in the 




The lowest differences are for 4.20 Extent to which service developments are 
implemented strategically (difference 0.2), 4.35 Extent of responsiveness of the 
authority to service users (difference 0.4), 4.40 Extent to which the authority 
focuses on customers (difference 0.4) and 4.39 Extent to which the authority is 
regarded as competitive (difference 0.4). 
 
For Chester-le-Street DC the largest differences are for 4.26 Extent to which 
strategies and plans are linked together (difference 1.2), 5.66 Extent to which the 
‘use’ stage of performance management is successful (difference 1.0) and 4.46 
Extent to which the council gives vfm (difference 1.0). There are three statements 
for which the difference is zero: 4.29 Extent to which policy decisions are based on 
evidence, 4.10 Level of innovation in service delivery and 4.42 Extent to which the 
authority focuses on service provision. The average difference of the means for 
the 14 statements is a score of 0.47 or 7.8%. The differences are therefore not 
considered substantial. 
 
The largest differences for Durham CC are for 4.40 Extent to which the authority 
focuses on customers (difference 2.8) with the questionnaire score being low, 12.3 
Extent to which  a high degree of mutual trust exists between different parts of the 
council (difference 2.4), with front-line staff scoring this is the lowest, 4.20 Extent 
to which service developments are implemented strategically (difference 1.8) and 
4.39 Extent to which the authority is regarded as competitive in terms of 
achievement (difference 1.8). As regards 4.20 the questionnaire respondent 
scored this higher than others except for one service manager, for 4.39 the 
questionnaire respondent scored this lower than others. 
 
In terms of the organisational profile for Darlington BC (Appendix 9.2) the mean 
difference is 2.2 with the questionnaire responses for the ten paired factors 
averaging 4.9 compared to 5.52 for those in the case study. The largest differences 
are for Budget to Revenue Driven (difference of 4.4), Status Quo to Change 
Orientated (3.8) and Monopolistic to Competitive (2.4). In these three instances the 
questionnaire score was lower than other respondents. The smallest differences 
are for Process to Results Orientated (0.8), Departmental to Non-Departmental 
Form (1.0), Organisation to Citizen Centred (1.8) and Rule to People Centred. 





For Chester-le-Street DC the respective figures are 5.2 (questionnaire) and 4.06 
(case study) with a mean difference of 1.36. The largest differences are for Position 
Power to Leadership (2.4), Departmental to Non-Departmental Form (2.4), 
Process to Results Orientated (2.2) and Budget to Revenue Driven (2.2). In these 
four instances the questionnaire respondent generally scored higher than those in 
the case study. The smallest differences are for Status Quo to Change Orientated 
(0.0), Independent Action to Collaboration (0.4) and Monopolistic to Competitive 
(0.6). 
 
Durham CC had a mean difference of 1.1 and average scores of 7.9 for the 
questionnaire and 6.84 for the case study. The largest differences were for Position 
Power to Leadership (2.8), Independent Action to Collaboration (2.0) and 
Monopolistic to Competitive (2.0) with the questionnaire respondent generally 
scoring higher than those in the case study. The smallest differences were for Rule 
to People Centred (0.2), Status Quo to Change Orientated (0.2) and Centralised 
to Decentralised (0.6). 
 
Table 9.1 provides a summary of the case study scores compared to those from 
the survey questionnaire. Overall, in terms of the questionnaire respondent giving 
similar scores to the case study Chester-le-Street DC had the smallest percentage 
variance difference for the statements. This statistic ignores the sign in calculation 
of the mean. Durham CC had the smallest percentage variance for the 
organisational profile.  
Although the case study interviews and focus group average scores differed from 
those of the questionnaire respondent the differences do not seem to be of such 
magnitude to suggest significant doubts regarding the results of the questionnaire 
and thus the correlations. Rather they tend to support this analysis; invariably it is 
the case in any (large) organisation there will be a diversity of perceptions. Even 
though the questionnaire gathered the views of one officer at the centre it seems 
these views were overall more similar than different to the case studies.  However, 
the key point is the questionnaire was completed by an officer at or near the top at 
the corporate centre of the organisation likely to be knowledgeable about the topic. 
Thus, although other workers (for example Ketokivi and Schroeder, 2004) have 
cautioned against using the perceptions of a single individual in organisational 
studies the evidence from this study suggests it can be an appropriate method and 
productive in the right circumstances. 
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Table 9.1: Summary of differences in survey questionnaire and case study 









Questionnaire Statements Mean 
Score 
2.93 4.29 4.50 
Case Study Mean Score 3.26 4.66 4.66 
Difference +0.33 +0.37 +0.16 
Variance Mean Difference 0.47 0.93 0.93 
Variance % Difference  7.8% 15.5% 15.5% 
    
Questionnaire Organisational 
Profile Mean 5.20 4.90 7.90 
Case Study Mean Score 4.06 5.52 6.84 
Difference -1.14 +0.62 -1.06 
Variance Mean Difference 1.36 2.20 1.10 
Variance % Difference 13.6% 22.0% 11.0% 
 
 
In the case studies as well as scoring the 15 statements with the strongest 
correlation (all at p<0.01) a number of issues were discussed based on specific 
questions (Appendix 4.4). The following sections summarise the discussions. 
 
The importance of the development and implementation of strategy 
All respondents at Chester-le-Street DC felt developing and implementing a 
strategy was important but overall things were just beginning to happen in this area, 
“…key council strategies are coming together but if I had been asked the same 
question last year it would have been terrible…” There was also a view strategies 
were created then nothing happened so there was an issue of translating strategy 
into operations and also communicating strategy, “…services deliver but what they 
deliver may not be in line with the strategy…” In particular frontline employees felt, 
“….at the time of the CPA strategies were not important at all but now management 
team realise their importance….” and service managers are beginning to work with 
other service managers rather than alone. The view is that prior to the adverse 
CPA (in which the authority received a poor rating) although strategies were 
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developed they were not important and not related to service delivery but things 
are now changing with the new management. Now strategies are being regarded 
as important and are being communicated throughout the Council. However, there 
were some comments suggesting it is still early and the full impact may not be 
evident for a few years.  
 
In Darlington BC the view was strategy is not only important but implemented and 
this has been particularly strong over the past three or four years. However, 
frontline employees felt, although strategy existed it was not always, or well, 
communicated to those delivering services. 
 
At Durham CC strategy has been strong for the past eight years and the different 
strategies are linked and for implementation there is a robust framework. Also, 
“….strategy is driving funding not the other way round….” and the four corporate 
aims are easy to understand and staff know how they contribute. However, 
frontline employees felt, although there are strategies, they don’t know much about 
them and they don’t impact much on their jobs. Also funding doesn’t necessarily 
follow a strategy. 
 
Durham CC and Darlington BC appear to be similar in having good and 
implemented strategies (for the past several years) although, frontline employees 
may be somewhat disconnected and communication of the strategies may be an 
issue. Chester-le-Street DC is in the process of putting clear strategies in place 
with implementation plans. 
 
Extent to which performance management is integrated with service 
planning 
In Darlington BC performance management and service planning are regarded as 
being separate but in the process of being brought together, “….integrated to a 
certain extent not fully.…”  Frontline employees see PIs as linking performance 
management and service planning and had an idea of which applied to them. In 
particular they understood how service planning was integrating services, “….don’t 
just look at litter when doing streets but also lamp posts and kerbs.…” (frontline 
employee). 
 
In Chester-le-Street DC it was felt the concept of integration was understood but 
practice lags although, “…it has improved over the last 12 months but not truly 
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embraced yet…” There is now linkage with high-level objectives that didn’t used to 
be the case. Frontline employees were very positive about developments in this 
area and referred to PerformancePlus, a computerised system facilitating 
integration, “....local PIs being developed for briefing books....”  
 
In Durham CC the general view was performance management and service 
planning are better linked with flexible service planning guidance centrally 
prescribed. Frontline staff felt they experienced the link but there was still work to 
do, for example, “….the service plan says one thing but may not be dealt with this 
way.…” (frontline employee). Proposed improvements to the appraisal system to 
provide better links, to service plans, for individuals is welcomed. Again, Darlington 
BC and Durham CC were similar, although the latter, perhaps had greater 
integration whilst Chester-le-Street DC recognised the need to do work in this area 
with progress being made.  
 
Extent to which performance management and service planning are 
decentralised 
In Chester-le-Street DC it was said there used to be no useful corporate guidance 
on performance management and service planning. A comment was, “A service 
plan has to actually mean something”. Things were said to be getting better but 
still a lot to do – very decentralised, “There was no centralisation, silo-working”. 
Frontline staff concurred performance management and service planning were 
very decentralised.  
 
Darlington BC also appears to have a largely decentralised system for 
performance management and service planning, although a service manager 
noted the coordinating role of the Corporate Planning Network, “….that collectively 
agree the framework….”. Frontline employees felt their views were fed into service 
planning to an extent. 
 
In Durham CC decentralisation was emphasised but within a clear corporate 
framework. Frontline employees noted, “There is more togetherness...” but a need 
for some centralisation. Again, Darlington BC and Durham CC are similar in having 
clear minimum standards (alongside decentralisation of doing service planning and 
performance management) appearing to direct performance management and 




The relationship between councillors (members) and officers 
At Chester-le-Street DC good and proper relationships were said to exist between 
councillors and officers although a service manager commented, “….don’t like 
members coming on the shop floor with things for staff to do….” However, it was 
noted this had improved but the roles of members and officers still need greater 
definition. Frontline employees generally felt as above but they also felt members 
needed more development to fulfil their roles properly. In Durham CC some 
respondents noted the new political leader of about five years ago changed things 
for the better. Frontline employees noted the good relationship and clearly defined 
roles. The member’s training programme appeared to be significant.  
 
In Darlington BC the relationship also seems to be ‘proper’ but sometimes things 
are done for members that should not be, although this was not said to be an 
especially widespread problem. Generally, it appeared in all three authorities the 
relationship between members and officers was professional, although in both 
Chester-le-Street DC and Darlington BC the rules do not appear to be as well 
followed, as is now the case in Durham CC. 
 
Level of resources to do performance management and service planning at 
centre and in departments 
It was felt there is too little resource in some departments and at the centre in 
Chester-le-Street DC. “PerformancePlus has been bought but not being used, not 
enough effort or resources. No light at the end of the tunnel”.  Frontline employees 
felt performance management was added to people’s jobs who don’t have time 
and it really needs some dedicated resource. As regards Durham CC the general 
view is there are mostly sufficient resources in departments but the level at the 
centre is inadequate. Frontline employees felt there was a need for the centre and 
departments to work better together in this area to make more effective use of the 
council’s resources. In Darlington BC the picture is variable, a service manager 
commented, “….don’t know if PerformancePlus helps or not?” The view was also 
put by both service managers; many things happen due to the goodwill of 
employees. 
For all three authorities resource for performance management was an issue. 
However, what didn’t come out so much was deployment which appeared to vary 




Level of involvement in performance management 
At Chester-le-Street DC involvement appeared to vary by department with some 
critical comment regarding the imposition of a framework, with little practical 
involvement. One comment was, “Departments are not joined up with the centre – 
do their own thing”. Another comment from the focus group, “It was CPA which 
prompted regular meetings”, suggesting things were moving but they needed to 
move further and become part of the way of working. In Darlington BC involvement 
was described as high but not always down to individuals, although personal 
development reviews (appraisals) do the job in part. The issue of sufficient time at 
the frontline to become involved appeared to be a problem. The position in Durham 
CC seemed to be very similar to Darlington BC and included the following 
comment, “Not enough voice for day-to-day views of frontline staff” (focus group). 
 
How widely is performance discussed, communicated and formally 
reported? 
In Chester-le-Street DC performance was said to be reasonably well discussed 
and reported amongst senior managers but below that to be poor (except in a very 
few specific areas) and to councillors not systematic, “...reports to Executive and 
Scrutiny, two out of 13 service teams only put reports together”. The lack of 
performance data on an Intranet was noted by some as a significant weakness. 
Apart from one service manager, formal reporting was noted as poor with the 
implication of the need for minimum corporate standards. Frontline staff felt far too 
much time was spent collecting data with not enough reporting and learning from 
it. Quarterly reports were noted but regarded as far too informal. 
 
In Durham CC performance appeared widely discussed and communicated 
including at staff briefings, although the practice varied by department. “Happens 
twice a year and a choice of three sessions to make sure everyone gets a chance 
to go”. Formal reporting is regarded as quite comprehensive although the Intranet 
is not yet used, for example to report using PerformancePlus. The focus group felt 
some reporting still in silos and needed to reflect the corporate organisation more. 
 
In Darlington BC there was widespread discussion at departmental management 
teams but going down further is variable and only sometimes picked up in 
appraisals (PDRs). The focus group concentrated on PDRs where performance 
issues do appear to be considered. Formal reporting was felt to be good to both 
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officers and members, although perhaps the scrutiny role could better use 
performance data. 
  
Extent to which authority is a learning organisation and innovative  
There was almost universal agreement that Chester-le-Street DC was not a 
learning authority (yet), “Likes to think itself better than it actually is in 
practice…dreadful in the past…slightly better now”. A view widely shared in the 
focus group was, “Only learning now because of CPA and the housing kick in the 
teeth – lower levels knew but senior levels wouldn’t listen” (frontline employee). 
One respondent described the CPA as a wakeup call but the amount of change 
required cannot happen overnight. As regards experimentation the council is 
described as risk averse – safety first with a fear of change. One respondent 
commented, “Still need to crack the trick of empowering the doers” (service 
manager) and another, “Staff are frightened of adapting to change” (frontline 
employee).  
 
Durham CC was regarded much more of a learning authority now than a few years 
ago with a specific change programme in place. “Moved a long way. Made very 
conscious efforts and corporately a change programme to encourage change…a 
clear steer from members and senior officers to move forward”. This view appeared 
widely shared in the authority. There was also a view that whilst the Council can 
learn from the outside it is not so easy within the Council due to silo working of 
departments. Progress is expected.  
 
In Darlington BC respondents were somewhat unsure whether the Council is a 
learning authority or not and whether the culture encourages experimentation. 
However, it was considered both had improved in the past three years or so, partly 
due to some latitude in resources. In the focus group it was said there was learning 
from other authorities at an operational level. A service manager commented 
relatively high levels of stress militated against learning. 
 
High degree of mutual trust between parts of the authority 
At Chester-le-Street DC the level of trust was said to vary between different actors 
but had recently improved, “No – getting a bit better, can’t get worse. At CMT level 
it is improving” (focus group). Some of the mistrust is put down to departments 
defending their corner, i.e. the lack of a corporate dimension or direction. There 
was a view, historically, the corporate centre had caused some of the problem by 
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their behaviour and approach, although this had largely gone, things can’t change 
overnight. 
 
In Darlington BC there was felt to be quite a high level of trust, although the legacy 
of CCT, had been mistrust. Some respondents felt the trust was on the surface but 
when tested it fell apart and then departments just defended their corner. The view 
of the focus group was much more negative saying there was not a lot of trust 
between departments. In Durham CC the situation appeared similar with the focus 
group talking about the silo mentality, a view also held by others but it was felt this 
would change with the new chief executive. Overall though, levels of trust were 
regarded as relatively high. 
 
Any barriers between different parts of the council 
A barrier identified in Chester-le-Street DC was a lack of a coherent organisation 
and some employees, “….don’t know what the Council is about – no linkages 
between the jobs of individuals and a common vision/goals.” Silo working needs 
breaking down and there is a geographical barrier with those who are not in the 
civic centre, not helped by poor ICT. The focus group were critical, “Terrible 
problems – professionalism, geographical, organisational, cultural” and don’t know 
what the council is doing to address the barriers. If things get done it is only due to 
friendships of people in different departments.  
 
In Darlington BC a barrier was said to be the lack of commitment to coordinate 
services providing customer benefits and, “Professional groups retreat to find a 
comfort zone, silo working, why should we help others if by doing so we miss our 
targets?” (service manager). This view was not as strongly held by other 
respondents. The focus group considered employees work for a particular 
department, not Darlington BC and also there is ‘the depot’ and ‘town hall’ – two 
different entities. Again, things get done because of relationships formed across 
the Council, sometimes despite the formal structure. 
 
In Durham CC, perhaps the biggest barrier identified in the focus group was 
between ‘the centre’ (or County Hall) and other areas of the Council and this is 
possibly related to size and geography. Another barrier was some departments, 
such as Education, have had performance management for some time finding it 
hard to follow the corporate approach. Another respondent identified the need for 
more corporate leadership and ownership. Another issue was departments need 
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to, “Treat people on their competence and not on their tier…” Hence, in all three 
authorities a number of barriers were identified and although there was discussion 
about overcoming them for many there are no easy means of resolution. 
 
In summary, the results of the case studies tend to support the results of the survey 
questionnaire, although there are some detail differences. Overall, the scores used 
in the analysis do not appear to be significantly different from those obtained in the 
interviews and focus groups. The responses based on the CPAR of the authorities 
are what would generally be expected. 
 
9.2 Interviews in late 2012/early 2013 
Five interviews were held in the period October 2012 to February 2013 to explore 
issues arising from the surveys and consider organisational performance in these 
settings. All interviews, scheduled for one hour, were conducted with those leading 
performance management in the organisations under anonymity so throughout this 
section Council A and Council B will be used along with Fire, Police and PCT to 
represent the organisations. The PCT was in the process of being abolished and 
of course the national performance framework had been abolished or substantially 
reduced. In particular the CAA proved to be short-lived, only reporting once. In 
addition the coalition government embarked on an unprecedented programme of 
spending cuts in the public sector which were beginning to bite when the interviews 
were undertaken. The interviews were not undertaken immediately, after the final 
survey, in order for some time to elapse so considered views, including the impact 
of the cuts could be gauged. 
 
A semi-structured approach was adopted using the pro-forma at Appendix 4.5. The 
focus was on the organisation’s performance from 2005, with a series of questions 
on past performance, and then a look-forward from the abolition of much of the 
national framework(s), to how performance management may develop in the near 
future.  
 
Views on the key determinants of organisational performance from 2005 to 
2010 
Council A felt determinants of performance were many but analytical ability or, 
“Maybe not analytical ability but its ability to draw together data because I think 
we’ve always been short on analysis”, was important to make use of data collected. 
Interpretation was regarded as a bit of a problem. It was also felt personalities were 
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very important in ensuring things happen. Council B took a different tack noting a 
strategic approach was probably necessary for effective performance. This 
required sufficient corporate resource and an organisation working as one. 
Departments need to be tied into the strategy and ensuring effective ‘unitary’ use 
of resources.  
 
Fire focused on the PIs driving performance in certain directions whilst suggesting, 
“….try to express….the level of effect of you know things like social 
deprivation….we had a much higher focus on anti-social behaviour activity for fire 
than on any other piece of work that we were doing”. The police didn’t see these 
‘nuisance’ fires as criminal acts and therefore as a priority. So, although there was 
quite a rigid national PI framework for fire services, local priorities were being 
addressed. There was also an effort to move to an evidence-based approach to 
drive performance. 
 
The Police noted the very strong national framework that existed in 2005 with 
Police Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) moving to the APACS 
structure. It was felt to be very ‘nit-picking’ and very much driven by crime figures, 
detection rates and arrest figures. “It was useful in some ways as forces 
understood what they were being targeted on…but too big, it wasn’t grounded in 
data or a valid framework and it almost stopped organisations thinking for 
themselves, they were chasing targets….”  
 
From 2006 PCTs were going through world class commissioning, an overarching 
label covering benchmarking and continuous improvement to give consistency 
across PCTs. It was very much driven by the Department of Health, “This is what 
you’ll deliver, this is how you’ll deliver it, this is how we’re going to performance 
manage you.” Each year PCTs were given their performance management 
framework including the ‘must dos’, for example MRSA targets, cancer-treatment 
targets and so on, “As a board this is what you will monitor progress on and monitor 
performance on and benchmark nationally.” So, although implementation was local 
it was very much driven nationally.   
  
Views on the determinants of organisational performance prior to 2005 
(CPA 2002 to CPA 2005) 
Council A felt determinants of organisational performance were the same prior to 
2005. Council B noted the CPA 2005 framework became more rigorous and put a 
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greater premium on data quality. The corporate dimension was arguably made 
more important in the assessment framework with a premium on strategy and 
demonstrating how services link in, “Demonstrating the golden thread.” 
 
For Fire the evidential basis and level of analysis was said to be lower and, “….you 
could argue that the CPA ‘harder test’ did challenge organisations to look at things 
in a different way and build-up further evidence around them.” The Police felt the 
biggest difference was the introduction of the ‘police’ BVPIs which tied in with 
partners through the LSP. 
 
The PCT felt the NHS performance framework in place prior to 2005 focused on 
the move from health authorities to primary care groups leading to PCTs. “The 
politically mandated changes have, whatever the flavour, always determined  what 
you’ll be measured against….”.  
 
Views on what changed to impact on performance over this period 
Council A felt performance was driven by the framework that ended up being ‘tired’ 
with too frequent reporting to too high a level. “We were drawn into a process of 
presenting data across the board without really the ability to say, yes, there’s all 
the numbers but that’s what we want. Forget all that, because that number there is 
the one you really want to be looking at”. With CAA the area focus became much 
more important and it was inspection driven, “….so the dialogue was always going 
to be coloured by the fact everybody wanted to get top marks. And so what 
happened was the level of honesty and integrity therefore, about that, was probably 
reduced”. Nonetheless it was felt to be a useful process and the final report format 
was thought to be at the right level. 
 
Council B felt things had changed in some senses but not others. The number of 
indicators was in theory rationalised and the local area agreement defined clearer 
priorities but these were mainly those of central government. Partnership working 
on performance management issues increased and the complexity of certain, 
especially ‘wicked’, issues came more to the fore. “The need for data quality 
assurance and the like between, as well as within, organisations…partner 
organisations created much work and frustration!” Further, the need for greater 
control over services to ensure good data collection became an issue as failure to 
collect data as per the definition could see indicators qualified with detrimental 




Fire felt, since 2002, the performance picture has become much richer but actually 
they’ve changed in a way similar to other organisations. Service or accountable 
managers have access to a greater amount of performance information, using 
such as performance dashboards and is much more frequent. Governance 
structures have been improved and sought elected member involvement in 
scrutiny to a greater degree. Critically, “We’ve looked to improve in the last three 
or four years….is our strategic review which is probably more structured now than 
it was previously.” Benchmarking was also regarded as important and has got 
more sophisticated over the years. Data is electronically submitted to DCLG 
(started from 2009). A key point is this was all mandatory.  
 
For the Police what developed was far too big, “….there were far too many 
indicators. People got hung up on measuring everything to have a balanced 
scorecard or what they were thinking was a balanced scorecard.” The whole 
situation seemed to have become even more defensive with the approach being, 
“I want to be best, I don’t want to be red, I don’t want to be on the HMIC radar, I 
don’t want a nasty letter from the Home Secretary….and it almost became a 
game.” There was also a clash between national and local priorities. For example 
knife and gun crime were given to all forces as a national priority but it’s not a 
significant issue here and therefore has a low priority for resources. Over the period 
there was more of a focus on policies.  
 
In terms of the PCT it was felt the menu varied a little, “….for example ten years 
ago you didn’t have the rigorous targets around health care infections; Clostridium 
difficile, MRSA they weren’t in the performance framework ten years ago whereas 
they are now because that’s, you know, part of the push.” The other thing more 
prominent in the performance framework is the, “….absolute drive for reporting 
near misses….a lot of investment has gone into that and in an effort to make it 
more of a transparent culture, and you know the whole thing around whistle blowing 
and transparency.” Other big issues have always been part of PCT performance 
management: financial balance, waiting times, treatments, life expectancy 
outcomes. Relatively new issues are health care, infection, focusing on managing 





Views on the importance of organisation structure, resources, leadership, 
etc. on performance 
The approach to strategy in Council A was described as kind of schizophrenic. 
There were two priorities and a number of themes. “We were monitoring themes 
and churning out data and information about that and worrying endlessly about 
how they related to each other and cross-cutting issues”.  
 
Council B felt structure did matter as it could determine how well people worked 
together, particularly on corporate issues. Leadership was also noted and it was 
seen at many levels but at the top the strategy was determined and very 
importantly the culture, “It’s the classic do as I say not as I do syndrome which was 
toxic for a time”. There was significant investment in performance management 
both at the centre and in departments that produced results. A centralised driven 
direction was felt to be critical in the organisation, especially when dealing with the 
Audit Commission. Engagement was also important, “I remember attending an 
event on BV, or was it CPA, hosted by the Audit Commission at which they waved 
a list in the air stating they had taken note of which councils had attended….and 
they meant it!” 
 
Fire felt the big change since 2005 was the development of agility. In particular 
making performance information more quickly available and accessible to 
managers. As regards CPA assessment they felt the process itself was incredibly 
burdensome. This diverted resources from improving performance management, 
although more resources were made available, “….if I’m honest I found the 
challenges from the Audit Commission to be very reactive and lacking in 
recognition of the strategic planning for an organisation….Because of the rigid PI 
framework they have a very very strong focus toward continual demonstrable 
improved performance across all areas, whereas we build our strategies in a way 
that might take us years to deliver improvements. And we do in some cases need 
years to assess how these improvements flow….come through”. The view was 
evaluation by the Audit Commission was not properly considered on their part so 
could end up in a position, “….where how you actually perform determines how 
you performance manage rather than the other way round”. In terms of leadership, 
teams were having to wrestle with the process and there were strong debates 
about performance at ‘leadership level’. So top management made the time to 




The Police felt in 2005 they were actually quite rich in resources, although it may 
not have felt so at the time. However, despite all the reviews, efficiency exercises 
and so on, “….all that really did was shuffle the deckchairs”. So resources were 
thrown at issues, as priorities, without understanding and as resources tightened 
there was more of a search for evidence. It was felt leadership was hugely 
important and two different styles were evident during the period in question. The 
first was based on CompStat, imported from New York, a very transactional way 
of managing performance. This led to reductions in crime but also used additional 
resources. The force then moved to a more relaxed style, almost conversational, 
about what was happening and why. This didn’t relate in any way to structure, it 
was about personal leadership. Structure started to come into play with the budget 
cuts.   
 
The PCT noted the positive joint-working with a clear view of the strength each 
partner brought to the table even though it was a time of growth in health with much 
additional resources. “So thinking, for example….some of the investments that 
were made in children and young people’s services with the council, around 
teenage pregnancy. So there was because of this growth in funding; it wasn’t a 
case of saying shall we put some money into two GP practices and the local 
college, or shall we appoint a good person with sex and relationship education 
skills to work with teachers. We actually, in that period of growth, were able to do 
both - we didn’t have to make decision either/or.” However, in the absence of 
money joint working became even more important. And leadership was crucial but 
even more so, “….it was bringing the right people who had the right knowledge and 
skills to do the work, and to guide the work”. 
 
Views on the organisation making deliberate efforts to improve aspects of 
performance 
Council A suggested efforts to improve aspects of performance were driven by the 
national agenda and even more so with the introduction of local area agreements. 
Certain services were targeted but not necessarily those prioritised locally. 
Authority B said education was deliberately targeted to improve examination 
results in schools and additional resources were employed but it was also about 
working smarter. Efforts were also made to improve partnership working in 
particular to increase effectiveness, although saving more, or reducing the 




Fire have already noted efforts to address anti-social behaviour (so called nuisance 
fires), “….we worked with a couple of examples of some identified problem 
areas….with local management teams to actually develop some worked or 
evidential examples of, first of recognition of prioritisation and then secondly, 
appropriate intervention and then thirdly, you know, improvements linked to 
outcomes basically…” The introduction of geospatial analysis was felt to be 
particularly powerful. 
 
Police, again, noted the importance of the national framework in which areas of 
crime performance had to be improved. The national intelligence model, effectively 
a business model, also drove improvements. 
 
The PCT suggested an example of where structural change in a geographic sense 
drove the organisation to prioritise the ‘equalisation’ of different performance in 
different parts of the area and also in some cases to meet the minimum standard 
or the English average. “And really there was a huge investment and a drive to 
improve the quality of how those commissioning decisions were made. Also an 
investment around public engagement and senior managers were tasked and it 
was written into their objectives about them having a locality lead….” 
 
Views on the national framework(s) determining performance management 
(practice, processes, staffing, reporting, etc.) 
Council A noted the national framework was in effect written into their community 
strategy with all the numbers which is what drove the organisation. Almost blindly 
so, “I feel that, and that was….what become part of the reason that people got tired 
of it….one of the calculations that wasn’t done very effectively was about the ability 
to change. How feasible is to move that number and you could end-up ‘hand 
wringing’ over a number that you couldn’t really influence very much, or could be 
blown off-course by factors outside your control entirely. Unemployment numbers 
is a classic one.” 
 
Council B felt the national framework determined many things in the organisation. 
To do well with the Audit Commission, a strategy was important with a performance 
management framework adequately resourced and directed. Data quality issues 
needed to be addressed that demanded good processes and procedures and 
effective internal audit. Reporting needed to be effective at both management and 
political levels and when appropriate should demonstrably lead to action. 
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For Fire, “I mean the overall….the national framework for fire services 
influenced…. well had ultimate influence, because a lot of the aspects around 
performance management were mandatory for us”. Fire went on to note it was not 
an option to ignore in any away the national framework. Similarly, for Police it 
largely determined the operation of performance management. 
 
The PCT noted world class commissioning with national benchmarking and site 
visits, inspections, examination of the accounts and organisational capacity. “The 
commissioning and performance management of health care services still remains 
very tightly controlled both from the Department of Health and Treasury”. This was 
described as the ‘grip’ controlling the PCT with it equalling assurance processes 
recognising the potential severe financial problems for a government losing control 
of NHS spending.   
 
Views on what was important about the national framework(s) 
For Council A, it provided a structure to work within and also tied in other public 
sector partners. There was also a common language and terminology providing 
the ability to converse widely. Council B noted the above and additionally felt it 
encouraged some sharing within the public sector as well as providing a focus for 
prioritisation, albeit many were nationally derived. It also influenced the culture of 
the organisation as to the importance of the management of performance and the 
influence of the corporate centre. Expertise was developed by the likes of the Audit 
Commission which also disseminated good practice. 
 
Fire felt it was the underlying principles that were of most importance. However, as 
noted previously, it also prioritised certain areas which could not be given a lower 
priority even though this was desired. It helped make changes to performance 
arrangements, governance and resource allocation. It also eventually influenced 
arrangements for programme management, financial management and risk 
management. However, with the changes in 2010 the less intrusive performance 
management has allowed the organisation to continue to develop. 
 
The Police noted the framework was well understood and allowed national 
comparisons to try and understand performance, “It tried to bring in a balanced 
scorecard performance framework but it didn’t succeed….because it became a 




The PCT felt the national framework had improved the health care experience for 
a lot of the population, supported prevention, the public health agenda and 
promoted working across sectors. 
 
Views on the advantages of the national framework(s) 
Table 9.2 lists two advantages of the national framework when asked as a direct 
question to the interviewee. 
Table 9.2 Summary of two advantages for the national framework 
















Direction Benchmarking Local flexibility 
 
Views on the disadvantages of the national framework(s) 
Table 9.3 lists two disadvantages of the national framework when asked as a direct 
question to the interviewee. 
Table 9.3 Summary of two disadvantages for the national framework 



























Views on how partnership working evolved from 2005 
Council A felt partnership working improved as partners got to know each other 
better but there were still underlying tensions around prioritisation and resources. 
Council B suggested, as partnerships matured, practical issues such as data 
quality became increasingly addressed out of necessity. Fire felt the national 
framework facilitated partnerships and this didn’t change although it was hard for 
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the fire service to get influence with others to reflect some of its priorities in plans, 
when it was regarded by others as a ‘minority’ activity.  
 
The Police noted a lot of partnership activity involved the sharing of data and being 
held to account for other people’s data and the other party for the police’s.  It was 
about swapping data rather than understanding. The local area agreement moved 
this on with real discussion about priorities and targets that could be delivered, 
“….we had this conversation about which partners would contribute what and how 
we could drive these things together, rather than just we’ve got this massive data 
collection exercise that we all have to do”. 
 
The PCT felt partnership was about sharing challenges and stories about the way 
things were and what had happened. Invariably, the dialogue developed over time 
and this influenced the extent of partnership working that became more involved.  
Views on the practical consequences of this partnership evolution 
Council A felt the key practical consequence was understanding of others’ 
positions improved as time went on. Council B noted, again, there was some 
practical integration of systems and audit assurance (of performance) data became 
important.  
 
Fire stressed the big practical consequence being the resources required, “To 
engage with partnerships….for a relatively small service the broad range of 
partnership agendas….it was a strange one because it’s almost as if everybody 
wants the fire service to be there yet the agenda is, you know, like I say….the focus 
of activity is very rarely to the benefit of fire service priorities, is what I would say”.  
 
For the Police it raised awareness, in practical terms, you cannot address this 
agenda on you own, partners came to understand each other’s business. For 
example, “The CPS had a target for offenders and drug use…. who were charged 
and went to court. The police force had a detection rate target. Now there’s a direct 
link between two because you can only take someone to court if they’ve actually 
committed a crime in the first place. Now because we were reducing crime and we 
were increasing our detection rate but that measured a rate against the crime. So 
you could have one crime with three offenders but you only get one detection. So 
this indicator’s measuring offenders, we’re measuring offences….CPS is pushing 
us for more offenders and we’re saying that’s not the right way to do it because 
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we’ve got fewer crimes and fewer offenders anyway. Some of them are prolific so 
if you want more offenders we start to criminalise ten year olds”.  In essence the 
police were being asked to search for crimes to meet a target. 
 
The PCT felt partnership working advanced understanding even if central 
government hindered this sometimes by not being joined-up themselves.  
 
Views on changes in partnership working after the introduction of CPA 
2005 
Council A said partnership working became more important but at the same time 
it started to look tired and had to be worked at even harder. Council B noted, as 
has been mentioned already, the increasing working on a practical level on things 
such as data quality. There was a coordination role taken on by the authority at 
this practical level but it was difficult given the pressures partners were under. Fire 
noted their communications and engagement strategy, “and one part of that is, if 
we’re engaging effectively then we’ll be doing that with partners as well”, this 
became more important as partnership working developed. For the Police there 
appeared to be little change. In terms of the PCT, again there was little change in 
practice, although things probably became more intense, in terms of partners’ 
demands for data. 
 
Views on the changes, if any, in performance management after the 
introduction of the CPA 2005 the ‘harder test’  
Council A felt performance management became more rigorous after 2005 with 
data quality in particular becoming increasingly important. Being able to calculate 
the CPA score given all the individual components became a given. Council B 
responded in a very similar manner, adding the need to manage inspections 
became a premium activity. There was also the perennial issue of access to health 
data. 
 
For Fire the impact was similar to for councils. Since the police were not subject to 
CPA there was limited impact except in how it changed partners’ behaviour, for 
example in becoming rather more circumspect and critical of data.  The same was 
true of the PCT although it was noted that ‘financial balance’ was a serous must 
do, “that trumps everything else”. It was also said since PCTs are part of the NHS 
money can be moved in a way that is not possible with, for example, councils. 
Governance was also regarded as critical and improved throughout the period. 
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Views on the reporting of performance 
Some comments have also been made on reporting in other sections. Council A 
said reporting was probably too frequent and didn’t sufficiently differentiate what 
key indicators were. Council B echoed this adding it was difficult to get effective 
scrutiny and invariably everything had to be ‘checked up’ the management 
hierarchy, as almost all indicators were deemed politically sensitive in one way or 
another. There was particular difficulty getting reporting direct from the 
computerised system accepted, “….typically reports were designed by almost a 
committee with all the consequences that this brings”.  
 
Fire used to publish three documents a year and was working to reduce this and 
make performance data more accessible locally. Now they have many more 
discussions about performance rather than almost endless formal reports. The 
Police had an annual report for policing looking backward and forward. It was 
excessive collecting the data for the reports, “People wanting figures for everything 
and the Home Office, you know, would have been our central collection point but 
when it was to be officially disseminated….frustration about having qualified stats 
and then they were out of date….with three month old crime data the offenders 
were long gone by then”. 
 
For the PCT there was and is extensive reporting, mainly to the Department of 
Health. Things became more outcome-focused as commissioning became more 
prevalent.  
 
Views on how the abolition of (some of) the national framework(s) affected 
the organisation 
For Council A the abolition had an impact but this was dwarfed by the very large 
cuts starting to be implemented. The council still had a performance management 
framework but much reduced, less formal and it was unclear how it would develop. 
The partnership work with others on performance management all but stopped. 
This was mirrored in Council B, which noted the LGA was developing a framework 
to cover some of what was lost but this was voluntary. It is possible, even likely, 
many councils would not participate. Fire still has a substantial national framework 





Police said it appeared, “…to have left a massive void with some forces thinking 
what do we do now. What we did here….was to stop and say, what is our structure? 
What do we do?” This led to the production of a balanced scorecard strategy map 
and talking about vision, values and key questions were introduced. Strategy 
documents became much different with a summary plan on a page and the number 
of indicators reduced from 980 to 150. “So it had a massive impact. We were 
suddenly in control of our own destiny and we chose to measure that information 
that was useful”. We still had to return data to the Home Office and they certainly 
look at it but nowhere near as previously, “There isn’t that feel of that big stick from 
the centre anymore”.  
 
The PCT noted, although they were being abolished, the targets would remain and 
so a new architecture was being put into place. The public health element of the 
PCT’s role was moving to councils with, “local determination but…. accountable 
for the delivery of these public health outcomes”.  
 
Views on the reduction of external audit 
Council A said, of course, performance audit has reduced as there are now no 
indicators to audit so it’s all financial with some governance. Council B mirrored 
this adding vfm was still considered as part of the financial audit but not as easy to 
do without robust and comprehensive performance data. Fire mentioned peer 
review and the processes developed in accordance with the Chief Fire Officers 
Association. 
 
For Police the danger in a reduction of audit was recognised, “I mean our plan has 
data quality on there….we’ve got rid of our strategic risk register….it’s the new 
partnership plan which we heat-map red-amber-green….it includes a risk 
matrix…and one of our risks is about data quality.” The view was data quality 
issues will be recognised and dealt with locally. The PCT’s view was similar in 
outline but more about inspection than audit. 
  
Views on the reduction of inspection 
Council A’s view on inspection was similar to for the reduction of external audit 
although there was still schools inspection as well as social care. In addition 
Council B mentioned the facility of peer review/challenge. Fire had definitely 
noticed the reduction in inspection and suggested it allowed the service to take 
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more of a lead on its own performance management. However for the Police, 
“Inspections have reduced; well I’m saying that. Do you know it probably hasn’t 
reduced, the burden has probably increased but the number of inspections to ‘feed 
the beast’ has reduced.” The approach is now risk-based from HMIC. They don’t 
look at data quality in a way they used to. 
 
The PCT noted the move towards peer review rather than inspection, “….there just 
doesn’t feel the same urgency about it….in the absence of an external framework 
of inspection what do we need to do therefore internally?” It was suggested time 
was needed to see how it would pan out. 
  
Views on the use of the single data list 
Council A were well aware of the single data list and feeding it with data but not 
sure the extent to which it would be used in practice. Council B concurred with this 
view noting it was far from the statutory BVPIs or NIs. Fire noted they still had a 
basket of indicators they must report on so the position was different to councils. 
The Police were not aware of the single data list but were required to submit 
against the annual data requirement, to the Home Office, which is similar to the 
single data list but, again, not used to performance manage police forces. The PCT 
still have the health framework with a wide range of data collated by HSCIC. 
 
Views on the use of benchmarking 
Council A said the use of benchmarking was popular in some parts of the 
organisation and centrally through CIPFA but it was unclear the extent to which 
this would continue, given the pressure on finances. Council B held a similar view 
whilst noting it had been of some, if limited use, as it was used defensively 
especially as part of the BV review four Cs. Fire noted the extensive benchmarking 
they have done in the past and continue to do. The regional control centre was 
mentioned, although of course abandoned. It was noted for Police the reporting of 
crimes through a national website, a form of benchmarking, although the geo-
demographic differences in areas can drive types of crime not really considered. 
For the PCT the view was, “….it was used more in local authority than health 
because of the whole thing….about statistical neighbours and although, in the 
latter days of the PCT it was being increasingly used in health…. Well, how else, 
we can measure that in some way but isn’t benchmarking against similar 
demographic a good way, or one way, of making that assessment”. This was in 
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relation to, for example, vfm on smoking cessation services.  It was not clear what 
was going to happen in the future. 
 
Views on the organisation’s performance since the demise of (some of) the 
national framework(s)  
Council A felt it was too early to say and given the reduction in performance 
management how would it be demonstrated anyway. Through the single data list, 
or the use of LG Inform? The level of complaints? Resident and user satisfaction? 
Council B held similar views and also noted the cuts must have an impact on 
performance as well as councils ceasing to undertake certain activities.  
 
For Fire changes were proposed, in particular the movement to regional control 
centres was abandoned.  Increasingly working with other fire services is becoming 
the norm, “….in the future fire services will be in a closer understanding operating 
environment than where they were many years ago. So, for instance….at some 
point there will be aspects of regional control centre working that would still be 
possible so we can provide support to other parts of the country and they can do 
likewise for us. But like I say, would that have been driven by the national 
framework? I don’t think so; I think we would have got there in any case.”  
 
Police felt their performance has improved, “….and the reason being I think it’s got 
better is because we know what we want to tackle. And once you’re clear what you 
want to achieve then your performance framework can fall out of that.”  It wasn’t 
thought the national framework didn’t work; it did so because a transactional kind 
of leadership worked for certain things and now the force has moved to situational 
leadership. There were benefits, “….even now we still think in terms of the police 
performance assessment framework (PPAF). So without a doubt there were some 
lessons learnt from that.” 
 
The changes for the PCT seemed to be rather less, apart from abolition, “We’ve 
still got the national operating framework that comes out annually. That gives us 
our big must dos in health and that’s supplemented by sub-indicators and sub-
targets….I suppose the difference is that, I think, it’s been left much more to local 
relationships and local partnerships.” There was then some talk regarding the 
challenges of operating with declining budgets, especially the impact on council 




Views on the potential impact of the abolition of the Audit Commission 
Council A felt the abolition of the Audit Commission was removing a means of 
common understanding, “….but the loss won’t be felt for a number of years….and 
if you set that in the context of reduced budgets and a whole range of 
disinvestments in the public sector, and performance management and monitoring 
being a target….the consequences are likely to be dire.” Council B noted the Audit 
Commission had produced a lot of good work overshadowed by some of the 
negative headlines. Generally, the impact would probably be negative in ways 
difficult to predict, unless replaced by something else. Learning would probably be 
reduced across the sector as it was still not clear the extent to which the LGA could 
fulfil the role. There was a tendency for peer review to be more variable than 
inspection and more could be ‘hidden’. 
 
Fire suggested it depends on what it was intended to achieve, and “….some of the 
comparisons that were used as sector best practice….you know, again the data 
was very very questionable when you looked at it….What I’m saying is, I think, 
there needs to be some moderation but does it need to be in the context of which 
the Audit Commission were assessing with that and the answer for me would be 
‘No’”. 
 
Police noted the Audit Commission did some of their data quality audits and vfm 
work and some of this is being picked up by HMIC but not all. However, “…..four 
or five years down the line when we’ve no national, then this may be of concern 
and can this be a sound approach?”  
 
The PCT said the Care Quality Commission would still exist so there would be 
regulation of the quality of services and safeguarding. Experience suggests 
something would replace it and there would not be a lack of scrutiny, “Whether it 
will be moved to being much more of a local scrutiny, a local focus rather than a 
national organisation I’m not sure.”   
 
Views on performance measurement and management in the organisation 
now 
Council A said the process is now much lighter with a better focus on local priorities 
but there were concerns regarding the availability of data and also the reduction in 
the, already inadequate, analysis capacity. Council B had similar views also noting 
the impact of the cuts may be unpredictable and could take out capability not 
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replaceable at short-notice. The use of the national resource being put together by 
the LGA was uncertain. 
 
Fire suggested how a performance management framework is introduced is 
important, “….can actually create a situation where your staff become very very 
focused on a mono-dimensional view on performance which is just about whether 
a target’s been met. Yes, so we’ve been, in the last couple of years trying to change 
that mind-set a little bit….Because we did find that our organisation suffered from, 
‘I’m feeling I must improve’ or ‘I’ve achieved target….I’ve succeeded.’” This also 
means trying to understand the consequences of the variation in demand on 
resources. 
 
Police use their plan on a page (balanced scorecard strategy map) to manage their 
performance now with a RAG rating and also covering strategic risk. Quarterly 
performance meetings are held with each of the commands addressing things 
impacting on organisational performance. “We introduce questions in there; things 
like how do you improve your confidence? How do you increase respect? How do 
you reduce crime? How do you reduce re-offending?....We spent two years 
learning about questions….people are now much clearer, much more 
understanding, so I think we have moved a long way from just managing the 
indicators”. 
 
The PCT felt, in practice, it hadn’t actually changed much for the reasons already 
noted. 
 
Views on reporting of performance post-abolition of (some of) the national 
framework 
Council A suggested their reporting was still evolving and included some of the 
former national indicators. There was less reporting although it did not appear to 
have a greater focus. Council B’s view was their reporting had reduced also and 
was rather less systematic. Reporting to scrutiny committees was heavily reduced 
and also departmentally. The council discontinued use of its performance 
management software reverting to the use of Microsoft Excel. It was anticipated 
further changes would be made, in particular, as resources were reduced further.    
 
For Fire reporting had evolved with the framework as noted previously. The Police 
noted the annual data requirement (ADR) return to the Home Office, reporting to 
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the executive, police and crime commissioner and on their website to the public. 
The view was this is now done rather differently from previously but it has not 
reduced. It was similar for the PCT with their reporting having changed little. 
 
Views on the development of performance management in the organisation 
up to around 2015 
Council A suggested this was not really known at this time but performance 
management would be much less than has recently been the case. Council B 
echoed this view and hoped it would be usefully selective and more focused for 
different audiences. It depended to some extent on the use of LG Inform and not 
just by this Council but how much it was used by others.  
 
Fire linked this to the transparency agenda and the wish to involve the public more, 
better ways for them to express an opinion by, “Change the way we consult 
basically and not just about whether we open a fire station one hour earlier but also 
about what we do and how we do it.” Also changes were going to be made to the 
back office by way of greater integration and the use of business intelligence, 
“….for two purposes: one to give greater end-user interaction and also for the 
benefits of cross-analyses across the whole enterprise of different data domains.” 
It was suggested stakeholder engagement would also be evaluated as to the most 
effective methods. 
 
For the Police it was about consolidating what’s been learnt over the last two or 
three years of ‘independence’. “….we’ll become much more astute at gathering 
data that helps us answer questions and not just having data for the sake of it.” 
The potential impact of police and crime commissioners is still to be seen and could 
have a large impact. 
 
The PCT felt resources becoming scarcer was a big issue, “I think there will need 
to be a more economic basis for decision-making and commissioning decisions. I 
think there will be more scrutiny….we don’t yet know how Health Watch will work. 
The question is what happens when you identify poor performance or when you’re 
not performing, if we don’t have the capacity or workforce to address it? You know, 






Views on the key drivers for performance management 
Council A said key drivers were a greater focus on priorities. They had moved on 
from encompassing all areas of life to the mainstream, not necessarily priorities 
but drivers. There was also to be a focus on outputs relating to outcomes, 
recognising outcomes tend to be long term. Council B suggested the biggest driver 
was probably the effective management of budget cuts because otherwise they’d 
go bust. Beyond that the improved management of remaining resources against a 
reduced and more focused set of priorities.  
 
Fire echoed this, “….I mean one of the key drivers has got to be about making sure 
we have the most effective outcomes for the resources we put into things really. 
It’s probably one of the biggest challenges for everybody at the minute.” Other 
drivers were continuing to develop the organisation, for example equipping people 
with new skills. “So we have a new focus on Lean ways of working, process 
improvement….not necessarily widely understood but it does get utilised.” 
 
For the Police it was money and the political agenda both nationally and locally. 
With the public and what they expect, a risk of reputation, “I think there will come 
a point where we don’t have sufficient resources to deal with conditions we have 
due to government cuts. I’m not saying we can’t make savings but historically.” 
There were also concerns about societal impacts, including changes to the welfare 
system that may drive police performance being directed to certain topic areas. “I 
was cynical quite early on. I wondered if the government had taken performance 
management out, knowing they were going to make big cuts, so that declines in 
performance would not be highlighted. Whilst giving responsibility elsewhere.” 
The PCT felt one of the key drivers was the cuts not just in health but in other 
services which could impact heavily on health issues. Politics was identified as a 
driver but unpredictable and not usually based on much evidence. 
 
9.3 Overview 
In summary what this demonstrates is how CPA and CAA impacted the four 
organisation types in different ways. The police forces and PCTs both had 
extensive separate frameworks controlled by central government departments, the 
Home Office and Department of Health respectively. That for local councils and 
fire services was controlled by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government but for councils with input from others, including those above and in 
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addition the Department for Education, Department for Transport, Department for 
Work and Pensions and so on. It is no surprise therefore the responses are 
somewhat different following the election of the new government in May 2010. 
When interviewees were asked about determinants of organisational performance 
they mainly talked about the impact of the national framework(s) rather than 
activities such as HR or planning. Of, course the framework(s), whilst not 
‘mandating’ such activities required certain things to be undertaken, such as 
management against PIs. Under CPA the corporate dimension, including strategic 
and service planning were important, in the achievement of high scores. There was 
some mention of strategy and resources and having an evidence base for action.  
 
There were changes impacting on performance over the period but these were not 
necessarily the same for all organisation types, although the local area agreement 
‘encouraged’ the four organisation types to work together. The quality of data 
became an issue with external auditors, at the behest of the Audit Commission, 
becoming more ‘critical’ in their investigations. This is a performance issue 
because it provided a greater focus on what was actually delivered. For example, 
there was a BVPI, BV165 Percentage pedestrian crossings with facilities for 
disabled people. The council had agreed with the local umbrella disability group as 
to what was important and therefore would be prioritised. Unfortunately, this did 
not have the same priority list as BV165. The result was despite meeting locally 
expressed needs the council scored very low on this indicator. Therefore efforts 
were made to increase performance by achieving the national standards also, 
although this was quite contentious. 
 
Views on the importance of structure, resources and leadership, etc. on 
performance lacked clarity, almost as if practitioners tend not think in this 
(compartmentalised) manner. Strategy, performance management, culture, 
engagement, leadership, agility, evidence and joint-working were all mentioned, 
although with no particular priority order.  
 
The organisations all made deliberate efforts to improve performance, although it 
may have been surprising if this was not the case and in most cases national 
priorities dominated. All agreed the national framework(s) was important in 
determining the nature of their performance management. It was felt to be 
important in providing a structure, underlying principles, a common terminology 
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and prioritisation. The advantages mirrored these whilst the disadvantages were 
about inflexibility, not reflecting local priorities and an obsession with the numbers. 
 
Over the period partnership working evolved and became more involved as the 
practicalities, for example of data quality, were grappled with. The practical 
consequences appeared to be a greater appreciation of partners’ positions and 
circumstances. In addition the resolution of many issues required the applied and 
directed concerted action of several partners. Generally the nature of partnership 
working changed little, except as noted the increasing importance of the 
practicalities, such as data quality. The change in CPA to the ‘harder test’ affected 
performance management by making it more intensive but this only applied to 
councils and fire services. Police forces and PCTs were principally affected at their 
interface with councils and fire services; for example being consulted by inspectors 
and data quality issues. 
 
The reporting of performance was generally extensive, if not always done 
particularly well. For example, being too frequent, too formal and not targeted 
according to need. The abolition of much of the national framework(s) impacted 
the organisation types; however for fire services remaining substantially in place, 
the impact on them was lower.  The PCT were also affected less, especially as 
regarding the interface with councils, notwithstanding their disappearance and 
transfer of public health responsibility to councils. The biggest impact was the 
unprecedented cuts in funding already having an impact, especially on councils. 
 
The views on the impact of the reduction of external audit and inspection were 
mixed and there was a hint of potential future problems. It was too early to see how 
the single data list and nationally maintained data sets would be used and hence 
their value. Benchmarking was felt to have been useful, in the past, although it was 
unclear the extent to which it would continue and the form it would take. 
 
The interviewees appeared to find it difficult to articulate their organisations’ 
performance following the demise of some of the national framework(s). This 
appeared to be more of an issue for councils than the other organisation types, 
probably because they had some framework remaining. 
 
Similar to for external audit and inspection it was felt by some the (possibly) 
adverse consequences of the abolition of the Audit Commission may not be felt for 
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several years. This depended on the extent to which key roles were going to be 
undertaken by others, such as the National Audit Office. 
 
The current picture regarding performance management had clearly (already) 
shown a large amount of rationalisation and more local determination. The councils 
seemed to be less certain as things were still being formulated and the impact of 
the cuts planned and starting to be managed. Likewise reporting had been reduced 
and there was the need to take some time to accommodate the new 
circumstances. Again, councils appear to have been affected rather more than the 
other organisations. As regards the future development of performance 
management, there was a great deal of uncertainty. For example the extent to 
which national initiatives, such as LG Inform, would have a positive impact. The 
tightening of resources was also part of the equation, which would be expected to 
play an important role in (re)shaping performance management.  
 
The key drivers for performance management in this new era were said to be: 
greater prioritisation, a focus on outputs leading to outcomes, the development of 




10. Results – Overall 
 
10.1 Questionnaire 
The results of the questionnaire statements as regards the testing of the 
hypotheses are summarised in Table 10.1.  
Table 10.1: Summary of the results of hypotheses testing for the surveys in 
2005, 2009 (CPA) and 2010 (CAA) 
Hypothesis Summary factor Accepted? 
CPA CAA 
A1. That an organisation that has a 
high level of strategic direction will 
have higher performance than one 
that has a lower level. 
Strategy Yes Yes 
A2. That an organisation that has a 
high level of strategic and service 
planning will have higher performance 
than one that has a lower level. 
Strategy Yes Yes? 
A3. That an organisation with a high 
level of performance management will 
have higher performance than one 




A4. That an organisation with a formal 
published organisational development 
strategy will have higher performance 
than one without such an ODS. 
Human resources Yes No 
A5. That an organisation that uses 
proprietary performance management 
software will have higher performance 
than an organisation that uses none 




A6. That an organisation that involves 
employees more in PM will have 
higher performance than an 





A7. That an organisation that uses the 
Balanced Scorecard/EFQM/TQM/ 
MBO/ Benchmarking/Strategy 
mapping will have higher performance 
than an organisation that does not. 
Strategy Partly  No 
A8. That an organisation that is more 
innovative will be higher performing 
than an organisation that is less 
innovative. 





Table 10.1: Summary of the results of hypotheses testing for the surveys in 
2005, 2009 (CPA) and 2010 (CAA) (continued) 
Hypothesis Summary factor Accepted? 
CPA CAA 
A9. That an organisation that has a 
higher level of citizen/service user 
focus will be higher performing than 
one that focuses on citizens/service 
users less. 
Strategy Yes No 
B1. That an organisation with a 
comprehensive approach to employee 
appraisal will have higher 
performance than an organisation with 
a less comprehensive approach. 
Human resources Partly No 
B2. That an organisation  that heavily 
involves service departments in 
service planning and performance 
management is higher performing 





C1. That an organisation that exhibits 
a higher level of decentralisation will 
be higher performing than one that is 
more centralised. 
Strategy No No 
C2. That an organisation with a higher 
level of decentralised service planning 
will be higher performing than one with 




C3. That an organisation with a higher 
level of decentralised performance 
management will be higher performing 




C4. That an organisation with a 
consistency of rules and practices 
throughout will be higher performing 
than an organisation with less 
consistency. 
Culture Yes No 
D1. That an organisation that exhibits a 
high level of political and managerial 
leadership will be higher performing 
than one that shows a lower level. 
Leadership Yes No 
D2. That an organisation where officer 
leadership is more pronounced than 
that from politicians will be higher 
performing than one where the reverse 
is the case. 
Leadership No No 
E1. That an organisation with a higher 
level of resources will be higher 
performing than an organisation with a 
lower level. 




Table 10.1: Summary of the results of hypotheses testing for the surveys in 
2005, 2009 (CPA) and 2010 (CAA) (continued) 
Hypothesis Summary factor Accepted? 
CPA CAA 
E2. That an organisation  with a 
relatively higher level of resources 
devoted to activities at the centre than 
in services will be higher performing 
than an organisation with the reverse. 
Resources No No 
E3. That an organisation with a higher 
level of resources spent on service 
planning will be higher performing than 
an organisation that spends less. 
Resources Yes No 
E4. That an organisation with a higher 
level of resources spent on 
performance management will be 
higher performing than an 
organisation that spends less. 
Resources Yes No 
E5. That an organisation that has well 
trained and motivated employees will 
be higher performing than an 
organisation whose employees are 
less well trained and motivated. 
Human resources Yes Yes 
E6. That an organisation where 
resources follow priorities will be 
higher performing than one where 
resources are allocated historically 
and not prioritised. 
Resources Yes No 
E7. That an organisation that uses 
ICT more will be higher performing 
than an organisation that uses it less. 
Resources Yes Yes 
F1. That an organisation that more 
actively engages with auditors, 
inspectors and other stakeholders will 
have higher performance than an 
organisation that has a lower level of 
engagement. 
Engagement Yes No 
F2. That an organisation that has 
outsourced more than services (by 
cost) will be higher performing than an 
organisation that has outsourced less 
(by cost). 
Strategy No No 
F3. That an organisation that has 
greater involvement of stakeholders 
and citizens in performance 
management will have higher 
performance than an organisation that 
has lower involvement. 





Table 10.1: Summary of the results of hypotheses testing for the surveys in 
2005, 2009 (CPA) and 2010 (CAA) (continued) 
Hypothesis Summary factor Accepted? 
CPA CAA 
G1. That an organisation that has a 
higher level of communication will be 
higher performing than an 
organisation that has a lower level. 
Engagement Yes No 
H1. That an organisation that has a 
higher level of performance reporting 
will be higher performing than an 





I1. That an organisation with a high 
supportive and learning culture that 
encourages innovation and non-blame 
will be higher performing than one 
where this kind of culture is less so. 
Culture Yes Yes 
I2. That an organisation where power 
is more diffused throughout the 
organisation will be higher performing 
than an organisation where power is 
more concentrated. 
Culture Yes Yes 
J1.That an organisation that 
demonstrates more post-bureaucratic 
characteristics will be higher 
performing than an organisation that 
shows fewer 
N/A Yes Yes 
J2.That an organisation that has 
moved the furthest to demonstrating 
stronger post-bureaucratic 
characteristics (in aggregate) over 
time will be higher performing than an 
organisation that shows weaker 
N/A Yes Yes 
That the content of a local authority’s 
BVPP will be related to their 
performance as measured by CPA 
N/A Yes N/A 
 
 
These findings mirror those of the Performance Management Measurement and 
Information (PMMI) Project researching performance management in well-
performing authorities (Improvement and Development Agency, 2005). The 
present research has added quantification, considered lower performing 
organisations and provided systematic evidence. It may therefore be a more 





10.2 BVPP Content Analysis 
 
The content analysis of a representative sample of 76 BVPPs demonstrated a 
statistically significant relationship between an authority’s rating under CPA and 
the content (mission/vision statement, selection of local performance indicators, 
objectives clearly shown, prioritisation evident and priority performance indicators 
included, review of strategies and an organisation development strategy) of their 
plan.  
 
10.3 Organisational Profile 
The organisational profile results suggest those organisations with higher 
performance are generally more post-bureaucratic.  Further, those that have 
moved further along the continuum (over the period of the research) also appear 
to be higher performing. This is consistent with NPM.   
 
10.4 Overall Summary 
Table 10.2 provides an overview of the results of the three surveys, BVPP content 
analysis and organisational profile. This shows that the summary factor Strategy 
exhibits the strongest association with organisational performance, followed by 
Performance management then Human resources. 
It should be borne in mind the type of data may be expected to exercise an 
influence over the summary factors derived. For example, the BVPP content 
analysis was limited in terms of the input of data. The 2009 and 2010 surveys show 
the results for all organisations combined and councils separately. The council 
results can then be compared with the 2005 survey. The list is shown in rank order 
of the results of the 2005 survey. In summary, Strategy is the predominant 
summary factor contributing to the variance in organisational performance followed 
by Performance management, Human resources, Culture and then Engagement.
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All LA All LA 
Strategy 1 1 2 2 2 1   1 
Performance 
management 2 2 3 3 1 2  
Engagement 3  5  5   
Human 
resources 4 3 1 4  3 2 
Culture 5  6 1 4  3 
Resources 6 4 4   4  
Innovation 7       
Physical 
infrastructure 8       
Reputation 9  7  3   
Leadership 10     5 4 





11. Discussion  
 
11.1 Introduction 
To reiterate, the research question put simply is: What factors determine 
organisational performance? This chapter discusses the results of the research 
from theoretical and practical perspectives as well as highlighting the contribution 
to knowledge.  It will consider the appropriateness of the methodology which 
consisted of using an independent assessment of organisational performance 
alongside postal and electronic questionnaires to collect data. The validation of this 
data by a small number of case studies will also be addressed. The triangulation 
of this data with the content analysis of a corporate document (BVPP) and the 
organisational profile related to a (post-) bureaucratic organisation will be 
demonstrated. The relation of methods in this work to those by previous 
researchers will be discussed demonstrating both similarities and differences, in 
particular the creative use of PCA. The importance of the longitudinal nature of the 
research will be considered and limitations addressed. 
 
The substance of the research will then be discussed; the criteria contributing to 
summary factors associated with organisational performance. Which of these 
contribute most to organisational performance, which less and can some actually 
contribute to diminishing performance? The theoretical importance of the research 
will be summarised and the practical use demonstrated by means of an example 
whilst highlighting the limitations of settings and context. 
 
11.2 Methodology 
The methodology was designed to collect a large spread of data as to factors 
associated with organisational performance, in order to test a number of 
hypotheses. The association with performance would be demonstrated through 
correlation with known measures of performance namely the published results of 
CPA and CAA.  Although, the CPA had its critics it was the result of considerable 
work led by the Audit Commission with input from other inspectorates, using a 
range of quantitative and qualitative data. It was therefore more suitable for this 
purpose when compared to other options. Similar problems arise in assessing 
performance in the private sector although in principle it, perhaps, ought to be 
simpler as the principal objective of the private sector is to make profit. However, 
the literature demonstrates it is not, in practice, as straightforward as a number of 




Other means of measuring organisational performance considered were the use 
of PIs such as the BVPIs and their replacement NIs and/or other sets such as those 
in the NHS PAF and the police APACS. These would have been suitable as they 
were national in nature, subject to audit as to their accuracy and validity and 
published. However, whilst such PIs do represent an assessment of performance 
and eventually became a more important part of CPA, there would be a 
requirement to form a composite number for organisational assessment. The other 
key option would be to ask the organisation representatives to rate their own 
organisation’s performance on a scale.  
 
Although the use of the views of a single respondent has been questioned as the 
most appropriate method to collect organisational data, in practice it may be the 
only one feasible. In any event it is argued this research is quite specific in requiring 
informed views, i.e. those likely to be the most accurate. It was not clear simply 
polling more people in the organisation would be beneficial for most of the 
statements. It was reasoned a very senior individual at the corporate centre would 
give the most accurate assessment of the organisational position for most of the 
statements. Notwithstanding this, a case study was undertaken in three councils 
to establish if the views of the respondent, as to key statements on the 
questionnaire, differed materially from other views in the organisation. Whilst it was 
found there were some differences the similarities were much greater. It was 
concluded therefore, for the data being collected, the method was appropriate.  
 
Given the number of organisations and the purpose of the research, for the main 
questionnaire survey, it was decided to survey the population. This was 
appropriate given the potential variation of variables in the organisations as to size, 
political affiliations, history, resources, culture and local external environment, such 
as levels of deprivation. It also facilitated consideration of other influences, other 
than defined by the statements, on organisational performance such as the above. 
If another means of selecting organisations had been chosen, say a quota by size, 
it would have been less comprehensive. A random sample could have been 
selected although it is not clear what advantages, this would have exhibited over, 
polling the entire population, which was a manageable size. 
 
The study of BVPPs did use a sample of councils based on type, geographic 
spread and CPAR. This was necessary partly for logistical reasons but also due to 




The case studies and interviews formed a convenience sample, which even so, 




The analysis reflected the purpose of the research and therefore, arising from this, 
the data collected. For the questionnaire surveys the analysis was done in a 
number of stages. Firstly, the correlation coefficients were calculated for each of 
the statements with CPA measures and CAAR. These coefficients for the 
statements were then used to test a series of hypotheses with a significance level 
of p<0.05 being set. A number of statements were used to test each hypothesis 
reflecting the complex nature of the performance concept. Using those statements 
having a statistical significance (p<0.05) with CPA and CAA assessments of 
organisational performance, PCA calculated the strength of the contribution to 
organisational performance. The statements were then grouped into summary 
factors so that each summary factor explained a certain percentage of the variance 
in organisational performance. The rationale for this approach was since a large 
number of statements were being considered it was necessary to separately 
establish the relation of each to organisational performance. Once this was done, 
those of sufficient strength were taken forward to consider their relative 
contribution. They were then allocated to one of 11 summary factors, although 
invariably there is an amount of overlap, reflecting the multivariate nature of 
performance. When using PCA, as the literature notes, it is important decisions are 
taken by the analyst rather than by the computer thus giving an informed 
consideration. 
 
Another point to be made is participants rated the statements on a scale of mainly 
one to six, which is effectively continuous although with discrete measurement 
points. The distance between the points was not designed to be equal, as it is not 
possible to practically design such a schema, when subjective views are being 
collected, even if such views are from an ‘informed’ participant. Indeed, it could be 
argued the very concept of organisational performance is not compatible with such 
an approach. 
 
Much thought went into the analysis of the data collected through the 
questionnaires, especially beyond the initial correlation, which was decided before 
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the data collection commenced. The use of PCA was determined after a 
consideration of the options given the number of responses and the nature of the 
data collected. The data was confirmed to be close to a normal distribution and so 
Pearson correlation was used, although using SPSS, both Spearman and 
Kendall’s correlation coefficients were also requested. These showed effectively 
the same values. The conventional significance level of p<0.05 was selected, 
which is appropriate for this study.  
 
PCA was used to take the analysis further by analysing the characteristics that 
correlated most highly with performance. PCA is a widely used statistical 
technique, although its limitations need to be borne in mind and as noted it is 
important the researcher interprets output and not let the computer take the 
decision. Since this was being used in an exploratory manner a large number of 
runs were undertaken using both orthogonal (varimax) and oblique (direct oblimin) 
rotation and varying the number of components extracted. As Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2013, p. 616) note, given the exploratory nature, ‘….both the theoretical and 
practical limitations to FA are relaxed in favor of a frank exploration of the data. 
Decisions about the number of factors and rotational scheme are based on 




This content analysis of BVPPs evaluated whether the content is related to their 
organisations’ performance. There are several reasons to suspect this may be the 
case. Firstly, this was the prime vehicle through which an authority reported its 
performance.   
 
Secondly, the factors used measured some organisational fundamentals including 
vision, strategic direction, having comprehensive PIs, clear objectives, prioritisation 
being evident, analysis of PIs with comparative data and reasons for variances. 
Further, there are links within the hierarchy of plans and strategies (corporate and 
service planning), an organisational development strategy and financial 
information.  
 
Thirdly, it should be expected an authority would use its BVPP to communicate 
internally and externally such that it would highlight its strong points. It would 




It has already been noted that authorities rated excellent and good were permitted 
to reduce the content of their BVPP and it is felt this has depressed BVPP scores 
for some authorities. In addition there are other means for authorities to cover some 
of the characteristics being taken from BVPPs, for example the use of separate 
documentation either in paper form or electronically, on the Council’s website. The 
fact even with these impacts, that would tend to reduce the strength of the 
correlation, the hypothesis is supported suggests something fundamental is being 
assessed.  
 
11.5 Organisational profile 
As noted the literature identified the theoretical and in some cases the actual 
impact of NPM on the public sector and one of these is the reduction of 
bureaucracy, or rather a post-bureaucratic orientation. Kernaghan (2000) used a 
series of paired statements to measure this post-bureaucratic orientation. This 
provides a further dimension to what may be important determinants of 
organisational performance, as one of the claims of NPM is it increases 
performance by introducing private sector practices and the ‘discipline of the 
market’, including competition. Since the 2005 survey also included Scottish and 
Welsh councils comparison of organisations under differing regimes was possible, 
although for these there is no CPA data to use. In 2009 and 2010 the similarities 
and differences between the four organisation types could be considered. 
Practically, it was necessary to limit the analysis given the potential permutations. 
This was done considering what was likely to be important, from the literature and 
what the research seemed to be showing.  
 
11.6 Summary Factors 
Eleven summary factors were identified from the main questionnaire research. This 
was done after all the data had been collected and analysed to make use of the 
‘complete’ picture. These summary factors could have been divided further but it 
was reasoned too much disaggregation would not add to answering the research 
question. In all the analyses, Strategy ranks either first or second in importance as 
a determinant of performance. Now, ‘strategy’ covers a wide range of concepts 
and associated activities. However, one of the key concepts is arguably of direction 
so setting a path for the organisation to follow to achieve specific measurable goals 
or objectives. The literature review identified the importance of strategic planning 
with 68% of 68 studies reporting a positive association with performance 
(Nandakumar, Ghobadian and O’Regan, 2012). This positive association is 
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supported by a range of other studies such as Walker and Boyne (2006), Andrews, 
Boyne and Law et al (2009) and Poister, Edwards and Pasha et al (2013). A 
successful strategic approach is likely to have implications for many other factors, 
which have been said to influence performance, such as the motivation of 
employees, encouraging a learning organisation and supportive culture. It may 
also demonstrate leadership and the (effective) use of performance management.   
 
Performance management was ranked second overall taking all the methods into 
consideration. Performance management may provide confirmation of the strategy 
being delivered and further, a demonstration of the contribution employees make. 
Boyne and Enticott (2004) found the clearest differences; between high and low 
performing councils under CPA were in the areas of performance management and 
the clarity of organisational priorities. The clarity of organisational strategies is about 
having a well-defined strategic approach.  
 
The summary factor ranked third is Human resources and the literature tends to 
argue it is best utilised in a strategic manner. Support for the view HR is an important 
determinant of organisational performance is widespread in the literature. Recent 
examples being Hoppas and Worrall (2012) who suggested HR improves 
organisational performance by strengthening human capital, employee attitudes 
and behaviour. Giauque, Anderfuhren-Biget, and Varone (2013) showed several 
HR practices appear to be strong predictors of organisational performance, 
including fairness, job enrichment, individual appraisal and professional 
development, which appear to be stronger predictors than public service motivation 
or organisational commitment. Further, writing in a new journal, dedicated to 
organisational effectiveness, Sparrow and Cooper (2014) suggested HR should be 
combined with a range of disciplines that all influence organisational performance. 
 
These three summary factors appear to be the most important in determining 
organisational performance. The next most important factors appeared to be 
Culture and Engagement. The literature review compiled a table from a chapter in 
a book (Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle, 2010) on public service improvement 
(Table 3.1, p. 51 in this thesis).  This meta-review suggests a number of factors 
linked to the improvement of services. Table 11.1 lists these factors alongside the 
summary factors defined in this research. All the 11 summary factors had some 
relationship to organisational performance, although Innovation and Risk appeared 
to be very low.  
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Table 11.1: Comparison of the summary factors identified in this research 
with those noted in Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle (2010) linked to 
organisational performance 
This research From Ashworth, Boyne and 
Entwistle (2010) (In italics may be 
linked to performance) 
Strategy Strategic planning 
Regulation 
Performance management Regulation 
Strategic planning 
Engagement Collaboration 





Physical infrastructure Organisation environment 




Matching the list from Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle (2010) shows direct matches 
for Strategy, Human resources, Culture, Innovation and Leadership while 
Engagement and collaboration are similar, although Engagement is, probably, rather 
wider including with more stakeholders, such as the media and citizens. 
Performance management doesn’t appear in the Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle list 
although it may, arguably, be matched with regulation that determines the nature of 
the PMF and strategy (thus Strategic planning), since this must be framed with 
regulation at its forefront. Organisation environment and organisation learning are 
not well matched although organisational learning may be linked with Innovation and 
organisational environment with Physical infrastructure and Reputation. Reputation 
seemed to be of some importance for performance in organisations having good 
relations with stakeholders and being favourably disposed to by government and its 
various agents, such as the Audit Commission and other regulators. However, the 
importance appears to be substantially less than for the key summary factors. 
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Leadership is low down the list suggesting some agreement with the Ashworth, 
Boyne and Entwistle list where it is a ‘maybe’.  
 
Two summary factors, from this current research, are not matched; Resources and 
Risk. Arguably, Risk could be placed with Strategy as it is best dealt with using a 
strategic approach. Resources was ranked sixth in this research but is not mentioned 
in the Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle list. 
 
11.7 The Longitudinal Approach 
An important part of the research was the longitudinal approach to examine the 
changes in factors over time that may influence organisational performance, 
although it is accepted the timeframe was rather short. As noted elsewhere the 
abolition of the national framework(s) effectively curtailed data collection. Another 
year of CAA data would have been useful and it was intended to vary the survey in 
an aim to boost response rates. Although, it is felt some certainty as to continuance 
of the national framework(s) would have had that effect in any case. The longitudinal 
approach gave a greater confidence in determining causation rather than simply 
association.   
 
11.8 Theoretical Considerations 
The literature review identified the theories as to what factors may result in improved 
organisational performance and some of the why. The results, in general, tend to 
support this in particular why Strategy, Performance management and Human 
resources appear to be important. Since the organisations in question are human 
constructs it should be of no surprise that the management of this key resource (as 
in RBV and HPWS), especially important in services, should be important for 
organisational performance (De Saá and Garcia-Falcón, 2002). However, other 
resources don’t seem to have the same strength of association with organisational 
performance. This may be because they are only (effectively) deployed by people, 
so managing this (people) resource well may be the key to the effective utilisation of 
other types of resources. This of course does not mean other types of resource are 
not important, rather they are immobile and require activation. 
11.9 Practical Considerations 
An important part of the impetus for this research was to provide a means to identify 
what organisations can do in order to improve their performance. So, will 
implementing a BSC, TQM or the EFQM EM improve organisational performance? 
335 
 
What about increasing resources deployed on performance management – at the 
centre and/or in services? What about having a formal corporate plan and 
associated service plans, in other words a strategic approach? Or the active 
management of human resources? To use the results it is simply a matter of 
completing the questionnaire and then examining the statements correlating highly 
with performance. If the organisation scores low for (some of) these statements 
then this suggests where improvement(s) may be needed (Appendix 10.1). Of 
course it is important this is used with due regard to the organisation, its 
circumstances and environment; in other words in context.  After each survey a 
summary report was sent to responding authorities and in 2006 a presentation was 
given at a Local Authorities Research Council Initiative (LARCI) conference in 
Birmingham (Goodchild, 2006). A number of a councils said they intended to use 
the results in improving their performance. A consultant requested the use of the 
questionnaire and results in his work with a council.  
 
11.10 Limitations 
All research has limitations due to such as time, availability of data, access to 
subjects, response rates, circumstances, events and a myriad other reasons. The 
key is to design the research to minimise these influences at the outset as it may 
not be possible to correct issues later. One of the key concerns of this research 
was the continuation of CPA, or at least some national method for rating 
organisations. It was known CPA would change and possibly replaced by 
something else, as indeed it was by CAA. Although CAA was different it still 
included an assessment of organisational performance, albeit in separate parts but 
these could be combined to provide an organisation rating. The lack of a national 
rating would effectively undermine the research; even through the use of national 
PIs would be an alternative. In the event CAA was abolished as was much of the 
national framework(s) including the national indicator set. However, even then a 
considerable amount of data had to be submitted to government, by councils, to 
be compiled as the single data list. Fire services, police forces and PCTs had to 
supply data also. 
 
The questionnaire was the basis for a large amount of the data as regards the 
evaluation of organisational performance. It may be a richness and valid assessment 
requires more detailed research (see Martin, Walker and Enticott et al, 2003). The 
case study provided additional support for the validity of the first questionnaire wave 




The questionnaire collected the views of a single officer in each organisation; even 
though it is felt it was a well ‘informed’ view. As noted previously Ketokivi and 
Schroeder (2004, p. 262) have cautioned against the use of single informant studies 
in specifically operations management research with regard to perceptual measures 
but also assert the use of perceptual measures is valid. It is believed the results of 
the research show the use of an appropriate single informant is able to produce 
meaningful results in studies such as this. 
 
The questionnaire asked respondents to complete an organisation profile of where 
they thought their council was against a series of factors at present (2005) and going 
back five years (2000). Clearly this latter relies on memory and it thus may produce 
less useful data for the year 2000 than 2005. Although, proving this one way or 
another is not easy, the distance between 2000 and 2005 may suggest respondents 
had an expectation the score would be higher in 2005 than 2000. In a few cases the 
reverse was recorded.  
 
The importance of the determinants of organisational performance may not be 
brought out in the questionnaires due to the wide-ranging nature of this research or 
it may not have been possible to identify its level of importance, if any. However, the 
consistency of the triangulation tends to suggest this was not the case and further, 
the results are consistent with other work, for example the meta-review of Ashworth, 
Boyne and Entwistle (2010).  
The case studies undertaken in 2005 were of three authorities and further a limited 
number of individuals so they may not be sufficiently representative to be particularly 
meaningful. The case studies were supplementary to the questionnaire survey 
undertaken for two purposes; firstly to add a richness to the quantitative data and 
secondly, as a check on the possible single informant issue problem. As shown the 
latter seems to have been successfully achieved. 
 
As regards the BVPP content analysis there are a number of potential limitations 
that could impact on the results. Some of these are inherent in the methodology 
and some are inherent in the nature of the BVPP and the government guidance 
that regulated its production. As regards the methodology, although the criteria 
were tested on a few BVPPs they represent a subset of those possible and so it is 
assumed they represent key criteria that determine an authority’s true 
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performance. The results of the questionnaire survey provide corroboration.  In 
addition the analysis of all 76 BVPPs was done by a single person and not subject 
to validation. There is some merit in a single person doing the analysis in that it 
would tend to promote consistency but it would be desirable to have at least two 
people rating, who could compare results derived independently and come to a 
consensus. It may also be suggested an experienced local government officer 
would have a good idea which the high performing and not so high performing 
authorities are and also their likely CPAR. A consideration of the results shows 
some authorities rated excellent received a relatively low score for their BVPP (for 
example Westminster) whilst some rated weak and poor received a relatively high 
score (for example Salford and North Shropshire). It is therefore considered there 
is not significant bias in this respect.  
 
The CPA measures and CAAR may not reflect the ‘true’ performance of 
organisations (Andrews, Boyne and Walker et al, 2003 and Boyne and Enticott, 
2004). This raises the question of what is ‘true’ performance and this is not a simple 
question to answer as it depends on a variety of considerations. This research 
assumes CPA and CAA consistently measure a real construct of performance in 
organisations. The conversion of police and PCT performance assessments to 
CPAR, PMS, SS and CA had to be undertaken (see Table 4.2, p. 136). Although this 
was successfully achieved the different measures used are not a perfect fit and how 
‘imperfect’ is not known.    
 
Respondents may be influenced in their responses by their organisation’s CPAR and 
CAAR. Whilst this may or not be true it should equally apply whatever the 
performance of the organisation. Other factors including personal background and 
views may also impact on their responses and it is difficult to gauge the potential 
impact of these. However, the case studies suggest this was not a particular issue 
of concern. 
 
The analysis using correlation may have not brought out the ‘true’ situation, 
especially the smaller number of cases in the 2009 and 2010 surveys. However, the 
results for the three surveys are generally consistent looking at the size of the 
correlations rather than just those significant at p<0.05. Of course, there are some 
differences between the four organisation types, which are to be expected. For 
example an organisation such as the police with a command structure is likely to 
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have some characteristics different from councils that also have many different 
services. 
 
The PCA, especially through the use of a smaller than recommended number of 
cases, may have misrepresented the actual position. As explained previously when 
using PCA in an exploratory investigation such ‘constraints’ tend to be relaxed. A 
careful reading of the results would suggest a remarkable consistency has been 
achieved demonstrated by the triangulation and when compared with other studies 






There are a number of conclusions arising from this research some of which relate 
to the research methodology and others the (potential) use of the results. The 
principal conclusions considered first address the findings of the research. These 
are the important outputs of the research demonstrating the contribution to 
knowledge.  
 
The research also aimed to bridge the practitioner-academic divide by taking on 
board the practical realities of ‘success’ in local public service organisations, in 
particular performance management, whilst maintaining academic rigour.  
  
12.2 Findings 
The research has demonstrated that: 
 
A high performing organisation would tend to have strategic direction with good 
strategic/service planning and performance management with involvement and 
practise evidence-based policy. There would be an ODS to give motivated and 
trained employees within a supportive learning culture, be innovative, have a high 
level of citizen focus with a consistency of practices. There would be both political 
and managerial leadership that would be demonstrably high but with diffusion of 
power throughout the organisation. Use of ICT would be high and there would be 
high levels of engagement and communication.  
 
On its own, proprietary performance management computer software does not 
produce higher organisational performance. Such systems may, however, operate 
as a ‘force multiplier’ to improve further, a good PMF but will not solve ‘problems’ 
in those deficient. 
 
When producing summary factors from the criteria, the top three of the 11 summary 
factors in explaining variation in organisational performance are Strategy, 
Performance management and Human resources. 
 
Of the other summary factors, Culture and Engagement came next, forming a 
second tier. Resources, Reputation and Leadership explain some of the variation, 
representing a third tier. The summary factors of Innovation, Risk and Physical 




The evidence from this research suggests performance management properly 
applied does indeed result in improved organisational performance. 
 
The causal nature and direction of the relationship is perhaps clear for many of the 
criteria but not so for some. For the 11 summary factors it is suggested these 
‘cause’ high performance but feedback loops may operate. So, for example, a good 
reputation is gained through high organisational performance and this reputation 
further enhances performance, as the organisation strives to meet expectations. 
 
The content analysis of BVPPs demonstrates such documents (tend to) reflect the 
performance of the organisation. Further the strongest correlation is with CPAR. 
Also, the other measures in CPA: PMS, SS and CA are all strongly correlated with 
the content of the BVPP. Further, the results of the content analysis and the 
questionnaire survey are mutually supportive. 
 
The organisational profile work strongly suggests organisations with a more post-
bureaucratic orientation exhibit higher performance and as they become more so, 
performance improves further.  
 
There would appear to be some differences between England, Scotland and Wales 
as regards the impact of the different criteria, although the absence of an 
equivalent rating to the CPA in Scotland and Wales limited the scope for 
investigation. 
 
Practitioners appear to have a different perspective from academics. A perspective 
grounded in operating on a day-to-day basis in the complex and variable nature of 
organisational performance. In particular the need to take into account the realities 
of Politics that may not be formally expressed. The national frameworks exert 
dominance and so practitioners see these as having particular influence and so 
strategies and operations reflect their needs. Academic work in contrast may seem 
rather abstract and remote from experience. 
 
12.3 Conduct and Methodology 
The questionnaire survey methodology appears to have been sound. A good 
response rate can be obtained from a large and relatively complicated 
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questionnaire but is subject to a variety of factors. The questionnaire survey 
instrument displayed a high degree of reliability and validity. 
The response to the questionnaire in 2005 was broadly representative in terms of 
type of council although there is a slight bias in terms of CPAR towards authorities 
rated excellent and good. There may also be a slight bias towards larger councils, 
although responses were obtained from some of the smallest councils in England. 
The number of respondents in 2009 and 2010 was much lower and less 
representative. However, it is not thought this has significantly biased the results. 
 
The views of a single respondent in an organisation can be usefully employed 
providing they are chosen with care in terms of the research topic and so obtaining 
the (informed) views of the Chief Executive (or other senior corporate policy officer) 
was very appropriate to the research topic. The use of case studies increased the 
level of confidence in the quality of the data obtained from the questionnaire. 
 
The use of the Pearson correlation coefficient has been shown to be a sound basis 
for considering the responses to the questionnaire using CPA measures and 
CAAR. 
PCA was an appropriate statistical technique for the exploratory investigation of 
the contribution to organisational performance of various factors, although it did 
require the relaxation of statistical bounds. This is not unusual in such exploratory 
research. 
 
12.4 Use of the Results 
This research can be utilised by local public service organisations as a first step in 
identifying what may be required to improve their performance. 
 
Using the 2005 results and taking Darlington Borough Council, as an example, the 
2005 BVPP contains a graph suggesting the Council has improved (Darlington 
Borough Council, 2005, p. 38). It is also the case the Council scored highly in many 
key statements such as 4.11, 4.18, 4.24, 4.26, 4.34, 4.39, 5.39, 5.58, 7.2, 7.3, 12.2, 
and 12.3. The high percentage rating for the BVPP supports this contention. 
 
The applicability of the results to other organisation types and settings has not 




The research was undertaken in a highly regulated local public services 
environment and it has not been ascertained if a reduction in this has an impact on 
summary factors contributing to organisational performance. It may be the case 
the summary factors are not dependent significantly on regulation, as the literature 
suggests strategy and human resources (management) are important 
determinants of organisational performance in many settings. However, it may 
‘depend’ and context is important. 
  
12.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
Future work could address the findings of this research and the methodologies that 
may enhance the search and validation of determinants of organisational 
performance. Whilst it is not expected any particular approach will capture all 
relevant details there are likely to be approaches better suited to this kind of 
endeavour. In particular, combine effectively the quantitative and qualitative to 
provide a statistically robust and rich picture of determinants of organisational 
performance.   
 
The present research identified 11 summary factors associated with organisational 
performance of which three appear to be dominant. Three of the others appear to 
have a very low association leaving five with an intermediate association. The 
research used a national rating of performance no longer available so future work 
will need to use another method to measure local public services performance. It 
could be useful to provide a comprehensive review of what is available and their 
suitability. 
 
As an exploratory PCA was used future research could aim to provide confirmation 
of the summary factors and their strength. 
 
As well as considering determinants of organisational performance this research 
added to the knowledge on the effectiveness of performance management in local 
public service organisations. It also produced a framework for further study that 
could allow a longitudinal perspective to be achieved, so trends in effectiveness 
can be evaluated and perhaps correlated with a variety of factors such as 
organisational culture, the extent of central imposition and control and the strategic 
focus of organisations. It could provide the basic methodology for further research 




It has previously been noted that it may not be the amount of resources that is 
important in influencing performance, rather how they are deployed. Deployment 
is not though limited to resources, for example (stakeholder) engagement often 
starts with a thorough analysis leading to a formal written strategy. How this 
strategy is deployed is likely to be important for the success, or otherwise, of the 
strategy.  Given the results of the relevant statements in the questionnaire this 
could be an area of useful future research.  
 
Future research could investigate each of the summary factors in more detail and 
the links between them. For example, the relationship between a strategic 
approach and engagement; the extent to which planning engagement can 
successfully be delivered and what is necessary for this to be achieved.  
 
As regards the BVPP, future work could use corporate documentation to consider 
the relative importance of the 21 criteria and thus provide a basis for further 
differentiation.  
 
The potential differences between organisation types could be investigated and 
other factors could be introduced such as organisation size, the deprivation of the 
organisation’s area and geographic region. Other work could also consider the 
extent to which the BV and CPA frameworks influenced the concept of high 
performance.  
 
A fruitful area of research could be a detailed extended case study of an 
organisation using the statements of statistically significant correlation coefficients, 
where organisational scores are currently low. By the organisation addressing 
attention to these areas it may be expected performance would improve. Such 
improvement could then be tracked over time with clear knowledge of the changes 
made. Consideration would need to be given as to the relationships between the 
different criteria and so the case study may be relatively complex. Another related 
option could be to develop a model using the criteria with appropriate relationships 
highlighted and use this to explore the dynamics utilising data from different 
organisations. 
 
This research was predominantly in the English local public services and so could 
usefully be replicated in other settings such as other public services, private and 
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Summary of literature used to contribute to the determination of survey 
content and analyses 
STATEMENT (CRITERIA) REFERENCES 
A. Strategy/Policy/Finance/HRM 
4.1 Written corporate strategy 
with top objectives tied into 
community strategy  
Gani and Jermias (2012), Schniederjans 
and Cao (2009), Nandakumar, Ghobadian 
and O’Regan (2012), Dess and Davis 
(1984), Miller and Cardinal (1994), Bolton 
and Leach (2002), Poister, Edwards and 
Pasha et al (2013)   
4.2 Written service plans  As 4.1 
4.3 Corporate strategy planned 
in advance with stakeholders  
Gregory (2003), Simmons (2003) 
4.4 Agreed formal mission/ 
vision statement  
Gregory (2003), Alavi and Karami (2009), 
Tvorik and McGivern (1997) 
4.5 Published organisational 
development strategy 
Joyce (2004), O’Donnell and Shields 
(2002), Watson (2001) 
4.6 Published medium term 
financial plan  
Phillips, Davies and Moutinho (1999), Audit 
Commission (2002b) 
4.7 Organisation wide 
(corporate) training programme 
that includes management  
Sharma and Gadenne (2008), Byrd and 
Marshall (1997), Chowhan (2013), Storey 
(2002), Improvement and Development 
Agency (2003) 
4.8 Reviews using work 
measurement  
Enticott, Walker and Boyne et al (2002), 
Entwistle, Dowson and Law (2003) 
4.9 Took part in I&DeA's local 
government improvement 
programme or equivalent  
Jones (2005), Improvement and 
Development Agency (1999a, 1999b), 
Jones (2004), Local Government 
Association (2009) 
4.10 Level of innovation in 
service delivery  
Lumpkin and Dess (1996), Cabinet Office 
(2003), Walker, Damanpour and Devece 
(2011), Parry and Proctor-Thomson (2003), 
Labroukos, Lioukas and Chambers (1995) 
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4.11 Level of innovation in 
service planning  
As 4.10 
4.12 Effectiveness more 
important than efficiency) 
Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle (2010), 
Davies, Nutley and Smith (1999), Rouse 
(1999), Pandey, Coursey and Moynihan 
(2007), Parry and Proctor-Thomson 
(2003), Boyne (2004), Porter (1996) 
4.13 Organisational values 
widely discussed 
Rouse (1999), Williams (2002), Hood 
(1991), Humphrey (2003) 




4.15 Political issues 'blow' 
strategy off course  
Bartlett, Corrigan and Dibben et al (1999), 
Entwistle, Martin and Enticott (2005), 
Boyne (2003b), Collier (2006), Skelcher 
(1992)  
4.16 Extent top-down approach 
to strategic planning  
Seddon (2003), Grace and Martin (2008), 
McKevitt and Lawton (1996) 
4.17 Central policy/ Best Value 
direction  
Eskildsen, Kristensen and Juhl (2004). 
Bititci, Carrie and McDevitt (1997) 
4.18 Corporate strategy linked to 
community strategy  
Kloot and Martin (2000), Morgan and 
Djebarni (2012) 
4.19 Extent organisation thinks 
strategically  
As 4.1  
4.20 Service developments 
implemented strategically  
As 4.1 
4.21 Extent of active 
management of HRM  
Wright, Dunford and Snell (2001), De Sáa 
and Garcia-Falcón (2002) 
4.22 Extent of front-line 
employee involvement in service 
planning  
Franco and Bourne (2003), Fisher (1990), 
Cowling and Newman (1995), Audit 
Commission (2000a), Wooldridge and 
Floyd (1990), Entwistle, Dowson and Law 
(2003), Phillips, Davies and Moutinho 
(1999) 
4.23 Level of departmental 
involvement in service planning  
As 4.22 
4.24 Extent of departmental 
involvement in doing service 
planning  
As 4.22 
4.25 Community priorities fed 
into plans  
Collier (2006), Marr and Creelman (2009), 
Bagley and Lewis (2008), Boyne and 
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Enticott (2004), Downe, Grace and Martin 
et al (2008) 
4.26 Strategies and plans linked 
together  
As 4.1 
4.27 Budget linked to priorities  Kloot and Martin (2000) 
4.28 Plan for short, medium and 
long term  
Shrivastava, Mohanty and Lakhe (2006) 
4.29 Policy decisions based on 
evidence  
Taylor and Godfrey (2003) 
4.30 Extent of formal risk 
management with written risk 
register  
Macpherson (2001), Goldeng, Grünfeld 
and Benito (2008) 
4.31 Extent of organisational 
slack in central functions  
Boyne (2003a), Andrews, Boyne and Law 
et al (2005) 
4.32 Extent of organisational 
slack in service departments 
As 4.31 
4.33 Budget devolved to 
departments  
As 4.6 
4.34 Delegation practiced within  Cox, Higgins and Tamkin (2012) 
4.35 Extent of responsiveness of 
the authority to service users  
Peters and Waterman (1982), Peters 
(1988), Crosby (1988), Osborne and 
Gaebler (1992), Marr and Creelman 
(2010), Skelcher (1992), Rahman and 
Bullock (2005), Pannirselvam and 
Ferguson (2001)  
4.36 Employee's goals aligned 
with organisation  
McGregor (1960), Latham and Locke 
(1979) 
4.37 Extent that organisation is 
citizen centred  
As 4.35 
4.38 Organisation is budget 
driven 
As 4.6 
4.39 Organisation regarded as 
competitive in terms of 
achievement  
Dunsire, Hartley and Parker (1991), 
Shrivastava, Mohanty and Lakhe (2006), 
Magd and Curry (2003), Fong, Cheng and 
Ho (1998), Maiga and Jacobs (2004), 
James and Field (1999), Grace, Fletcher 
and Martin et al (2007) 
4.40 Extent to which 





4.41 Organisation focuses on 
employees  
As 4.36 
4.42 Organisation focuses on 
service provision  
As 4.35 
4.43 Extent performance 
management focused on group 
processes  
Winstanley and Stuart-Smith (1996), 
Rahman and Bullock (2005) 
4.44 Service planning is 
optimum  
As 4.1 
4.45 Extent to which probity is 
valued  
Winstanley and Stuart-Smith (1996), 
Stanwick and Stanwick (2003), Batty and 
Hilton (2003), Lere and Gaumnitz (2003) 
4.46 Extent to which 
organisation gives value for 
money  
Magd and Curry (2003), Boyne, Gould-
Williams and Law et al (2001) 
4.47 Aims and objectives shared 
across organisation 
As 4.36 
4.48 Extent of separation 
between strategy and 
implementation  
Lawton, McKevitt and Millar (2000), Stahr, 
Bulman and Stead (2000) 
4.49 Extent of organisation 
focus on 'ends' rather than 
'means'  
See 4.1 
4.50 Extent to which critical 
success factors are used  
De Waal (2003b, 2004) 
4.51 Extent to which HRM is 
important for organisational 
performance  
Bourne, Franco-Santos and Pavlov et al 
(2008), Pannirselvan and Ferguson 
(2001), Chew and Sharma (2005), Den 
Hartog and Verburg (2004), Joyce (2004), 
McBain, Ghobadian and Switzer et al 
(2012) 
4.52 Extent to which Best Value 
(other) reviews result in service 
improvement  
Entwistle, Dowson and Law (2003), 
Enticott, Walker and Boyne et al (2002) 
4.53 Extent to which employee 
incentives are financial  
Dunsire, Hartley and Parker (1991), 
Goldeng, Grünfeld and Benito (2008), 
Verbeeten (2008) 
4.54 Team/individual goals 




4.55 Aims/objectives corporate 
body and service providers 
linked  
As 4.36 
B. Performance Management 
5.1 Use of proprietary 
performance management 
software  
Marr (2001), Marr and Neely (2003), 
Barrett (2004) 
B57 Collect all Quality of Life 
Indicators  
Audit Commission (2000a) 
5.3 Use EFQM Excellence 
Model or variant  
Macpherson (2001), Moeller, Breinlinger-
O’Reilly and Elser (2000), McAdam and 
Walker (2003), Jacobs and Suckling 
(2007), Larsen (2001) 
5.4 Use Balanced Scorecard or 
variant  
Kaplan and Norton (1992, 2001), Talbot 
(1999), Malmi (2001), McAdam and 
Walker (2003), Cabinet Office (2001), 
Hoque and James (2000), De Geuser, 
Mooraj and Oyon (2009), Jacobs and 
Suckling (2007)  
5.5 Use Total Quality 
Management  
Leonard and McAdam (2004), Moura e Sá 
and Kanji (2003), Rouse (1999), 
Shrivastava, Mohanty and Lakhe (2006), 
Zakuan, Yusof and Laosirihongthong et al 
(2010), Al-Dhaafri, Yusoff and Al-Swidi 
(2003), Rahman and Bullock (2005) 
5.6 Use Benchmarking  Longbottom (2000), Cox and Thompson 
(1998), Holloway, Francis and Hinton 
(1999), Audit Commission (2000a), Magd 
and Curry (2003), Maiga and Jacobs 
(2004) 
5.7 Use Management by 
Objectives  
Drucker (1955), Vedung (1997) 
5.8 Use strategy mapping  Kaplan and Norton (2000b) 
5.9 Use corporate planning As 4.1 
5.10 Use outcome (results) 
based accountability (O(R)BA) 
As 4.1 
5.11 Use other techniques for 
managing performance 
Hines, Holweg and Rich (2004), Radnor, 
Walley and Stephens et al (2006), 
Holloway (2001) 
5.13 Hold Investors in People Cox, Higgins and Tamkin (2012), Franco-
Santos, Khilji and Bourne (2011), Paton 
(2003), Bourne, Franco-Santos and Pavlov 
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et al (2008), Bourne and Franco-Santos 
(2010)  
5.15 Hold any performance-
based awards (e.g. Beacon) 
Rashman, Downe and Hartley (2005), 
Entwistle and Downe (2005), Hartley and 
Downe (2007), Withers and Hartley 
(2007), Wilford (2007), Department of 
Environment, Transport and the Regions 
(1999) 
5.17  Have quality accreditation 
(ISO 9000) 
Lambert and Ouedraogo (2008), Paton 
(2003) 
5.18 Team based appraisal  Cox, Higgins and Tamkin (2012) 
5.19 Managers formally 
appraised by subordinates  
As 5.18 
5.20 Performance management 
exist to extent if not for Best 
Value  
Audit Commission (2000a), Martin and 
Davis (2001), Keenan (2000) 
5.21 Extent to which meaningful 
indicators exist (excluding 
statutory)  
Smith (1995), Stewart and Walsh (1994), 
Audit Commission (2000a), Bevan and 
Hood (2006), Greener (2003), Bevan 
(2006), Collier (2006), Boyne and Law 
(1991) 
5.22 Performance related pay 
for Chief Executive/ Directors 
Franco and Bourne (2003), Stanwick and 
Stanwick (2003) 
B69 Performance related pay for 
other senior managers  
As 5.22 
5.24 Appraisal linked to financial 
reward  
As 5.22 
5.25 Appraisal competency 
based  
As 5.18 
5.26 Performance management 
produces sufficient timely 
information  
Smith (1990), Van de Walle and Bovaird 
(2007) 
5.27 Performance management 
increase accountability to 
citizens  
Adserà (2003), Andrews and Van de Walle 
(2013), Lemieux-Charles, McGuire and 
Champagne et al (2003), Boyne and Law 
(1991), Audit Commission (2000c), 
Skelcher (1992), Jackson (1993), Boyne, 
Gould-Williams and Law et al (2002b) 
5.28 Performance management 





5.29 Performance management 
too complicated  
Smith (1990, 1995), Midwinter (1994), 
Stewart and Walsh (1994), Noordegraaf 
and Abma (2003) 
5.30 Performance of 
professionals managed  
As 5.18 
5.31 Too many performance 
indicators  
Ballantine, Brignall and Modell (1998), 
Neely (2003), Boyne and Gould-Williams 
(2003) 
5.32 Are targets ambitious  Pollitt (2000), Seddon (2003), Bevan and 
Hood (2006), Enticott, Walker and Boyne 
et al (2002) 
5.33 Range of qualitative and 
quantitative indicators  
As 5.21 
5.34 Performance management 
method of control  
Seddon (2003), Soltani, Singh and Liao et 
al (2010), Triantafillou (2007), Grubnic and 
Woods (2009) 
5.35 Innovative approach to 
performance management  
Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) 
5.36 Approach to performance 
management top-down  
Seddon (2003), Grace and Martin (2008), 
McKevitt and Lawton (1996) 
5.37 Level of departmental 
involvement in developing 
performance management  
As 4.22, 4.23, 4.24 
5.38 Level of departmental 
involvement in running 
performance management  
As 4.22, 4.23, 4.24 
5.39 Adequacy of systems for 
collecting national indicators  
As 4.17 
5.40 Comprehensiveness of set 
of local indicators  
As 5.21 
5.41 Extent of employee 
rewards for good performance  
As 4.53 
5.42 Extent of sanctions against 
employees for poor performance  
As 4.53 
5.43 Extent performance 
managed not just measured  
Burke (2004), Palmer (1993), Emiliani 
(2000) 
5.44 Extent performance 
management an agent of 
change  
Cowling and Newman (1995), Watson 
(2001), O’Donnell and Shields (2002), 
Audit Commission (2000a), Enticott, 
Walker and Boyne et al (2002), Entwistle, 
Dowson and Law (2003) 
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5.45 Extent managers have 
access to quality timely 
performance information  
Lebas (1995), Ryan, Stanley and Nelson 
(2002), Mack and Ryan (2004), Steccolini 
(2004), Thompson (1995) 
5.46 Extent Members (political 
representatives) have access to 
quality timely performance 
information 
Lebas (1995), Boyne, Gould-Williams and 
Law et al (2001) 
5.47 Extent performance 
management produces perverse 
incentives  
Triantafillou (2007), Bevan and Hood 
(2006), Bevan (2006), Haubrich and 
McLean (2006a), McLean, Haubrich and 
Gutiérrez-Romero (2007), Higgins, James 
and Roper (2004) 
5.48 Extent performance 
management skews 
organisation priorities  
Department of Transport, Local 
Government and the Regions (2001), 
Bevan (2006), Collier (2006), Downe, 
Grace and Martin et al (2008), Audit 
Commission (2002a), Higgins, James and 
Roper (2004), Grubnic and Woods (2009), 
Entwistle and Enticott (2007), Sullivan and 
Gillanders (2005), Entwistle, Downe and 
Guarneros-Meza et al (2014) 
5.49 Extent performance 
management measures things 
that matter  
As 5.48 
5.50 Level of game playing 
(auditors/government)  
As 5.47 
5.51 Extent performance 
management focused on 
learning  
Bourne and Franco-Santos (2010), 
Lambert and Ouedraogo (2008), Davis 
(1998) 
5.52 Extent performance 
management focused on 
qualitative measures  
Rahman and Bullock (2005), Jacobs 
(2004), Kelman and Hong (2012) 
5.53 Extent performance 
management is optimum 
As 5.45 
5.54 Extent organisational 
performance rated more highly 
than democratic  
Martin and Davis (2001), Jackson (1993), 
Skelcher and Mathur (2004), Skelcher and 
Sullivan (2008) 
5.55 External performance 
constrained by central 
government action  
Audit Commission (2002b), Grace and 
Martin (2008) 
5.56 Extent targets sub-optimise 
performance  
As 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 
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5.57 Extent performance 
management agent of 
accountability 
As 5.27, 5.28 
5.58 Extent performance 
management integrated into 
strategy  
As 4.1 
5.59 Extent context is 
considered in analysis  
Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle (2010), 
Stewart and Walsh (1994), Chang, Lin and 
Northcott (2002), Downe, Grace and 
Martin et al (2008), Chang and Ku (2009), 
Ezzamel and Watson (1993) 
5.60 Extent focus on national 
indicators to detriment of local 
indicators  
Vincent-Jones (1999) 
5.61 Extent focus on what 
measured rather than what 
matters  
As 5.49 
5.62 Extent performance 
management has local political 
commitment  
Entwistle and Laffin (2005), Boyne 
(2003b), Stewart and Walsh (1994), 
Pedersen and Huniche (2011), Entwistle, 
Martin and Enticott (2005), Boyne, Gould-
Williams and Law et al (2000a), Chang 
and Ku (2009) 
5.63 Extent performance 
management has commitment 
top-level management  
As 5.63 
5.64 Extent effort spent 
improving accuracy PIs rather 
than managing services  
Smith (1995), Midwinter (1994), Bevan 
and Hood (2006), Bevan (2006) 
5.65 Extent 'equity' a driver of 
service performance  
Hood (1991), Simmons (2003), De Waal, 
Goedegebuure and Hinfelaar (2012) 
5.66 Extent to which 'use' stage 
of performance management 
successful  
Lawton, McKevitt and Millar (2000), 
Radnor and Holweg (2011), Pedersen and 
Huniche (2011), Likierman (1993), Sole 
(2009), De Waal (2003b, 2004), Stahr, 
Bulman and Stead (2000), Soderberg, 
Kalagnanam and Sheehan et al (2011) 
5.67 Extent EFQM/BSC integral 
part of strategic planning 
Kaplan and Norton (1996b), De Waal 
(2003a), Malmi (2001), McAdam and 
Walker (2003), Cabinet Office (2001), 
Wilson, Hagarty and Gauthier (2003), 
Kollberg and Elg (2011) 
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5.68 Extent strategy maps are 
used  
Kaplan and Norton (2000b) 
C. Administration 
6.1 Level of centralisation of 
control  
Labroukos, Lioukas and Chambers (1995), 
Ebinger, Grohs and Reiter (2011) 
6.2 Level of centralisation of 
administration  
As 6.1 
6.3 Level of centralisation of 
service planning  
As 6.1 
6.4 Level of centralisation of 
performance management 
As 6.1 
6.5 Extent to which organisation 
departments operate 
independently  
Lee and Choi (2000), Gyan-Baffour 
(1999), Ezzamel and Watson (1993) 
6.6 Consistency of the level of 
practices/routines  
Palmer (1993) 
6.7 Extent to which need for 
'control' tends to subvert 
'purpose'  
As 5.34 
6.8 Extent to which 
administrative policies and 
practices are evidence-based  
Davies, Nutley and Smith (1999), Taylor 
and Godfrey (2003) 
6.9 Extent to which governance 
needs are discussed  
Entwistle, Downe and Guarneros-Meza et 
al (2014), Andrews, Cowell and Downe 
(2008), Peck (2004), Skelcher and Mathur 
(2004), Johnson and Osborne (2003), 
Aucoin (2012) 
D. Leadership 
7.1 Organisation  characterised 
as officer led  
Entwistle, Martin and Enticott (2005), 
Andrews and Boyne (2010), Michailidis 
and Charalamous (2012), Parry and 
Proctor-Thomson (2003), McBain, 
Ghobadian and Switzer et al (2012), 
Humphreys (2001), Bryman (2004) 
7.2 Level of political leadership 
in organisation 
As 7.1 
7.3 Level of officer leadership in 
the organisation  
As 7.1 







under/overspends carried over 
one year to next  
Phillips, Davies and Moutinho (1999) 
8.2 Allocation of resources 
formally determined by priorities  
Tvorik and McGivern (1997), Higgins, 
James and Roper (2004), Martin (1999) 
8.3 Extent to which employees 
are well trained  
As 4.7 
8.4 Level of motivation displayed 
by employees  
Cowling and Newman (1995), Seddon 
(2003), Improvement and Development 
Agency (2003), Latham and Locke (1979), 
McDonald and Smith (1995) 
8.5 Extent managers overloaded 
with work  
Andrews and Boyne (2010), Andrews and 
Brewer (2013), Martin and Hartley (2000), 
Withers and Hartley (2007) 
8.6 Extent other employees are 
overloaded with work  
As 8.5 
8.7 Amount of resources 
deployed at corporate centre  
Boyne (2003a), Lemieux-Charles, McGuire 
and Champagne  et al (2003), Moeller, 
Breinlinger-O’Reilly and Elser (2000), 
Jones (2005), Carmeli (2001) 
8.8 Use of ICT in the 
organisation 
Byrd and Marshall (1997), Begemann and 
Bititci (1999), Bititci, Nudurupati and 
Turner et al (2002), Mithas, Ramasubbu 
and Sambamurthy (2011), Melville, 
Kraemer and Gurbaxani (2004) 
8.9 Level of research capacity  As 8.17 
8.10 Level of resources to do 
performance management at the 
centre  
Boyne (2003a), Lemieux-Charles, McGuire 
and Champagne et al (2003), De Sáa and 
Garcia-Falcón (2002), Tvorik and 
McGivern (1997), Carmeli (2001), López 
(2003, 2006), Galbreath (2005), Douglas, 
Jenkins and Kennedy (2012), 
Improvement and Development Agency 
(2005) 
8.11 Level of resources to do 
performance management in 
service departments  
As 8.10 
8.12 Extent information available 
for corporate/ service planning  
HM Treasury (2001), Lemieux-Charles, 
McGuire and Champagne et al (2003), 
Van de Walle and Bovaird (2007), Wall 
and Martin (2003), Steccolini (2004) 
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8.13 Quality of organisation’s 
physical infrastructure  
Tends not to be considered in the literature 
although may be specific for example 
information technology: Bititci, Nudurupati 
and Turner et al (2002) 
8.14 Extent employee creativity 
is harnessed  
Paton (2003), Guha, Grover and Kettinger 
et al (1997), Fisher (1990) 
8.15 Extent strategic capacity is 
overloaded  
As 8.10, 8.11 
8.16 Extent operational capacity 
is overloaded  
As 8.10, 8.11 
8.17 Extent policy analysis 
capacity is overloaded  
Lemieux-Charles, McGuire and 
Champagne et al (2003) 
8.18 Extent of budgetary slack in 
the organisation 
Boyne (2003a), Andrews, Boyne and 
Walker et al (2003), Andrews, Boyne and 
Law et al (2005) 
F. Stakeholders and Partnerships 
9.1 Outsourced any central 
services  
Grace, Fletcher and Martin et al (2007), 
Marchington, Cooke and Hebson (2003), 
Dunsire, Hartley and Parker (1991), 
Vangen and Huxham (2004), Entwistle 
(2005), Stewart (1993), Greenwood and 
Wilson (1994) 
9.2 Outsourced any customer 
services  
As 9.1 
9.3 Strategic partnership with 
provider of many services  
As 9.1 
9.4 Government supportive of 
organisation 
Enticott, Walker and Boyne et al (2002), 
Entwistle and Laffin (2005), Marr and 
Creelman (2009), Paton (2003), Carter, 
Danford and Howcroft et al (2011), 
Cabinet Office (2001), Hartley and Allison 
(2000), Cabinet Office/HM Customs and 
Excise (2001), Vincent-Jones (1999), 
Bowerman, Francis and Ball et al (2002), 
Audit Commission (2000c)  
9.5 Inspectors supportive of 
organisation 
As 9.4 
9.6 External auditors supportive 
of organisation 
As 9.4 
9.7 Views of organisation 
employees formally collected  
Drucker (1955), Guha, Grover and 
Kettinger et al (1997), Fisher (1990), 
Zakuan, Yusof and Laosirihongthong et al 
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(2010), Skelcher (1992), Tortosa, Moliner 
and Sánchez (2008), Lings and Greenley 
(2009), Gyan-Baffour (1999), Summers 
and Hyman (2005), Entwistle, Dowson and 
Law (2003), Enticott, Walker and Boyne et 
al (2002), Improvement and Development 
Agency (2003, 2005) 




9.9 Extent internal audit 
involvement in performance 
management  
Steccolini (2004), Boland and Fowler 
(2000) 
9.10 Extent use of external audit 
to improve performance 
management 
As 9.4 
9.11 Extent of use consultants in 
centre  
As 9.1 
9.12 Extent use of inspection 
improves performance at service 
delivery  
Department of Transport, Local 
Government and the Regions (2001), 
Department for Communities and Local 
Government (2006), Andrews, Boyne and 
Law et al (2003), Enticott, Walker and 
Boyne et al (2002), Entwistle, Dowson and 
Law (2003), Downe, Grace and Martin et 
al (2007) 
9.13 Extent of use consultants in 
services  
As 9.1 
9.14 Extent of involvement of 
external stakeholders in 
authority  
Rouse (1999), Walker, Brewer and Boyne 
et al (2011), Schuler and Jackson (2014), 
Smith (1988), Sundaram and Kasabov 
(2012), Gregory (2003), Simmons (2003), 
Boyne, Gould-Williams and Law et al 
(1998) 
9.15 Level of engagement with 
inspectors  
As 9.5, 9.12 
9.16 Level of engagement with 
central government  
As 9.4 
9.17 Level of engagement with 
professional organisations  
Lemieux-Charles, McGuire and 
Champagne et al (2003) 
9.18 Extent of use of internal 
networks by authority 
Walker, Andrews and Boyne et al (2010), 




9.19 Extent of use of external 
networks by authority  
As 9.18 
9.20 Extent of user (of services) 
consultation  
Walker and Boyne (2006), Andrews, 
Boyne and Walker (2011), Enticott, Walker 
and Boyne et al (2002) 
9.21 Transactions with citizens 
rather than relationships  
Game (2006) 
9.22 Extent to which 
stakeholders participate in 
performance management  
As 9.23, 9.24, 9.25 
9.23 Extent to which citizens 
participate in performance 
management  
Walker, Brewer and Boyne et al (2011), 
Andrews, Boyne and Walker (2011), 
Stipak (1979), Enticott, Walker and Boyne 
et al (2002), Game (2006) 
9.24 Extent partnerships 
fragmenting effort on 
performance management  
Sullivan, Downe and Entwistle et al (2006), 
Peck (2004), Skelcher and Mathur (2004), 
Huxham (2003), McMurray (2007) 
9.25 Extent partnerships making 
strategies more meaningful  
Morgan and Djebarni (2012), Wildridge, 
Childs and Cawthra et al (2004), Skelcher 
and Sullivan (2008), Vangen and Huxham 
(2004), Barton and Valero-Silva (2011), 
Entwistle (2014), Audit Commission 
(2002b) 
G. Communication 
10.1 Extent organisation's 
relationship with media is good  
Wall and Martin (2003), Franco and 
Bourne (2003), Cowling and Newman 
(1995) 
10.2 Extent communication on 
corporate/service planning   
As 10.1 
10.3 Extent of communication 
on service performance  
As 10.1 
10.4 Extent strategic direction 
widely communicated  
As 10.1 
10.5 Extent use of employees' 
knowledge in performance 
management  
As 10.1 
H. Reporting performance 
11.1 Performance reported on 
the organisation's Intranet  
HM Treasury (2001), Andrews and Van de 
Walle (2013), Boyne, Gould-Williams and 
Law et al (2002b), Boyne and Law (1991), 
Thompson (1995), Wall and Martin (2003), 
Audit Commission (2000c), Steccolini 
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(2004), Higgins, James and Roper (2004), 
Mack and Ryan (2004) 
11.2 Performance reported on 
the organisation's website   
As 11.1 
11.3 Extent publishing 
performance data detrimental 
As 11.1 
11.4 Extent publishing 
performance data internally  
As 11.1 
11.5 Extent publishing 
performance data externally  
As 11.1 
11.6 Feedback to internal 
stakeholders on strategy/ 
performance management  
As 11.1 
11.7 Feedback to external 
stakeholders on strategy/ 
performance management  
As 11.1 
I. Organisational culture 
12.1 Extent that the organisation 
is a learning organisation  
Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle (2010), 
Bourne and Franco-Santos (2010), 
Seddon and Brand (2008), Davis (1998), 
Tvorik and McGivern (1997), McAdam and 
O’Neill (2002) 
12.2 Extent to which a 
psychological contract exists 
between employees and 
organisation 
As 4.5 
12.3 Extent to which high 
degree of mutual trust between 
parts of the organisation 
Bourne, Franco-Santos and Pavlov et al 
(2008), Farndale, Hope-Hailey and Kelliher 
(2011) 
12.4 Extent to which decision 
making is by consensus  
Vedung (1997), Seddon (2003), 
Improvement and Development Agency 
(2003 and 2005) 
12.5 Extent to which 
organisation has a blame culture 
Kangis, Gordon and Williams (2000), 
Chew and Sharma (2005), Lawson, Hatch 
and Desroches (2013), Williams (2002), 
Boyne, Gould-Williams and Law et al 
(2000a), Marchington, Cooke and Hebson 
(2003), Osborne and Cowen (2002) 
12.6 Extent to which 





12.7 Extent to which 
organisation has good relation 
trade unions 
As 4.21 
12.8 Level of 'good' ethical 
behaviour  
Winstanley and Stuart-Smith (1996), 
Gregory (2003), Stanwick and Stanwick 
(2003), Adserà (2003) 
12.9 Extent to which employee's 
level in organisation determines 
contribution  
Paton (2003), Watson (2001), Gyan-
Baffour (1999), Improvement and 
Development Agency (2003), McDonald 
and Smith (1995), Latham and Locke 
(1979) 
12.10 Extent to which 
employee's role determined by 
job description  
As 12.9 
12.11 Extent to which 
organisation driven by 
achievement of targets  
Pollitt (2000), Seddon (2003), Bevan and 
Hood (2006), Bevan (2006), Seddon and 
Brand (2008), Boyne and Gould-Williams 
(2003), Enticott, Walker and Boyne et al 
(2002) 
12.12 Extent to which people 
come first in organisation 
As 4.35, 4.40, 4.41 
12.13 Extent to which 
organisation encourages taking 
initiative  
Improvement and Development Agency 
(2003) 
12.14 Extent to which officers 
and politicians have distinct and 
clear roles  
Aucoin (2012), Fenwick and Miller (2012) 
12.15 Extent to which power lies 
more in centre than departments  
Kelman, Hong and Turbitt (2013) 
12.16 Level of employees' 
morale  
Entwistle and Downe (2005) 
12.17 Extent to which 
organisational position 
determines contribution in teams  
As 12.9, 12.10 
12.18 Extent to which 
organisation driven by rules 
As 4.12 
12.19 Extent to which 
organisation operates 
independently in provision of 
services  
As 4.1, 4.3 
12.20 Extent to which 




12.21 Extent to which 
organisation is results oriented  
As 12.11 
12.22 Extent of barriers to 
cooperation between service 
areas  
Bourne, Franco-Santos and Pavlov et al 
(2008) 
12.23 Extent of barriers to 
cooperation between centre and 
service areas  
As 12.22 
12.24 Extent service to public a 
high priority  
As 4.12 
12.25 Extent to which ideology 
drives organisation activities  
Hood (1991), Painter (1999), Jackson 
(1993) 
12.26 Extent to which 
management creates a 
supportive culture  
Bititci, Mendibil and Nudurupati et al 
(2006), Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle 
(2010), Franco and Bourne (2003), Kangis, 
Gordon and Williams (2000), Chew and 
Sharma (2005), Pandey. Coursey and 
Moynihan (2007), Lawson, Hatch and 
Desroches (2013), Den Hartog and 
Verburg (2004) 
12.27 Extent internal 
environment has impact on 
organisation's performance  
Bourne and Franco-Santos (2010), 
Rahman and Bullock (2005), Nandakumar, 
Ghobadian and O’Regan (2012) 
12.28 Extent external 
environment has impact on 
organisation's performance  
Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle (2010), 
Franco and Bourne (2003), Arikibe (2011), 
Zajac and Shortell (1989), Meier, O’Toole 
and Boyne et al (2007), Boyne and Meier 
(2009), Andrews, Boyne and Meier et al 
(2009) 
12.29 Extent of learning from 
other similar organisations 
Ashworth, Boyne and Entwistle (2010), 
Bourne and Franco-Santos (2010), Woods 
and Grubnic (2008), Kloot and Martin 
(2000), Davis (1998), Lambert and 
Ouedraogo (2008), Rashman, Downe and 
Hartley (2005), Tvorik and McGivern (1997) 
12.30 Extent of learning from 
private sector  
As 12.29 
12.31 Extent of learning from 
voluntary sector  
As 12.29 
12.32 Extent of inclination for 
experimentation within 
organisation  
As 4.10, 4.11 
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12.34 Extent of 
misrepresentation of financial 
information 
As 5.47 
12.35 Extent performance 
management sympathetic with 
organisational culture  
Lawton, McKevitt and Millar (2000), 
Pratchett and Leach (2003), Joyce (2004), 
Noordegraaf and Abma (2003), Franco and 
Bourne (2003), Masterson and Taylor 
(1996), Watson (2001), Williams (2002), 
Winstanley and Stuart-Smith (1996), Chang 
and Ku (2009) 
J. Organisational profile Kernaghan (2000), Kernaghan, Marson and 
Borins (2000) 
CONTENT ANALYSIS Atinkemer, Chaturvedi and Kondareddy 
(1998), Koys (2000), Montabon, Sroufe and 
Narasimham (2007), Chew and Sharma 
(2005), Labroukos, Lioukas and Chambers 
(1995), McClelland, Liang and Barker 
(2010), Osborne, Stubbart and 
Ramaprasad (2001) 
CORRELATION Andrews, Boyne and Walker et al (2003), 
Shrivastava, Mohanty and Lakhe (2006), 
Meier and O’Toole (2002), Gani and 
Jermias (2012), Andrews, Boyne and 
Walker (2006), Gelade and Ivery (2003) 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT 
ANALYSIS 
Shrivastava, Mohanty and Lakhe (2006), 













UNIVERSITY OF TEESSIDE 
 
CRITERIA AND CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH 
PERFORMING ORGANISATIONS 
 
Background: This questionnaire is the key element of a 3 year research project 
(as part of a part-time PhD at Teesside University) looking at the criteria and 
characteristics that may be associated with high performance, in particular the 
impact of management approaches such as (Total) Quality Management, the 
Excellence Model and the Balanced Scorecard. This research builds on that 
undertaken with local authorities in 2005 utilising the results of the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) which is now extended to other 
local statutory organisations.  
  
Purpose: The aim of the research is to investigate the criteria/characteristics that 
may be responsible for organisations being high performing and successful in 
delivering services to their local communities and the role, if any, that 
performance management plays in this.  
 
Participation: This questionnaire has been circulated to the 4 scored 
organisations (top-tier council, primary care trust, fire and rescue service and 
police force) of each LSP in England to be completed by the Chief Executive or 
an officer (with at least five years’ experience in a senior position) selected by 
him or her from a central unit that deals with policy and/or performance 
management issues. Although the questionnaire appears lengthy it is specifically 
designed to collect data on all the principal characteristics that may impact on 
organisational performance and will therefore provide data of practical value. It 
should take about 45 minutes to complete. 
 
Confidentiality: No organisation will be individually identified unless specific 
consent has been given by ticking the appropriate box and signing and dating in 
the requisite place later in this questionnaire. 
 
Availability of results: A summary of the overall results of the research will be 
supplied in each of the 3 years to organisations that have requested a summary 
by indicating so in the appropriate place.  
 
Any Questions: Thank you for your valued input and please don’t hesitate to 
contact me (details are at the bottom of the form) if you have any questions or 
concerns or would like to discuss the research further.  
 
Instructions: Please indicate your response by placing a cross (X) in the 
appropriate box. Some statements are in the form of a question requiring a 
Yes/No response and these are at the beginning of each section, if applicable.  
Most questions ask you for your opinion as to the extent to which you think that 
certain criteria or characteristics are rated High or Low in your organisation. A 
score of 6 means that the criterion or characteristic is present to a high level 
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whilst a score of 1 means that it is present to a low level. Please only mark one 
box for each statement and do not straddle two boxes. There are separate 
instructions for completion of the organisational profile that is the first section of 
this questionnaire. Please return the completed questionnaire by DD MM  YYYY. 
 
 
PLEASE STATE ORGANISATION:  
____________________________________ 
 






The chart on the next page (after Kernaghan, 2000) is designed measure the 
organisation’s profile with respect to the level of bureaucracy. Please mark a 
cross on the chart against each of the range of characteristics where you think 
the organisation is now. For example as shown below if you think that the 
organisation is totally Organisation Centred rather than Citizen Centred then you 




      
Example A X          Example A1 
Example B  X         Example B1 
Example C    X       Example C1 
 
 





























PLEASE COMPLETE THIS SECTION 
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(quality service 
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financed if 


















SECTION A: STRATEGY/POLICY/FINANCE/HRM 
 
No. Criteria/Characteristic Yes  No 
4.1 Does the organisation have a written corporate 
strategy/plan with top-level objectives tied into a community 
strategy/plan? 
  
4.2 Does the organisation have written (not necessarily 
published) service plans covering every service? 
  
4.3 Does the organisation have a corporate strategy that is fully 
planned in advance involving stakeholders? 
  
4.4 Does the organisation have an agreed formal mission/vision 
statement that is widely published? 
  
4.5 Does the organisation have a formal published 
Organisational Development Strategy (ODS)?  
  
4.6 Has the organisation produced (not necessarily published) a 
medium term financial plan (MTFP)? 
  
4.7 Does the organisation have an organisation-wide 
(corporate) training programme that includes management 
(not just the professions)? 
  
4.8 Does the organisation undertake reviews utilising work 
measurement techniques? 
  
4.9 Has the organisation taken part in a “peer review” process?   
 
                                                                     High----------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
4.10 The level of innovation in the  
organisation’s approach to 
service delivery 
      
4.11 The level of innovation in the 
organisation’s approach to 
service planning 
      
4.12 The extent to which effectiveness 
is regarded as more important 
than efficiency in the organisation 
      
4.13 The extent to which 
organisational values are widely 
discussed and agreed within the 
organisation 
      
4.14 The extent to which training is 
considered to improve the 
organisation’s performance 
      
4.15 The extent to which political 
issues are considered to ‘blow’ 
the organisation’s strategy off 
course 
      
 
 





                                                                       High-------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
4.16 The extent to which the 
organisation has a top-down 
approach to strategic 
(corporate/service) planning 
      
4.17 The extent to which the 
organisation has central 
policy/performance management 
direction 
      
4.18 The extent to which the corporate 
strategy/plan is linked to the 
community strategy/plan 
      
4.19 The extent to which the 
organisation thinks strategically 
      
4.20 The extent to which the 
organisation implements service 
developments/ initiatives in a 
strategic manner 
      
4.21 The extent to which the active 
management of  human 
resources and formal HRM 
policies exist within the 
organisation 
      
4.22 The level of front-line employee 
involvement in service planning 
      
4.23 The level of departmental 
involvement in the development 
of service planning 
      
4.24 The level of departmental 
involvement in doing service 
planning 
      
4.25 The extent to which community 
priorities are fed into plans and 
services 
      
4.26 The extent to which strategies 
and plans at various levels are 
linked together  
      
4.27 The extent to which the budget is 
linked to the organisation’s 
priorities 
      
                                                        
4.28 
The extent to which the
organisation plans for the short 
(<3 years), medium (3-5 years) 
and long-term (>5 years) as a 
package 
      
4.29 The extent to which policy 
decisions in the organisation are 
based on evidence 
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                                                                     High-------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
4.30 The extent to which the 
organisation practices formal risk 
management with a written risk 
register 
      
4.31 The extent of organisational slack 
(spare capacity) in central 
functions of the organisation 
      
4.32 The extent of organisational slack 
(spare capacity) in service 
departments 
      
4.33 The extent to which budgets are 
devolved to departments 
      
4.34 The extent to which delegation is 
practised within the organisation 
      
4.35 The level of responsiveness of 
the organisation to users of 
services 
      
4.36 The extent to which employee’s 
goals are aligned with 
organisation 
      
4.37 The extent to which the 
organisation is citizen centred 
      
4.38 The extent to which the 
organisation is budget driven 
      
4.39 The extent to which the 
organisation is regarded as 
competitive in terms of 
achievement, e.g. competing for 
awards 
      
4.40 The extent to which the 
organisation focuses on 
customers 
      
4.41 The extent to which the 
organisation focuses on 
employees 
      
4.42 The extent to which the 
organisation focuses on service 
provision 
      
4.43 The extent to which performance 
management is focused on group 
processes rather than the 
individual 
      
4.44 The extent to which service 
planning is optimum – more will 
produce diminishing returns 
      
4.45 The extent to which probity is 
valued in the organisation 
      
4.46 The extent to which the 
organisation gives value for 
money 




                                                                        High-------------------------Low 
                                           
No. 
Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
4.47 The extent to which aims and 
objectives are shared across the 
organisation 
      
4.48 The extent of the separation 
between strategy (policy) making 
and implementation   
      
4.49 The extent to which the 
organisation focuses on ’ends’ 
(what) rather than ‘means’ (how) 
in service delivery or ‘What 
matters is what works’ 
      
4.50 The extent to which the concept 
of critical success factors (CSF) 
including key PIs are used in the 
management of the organisation’s 
performance 
      
4.51 The extent to which human 
resource management (HRM) is 
important for organisational 
performance 
      
4.52 The extent to which management 
reviews (carried out by the 
organisation’s staff or 
consultants)  have resulted in 
service improvements in the 
organisation 
      
4.53 The extent to which employee 
incentives are financial 
      
4.54 The extent to which team and 
individual goals are aligned to 
strategy  
      
4.55 The extent to which the aims and 
objectives of the corporate body 
and service providers are linked 
and aligned 
      
 
 
SECTION B: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
  
No. Criteria/Characteristic Yes  No 
5.1 Does the organisation use proprietary Performance 
Management software? 
 
If ‘Yes’ please state which: 
  
B57  Collect all Quality of Life indicators   
5.3 Does the organisation use the EFQM ‘Excellence 
Model’ (or a variant)? 
  
5.4 Does the organisation use the Balanced Scorecard 





No. Criteria/Characteristic Yes  No 
5.5 Does the organisation use Total Quality Management 
(TQM)? 
  
5.6 Does the organisation use Benchmarking?   
5.7 Does the organisation use management by objectives 
(MBO)? 
  
5.8 Does the organisation use strategy mapping (linking 
up objectives)? 
  
5.9 Does the organisation use corporate planning?   
5.10 Does the organisation use outcome/results based 
accountability (O(R)BA)? 
  
5.11 Does the organisation use any other techniques for 
managing/improving performance? Please list all that 







5.13 Does the organisation hold Investors in People 
status? 
i) whole organisation 
 
ii) part(s) of the organisation. Please state 





5.15 Does the organisation hold any performance-based 
awards, for example Beacon? Please list all that are 




5.17 Does the organisation have quality accreditation (ISO 
9000 or equivalent)? 
  
5.18 Does the organisation have team-based appraisal (in 
addition to individual employee appraisal)? 
  
5.19 Are managers in the organisation formally appraised 
by their subordinates (upward appraisal or 360 degree 
appraisal)?  
  
5.20 Would performance management exist in the 
organisation to the extent that it does if not for central 
government requirements? 
  
5.21 Does a range of meaningful (performance) indicators 
exist in the organisation (excluding the statutory 
national set)? 
  
5.22 Does the organisation have performance related pay 
(PRP) for senior managers (Chief Executive and 
Directors)? 
  
B69 Does the organisation have performance related pay 
(PRP) for other senior managers? 
  
5.23 Does the organisation have performance-related pay 





No. Criteria/Characteristic Yes  No 
5.24 In the organisation is appraisal linked to financial 
reward? 
  
5.25 Is the organisation’s appraisal competency based?   
5.26 In the organisation does the performance 
management system/framework produce sufficient 
timely performance information? 
  
5.27 Does performance management increase the 
organisation’s accountability to the citizen? 
  
5.28 Does performance management increase the 
organisation’s accountability to central government? 
  
5.29 Is performance management in the organisation too 
complicated? 
  
5.30 Does the organisation manage the performance of 
professionals in the organisation 
  
5.31 Does the organisation have too many (performance) 
indicators?  
  
5.32 Are targets that are set by the organisation generally 
ambitious? 
  
5.33 Does the organisation have a range of qualitative 
(soft) indicators as well as quantitative (hard) 
indicators? 
  




                                            
                                                             High----------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
5.35 The extent to which the 
organisation has an innovative 
approach to performance 
management  
      
5.36 The extent to which the 
organisation approach to 
performance management is ‘top-
down’ 
      
5.37 The level of departmental 
involvement in the development 
of  performance management 
systems 
      
5.38 The level of departmental 
involvement in running 
performance management 
      
5.39 The adequacy of systems for 
collecting national (performance) 
indicators 
      
5.40 The comprehensiveness of the 
organisation’s set of local 
(performance) indicators 
      
5.41 The extent of employee rewards 
for good performance 
      
5.42 The extent of sanctions against 
employees for poor performance 




                                                                    High---------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
5.43 The extent to which performance 
is managed rather than just 
measured in the organisation 
      
5.44 The extent to which performance 
management in the organisation 
is an agent of change 
      
                                      
5.45 
The extent to which managers 
have access to sufficient good 
quality timely performance 
information to make decisions 
      
5.46 The extent to which Elected 
Members (democratic 
representatives) have access to 
sufficient good quality timely 
performance information to make 
decisions 
      
5.47 The extent to which performance 
management produces perverse 
incentives for the organisation 
(e.g. rewards for doing  activities 
that are not organisation’s 
priority)  
      
5.48 The extent to which performance 
management skews the 
organisation’s priorities  
      
5.49 The extent to which performance 
management measures the 
things that matter to the 
organisation 
      
5.50 The level of ‘game playing’ (doing 
things that are required by others 
rather than because they benefit 
the organisation or the services 
provided) in performance 
management (as regards 
external auditors and central 
government) 
      
5.51 The extent to which performance 
management is focused on 
learning 
      
5.52 The extent to which performance 
management is focused on 
qualitative measures 
      
5.53 The extent to which performance 
management is optimum – more 
will produce diminishing returns 
      
5.54 The extent to which 
organisational performance is 
rated more highly than other 
factors, such as local democracy 
or accountability to citizens 
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                                                            High---------------------------Low  
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
5.55 The extent to which performance 
is constrained by central 
government actions 
      
                
5.56 
The extent to which targets sub-
optimise performance in the 
organisation  
      
5.57 The extent to which performance 
management is an agent of 
accountability 
      
5.58 The extent to which performance 
management is integrated into 
strategy and processes 
      
5.59 The extent to which context is 
considered in the analysis of 
performance 
      
5.60 The extent to which the focus is 
on national indicators to the 
detriment of local indicators  
      
5.61 The extent to which the 
organisation focuses on what is 
measured rather than what 
matters locally 
      
5.62 The extent to which performance 
management has local political 
commitment 
      
5.63 The extent to which performance 
management has the 
commitment of the top level 
management team 
      
5.64 The extent to which effort is 
expended improving the accuracy 
of PIs rather than managing 
services 
      
5.65 The extent to which ‘Equity’ is a 
driver of service performance in 
the organisation  
      
5.66 The extent to which the ‘use’ 
stage (i.e. performance 
management actually being used 
by managers to improve 
performance) of performance 
management has been 
successful 
      
5.67 The extent to which techniques 
such as the EFQM and BSC are 
an integral part of strategic and 
operational planning within the 
organisation 
      
5.68 The extent to which strategy 
maps are used within the 
organisation 




SECTION C: ADMINISTRATION   
                                                              
                                                   High----------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
6.1 The level of centralisation of 
control within the organisation 
      
6.2 The level of centralisation of 
administration within the 
organisation 
      
6.3 The level of centralisation of 
service planning 
      
6.4 The level of centralisation of 
performance management 
      
6.5 The extent to which your 
organisation’s departments or 
component parts operate 
independently (often described 
as in ‘silos’) 
      
6.6 The consistency of the level of 
practices and routines throughout 
the organisation 
      
6.7 The extent to which the need for 
‘Control’ tends to subvert the 
‘Purpose’ of the activity  
      
6.8 The extent to which 
administrative policies and 
practice are based on evidence 
      
6.9 The extent to which governance 
needs are discussed within the 
organisation 




SECTION D: LEADERSHIP 
 
No. Criteria/Characteristic Yes  No 
7.1 Can the organisation be characterised as officer-led? 




                                                High---------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
7.2 The level of political leadership 
within the organisation 
      
7.3 The level of officer leadership 
within the organisation 
      
7.4 The level  of empowerment that 
officers have within the 
organisation 







SECTION E: RESOURCES 
 
No. Criteria/Characteristic Yes  No 
8.1 Are departmental under/overspends normally carried 
over, in whole or part, from one year to the next? 
  
8.2 Is the allocation of resources mainly formally 
determined by priorities? 
  
         
 
                                                                      High-----------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
8.3 The extent to which employees 
are well trained to perform their 
duties 
      
8.4 The general level of motivation 
displayed by employees  
      
8.5 The extent to which managers 
are overloaded with work 
      
8.6 The extent to which other 
employees are overloaded with 
work 
      
8.7 The amount of resources 
deployed at the corporate centre 
(policy/performance 
management) 
      
8.8 The use of ICT in the 
organisation 
      
8.9 The level of research capacity 
within the Organisation (or where 
joint arrangements are available 
that are paid for en block in 
advance) 
      
8.10 The adequacy of the level of 
resources to do performance 
management at the centre 
      
8.11 The adequacy of the level of 
resources to do performance 
management in service 
departments 
      
8.12 The extent to which information is 
available for corporate/service 
planning 
      
8.13 The quality of physical 
infrastructure (buildings, 
decoration, furnishings, etc.) 
      
8.14 The extent to which employee 
creativity is harnessed 
      
8.15 The extent to which strategic 
capacity in the organisation is 
overloaded 





                                                                       High-----------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
8.16 The extent to which operational 
capacity in the organisation is 
overloaded 
      
8.17 The extent to which policy 
analysis capacity in the 
organisation is overloaded 
      
8.18 The extent of budgetary slack 
within the organisation 
      
 
 
SECTION F: STAKEHOLDERS AND PARTNERSHIPS 
 
No. Criteria/Characteristic Yes  No 
9.1 Has the organisation outsourced any central services 
(e.g. HR, finance)? 
  
9.2 Has the organisation outsourced any customer 
services (e.g. refuse collection, highways 
maintenance, vehicle maintenance)? 
  
9.3 Does the organisation have a strategic partnership(s) 
with a provider of many services? 
  
9.4 Is the Government supportive of your organisation?   
9.5 Are inspectors supportive of your organisation?   
9.6 Are the external auditors supportive of your 
organisation? 
  
9.7 Are the views of organisation employees formally 
collected? 
  
9.8 Are the views of Elected Members (democratic 




                                                                       High--------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
9.9 The extent of internal audit 
involvement in performance 
management 
      
9.10 The extent of the use of external 
audit involvement in improving 
the organisation’s performance 
management 
      
9.11 The extent of the use of 
consultants in the centre (policy/ 
performance management) 
      
9.12 The extent to which external 
inspection improves the 
performance of the organisation 
at delivering services 
      
9.13 The extent of the use of 
consultants in services 
      
9.14 The extent of the involvement of 
stakeholders in organisation 
business 
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                                                                      High--------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
9.15 The level of engagement with 
inspectors 
      
9.16 The level of engagement with 
central government 
      
9.17 The level of engagement with 
professional organisations (e.g. 
CIPFA) 
      
9.18 The extent of the use of internal 
networks within the organisation 
      
9.19 The extent of the use of external 
networks by the organisation 
      
9.20 The extent of user (of services) 
consultation 
      
9.21 The extent to which the 
organisation has transactions 
with citizens rather than 
relationships 
      
9.22 The extent to which stakeholders 
participate in performance 
management 
      
9.23 The extent to which citizens 
participate in performance 
management 
      
9.24 The extent to which partnerships 
are fragmenting effort on 
performance management 
      
9.25 The extent to which partnerships 
(including the LSP) are making 
the development of the 
organisation’s strategies more 
meaningful 
      
 
 
SECTION G: COMMUNICATION 
                       
                                                                      High----------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
10.1 The extent to which the  
organisation’s relationship with 
the media is good 
      
10.2 The level of communication on 
corporate/service planning with 
the organisation’s employees 
      
10.3 The level of communication on 
service performance with the 
organisation’s employees 






                                                                    High----------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
10.4 The extent to which the strategic 
direction of the organisation is 
widely communicated to 
employees 
      
10.5 The extent of the use of 
employees’ knowledge in 
performance management 
      
 
 
SECTION H: REPORTING PERFORMANCE 
 
No. Criteria/Characteristic Yes  No 
11.1 Is the organisation’s performance reported on the 
(internal) intranet? 
  




                                                  High----------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
11.3 The extent to which the 
publishing of performance data 
has been detrimental to the 
organisation 
      
11.4 The extent of publishing/reporting 
performance information – 
internally 
      
11.5 The extent of publishing/reporting 
performance information – 
externally 
      
11.6 The extent of feedback to internal 
stakeholders on strategy and 
performance management 
      
11.7 The extent of feedback to 
external stakeholders on strategy 
and performance management 




SECTION I: ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
 
                                                   High---------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
12.1 The extent to which the 
organisation is a learning 
organisation 







                                                                      High---------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
12.2 The extent to which an 
agreement exists between the 
organisation and its employees 
(other than the formal contract 
of employment) such that there 
are considered to be additional 
obligations and commitments 
on both sides, often known as a 
psychological contract and often 
embodied in an organisational 
development strategy (ODS) 
      
12.3 The extent to which there is a 
high degree of mutual trust and 
dependency between the 
different parts of the 
organisation 
      
12.4 The extent to which decision 
making in the organisation is 
largely by consensus 
      
12.5 The extent to which the 
organisation has a blame 
culture 
      
12.6 The extent to which 
management create a sense of 
urgency within the organisation 
      
12.7 The extent to which the 
organisation has good relations 
with the trades unions 
      
12.8 The level of ‘good’ ethical 
behaviour both within the 
organisation and externally 
      
12.9 The extent to which the level of 
an employee in the organisation 
determines their perceived 
contribution 
      
12.10 The extent to which an 
employee’s role is defined by 
their job description  
      
12.11 The extent to which the 
organisation is driven by the 
achievement of targets  
      
12.12 The extent to which people 
come first in the organisation  
      
12.13 The extent to which taking the 
initiative is encouraged in the 
organisation 
      
12.14 The extent to which officers and 
politicians have distinct and 
clear roles  





                                                              High---------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
12.15 The extent to which power lies 
more at the centre than in 
service departments 
      
12.16 The level of employee morale       
12.17 The extent to which the position 
of an employee determines their 
contribution to work teams 
      
12.18 The extent to which the 
organisation is driven by rules 
      
12.19 The extent to which 
organisation operates 
independently (of other 
organisations) in the provision 
of services 
      
12.20 The extent to which the 
organisation is change oriented 
      
12.21 The extent to which the 
organisation is results oriented 
      
12.22 The extent of barriers to co-
operation between different 
service areas 
      
12.23 The extent of barriers to co-
operation between centre and 
service areas 
      
12.24 The extent to which service to 
the public is a high priority  
      
12.25 The extent to which ideology 
drives organisation activities 
      
12.26 The extent to which 
management creates a 
supportive culture 
      
12.27 The extent to which the internal 
environment has a significant 
impact on the organisation’s 
performance 
      
12.28 The extent to which the external 
environment has a significant 
impact on the organisation’s 
performance 
      
12.29 The extent of learning from 
other local authorities 
      
12.30 The extent of learning from the 
private sector 
      
12.31 The extent of learning from the 
voluntary sector 
      
12.32 The extent of the inclination for 
experimentation within the 
organisation 
      
12.33 The extent of misleading use of 
performance information by the 
organisation 
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                                                   High---------------------------Low 
No. Criteria/Characteristics 6 5 4 3 2 1 
12.34 The extent of misleading use of 
financial information (creative 
accounting) by the organisation 
      
12.35 The extent to which 
performance management is 
sympathetic with the 
organisational culture 
      
 
 











(Please continue on a separate sheet and attach to the questionnaire if 
necessary) 
 
If you consent to your organisation being quoted by way of example or illustration 
in the research reports please place a cross in the box below and place your 




  _____________________________________ (signature) 
 
  _____________________________________  (designation) 
 
 
If you would like a summary of the results when available please insert your 
name and address below. I will send by e-mail if you include your e-mail address. 
 
Name:      __________________________________________ 
 
Address:  __________________________________________ 
 
     __________________________________________ 
 
                __________________________________________ 
    
               
E-mail:     __________________________________________ 
 
Please return the completed form by DD MM YYYY. Please feel free to submit 
any additional comments that you feel may be of relevance to this research. I 
hope that you have found taking part interesting and have indicated that you 




David Goodchild, Policy Advisor, Chief Executive’s Department, Darlington 
Borough Council, Town Hall, Feethams, Darlington. DL1 5QT (Tel: 01325 
388015, E-mail: david.goodchild@darlington.gov.uk) 
 


























































5  4  3  2  1  0  
1  Mission/Vision statement              
2  Selection of Local Performance 
Indicators  
(LPIs)  
            
3  Inclusion of national Quality of Life  
(QoL) indicators  
            
4  Inclusion of other PI sets               
5  Clear structure (Intro-Strategy-Past 
Year-Future Years-Tabulations)  
            
6  Objectives clearly shown              
7  Prioritisation evident              
8  Level of analysis evident              
9  Link to Corporate Plan/Strategy              
10  Link to Community Plan/Strategy              
11  Introduction from Leader/Chief 
Executive  
            
12  Comparative data              
13  Reasons for variances              
14  PIs ordered by aims/objectives              
15  Priority PIs indicated               
16  Financial statement              
17  Best Value Reviews              
18  Service Planning              
19  Performance Management Framework              
20  Review of strategies              
21  Organisational Development  
Strategy/Review  











Council BVPPs used in the research (with % score given indicated) 
CPA Rating  
Excellent  Good  Fair  Weak  Poor  





Lincolnshire (42%)  Bedfordshire 
(46%)  
NONE  







Durham (64%)  Oxfordshire (40%)  Staffordshire 
(24%)  
ONLY 2    
Nottinghamshire 
(50%)  
        
METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COUNCILS  
Gateshead 
(69%)  






Bury (39%)  Walsall (39%)  Oldham 
(52%)  
  
Wigan (38%)  Solihull (49%)  Wirral (60%)  Salford (68%)    
LONDON BOROUGH COUNCILS  
Bexley (83%)  Croydon (38%)  Barnet (65%)  Ealing (38%)  NONE  
Kensington &  
Chelsea (22%)  
Richmond-upon-
Thames (33%)  







Harrow (45%)  Hillingdon 
(26%)  
  
SHIRE DISTRICT COUNCILS  
Basingstoke & 
Deane (52%)  
Babergh (33%)  Adur (56%)  Berwick-upon 
Tweed (29%)  
Chester-le- 
Street (23%)  




Corby (25%)  Harlow (32%)  




Oswestry (49%)  Norwich (27%)  Tunbridge  






Preston (43%)  South Holland 
(37%)  





UNITARY COUNCILS  
Hartlepool 
(43%)  








Redcar &  
Cleveland (48%)  
Nottingham (19%)  Plymouth 
(33%)  













Telford &  
Wrekin (78%)  
West Berkshire 
(50%)  
      
Note that the percentage score is given and that authorities rated Excellent and Good did 
not have to fully comply with government guidance regarding the content of BVPPs. Also 
that there are other mechanisms available to ‘deliver' against some of the criteria used in 

































2005 Case Study Pro forma 
UNIVERSITY OF TEESSIDE 
 
There are a number of questions that aim to explore issues arising from the 
survey questionnaire sent to all principal English, Scottish and Welsh authorities 
(443) of which 220 or 49.66% were returned. The focus is on strategy, 
performance management and organisational culture. Please illustrate you 




A. Please tell me the extent to which you think the development of strategy 
and its implementation are important and practiced in the authority? 
 
 
B. Please tell me the extent to which you think performance management is 
integrated with service planning in the authority? 
 
 
C. Please tell me the extent to which you think performance management and 




D. Please tell me what you think the relationship is between Elected Members 
and officers and who tends to lead in the authority? 
 
 
E. Please tell me what you think about the level of resources in the authority 




F. Can you explain who is involved in performance management and service 
planning within the authority? 
 
 
G. How widely do you think performance is discussed and communicated 





H. Where, how and to whom is performance reported to in the authority? 
 
 
I. To what extent do you think the authority is a learning organisation and 
values experimentation? 
 
To what extent do you think there is a high degree of mutual trust 
between different parts of the authority? 
Do you think that there are any barriers between different service areas 
and the centre and service areas? 
 
 






and 6 (6 is 
high) 
5.58 Extent performance management 
integrated into strategy 0.405** 
 
4.40 Extent to which authority focuses on 
customers 0.407** 
 
4.20 Extent to which service developments 
are implemented strategically 0.409** 
 
4.39 Extent to which authority regarded as 
competitive in terms of achievement 0.411** 
 
12.3 Extent to which high degree of mutual 
trust between parts of the council 0.419** 
 
9.5 Extent to which inspectors are 
considered supportive of authority 0.422** 
 
4.42 Extent to which authority focuses on 
service provision 0.427** 
 
4.35 Extent of the responsiveness of the 
authority to service users 0.443** 
 
5.66 Extent to which 'use' stage of 
performance management is successful 0.445** 
 
4.26 Extent to which strategies and plans 




4.19 Extent that the authority thinks 
strategically 0.456** 
 
4.11 Level of innovation in service planning 0.464** 
 
4.46 Extent to which council gives value for 
money 0.468** 
 
4.10 Level of innovation in service delivery 0.469** 
 
4.29 Extent to which policy decisions based 
on evidence 0.493** 
 
** p<0.01 
                           
 
Organisation profile scores for 2005 by CPA Rating (Concept after 
Kernaghan, 2000) 
 <<<1 TO 10>>> 
CPA RATING Interview 
Response 
(Between 1 
and 10) Poor Weak Fair  Good  Excell All 
Organisation to 
Citizen Centred  4.33 6.15 6.63 7.07 9.22 6.88 
 
Position Power to 
Leadership 5.00 6.23 6.68 7.96 7.03 6.78 
 
Rule to People 




Collaboration 4.33 6.38 6.85 7.10 7.27 6.96 
 
Status Quo to 
Change 




Orientated 6.00 6.15 6.59 6.84 6.78 6.67 
 
Centralised to 










Revenue Driven 3.67 5.23 5.43 5.50 5.61 5.45 
 
Monopolistic to 




























2012/13 Interview Questions Pro forma 
 
1. Background and introduction to the study 
 
1.1. Research to date 
1.2. Usefulness to organisations 
1.3. Plans for completion 
 
2. Purpose of the interview 
 
2.1. How the case studies fit into the research 
2.2. Request permission to name organisation 
2.3. Request permission to use quotes/name and/or job title 
2.4. Anonymity guaranteed if requested 
2.5. Offer write-up to check for accuracy 
 
3. Review organisation’s performance as assessed by 
auditors/inspectors/regulators since 2005 
 
3.1. History of performance as measured by CPA/CAA 
3.2. Organisation/service reports 
3.3. Corporate Assessment reports 
 
4. Questions on past performance management 
 
4.1. What do you think were the key determinants of your 
organisation’s performance from 2005 up to mid-2010? 
 
4.2. Are these the same as prior to 2005? (CPA from 2002 to the CPA 
Harder Test 2005) 
 
4.3. What changed to impact performance over this period? 
 
4.4. What was important in terms of organisation structure, resources, 
leadership and so on? 
 
4.5. Did the organisation make deliberate efforts to improve any aspect 
of performance? If so what and how? Was it successful? If so how was it 




4.6. To what extent did the national framework determine performance 
management (practice, processes, staffing, reporting, etc.) in your organisation? 
(BV from 1997, CPA 2002, CPA Harder Test 2005, CAA 2009) 
 
4.7. What do you think was important about the framework? And the 
way it evolved? 
 
4.8. What do you think were its advantages? 
 
4.9. What do you think were its disadvantages? 
 
4.10. In what way did partnership working evolve from 2005 onwards? 
 
4.11. And what were the practical consequences of this? 
 
4.12. Did partnership working change when CAA replaced CPA? If so 
how and why?  
 
4.13. Did the change from CPA2002 to CPA2005 (the Harder Test) then 
to CAA have any impact on performance management? If so what and how?  
 
4.14. Did you report performance to elected representatives, the 
executive, scrutiny, partners, and the public? How was this done? 
 
 
5. Questions on future performance management 
 
5.1. How did the abolition of the national framework for performance 
management affect your organisation? 
 
5.2. What are the specifics? 
 
5.3. Has the reduction of external audit been evident? If so with what 
consequences? 
 
5.4. Has the reduction of inspection been evident? If so with what 
consequences? 
 
5.5. Do you use the single data list? 
 




5.7. How do you think your organisation’s performance has varied, if at 
all, since the framework’s demise? 
 
5.8. Do you think that the abolition of the Audit Commission will have 
an impact? Has it already? What is this impact? 
 
5.9. How do you measure and manage the organisation’s performance now? 
 
5.10. Do you report performance to elected representatives, the 
executive, scrutiny, partners, and the public? How is this done? 
 
5.11. How do you think performance management will develop in your 
organisation up to 2015? And beyond?  
 
5.12. What do you think the key drivers for this are? 
 
 
6. Anything else 
 
6.1. Do you have anything else to add? 
 
 
Thank you and close 
 





Comparison of the means for the first batch of responses received with those 
received after the reminder letter for the 2005 survey 
STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
4.1 Written corporate strategy with top 
objectives tied into community 
strategy (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.94 1.93 1.97 +0.04 
4.2 Written service plans (Yes = 2, 
No=1) 
1.96 1.95 1.97 +0.02 
4.3 Corporate strategy planned in 
advance with stakeholders (Yes = 2, 
No=1) 
1.78 1.78 1.78 0.00 
4.4 Agreed formal mission/ vision 
statement (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.93 1.91 1.97 +0.06 
4.5 Published organisational 
development strategy (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.31 1.30 1.34 +0.04 
4.6 Published medium term financial 
plan (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.95 1.95 1.94 -0.01 
4.7 Council wide (corporate) training 
programme that includes 
management (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.87 1.89 1.82 -0.07 
4.8 Reviews using work measurement 
(Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.47 1.49 1.44 -0.05 
4.9 Took part in I&DeA's local 
government improvement programme 
or equivalent (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.60 1.57 1.67 +0.10 
4.10 Level of innovation in service 
delivery (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.34 4.39 4.22 -0.17 
4.11 Level of innovation in service 
planning (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.22 4.24 4.18 -0.06 
4.12 Effectiveness more important 
than efficiency (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.01 3.98 4.09 +0.11 
4.13 Organisational values widely 
discussed (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.13 4.20 3.99 -0.21 
4.14 Extent to which training improves 
authority's performance (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 




STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
4.15 Political issues 'blow' strategy off 
course (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
2.78 2.68 3.00 +0.32 
4.16 Extent top-down approach to 
strategic planning (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.22 4.26 4.12 -0.14 
4.17 Central policy/ Best Value 
direction (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.58 4.57 4.60 +0.03 
4.18 Corporate strategy linked to 
community strategy (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 
4.89 4.90 4.85 -0.05 
4.19 Extent authority thinks 
strategically (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.60 4.62 4.55 -0.07 
4.20 Service developments 
implemented strategically (1 - Low to 
6 - High) 
4.26 4.30 4.16 -0.14 
4.21 Extent of active management of 
HRM (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.18 4.22 4.09 -0.11 
4.22 Extent of front-line employee 
involvement in service planning (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
3.56 3.59 3.51 -0.08 
4.23 Level of departmental 
involvement in service planning (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
4.55 4.56 4.53 -0.03 
4.24 Extent of departmental 
involvement in doing service planning 
(1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.82 4.83 4.67 -0.16 
4.25 Community priorities fed into 
plans (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.65 4.67 4.60 -0.07 
4.26 Strategies and plans linked 
together (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.45 4.49 4.37 -0.12 
4.27 Budget linked to priorities (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
3.90 4.64 4.45 -0.19 
4.28 Plan for short, medium and long 
term (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.17 4.14 4.22 +0.08 
4.29 Policy decisions based on 
evidence (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.18 4.16 4.23 +0.07 
4.30 Extent of formal risk 
management with written risk register 
(1 - Low to 6 - High) 




STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
4.31 Extent of organisational slack in 
central functions (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
1.82 1.80 1.86 +0.06 
4.32 Extent of organisational slack in 
service departments (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 
1.96 1.94 2.00 +0.06 
4.33 Budget devolved to departments 
(1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.85 4.78 5.02 +0.24 
4.34 Delegation practiced within 
authority (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.57 4.59 4.53 -0.06 
4.35 Extent of responsiveness of the 
authority to service users (1 - Low to 6 
- High) 
4.28 4.53 4.41 -0.12 
4.36 Employee's goals aligned with 
council's (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.28 4.33 4.17 -0.16 
4.37 Extent that authority is citizen 
centred (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.16 4.13 4.23 +0.10 
4.38 Authority is budget driven (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
4.49 4.38 4.74 +0.36 
4.39 Authority regarded as 
competitive in terms of achievement 
(1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.63 3.61 3.68 +0.07 
4.40 Extent to which authority focuses 
on customers (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.44 4.43 4.48 +0.05 
4.41 Authority focuses on employees 
(1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.99 4.07 3.94 -0.14 
4.42 Authority focuses on service 
provision (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.84 4.85 4.82 -0.03 
4.43 Extent performance 
management focused on group 
processes (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.21 4.19 4.26 +0.07 
4.44 Service planning is optimum (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
3.67 3.66 3.69 +0.03 
4.45 Extent to which probity is valued 
(1 - Low to 6 - High) 




STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
4.46 Extent to which council gives 
value for money (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.64 4.59 4.75 +0.16 
4.47 Aims and objectives shared 
across authority (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.72 4.75 4.65 -0.10 
4.48 Extent of separation between 
strategy and implementation (1 - Low 
to 6 - High) 
3.41 3.35 3.54 +0.19 
4.49 Extent of authority focus on 
'ends' rather than 'means' (1 - Low to 
6 - High) 
4.26 4.27 4.24 -0.03 
4.50 Extent to which critical success 
factors are used (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.38 4.37 4.39 +0.02 
4.51 Extent to which HRM is important 
for organisational performance (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
4.33 4.36 4.26 -0.10 
4.52 Extent to which Best Value 
reviews result in service improvement 
(1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.87 3.84 3.95 +0.11 
4.53 Extent to which employee 
incentives are financial (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 
2.33 2.30 2.42 +0.12 
4.54 Team/individual goals aligned to 
strategy (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.35 4.40 4.23 -0.17 
4.55 Aims/objectives corporate body 
and service providers linked (1 - Low 
to 6 - High) 
4.51 4.49 4.56 +0.07 
5.1 Use of proprietary performance 
management software (Yes = 2, 
No=1) 
1.43 1.45 1.39 -0.06 
B57 Collect all Quality of Life 
Indicators (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.44 1.41 1.50 +0.09 
5.3 Use EFQM Excellence Model or 
variant (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.32 1.34 1.28 -0.06 
5.4 Use Balanced Scorecard or 
variant (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.38 1.36 1.42 +0.06 
5.5 Use Total Quality Management 
(Yes = 2, No=1) 




STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
5.6 Use Benchmarking (Yes = 2, 
No=1) 
1.89 1.88 1.92 +0.04 
5.7 Use Management by Objectives 
(Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.29 1.26 1.37 +0.11 
5.8 Use strategy mapping (Yes = 2, 
No=1) 
1.50 1.46 1.60 +0.14 
5.18 Team based appraisal (Yes = 2, 
No=1) 
1.22 1.21 1.23 +0.02 
5.19 Managers formally appraised by 
subordinates (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.38 1.38 1.39 +0.01 
5.20 Performance management exist 
to extent if not for Best Value (Yes = 
2, No=1) 
1.71 1.71 1.71 0.00 
5.21 Extent to which meaningful 
indicators exist (excluding statutory) 
(Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.89 1.90 1.85 -0.05 
5.22 Performance related pay for 
Chief Executive/ Directors (Yes = 2, 
No=1) 
1.23 1.22 1.25 +0.03 
B69 Performance related pay for other 
senior managers (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.11 1.12 1.08 -0.04 
5.24 Appraisal linked to financial 
reward (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.17 1.15 1.23 +0.08 
5.25 Appraisal competency based 
(Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.60 1.57 1.68 +0.11 
5.26 Performance management 
produces sufficient timely information 
(Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.83 1.84 1.80 -0.04 
5.27 Performance management 
increase accountability to citizens 
(Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.72 1.69 1.79 +0.10 
5.28 Performance management 
increase accountability to central 
government (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.92 1.94 1.88 -0.06 
5.29 Performance management too 
complicated (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.23 1.24 1.18 -0.06 
5.30 Performance of professionals 
managed (Yes = 2, No=1) 




STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
5.31 Too many performance 
indicators (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.53 1.52 1.57 +0.05 
5.32 Are targets ambitious (Yes = 2, 
No=1) 
1.78 1.80 1.74 -0.06 
5.33 Range of qualitative and 
quantitative indicators (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.79 1.80 1.77 -0.03 
5.34 Performance management 
method of control (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.54 1.54 1.56 +0.02 
5.35 Innovative approach to 
performance management (1 - Low to 
6 - High) 
4.32 4.28 4.41 +0.13 
5.36 Approach to performance 
management top-down (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 
4.29 4.29 4.29 0.00 
5.37 Level of departmental 
involvement in developing 
performance management (1 - Low to 
6 - High) 
4.30 4.26 4.38 +0.12 
5.38 Level of departmental 
involvement in running performance 
management (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.58 4.52 4.72 +0.20 
5.39 Adequacy of systems for 
collecting national indicators (1 - Low 
to 6 - High) 
4.66 4.69 4.61 -0.08 
5.40 Comprehensiveness of set of 
local indicators (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.17 4.16 4.20 +0.04 
5.41 Extent of employee rewards for 
good performance (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 
2.41 2.38 2.47 +0.09 
5.42 Extent of sanctions against 
employees for poor performance (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
2.53 2.52 2.56 +0.04 
5.43 Extent performance managed 
not just measured (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 





STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
5.44 Extent performance 
management an agent of change (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
4.16 4.18 4.11 -0.07 
5.45 Extent managers have access to 
quality timely performance information 
(1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.22 4.25 4.15 -0.10 
5.46 Extent Members have access to 
quality timely performance information 
(1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.27 4.26 4.30 +0.04 
5.47 Extent performance 
management produces perverse 
incentives (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.08 3.00 3.29 +0.29 
5.48 Extent performance 
management skews authority 
priorities (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
2.84 2.78 2.98 +0.20 
5.49 Extent performance 
management measures things that 
matter (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.37 4.38 4.36 -0.02 
5.50 Level of game playing 
(auditors/government) (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 
3.49 3.45 3.59 +0.14 
5.51 Extent performance 
management focused on learning (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
3.58 3.55 3.65 +0.10 
5.52 Extent performance 
management focused on qualitative 
measures (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.55 3.48 3.71 +0.23 
5.53 Extent performance 
management is optimum (1 - Low to 6 
- High) 
3.32 3.31 3.32 +0.01 
5.54 Extent organisational 
performance rated more highly than 
democratic (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.74 3.77 3.66 -0.11 
5.55 External performance 
constrained by central government 
action (1 - Low to 6 - High) 





STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
5.56 Extent targets sub-optimise 
performance (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.13 3.07 3.28 +0.21 
5.57 Extent Performance 
management agent of accountability 
(1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.43 4.46 4.36 +0.10 
5.58 Extent performance 
management integrated into strategy 
(1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.49 4.52 4.42 -0.10 
5.59 Extent context is considered in 
analysis (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.48 4.51 4.41 -0.10 
5.60 Extent focus on national 
indicators to detriment of local 
indicators (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.77 3.74 3.83 +0.09 
5.61 Extent focus on what measured 
rather than what matters (1 - Low to 6 
- High) 
3.16 3.09 3.32 +0.23 
5.62 Extent performance 
management has local political 
commitment (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.18 4.34 4.12 -0.22 
5.63 Extent performance 
management has commitment top-
level management (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 
5.02 5.03 5.00 -0.03 
5.64 Extent effort spent improving 
accuracy PIs rather than managing 
services (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.22 3.21 3.26 +0.05 
5.65 Extent 'equity' a driver of service 
performance (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.68 3.65 3.77 +0.12 
5.66 Extent to which 'use' stage of 
performance management successful 
(1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.96 4.01 3.85 -0.16 
5.67 Extent EFQM/BSC integral part 
of strategic planning (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 
2.64 2.53 2.91 +0.38 
5.68 Extent strategy maps are used (1 
- Low to 6 - High) 
2.43 2.23 2.85 +0.62 
6.1 Level of centralisation of control (1 
- Low to 6 - High) 




STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
6.2 Level of centralisation of 
administration (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.33 3.39 3.30 -0.09 
6.3 Level of centralisation of service 
planning (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.21 3.22 3.21 -0.01 
6.4 Level of centralisation of 
performance management (1 - Low to 
6 - High) 
4.07 4.02 4.20 +0.18 
6.5 Extent to which council 
departments operate independently (1 
- Low to 6 - High) 
3.52 3.45 3.67 +0.22 
6.6 Consistency of the level of 
practices/routines (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.67 3.62 3.77 +0.15 
6.7 Extent to which need for 'control' 
tends to subvert 'purpose' (1 - Low to 
6 - High) 
3.06 2.99 3.22 +0.23 
6.8 Extent to which administrative 
policies and practices are evidence-
based (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.94 3.97 3.88 -0.09 
6.9 Extent to which governance needs 
are discussed (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.38 4.44 4.24 -0.20 
7.1 Authority characterised as officer 
led (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.45 1.45 1.45 0.00 
7.2 Level of political leadership in 
authority (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.41 4.40 4.45 +0.05 
7.3 Level of officer leadership in the 
authority (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.82 4.85 4.74 -0.11 
7.4 Level of empowerment of officers 
(1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.47 4.50 4.38 -0.12 
8.1 Departmental under/overspends 
carried over one year to next (Yes = 
2, No=1) 
1.38 1.38 1.38 0.00 
8.2 Allocation of resources formally 
determined by priorities (Yes = 2, 
No=1) 
1.78 1.79 1.77 -0.02 
8.3 Extent to which employees are 
well trained (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.39 4.38 4.39 +0.01 
8.4 Level of motivation displayed by 
employees (1 - Low to 6 - High) 




STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
8.5 Extent managers overloaded with 
work (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.49 4.47 4.53 +0.06 
8.6 Extent other employees are 
overloaded with work (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 
4.01 3.99 4.08 +0.09 
8.7 Amount of resources deployed at 
corporate centre (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.02 3.03 3.02 -0.01 
8.8 Use of ICT in the authority (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
4.56 4.65 4.37 -0.28 
8.9 Level of research capacity (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
3.03 3.02 3.06 +0.04 
8.10 Level of resources to do 
performance management at the 
centre (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.52 3.64 3.24 -0.40 
8.11 Level of resources to do 
performance management in service 
departments (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.40 3.41 3.37 -0.04 
8.12 Extent information available for 
corporate/ service planning (1 - Low to 
6 - High) 
4.22 4.22 4.23 +0.01 
8.13 Quality of authority's physical 
infrastructure (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.62 3.60 3.67 +0.07 
8.14 Extent employee creativity is 
harnessed (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.53 3.55 3.48 -0.07 
8.15 Extent strategic capacity is 
overloaded (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.25 4.27 4.20 -0.07 
8.16 Extent operational capacity is 
overloaded (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.13 4.09 4.24 +0.13 
8.17 Extent policy analysis capacity is 
overloaded (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.25 4.30 4.14 -0.16 
8.18 Extent of budgetary slack in the 
authority (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
1.94 2.05 1.71 -0.34 
9.1 Outsourced any central services 
(Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.21 1.21 1.22 +0.01 
9.2 Outsourced any customer 
services (Yes = 2, No=1) 




STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
9.3 Strategic partnership with provider 
of many services (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.39 1.38 1.42 +0.04 
9.4 Government supportive of 
authority (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.77 1.77 1.76 -0.01 
9.5 Inspectors supportive of authority 
(Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.83 1.84 1.81 -0.03 
9.6 External auditors supportive of 
authority (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.92 1.91 1.94 +0.03 
9.7 Views of council employees 
formally collected (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.83 1.81 1.86 +0.05 
9.8 Views of council Elected Members 
formally collected (Yes = 2, No=1) 
1.52 1.49 1.59 +0.10 
9.9 Extent internal audit involvement 
in performance management (1 - Low 
to 6 - High) 
3.57 3.53 3.68 +0.15 
9.10 Extent use of external audit to 
improve performance management (1 
- Low to 6 - High) 
3.93 3.87 4.09 +0.22 
9.11 Extent of use consultants in 
centre (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
2.45 2.36 2.65 +0.29 
9.12 Extent use of inspection 
improves performance at service 
delivery (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.95 3.92 4.03 +0.11 
9.13 Extent of use consultants in 
services (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.04 3.01 3.09 +0.08 
9.14 Extent of involvement of external 
stakeholders in authority (1 - Low to 6 
- High) 
3.89 3.79 4.13 +0.34 
9.15 Level of engagement with 
inspectors (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.48 4.42 4.62 +0.20 
9.16 Level of engagement with central 
government (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.88 3.81 4.05 +0.24 
9.17 Level of engagement with 
professional organisations (1 - Low to 
6 - High) 




STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
9.18 Extent of use of internal networks 
by authority (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.34 4.30 4.44 +0.14 
9.19 Extent of use of external 
networks by authority (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 
4.36 4.31 4.47 +0.16 
9.20 Extent of user (of services) 
consultation (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.31 4.32 4.29 -0.03 
9.21 Transactions with citizens rather 
than relationships (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.68 3.69 3.67 -0.02 
9.22 Extent to which stakeholders 
participate in performance 
management (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
2.93 2.93 2.92 -0.01 
9.23 Extent to which citizens 
participate in performance 
management (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
2.60 2.52 2.79 +0.27 
9.24 Extent partnerships fragmenting 
effort on performance management (1 
- Low to 6 - High) 
2.76 2.70 2.92 +0.22 
9.25 Extent partnerships making 
strategies more meaningful (1 - Low 
to 6 - High) 
4.06 4.05 4.08 +0.03 
10.1 Extent authority's relationship 
with media is good (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 
4.18 4.17 4.18 +0.01 
10.2 Extent communication on 
corporate/service planning  (1 - Low to 
6 - High) 
4.21 4.27 4.08 -0.19 
10.3 Extent of communication on 
service performance (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 
4.10 4.11 4.08 -0.03 
10.4 Extent strategic direction widely 
communicated (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.55 4.54 4.57 +0.03 
10.5 Extent use of employees' 
knowledge in performance 
management (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.70 3.66 3.71 +0.05 
11.1 Performance reported on the 
council's intranet (Yes = 2, No=1) 




STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
11.2 Performance reported on the 
council's website  (Yes = 2, No=1) 
4.41 4.40 4.45 +0.05 
11.3 Extent publishing performance 
data detrimental (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
2.06 2.01 2.17 +0.16 
11.4 Extent publishing performance 
data internally (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.91 3.88 3.98 +0.10 
11.5 Extent publishing performance 
data externally (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.61 3.61 3.62 +0.01 
11.6 Feedback to internal 
stakeholders on strategy/ 
performance management (1 - Low to 
6 - High) 
3.64 3.68 3.54 -0.14 
11.7 Feedback to external 
stakeholders on strategy/ 
performance management (1 - Low to 
6 - High) 
3.26 3.23 3.30 +0.07 
12.1 Extent that the authority is a 
learning organisation (1 - Low to 6 – 
High) 
4.05 4.07 3.98 -0.09 
12.2 Extent to which a psychological 
contract exists between employees 
and council (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
2.80 2.75 2.89 +0.14 
12.3 Extent to which high degree of 
mutual trust between parts of the 
council (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.94 3.99 3.83 -0.16 
12.4 Extent to which decision making 
is by consensus (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.99 4.05 3.85 -0.20 
12.5 Extent to which authority has a 
blame culture (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
2.75 2.68 2.92 +0.24 
12.6 Extent to which management 
create sense of urgency (1 - Low to 6 
- High) 
4.13 4.09 4.21 +0.12 
12.7 Extent to which authority has 
good relation trade unions (1 - Low to 
6 - High) 
4.49 4.47 4.55 +0.08 
12.8 Level of 'good' ethical behaviour 
(1 - Low to 6 - High) 




STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
12.9 Extent to which employee's level 
in organisation determines 
contribution (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.36 3.34 3.38 +0.04 
12.10 Extent to which employee's role 
determined by job description (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
3.88 3.81 3.98 +0.17 
12.11 Extent to which authority driven 
by achievement of targets (1 - Low to 
6 - High) 
4.12 4.14 4.08 -0.06 
12.12 Extent to which people come 
first in authority (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.93 3.95 3.89 -0.06 
12.13 Extent to which authority 
encourages taking initiative (1 - Low 
to 6 - High) 
4.12 4.17 4.00 -0.17 
12.14 Extent to which officers and 
politicians have distinct and clear 
roles (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.58 4.58 4.58 0.00 
12.15 Extent to which power lies more 
in centre than departments (1 - Low to 
6 - High) 
3.51 3.44 3.68 +0.24 
12.16 Level of employees' morale (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
3.99 3.92 4.01 +0.09 
12.17 Extent to which organisational 
position determines contribution in 
teams (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.35 3.34 3.36 +0.02 
12.18 Extent to which authority driven 
by rules (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.77 3.74 3.85 +0.11 
12.19 Extent to which authority 
operates independently in provision of 
services (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.61 3.55 3.73 +0.18 
12.20 Extent to which authority is 
change oriented (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.37 4.39 4.32 -0.07 
12.21 Extent to which authority is 
results oriented (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.41 4.44 4.35 -0.09 
12.22 Extent of barriers to 
cooperation between service areas (1 
- Low to 6 - High) 




STATEMENT All 1st 2nd Difference 
1st to 2nd  
12.23 Extent of barriers to 
cooperation between centre and 
service areas (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.00 2.98 3.06 +0.08 
12.24 Extent service to public a high 
priority (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
5.09 5.13 5.00 -0.13 
12.25 Extent to which ideology drives 
council activities (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
2.99 2.90 3.18 +0.28 
12.26 Extent to which management 
creates a supportive culture (1 - Low 
to 6 - High) 
4.30 4.34 4.20 -0.14 
12.27 Extent internal environment has 
impact on authority's performance (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
4.34 4.37 4.26 -0.11 
12.28 Extent external environment 
has impact on authority's 
performance (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.24 4.24 4.24 0.00 
12.29 Extent of learning from other 
authorities (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
4.00 4.01 4.00 -0.01 
12.30 Extent of learning from private 
sector (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
3.07 3.01 3.21 +0.20 
12.31 Extent of learning from 
voluntary sector (1 - Low to 6 - High) 
2.88 2.76 3.15 +0.39 
12.32 Extent of inclination for 
experimentation within authority (1 - 
Low to 6 - High) 
3.65 3.73 3.45 -0.28 
12.33 Extent of misrepresentation of 
performance information (1 - Low to 6 
- High) 
1.87 1.79 2.05 +0.26 
12.34 Extent of misrepresentation of 
financial information (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 
1.54 1.47 1.71 +0.24 
12.35 Extent performance 
management sympathetic with 
organisational culture (1 - Low to 6 - 
High) 
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partnership with 
provider of many 
services  




Summary of statistically significant statement correlations for all the 
surveys (X p<0.05, XX p<0.01. Shading shows the significance at these 





2009 (CPA) 2010 (CAA) 








XX XX        
9.6 External 
auditors supportive 
of organisation  
XX         




X         
9.8 Views of 
politicians formally 
collected 
X         




XX         




service delivery  
X         





XX         
9.15 Level of 
engagement with 
inspectors 
XX X        
9.16 Level of 
engagement with 
central government  
 X        




XX         








Summary of statistically significant statement correlations for all the 
surveys (X p<0.05, XX p<0.01. Shading shows the significance at these 





2009 (CPA) 2010 (CAA) 
 LA LA All Fire Police PCT All LA Fire 




XX         
9.20 Extent of user 
(of services) 
consultation  
XX         






XX         









more meaningful  




media is good  




planning   
XX X        









XX         





XX         
11.1 Performance 
reported on the 
organisation's 
Intranet 
X         
473 
 
Summary of statistically significant statement correlations for all the 
surveys (X p<0.05, XX p<0.01. Shading shows the significance at these 





2009 (CPA) 2010 (CAA) 















X    X     






XX         






XX         
12.1 Extent that 
the organisation is 
a learning 
organisation  
XX         







XX         
12.3 Extent to 
which high degree 
of mutual trust 
between parts of 
the organisation  
XX         
12.4 Extent to 
which decision 
making is by 
consensus  





Summary of statistically significant statement correlations for all the 
surveys (X p<0.05, XX p<0.01. Shading shows the significance at these 






2009 (CPA) 2010 (CAA) 
 LA LA All Fire Police PCT All LA Fire 
12.5 Extent to 
which organisation 
has a blame 
culture  
XX      X   
12.7 Extent to 
which organisation 
has good relation 
trade unions  
XX   X      
12.8 Level of 
'good' ethical 
behaviour  
XX      X  X 
12.10 Extent to 
which employee's 
role determined by 
job description  
    X     





XX         
12.12 Extent to 
which people 
come first in 
organisation  
XX         




XX         
12.14 Extent to 
which officers and 
politicians have 
distinct and clear 
roles  
XX      X X  
12.15 Extent to 
which power lies 
more in centre 
than departments  
  X X      
12.16 Level of 
employees' morale 
X X        
12.20 Extent to 
which organisation 
is change oriented  
XX   X      
12.21 Extent to 
which organisation 
is results oriented  




Summary of statistically significant statement correlations for all the 
surveys (X p<0.05, XX p<0.01. Shading shows the significance at these 






2009 (CPA) 2010 (CAA) 
 LA LA All Fire Police PCT All LA Fire 





XX         




and service areas  
XX         
12.24 Extent 
service to public a 
high priority  
XX         
12.29 Extent of 
learning from other 
authorities  
XX         
12.30 Extent of 
learning from 
private sector  
XX      X X  
12.31 Extent of 
learning from 
voluntary sector   
XX         
12.32 Extent of 
inclination for 
experimentation 
within organisation   
XX      X   




X         















Explanation for Appendices 5.2 to 5.32 
Appendices 5.2 to 5.32 contain the correlations between the statements in the 
survey questionnaire and organisational performance as assessed by the Audit 
Commission through the Comprehensive Performance Assessment. Correlations 
are shown for six organisation groups: local authorities in 2005, for all four 
organisation types combined in 2009 and then for each of the four organisation 
types separately. The statistical significance of the correlation is shown thus:              
*p<0.05 and **p<0.01. Below the main headings at the top of the table a summary 
of the number of statements significant at these levels is shown with a grand total 
to the far left 
 STATEMENT         
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed)  
NX – Not included 















                                *           ** 
LA 2005                33       121 
All 2009                22           9 
LA 2009                18           8 
Fire 2009               13          8 
Police 2009             4          2 
PCT 2009                 6          2 
*         **  
4        36 
8          2 
4          3 
3          1 
0          0  
1          0 
*         ** 
10      28 
5          6 
6          4 
2          2 
0          2 
0          0 
*           ** 
10        24 
1           0 
1           0 
1           5      
2          0 
5          2  
*           ** 
9       33 
8         1 
7         1    
7         0 
2         0       
0         0 
4.1 Written corporate strategy with 
top objectives tied into community 
strategy 
0.160*      
-0.142      
-0.140 
NC       
NC       
NC 
0.112        
-0.178        
-0.264  
NC        
NC        
NC 
0.155*         
-0.018 
0.007     
NC             
NC          
NC 
0.122           
-0.027          
-0.036     
NC            
NC          
NC 
 
The number of statements 
(variables) statistically significant 
at *p<0.05 and **p<0.01 with each 
CPA performance measure 
The total number of statements 
(variables) statistically significant at 
*p<0.05 and **p<0.01 with all four 





Pearson correlation coefficients for strategic direction statements and CPA 
Rating, Performance Management Score, Service Score and Corporate 
Assessment (Hypothesis A1) 
STATEMENT         
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 
















                                *           ** 
LA 2005                33       121 
All 2009                22           9 
LA 2009                18           8 
Fire 2009               13          8 
Police 2009             4          2 
PCT 2009                 6          2 
*         **  
4        36 
8          2 
4          3 
3          1 
0          0  
1          0 
*         ** 
10      28 
5          6 
6          4 
2          2 
0          2 
0          0 
*           ** 
10        24 
1           0 
1           0 
1           5      
2          0 
5          2 
*           ** 
9       33 
8         1 
7         1    
7         0 
2         0       
0         0 
4.1 Written corporate strategy with 
top objectives tied into community 
strategy 
0.160*     
-0.142     
-0.140 
NC      
NC       
NC 
0.112        
-0.178        
-0.264  
NC      
NC      
NC 
0.155*       
-0.018 
0.007    
NC         
NC        
NC 
0.122        
-0.027        
-0.036    
NC            
NC        
NC 













0.185        
-0.146 







0.093        
-0.218 
4.3 Corporate strategy planned in 
advance with stakeholders 
0.266** 
0.006       
-0.025 
0.072   
NC   
0.333 
0.159* 
0.072       
-0.161 
0.579* 
NC          
-0.111 
0.175*     
0.065        
-0.116 
0.711** 
NC    
0.259 
0.229**     
-0.157       
-0.111        
-0.207    




4.4 Agreed formal mission/ vision 
statement 
-0.001     
-0.081      
-0.040 
NC      
NC      
NC 
0.078   
0.014        
-0.024 
NC        
NC      
NC 
0.003        
-0.031 
0.012    
NC        
NC        
NC 
-0.010       
-0.156        
-0.209     
NC        
NC         
NC  












0.186    
NC 










0.186     
NC 
4.6 Published medium term 
financial plan 
0.032 
0.000       
-0.144 
0.346  
NC      
NC 
-0.019      
-0.255*     
-0.265     
-0.323 
NC       
NC 
0.043        
-0.132 
0.010         
-0.283                        
NC        
NC 
0.020        
-0.172        
-0.285* 
0.067
NC                   
NC 
4.9 Took part in I&DeA’s local 
government improvement 
programme or equivalent 
0.080 













0.105     
NC   
0.727*   
NC 
0.082    
0.046        
-0.094 
0.600* 
0.557    
NC 
4.15  Political issues ‘blow’ 
strategy off course  
-0.333**   
-0.218*    
-0.233     
-.0223 
0.166       
-0.111 
-0.274**  
0.051        
-0.079 
0.438       
-0.166       
-0.111 
-0.134        
-0.070        
-0.110 
0.335         
-0.274       
-0.235 
-0.365**    
-0.019        
-0.141 
0.378        
-0.166         
-0.111 
4.16 A16 Extent top-down 








0.021         
-0.083 
0.210       
-0.057      
-0.361 
0.060        
-0.003        
-0.021 
0.292        
-0.124       
-0.693* 
-0.071   
0.053        
-0.032 
0.183         
-0.057         
-0.091 









0.199   
0.277**      
-0.039       
-0.416      
-0.238 
0.220**     
-0.052 
0.245 
0.086        




0.256         
-0.085        
-0.416        
-0.408 




0.068       








0.314        
0.164*       
-0.030        
-0.040         



































0.240         
-0.120 






























0.177       
-0.019 


















0.196         
-0.436 
























0.087         
-0.302 
4.27 Budget linked to priorities 0.243** 
0.147 
0.185 






0.037       
-0.201 
0.089 
0.150*       
-0.021 
0.131 
0.090        





0.378         
-0.201 
0.000 






















































4.30 Extent of formal risk 
management with written risk 
register 
0.296**    
-0.039 
0.084       


















0.138         
-0.138        
-0.200 


























4.38 Organisation is budget driven -0.067     
-0.055      
-0.206 
0.330 
0.557       
-0.218 
-0.112 
0.003       
-0.160 
0.175 
0.268        
-0.145 
-0.070        
-0.064        
-0.093 
0.224 
0.326        
-0.388 
-0.067       
-0.031       
-0.229 
0.395 
0.268        
-0.218 
























0.248        
-0.091 












0.415       
-0.250  






































4.48 Extent of separation between 
strategy and implementation 
0.063       
-0.267*       
-0.089     
-0.632**    
-0.082     
-0.249 
-0.062     
-0.179      
-0.355* 
0.155        
-0.055      
-0.277  
-0.023       
-0.273*     
-0.068       
-0.291       
-0.282       
-0.138 
-0.029       
-0.268*     
-0.341* 
0.000          
-0.055        
-0.083 
4.49 Extent of organisation focus 








0.111       
0.189*       
-0.032 
0.177 
0.225        
0.299**     
-0.047 
0.193          
-0.410        
481 
 
































0.112        
-0.100 
4.55 Aims/objectives corporate 























0.233         
-0.384 
B57 Collect all Quality of Life 
Indicators 
0.121    
NX                  
NX          
NX           
NX          
NX 
0.211**  
NX           
NX              
NX          
NX          
NX 
0.103    
NX            
NX           
NX          
NX                
NX 
0.158*     
NX             
NX             
NX             
NX          
NX 

















0.101        
-0.026 
0.461 
0.244**     





5.4 Use Balanced Scorecard or 
variant 
0.038       
-0.032 
0.042 
0.189       





0.289        
-0.474      
-0.111 






0.093        
-0.083       
-0.146 
0.518*       
-0.474 
0.333 








0.142    
0.029        
-0.083 
0.055 
0.000         
-0.145 
0.088        
-0.161        
-0.085 
0.114 
0.069        
-0.267 
0.173*       
-0.066       
-0.154 
0.288 
0.000        
-0.218 
5.6 Use Benchmarking 0.079 
0.222* 
0.214 
0.354   
NC       
NC 
0.024 
0.137   
0.113 
0.279    
NC       
NC 
0.122        
-0.029 
0.006 
0.182    





0.468      




5.7 Use Management by 
Objectives 
0.001       
-0.094      
-0.071     
-0.289 
0.614       
-0.218 
0.042    











0.001        
-0.063        
-0.083 
0.055 
0.474          
-0.218 






















0.000         
-0.218 
5.9 Use corporate planning NX    
0.089 
0.182       
-0.175 
NC             
NC 
NX    
0.272* 
0.307* 
0.240   
NC        
NC 
NX             
-0.019 
0.054 
0.135     
NC        
NC 
NX      
0.068 
0.140 
0.077     
NC         
NC 
5.32 Are targets ambitious 0.178* 
0.000 
0.092   
NC  










0.120    
NC    




0.276*    
NC     
0.750*     
NC 
5.34 Performance management 
method of control 
-0.163*  





-0.090      
-0.005     
-0.078 
0.049 
0.750*     
-0.272 
-0.077  
0.053         
-0.033 
0.053 
0.584        
-0.045 
-0.210**  
0.033        
-0.221 
0.472        
0.750* 
0.000 
5.37 Level of departmental 





0.200       

















0.189          
0.000 
0.183 
5.38 Level of departmental 
involvement in running 
performance management 
0.289**    
-0.015       
-0.025 
0.037       
-0.310     
-0.302 
0.295**      
-0.076      
-0.050 
0.061       





0.332        
-0.045       
-0.536 
0.255**     
-0.080        
-0.087 
0.193         
-0.197 
0.000 
5.48 Extent performance 
management skews organisation’s 
priorities 
0.014   
0.000         
-0.034 
0.355 
-0.061   
0.082        
-0.078 
0.415 
0.069        









0.589        
-0.588 
0.516       
-0.033 




5.49 Extent performance 
management measures things that 
matter 
0.291**     
-0.017      
-0.075 





0.027       
-0.048 
0.000       
-0.373 
0.228**     
-0.031        
-0.079 
0.256 





0.266         
0.000        
-0.350 
5.50 Level of game playing 
(auditors/government) 
0.061        
-0.145      
-0.097     
-0.080     
-0.588      
-0.219 
-0.041  
0.018        
-0.015 
0.185       
-0.354      
-0.135 
0.118         
-0.105        
-0.001 
0.000        
-0.413       
-0.166  
0.035         
-0.159       
-0.140 
0.098          
-0.354       
-0.219 
5.58 Extent performance 












0.000       
-0.167 
0.269**   
0.017        
-0.027 
0.367 





0.155         
0.000        
-0.500 




0.353*      





0.326*      
-0.328 
0.000       
-0.458 
0.260**     
-0.013 
0.131 
0.106        




0.347*       
-0.195        
0.000        
-0.250 











0.093       
-0.354      
-0.229 
0.238**     
-0.114 
0.093 
0.289        





0.249         
-0.354 
0.171 













0.000       
-0.413    









0.366         
0.000         
-0.372 
5.67 Extent EFQM/BSC integral 
part of strategic planning 
0.218**    
-0.063 
0.092 
0.272        
-0.419      
-0.286 
0.239**   
0.004       
-0.055 
0.286       
-0.567      
-0.429  
0.259**     
-0.132 
0.127 
0.150        
-0.493       
-0.111 
0.195**     
-0.079       
-0.027 
0.309          




5.68 Extent strategy maps are 
used 
0.209**    
-0.023 
0.014 
0.359       
-0.044     
-0.385 
0.229**     
-0.007        
-0.238 
0.418       
-0.316 
0.282 
0.254**     
-0.014 
0.002 




0.029         
-0.064 
0.586*       
-0.316 
0.231 
6.5 Extent to which organisation 
departments operate 
independently 
-0.245**   
-0.075     
-0.125 
0.083 
0.211       
-0.384 
-0.232**     
-0.218*     




-0.008     
0.007        
-0.016       
-0.023       
-0.137 
0.270 
-0.280**    





6.9 Extent to which governance 




0.419       








0.217**     
-0.161 
0.123 
0.035        





0.555*        
0.000 
0.000 
9.3 Strategic partnership with 
provider of many services 
0.011       
-0.240*    
-0.157     
-0.289     





0.455        
-0.474 
0.444 
0.029         
-0.133       
-0.154 
0.395        
-0.304 
0.259 
0.043        
-0.217*     
-0.174         
-0.327          
-0.474 
0.333 
9.25 Extent partnerships making 










0.303       











0.551*       
-0.247          
-0.258 
10.4 Extent strategic direction 
widely communicated 
0.241**     
-0.086     
-0.007     
-0.168 





0.587**    











0.182         
-0.257         
-0.392 
11.6 Feedback to internal 
stakeholders on strategy/ 
performance management 










0.359       
-0.375 




0.286        
-0.722* 
0.238**   





11.7 Feedback to external 




















0.524       
-0.111 
0.247       
-0.296 
0.497        
-0.481 
0.247        
-0.111 
12.19 Extent to which organisation 
operates independently in 
provision of services 
-0.093     
-0.132 
0.139       
-0.442     
-0.614 
0.138 
-0.150*     
-0.051     
-0.003      
-0.479      
-0.474 
0.365 
-0.105       
-0.139 
0.194        





0.085         




























Pearson correlation coefficients for higher level of strategic and service 
planning statements and CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, 
Service Score and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis A2) 
 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                                *           ** 
LA 2005                 8             30 
All 2009                 8               6 
LA 2009                 8               4 
Fire 2009               6               2         
Police 2009           0               0  
PCT 2009               2               1 
*          **  
1        10 
3         2 
4         1 
2          0 
0          0  
0          0 
*         ** 
2        7 
4        2      
2        3 
2        0 
0        0 
1        0 
*           ** 
5          4 
0          0 
0          0 
0          2 
0          0 
1         1 
*          ** 
0        9 
1        2 
2        0 
2        0 
0        0 
0        0 
4.1 Written corporate strategy with 
top objectives tied into community 
strategy 
0.160*     
-0.142     
-0.140 
NC      
NC      
NC 
0.112     
-0.178    
-0.264 
NC     
NC     
NC  
0.155*        
-0.018 
0.007    
NC         
NC        
NC 
0.122        
-0.027      
-0.036  
NC        
NC       
NC 












-0.020    
0.185        
-0.146 







0.093        
-0.218 
4.3 Corporate strategy planned in 
advance with stakeholders 
0.266** 
0.006      
-0.025 
0.072   
NC  
0.333     
0.159* 
0.072      
-0.161 
0.579* 
NC          
-0.111 
0.175*    
0.065        
-0.116 
0.711** 
NC    
0.259 
0.229**     
-0.157      
-0.111      
-0.207 




4.4 Agreed formal mission/ vision 
statement 
-0.001     






0.014     
-0.024 
NC     
NC     
NC  
0.003        
-0.031 
0.012    
NC         
NC        
NC  
-0.010      
-0.156      
-0.209 
NC       
NC       
NC 























0.155      
0.124        
-0.229 









0.021     
-0.083 
0.210      
-0.057    
-0.361 
0.060        
-0.003       
-0.021 
0.292        
-0.124       
-0.693* 
-0.071 
0.053        
-0.032 
0.183        
-0.057      
-0.091 
4.23 Level of departmental 


























4.24 Extent of departmental 
























0.325        
-0.128 


















































4.55 Aims/objectives corporate 























0.266        
-0.156 
0.233        
-0.384 
5.9 Use corporate planning NX  
0.089 
0.182      
-0.175 






NC     
NC 
NX             
-0.019 
0.054 
0.135    
NC        
NC 




NC       
NC 
5.67 Extent EFQM/BSC integral 
part of strategic planning 
0.218**    
-0.063 
0.092 
0.359      
-0.044     
-0.385 
0.239** 
0.004     
-0.055 
0.286     
-0.567    
-0.429 
0.259**     
-0.132 
0.127 
0.150        
-0.493       
-0.111 
0.195**    
-0.079      
-0.027 
0.309        
-0.567      
-0.143 
6.3 Level of centralisation of service 
planning 
0.004      
-0.188     
-0.087 
0.378      
-0.385 
0.143 
0.012      
-0.017    
-0.090    
-0.130    
-0.416    
-0.286 
0.004        
-0.094       
-0.150 
0.045        
-0.016       
-0.524 
0.008        
-0.071      
-0.086 
0.607*      
-0.416      
-0.143 
8.12 Extent information available for 










0.068     




0.039        
-0.080 





0.208        
-0.463      
-0.429  
10.2 Extent communication on 










0.157     





0.322        












Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of performance 
management statements and CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, 
Service Score and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis A3) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                                *           ** 
LA 2005                 42          130 
All 2009                  16             8  
LA 2009                  21             9 
Fire 2009                16             5 
Police 2009              6              0 
PCT 2009                19             7        
*          **  
9         47 
3          2 
5          3 
3          0 
2         0 
1         2 
*         ** 
10       47 
6         2 
8         3 
0         2 
2         0 
2         1 
*           ** 
12      31 
3         4 
2         0 
4         1 
2         0 
13       2 
*          ** 
11      45 
4         0 
6         3 
9         2 
0       0 
3         2 




0.420**    
-0.029      




0.372**    
-0.285 
0.347       
-0.025 
0.182*      
-0.073 
0.191        
-0.268 





0.017       
0.347 
0.625 
4.43 Extent performance 





0.224       
















0.098        
-0.129      
0.093 
0.160 
4.50 Extent to which critical 










0.343       
-0.277 
0.156 
0.273**     
-0.010 
0.078 
0.501        





0.232        




4.52 Extent to which management 





0.091       




0.339*       
-0.067      











0.088        
-0.166 
0.000 
5.1 Use of proprietary 
performance management 
software 
0.035       
-0.137      
-0.238 
0.213       
-0.219      
-0.218 
0.060       
-0.202       
-0.195 
0.074       
-0.474      
-0.218 
0.071        
-0.017       
-0.089       
-0.019       
-0.434 
0.024 
0.063         
-0.156       
-0.220 
0.107        
-0.474       
-0.218 
B57 Collect all Quality of Life 
Indicators 
0.115   
NX          
NX         
NX          
NX         
NX 
0.211** 
NX        
NX         
NX        
NX          
NX 
0.103    
NX          
NX         
NX         
NX         
NX 
0.158*    
NX            
NX           
NX           
NX              
NX 

















0.101        
-0.026 
0.461 
0.244**      





5.4 Use Balanced Scorecard or 
variant 
0.038       
-0.032 
0.042 
0.189       





0.289       
-0.474      
-0.111 






0.093        
-0.083        
-0.146 
0.518*       
-0.474 
0.333 








0.142    
0.029       
-0.083 
0.055 
0.000       
-0.145 
0.088        
-0.161       
-0.085 
0.114 
0.069        
-0.267 
0.173*       
-0.066        
-0.154 
0.288 
0.000        
-0.218 
5.6 Use Benchmarking 0.079 
0.222* 
0.214 
0.354   





0.279    
NC       
NC 
0.122        
-0.029  
0.006 
0.182    





0.468    
NC        
NC 
5.7 Use Management by 
Objectives 
0.001       
-0.094      
-0.071      
-0.289 
0.042   







0.001        











0.474        
-0.218 






















0.000        
-0.218 
5.10 Use Outcome based 
accountability 




0.614       
-0.350 
NX   

















5.11 Use of other techniques for 
performance management 
NX              
-0.019 
0.147       
-0.094      
-0.570 
0.408 
NX     
0.169 
0.128 
0.289       
-0.474 
0.068 
NX     
0.043   
0.155 
0.395        
-0.347 
0.181 
NX             
-0.142  
0.075        
-0.286        
-0.474       
-0.408 
5.13 Hold Investor in People NX              
-0.429**     
-0.405**   
-0.279      
-0.690* 
0.271 
NX              
-0.289*    
-0.332*    
-0.496      
-0.514      
-0.107 
NX              
-0.385**         
-0.322*     
-0.468       
-0.342       
-0.043 
NX             
-0.191       
-0.142       
-0.260       
-0.514 
0.217 
5.15 Hold any performance-based 
awards (e.g. Beacon) 
NX   
0.125 




NX         





NX     
0.099 
0.249 
0.118        
-0.104 
0.086 
NX            
0.007        
-0.053 
0.518* 
0.000        
-0.158 
5.17 Quality accreditation 
(ISO9000) 






NX     





NX        





NX     
0.127 








0.105       
-0.333 
0.149*   








0.277        










5.19 Managers formally appraised 
by subordinates 
0.007   





0.050       

















5.20 Performance management 
exist to extent if not for central 
government requirements (Best 
Value) 
0.119        
-0.084      
-0.131       







0.000       
-0.583 
0.035        
-0.015  
0.048 
0.500        
-0.286       
-0.722* 
0.127        
-0.041       
-0.087       
-0.283      
0.000 
0.000 
5.21 Extent to which meaningful 
indicators exist (excluding 
statutory) 
0.057       
-0.131      
-0.078   
NC       




0.086   
NC       
NC       
NC  
0.052        
-0.092       
-0.093  
NC       
NC        
NC 
0.098        
-0.061        
-0.079    
NC        
NC        
NC 
5.22 Performance related pay for 
(senior managers) Chief 
Executive/ Directors 
0.110       





0.074       
-0.145      
-0.231      
-0.355  
0.516       
-0.583 
0.153*      
-0.293** 
0.092        
-0.182 
0.824*      
-0.444 
0.068         
-0.209         




B69 Performance related pay for 
other senior managers 
0.227** 
NX              
NX           
NX               
NX           
NX 
0.175*  
NX        
NX        
NX         
NX        
NX 
0.219*  
NX         
NX         
NX         
NX                
NX 
0.197*   
NX           
NX          
NX          
NX          
NX 
5.24 Appraisal linked to financial 
reward 
0.242**    
-0.143       
-0.047 
0.000 
0.219       
-0.408 
0.214**     
-0.101      
-0.199 
0.070 
0.000       
-0.612 
0.200*      
-0.300** 
0.088 
0.019        
-0.152       
-0.726* 
0.229**      
-0.183        
-0.184       
-0.134 
0.000        
-0.408    
5.25 Appraisal competency based 0.003 
0.036 
0.009 
0.189   





0.000   
NC             
-0.218 
0.015        
-0.145       
-0.004       
-0.225  





0.175     
NC            
-0.218 
5.26 Extent to which performance 









0.453   
0.122     
0.083        
-0.104 




0.468     
493 
 
NC   
0.408 
NC             
-0.272 
NC              
-0.499 
NC             
-0.408 
5.27 Performance management 
increase accountability to citizens 
0.234**    
-0.029      
-0.068 












0.135        
-0.137       
-0.130 
0.200**      
-0.011       
-0.135 
0.510       
0.000         
-0.060 
5.28 Performance management 





0.378   





0.242   
NC   
0.250 
0.261**  
0.099        
-0.007  
NC       
NC     
0.111 
0.162* 
0.115        
-0.087 
0.607*   
NC    
0.500 
5.29 Extent that performance 

























5.30 Performance of professionals 
managed 
0.252**    









0.567       
-0.111 
0.225**  





0.272**      
-0.032 
0.009         
-0.288 
0.567         
-0.333 












0.474       
-0.167 
0.044        
-0.047  










5.32 Are targets ambitious 0.178* 
0.000 
0.092   
NC   










0.120    
NC    




0.276*   
NC    
0.750*   
NC 
5.33 Range of qualitative and 
quantitative indicators 
0.191** 
0.000       
-0.035 





0.250       
-0.099       
-0.500   
NC 
0.193**     
-0.153       
-0.019         
-0.178        
-0.206  
NC 
0.202**      
-0.113        
-0.098 
0.472        




5.34 Performance management 
method of control 
-0.163*  





-0.090      
-0.005      
-0.078 
0.049 
0.750*       
-0.272 
-0.077  
0.053         
-0.033 
0.053 
0.584        
-0.045 
-0.210** 































5.36 Approach to performance 
management top-down 
0.107       
-0.058 
0.040       
-0.066 




0.106       
-0.382 
0.640       
-0.302 
0.077        
-0.029 
0.160        
-0.308 






0.640     
0.302 
5.37 Level of departmental 





0.200       

















0.189       
0.000 
0.183 
5.38 Level of departmental 
involvement in running 
performance management 
0.289**     
-0.015      
-0.025 
0.037       
-0.310       
-0.302 
0.295**    
-0.076      
-0.050 
0.061        





0.332        
-0.045        
-0.536 
0.255**      
-0.080       
-0.087 
0.193        
-0.197 
0.000 
5.39 Adequacy of systems for 
collecting national indicators 
0.299** 
0.031 
0.106       
-0.080 












0.309        
-0.703* 
0.267**  





5.40 Comprehensiveness of set of 
local indicators 
0.285**    
-0.148      
-0.083 
0.221 
0.175       
-0.120 
0.281**  
0.032       
-0.007      
-0.152 
0.237        
-0.441 
0.213**     
-0.177       
-0.157        
-0.076 






0.237         
-0.120 
5.41 Extent of employee rewards 
for good performance 
0.254** 
0.015 






0.270**     
-0.167 








0.296       
-0.429 
0.320       
-0.667*  
0.278         
-0.587 
0.320         
-0.429 
5.42 Extent of sanctions against 
employees for poor performance 
0.137       
-0.119      
-0.107 
0.191       





0.083       
-0.577      
-0.512 
0.196*        
-0.134       
-0.031        
-0.033        
-0.198       
-0.156     
0.163*        
-0.090       
-0.079 
0.274         
-0.577       
-0.384 
5.43 Extent performance 









0.399**     
-0.070 
0.202       
-0.509 










0.202         
-0.655* 
5.44  Extent performance 









0.190       
-0.166 
0.169       
-0.145  









0.085       
0.169         
-0.218 
5.45 Extent managers have 
























0.221         
-0.557 
5.46 Extent democratic 
representatives have access to 
quality timely performance 
information 
0.311** 
0.000        
-0.043 
0.042        
-0.105 
0.217 
0.278**    
-0.007 
0.058       
-0.091 










0.034         
-0.063       
0.189         
-0.461 
5.47 Extent performance 
management produces perverse 
incentives 
-0.080      
-0.081      
-0.020 
0.055 
0.286       
-0.784** 
-0.136      
-0.103      
-0.166 
0.188 
0.000       
-0.033 
-0.014       
-0.148        
-0.051 
0.000        
-0.233 
0.131 
-0.121        
-0.052         




5.48  Extent performance 
management skews organisation’s 
priorities 
0.014   
0.000       
-0.034 
0.355 
0.589       
-0.588 
-0.061   
0.082        
-0.078 
0.415 
0.516       
-0.033 
0.069        
-0.161       
-0.025 
0.410 










5.49 Extent performance 
management measures things 
that matter 
0.291**    
-0.017      
-0.075 





0.027       
-0.048  
0.000       
-0.373 
0.228**     
-0.031        
-0.079 
0.256 





0.266       
0.000        
-0.350 
5.50 Level of game playing 
(auditors/government) 
0.061       
-0.145      
-0.097      
-0.080      
-0.588      
-0.219 
-0.041  
0.018        
-0.015 
0.185       
-0.354       
-0.135 
0.118         
-0.105       
-0.001 
0.000        
-0.413       
-0.166 
0.035         
-0.159        
-0.140 
0.098         
-0.354        
-0.219 
5.51 Extent performance 




0.616*      









0.082   
0.206 
0.520         





0.255        
-0.320 
0.550 
5.52 Extent performance 











0.654**    
-0.474      
-0.020 
0.180*      
-0.062 
0.005 
0.635*       
-0.261       
-0.576 
0.217**      
-0.024 
0.002 
0.434         
-0.474        
-0.294 
5.53 Extent performance 





















0.199         
-0.094 
0.283         
-0.316 
5.54 Extent organisational 
performance rated more highly 
than democratic 
0.126        
-0.316**    
-0.336*    
-0.406 
0.419        
-0.384 
0.086        
-0.054       
-0.283* 
0.307 
0.189       
-0.341 
0.110    





0.084        
-0.009         
-0.183 
0.179 
0.189         
-0.128 
5.55 External performance 
constrained by central government 
action 
0.143        
-0.086      
-0.131      
-0.303       
-0.160      
-0.550 
0.009     





0.048      
0.035         
-0.002 
0.332        
-0.238 
0.277 
0.113        
-0.189       
-0.152        
-0.033       
0.000 
0.125 
5.56 Extent targets sub-optimise 
performance 
0.010  
0.128       
-0.114      
-0.083 
-0.039      
-0.032       
-0.168 
0.214 
0.028        
-0.188        








0.243        
-0.436 
0.000       
-0.145  




5.57 Extent performance 




0.135        
-0.038      





0.331        





0.415         





0.014          
-0.375       
-0.333 
5.58 Extent performance 












0.000       
-0.167 
0.269**   
0.017        
-0.027 
0.367 





0.155       
0.000         
-0.500 




0.353*       





0.326*       
-0.328 
0.000       
-0.458 
0.260**      
-0.013  
0.131 
0.106        




0.347*        
-0.195      
0.000        
-0.250 
5.60 Extent focus on national 






0.347        
-0.603 
-0.167*     
-0.071       
-0.065       
-0.094 




0.218        









5.61 Extent focus on what 
measured rather than what 
matters 
-0.216**   
-0.106      
-0.148 
0.293 
0.000        
-0.791** 
-0.213**   
-0.144       
-0.281* 
0.144        
-0.224 
0.000 
-0.119       
-0.013       
-0.001 
0.000        
-0.491 
0.000 
-0.235**     
-0.114        
-0.134 
0.138        
-0.224 
0.316 
5.62 Extent performance 
management has local political 
commitment 
0.275** 
0.043        
-0.053 
0.294 


















0.514          
-0.387 
5.63 Extent performance 
management has commitment 
top-level management 
0.224**     
-0.017 
0.099 
0.244        






















5.64 Extent effort spent improving 









0.007       
-0.053 
0.132       
-0.202 
0.030 
-0.070        
-0.038       
-0.033 






0.168        
-0.202 
0.539  











0.093        
-0.354       
-0.229 
0.238**      
-0.114 
0.093 
0.289        





0.249        
-0.354 
0.171 













0.000       
-0.413 









0.366       
0.000        
-0.372 
 5.67 Extent EFQM/BSC integral 
part of strategic planning 
0.218**    
-0.063 
0.092 
0.272        
-0.419       
-0.286 
0.239**   
0.004       
-0.055 
0.286        
-0.567      
-0.429 
0.259**     
-0.132 
0.127 
0.150        
-0.493        
-0.111 
0.195**      
-0.079       
-0.027 
0.309        
-0.567        
-0.143 
5.68 Extent strategy maps are 
used 
0.209**     
-0.023  
0.014 
0.359        
-0.044       
-0.385 
0.229**    
-0.007       
-0.238 
0.418       
-0.316 
0.282 
0.254**     
-0.014 
0.002 




0.029         
-0.064 
0.586*       
-0.316 
0.231 
6.4 Level of centralisation of 
performance management 
0.053        
-0.047 
0.122        





0.083        
-0.206      
-0.375      
-0.364 
0.009        
-0.188        
-0.014         
-0.069        





0.056         
-0.375       
-0.156 
8.2 Allocation of resources 
formally determined by priorities 
0.192**     
-0.005 
0.031    
NC       
NC   
0.333 
0.196**    
-0.006      
-0.045 
NC       
NC             
-0.111 
0.131    
0.038        
-0.009  
NC       
NC    
0.259 
0.171*        
-0.151       
-0.204   
NC        
NC            
-0.333 
8.10 Level of resources to do 






















0.000       
-0.768** 
0.177        
-0.697* 
0.000         
-0.640* 
8.11 Level of resources to do 





0.196       
-0.240 
0.149 
0.140       
-0.051 
0.105        
-0.042      





0.092         





0.414         
-0.144        
-0.745* 
9.9 Extent internal audit 
involvement in performance 
management 
0.218**     
-0.026 
0.087 
0.188        






0.000       
-0.062 
0.164*       
-0.093 
0.024 






0.533*       
0.000 
0.371 
9.10 Extent use of external audit 
to improve performance 
management 
0.124        
-0.026 
0.182 
0.131        





0.206        
-0.367       
-0.286 
0.119        
-0.021 
0.139 
0.111        





0.716**       
-0.367 
0.156 
9.11 Extent of use consultants in 
centre 
-0.074        
-0.183       
-0.076 
0.146        
-0.441       
-0.302 
-0.040       
-0.108       
-0.186       
-0.079      
-0.202       
-0.201 
-0.014        
-0.296**     
-0.018        
-0.180       
-0.315        
-0.201 
-0.093        
-0.084        
-0.271 
0.774**       
-0.202 
0.000 
9.12 Extent use of inspection 
improves performance at service 
delivery 
0.152*      
-0.076 
0.070 






0.031       
-0.187      
-0.442 
0.125        
-0.116 
0.012 
0.015         





0.505         
-0.188 
0.000 
9.22 Extent to which stakeholders 
participate in performance 
management 
0.192*   






0.083       
-0.038 
0.322 
0.359       
-0.294  
0.198**     
-0.200       
-0.258 
0.329 
0.205        
-0.240 
0.229**      





9.23 Extent to which citizens 














0.292**     
-0.232*      
-0.220 
0.438        
-0.389       
-0.356 








9.24 Extent partnerships 





0.200        
-0.049       
-0.246 
0.008   
0.044 




0.013        
-0.115       
-0.016        






0.286       
0.177 
0.410 










0.288*       
-0.013 














10.5 Extent use of employees’ 











0.143        
-0.204       
-0.248 
0.113        
-0.154        
-0.026 
0.385        





0.432         
-0.204 
0.000 
11.1 Performance reported on the 
organisation’s Intranet 
0.161*      
-0.007 
0.074 
0.139   
NC        
NC 
0.144 
0.219*   
0.225 
0.150   
NC       
NC 
0.080        
-0.101       
-0.031  
NC       
NC       
NC 
0.144        
-0.056       
-0.159 
0.498    
NC        
NC 
11.2 Performance reported on the 




0.139   
NC        
NC 
0.144   
0.051         
-0.011 
0.150   
NC       
NC  
-0.034        
-0.060 
0.015     
NC        
NC       
NC  
0.154*       
-0.152        
-0.314* 
0.498     
NC        
NC 
11.3 Extent publishing 
performance data detrimental 
-0.288**    
-0.090       
-0.138 
0.577*      
-0.098       
-0.392 
-0.250**   
-0.139       
-0.165       
-0.028 
0.000       
-0.131 
-0.144       
-0.263*      
-0.061       
-0.118        
-0.097        
-0.240 
-0.274**    
-0.070 
0.074 
0.005       
0.000 
0.000 
11.4 Extent publishing 
performance data internally 
0.185*       
-0.086       
-0.014 
0.124 




0.036       
-0.049 
0.375       
-0.517 
0.031        
-0.084 
0.145        
-0.089 
0.601        
-0.635* 
0.195**   





11.5 Extent publishing 







0.165       
-0.246 
0.125        
-0.202 










0.375       
-0.578 
0.292        
-0.622 
0.375         
-0.079 
11.6 Feedback to internal 
stakeholders on strategy/ 
performance management 










0.359       
-0.375 




0.286        
-0.722*   
0.238**   





11.7 Feedback to external 












0.247       
-0.296 










0.247         
-0.418 
12.11 Extent to which organisation 
driven by achievement of targets 
0.311**    
-0.110      
-0.004 
0.400 












0.667*       
-0.383 
0.241**       
-0.034        
-0.257 
0.472 
0.416          
-0.111 
12.33 Extent of misrepresentation 
of performance information 
-0.140 
0.042 




-0.246**    
-0.026       




0.032         
-0.057 
0.043        









12.35 Extent performance 




0.064       
-0.107 




0.229       
-0.257 




0.030        
-0.337 



















Appendix 5.5  
Pearson correlation coefficients for an organisation with an organisational 
development strategy statements and CPA Rating, Performance Management 
Score, Service Score and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis A4) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                                *           ** 
LA 2005                 22            57 
All 2009                  10           15 
LA 2009                  19           11 
Fire 2009                  5             5 
Police 2009              1             0 
PCT 2009                  6             2 
*          **  
1        22 
0         2 
6         2 
3         0 
0         0 
0         0 
*         ** 
7       11 
6        8 
6        6 
1        2 
0        0 
1       0 
*           ** 
10       6 
0         2 
2        0 
0         3 
1       0 
5         1 
*          ** 
4       18 
4       3 
5        3 
1        0 
0        0 
0        1 
4.4 Agreed formal mission/ vision 
statement 
-0.001     
-0.081      
-0.040 
NC       
NC      
NC 
0.078 
0.014       
-0.024 
NC       
NC       
NC  
0.003        
-0.031 
0.012     
NC        
NC        
NC 
-0.010      
-0.156     
-0.209 
NC              
NC              
NC 
























0.186   
NC 
4.13 Extent to which effectiveness 




0.236      














































0.469      
-0.415 




0.237       
-0.141 


















0.152      
-0.500 














































































4.51 Extent to which HRM is 























0.238     
0.308 
0.204 
























0.112      
-0.100 


























5.19 Managers formally appraised 
by subordinates 
0.007  





0.050       

















5.22 Performance related pay for 
Chief Executive/ Directors 
0.110      






0.145       
-0.231      
-0.355 
0.516       
-0.583 
0.153*        
-0.293** 
0.092        
-0.182 
0.824*       
-0.444 
0.068       





B69 Performance related pay for 
other senior managers 
0.227** 
NX        
NX        
NX        
NX        
NX 
0.175* 
NX        
NX        
NX        
NX        
NX 
0.219*   
NX            
NX          
NX         
NX                
NX 
0.197** 
NX         
NX         
NX        
NX        
NX 
5.24 Appraisal linked to financial 
reward 
0.242**    
-0.143      
-0.047 
0.000 
0.219       
-0.408 
0.214**    
-0.101      
-0.199 
0.070 
0.000       
-0.612 
0.200**      
-0.300** 
0.088 
0.019        
-0.152       
-0.726*  
0.229**     
-0.183      
-0.184 
0.134 
0.000       
-0.408 
5.25 Appraisal competency based 0.003 
0.036 
0.009 







NC             
-0.218 
0.015        
-0.145        
-0.004       
-0.225   






NC           
-0.218  
5.41 Extent of employee rewards 
for good performance 
0.254** 
0.015 
0.128      
-0.139 






0.320       
-0.667* 
0.270**      
-0.167  
0.042         
-0.016 






0.320      
-0.429 
 5.42 Extent of sanctions against 
employees for poor performance 
0.137      
-0.119     
-0.107 
0.191       
-0.240      




0.083       
-0.577      
-0.512 
0.196*       
-0.134        
-0.031        
-0.033       
-0.198       
-0.156 
0.163*      
-0.090       
-0.079 
0.274       




5.51 Extent performance 




0.616*      











0.520        





0.255      
-0.320 
0.550 
















0.171        
-0.079        





0.191      
0.000       
-0.200 










0.388**    
-0.071 











0.136     
0.000      
-0.603 


























10.2 Extent communication on 










0.157       





0.322         





0.412      
-0.257 
0.229 






0.641      
-0.267   
0.258** 
0.168 
0.288*      
-0.013 














10.4 Extent strategic direction 
widely communicated 
0.241**    
-0.061     
-0.007      
-0.168 





0.587**    











0.182       
-0.257     
-0.392 
11.1 Performance reported on the 
organisation’s Intranet 
0.161*     
-0.007 
0.074 





0.080        
-0.101        
-0.031   
NC        
0.144      





NC      
NC 
NC       
NC 
NC        
NC 
NC             
NC 
12.1 Extent that the organisation is 
a learning organisation 
























12.5 Extent to which organisation 
has a blame culture 
-0.238**   






-0.204      
-0.387** 
0.185 
0.000       
-0.437 
0.020  
0.015        
-0.153        
-0.010        
-0.314 
0.125 
-0.248**   
-0.108      
-0.340* 
0.221 
0.000        
-0.316 
12.16 Level of employees’ morale 0.391** 
0.048 









































Pearson correlation coefficients for an organisation with proprietary 
performance management software statement and CPA Rating, Performance 
Management Score, Service Score and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis 
A5) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                          *           ** 
LA 2005              0         0   
All 2009               0         0 
LA 2009               0         0 
Fire 2009              0         0 
Police 2009          0         0 
PCT 2009                 
*          **  
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*           ** 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*          ** 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
5.1 Use of proprietary 
performance management 
software 
0.035         
-0.137       
-0.238  
0.213         
-0.219       
-0.218 
0.060        
-0.202       
-0.195 
0.074         
-0.474       
-0.218 
0.071           
-0.017        
-0.089         
-0.019         
-0.434 
0.024 
0.063          
-0.156       
-0.220 
0.107          









Appendix 5.7  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a high level of employee involvement in 
performance management statements and CPA Rating, Performance 
Management Score, Service Score and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis 
A6) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 











                              *           ** 
LA 2005                4           15 
All 2009                 1            1 
LA 2009                 4            0 
Fire 2009               0            0  
Police 2009           0            0   
PCT 2009              1             1   
*         **  
1        5 
0        0 
1       0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
1        4 
1        1 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*           ** 
2        1 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
1        1 
*          ** 
0        5 
0        0 
2        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0         0 





0.179        
-0.283 
0.091 
-0.081      
0.021         
-0.083 
0.210         
-0.057        
-0.361 
-0.060           
-0.003        
-0.021 
0.292          
-0.124          
-0.693* 
-0.071  
0.053          
-0.032 
0.183          
-0.057        
-0.091 
4.22 Extent of front-line employee 





























0.237        
-0.141 










































































4.43 Extent performance 





0.224        

















0.129          
0.093 
0.160 
10.5 Extent use of employees’ 











0.143         
-0.204        
-0.248 
0.113           
-0.154            
-0.026 
0.385           

























Pearson correlation coefficients for use of BSC/EFQM/TQM/MBO/ 
Benchmarking/Strategy mapping statements and CPA Rating, Performance 
Management Score, Service Score and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis 
A7) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                              *           ** 
LA 2005                3             11 
All 2009                1               0 
LA 2009                 0              0 
Fire 2009               1              0   
Police 2009           0              0 
PCT 2009               0              1 
*         **  
0        3 
1       0 
0       0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        1 
*         ** 
1        2 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*           ** 
0        4 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*          ** 
2        2 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 

















0.101        
-0.026 
0.461 
0.244**      
-0.002        
-0.143 
0.327 
0.000   
0.218 
5.4 Use Balanced Scorecard or 
variant 
0.038       
-0.032 
0.042 
0.189         





0.289        
-0.474       
-0.111 






0.093        
-0.083        
-0.146 
0.518*       
-0.474    
0.333  
5.5 Use Total Quality Management 0.134 
0.007 
0.085         
-0.139 
0.142   
0.029        
-0.083   
0.055 
0.088         
-0.161         
-0.085 
0.114 
0.173*        







0.000        
-0.145 
0.069        
-0.267 
0.000        
-0.218 









0.279   
NC      
NC 
0.122         
-0.029  
0.006 
0.182     
NC         




0.468     
NC        
NC 
5.7 Use Management by Objectives 0.001       
-0.094     
-0.071     
-0.289 
0.614       
-0.218 
0.042      











0.001         
-0.063        
-0.083 
0.055 
0.474         
-0.218 






















0.000         
-0.218 
5.67 Extent EFQM/BSC integral 
part of strategic planning 
0.218**    
-0.063 
0.092 
0.272        
-0.419       
-0.286 
0.239**    
0.004       
-0.055 
0.286        
-0.567       
-0.429 
0.259**      
-0.132 
0.127 
0.150         
-0.493         
-0.111 
0.195**      
-0.079         
-0.027 
0.309        
















Appendix 5.9  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a high level of innovation statements and 
CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, Service Score and Corporate 
Assessment (Hypothesis A8) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 











                             *           ** 
LA 2005               2          12 
All 2009               1            0 
LA 2009               1            0 
Fire 2009              2            0   
Police 2009          0            0 
PCT 2009              2            0 
*         **  
0        4 
0       0 
1       0 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
1        3 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
*           ** 
0        2 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
*          ** 
1        3 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
0         0 























0.059        
-0.064 
0.143 
























0.124        
-0.229 
12.20 Extent to which 







0.150*       
-0.023      








0.381           
-0.200 























0.106     
































 Pearson correlation coefficients for a high level of citizen/service user focus 
statements and CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, Service Score 
and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis A9) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                                *           ** 
LA 2005                4            41 
All 2009                4              2 
LA 2009                3              1 
Fire 2009              2              0   
Police 2009          0              0 
PCT 2009              0             1 
*         **  
0        11 
0         0 
0         1 
1         0 
0         0 
0         0 
*         ** 
1        11 
2          1 
2          0 
0          0 
0          0 
0          0 
*           ** 
3        8 
1        0 
1        0 
1        0 
0        0 
0        1 
*          ** 
0         11 
1           1 
0           0 
0           0 
0           0 
0           0 




0.177       
-0.019 


















0.196          
-0.436 
4.35 Extent of responsiveness of 




0.128       




0.087       
-0.412     
-0.199     
-0.341 
0.275**     
-0.040 
0.124        
-0.212 





0.104         
-0.199        
-0.209 




0.182       













0.354        









4.40 Extent to which organisation 




0.561*     
















0.254          
-0.022        
-0.050         
-0.098 
























0.248          
-0.091 
4.46 Extent to which organisation 
gives value for money 
0.468** 
0.115 




















0.371          
-0.128 
5.27 Performance management 
increase accountability to 
citizens 
0.234**     
-0.029      
-0.068 












0.135        
-0.137       
-0.130 
0.200**       
-0.011          
-0.135 
0.510         
0.000          
-0.060 











0.093       
-0.354       
-0.029 
0.238**     
-0.114 
0.093 
0.289        





0.249          
-0.354 
0.171 
9.20 Extent of user (of services) 
consultation 
0.360**      
-0.039     
-0.039 
0.000 
0.031       
-0.180 
0.279**  
0.006       
-0.027 
0.197       
-0.169      
-0.120 
0.320**        
-0.157 
0.063 
0.105        





0.356           
-0.169          
-0.180 
9.21 Transactions with citizens 
rather than relationships 
-0.067       
-0.032     





0.008        




0.018     
0.032        
-0.010       
-0.255 
0.095        
-0.060 
-0.103      





9.23 Extent to which citizens 










0.292**     
-0.232*     
-0.220 
0.438        










-0.389       
-0.356 
0.000          
-0.267 




0.056       
-0.158     
















0.265          















































Appendix 5.11  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a comprehensive approach to employee 
appraisal statements and CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, 
Service Score and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis B1) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                             *           ** 
LA 2005               9           19 
All 2009               1             4 
LA 2009                2            2 
Fire 2009              0             0   
Police 2009          2             0 
PCT 2009              2             1 
*          **  
0        6 
0       0 
1       0 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
3        4         
1        1 
0        1 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
*           ** 
5       3 
0        2 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
1        0 
*          ** 
1        6 
0        1 
1        1 
0        0 
0        0 
0         1 


























4.53 Extent to which employee 









0.025     
-0.029    
-0.192    
-0.259 




0.076        
-0.136 
0.270**    
-0.005 
0.025      
-0.023      
-0.192 
0.111 




0.105      
-0.333 
0.149*   








0.277        










5.19 Managers formally appraised 
by subordinates 
0.007    





0.050     

















5.22 Performance related pay for 
(senior managers) Chief Executive/ 
Directors 
0.110       





0.074     
-0.145     
-0.231    
-0.355 
0.576     
-0.583 
0.153*       
-0.293** 
0.092        
-0.182 
0.824*       
-0.444 
0.068       





B69 Performance related pay for 
other senior managers 
0.227** 
NX         
NX         
NX         
NX        
NX 
0.175* 
NX                 
NX                  
NX                 
NX        
NX 
0.219** 
NX                     
NX               
NX                     
NX         
NX 
0.197** 
NX                
NX                 
NX               
NX        
NX 
5.23 Performance related pay other 
than for senior managers 
NX     





NX     





NX    
0.072 
0.058    
NC    
0.478    
NC 
NX     





5.24 Appraisal linked to financial 
reward 
0.242**    
-0.143     
-0.047 
0.000 
0.219      
-0.408 
0.214**  
-0.101     
-0.199 
0.070 
0.000     
-0.612 
0.200*       
-0.300** 
0.088 
0.019        
-0.152       
-0.726* 
0.229**    
-0.183       
-0.184 
0.134 
0.000      
-0.408 










NC         
-0.218 
0.015        
-0.145       
-0.004       
-0.225   






NC           
-0.218 




0.128      
-0.139 






0.320      
-0.667* 
0.270**     
-0.167 
0.042         
-0.016 






0.320      
-0.429 
5.42 Extent of sanctions against 
employees for poor performance 
0.137      
-0.119     
-0.107 




0.083     
0.196**       
-0.134       
-0.031       
-0.033       
0.163*      
-0.090      
-0.079 
0.274       
519 
 
-0.240     
-0.384 
-0.577    
-0.512 
-0.198        
-0.156 
-0.577      
-0.384 
















0.171        
-0.079       





0.191      
-0.000      
-0.200 
12.9 Extent to which employee’s 
level in organisation determines 
contribution 
0.091      
-0.124      




-0.019    
-0.042     
-0.042    
-0.287 
0.000      
-0.135 
0.119        
-0.189       
-0.079        
-0.423 
0.000        
-0.273 
0.088       
-0.062      
-0.170 
0.105 
0.000       
-0.219 
12.10 Extent to which employee’s 
role determined by job description 




0.681*      
-0.447 
-0.109     





0.044    




























Appendix 5.12  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of service departments’ 
involvement in service planning and performance management statements 
and CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, Service Score and 
Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis B2) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01level (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                                *           ** 
LA 2005               1            21 
All 2009               4              2 
LA 2009                5             2 
Fire 2009              2              0   
Police 2009           0             0 
PCT 2009               3             0 
*          **  
0        6 
1       2 
2       1 
2        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
0        5         
2        0 
1        1 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
*           ** 
1       4 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
*          ** 
0        6 
1        0 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
1         0 
4.23 Level of departmental 


























4.24 Extent of departmental 
























0.325       
-0.128 




0.177       
-0.019 






















5.36 Approach to performance 
management top-down 
0.107      
-0.058 
0.040       
-0.066 




0.106     
-0.382 
0.640      
-0.302 
0.077        
-0.029 
0.160        
-0.308 








5.37 Level of departmental 





0.200       

















0.189     
0.000 
0.183 
5.38 Level of departmental 
involvement in running performance 
management 
0.289**   
-0.015     
-0.025 
0.037      
-0.310     
-0.302 
0.295**  
-0.076    
-0.050 
0.061     





0.332        
-0.045       
-0.536 
0.255**    
-0.080     
-0.087 
0.193       
-0.197  
0.000 
8.11 Level of resources to do 





0.196      
-0.240 
0.149  
0.140     
-0.051 
0.105     
-0.042    





0.092        





0.414        


















Appendix 5.13  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of decentralisation 
statements and CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, Service Score 
and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis C1) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                                *           ** 
LA 2005                1             7 
All 2009                 3             2 
LA 2009                 3             3 
Fire 2009              3              1 
Police 2009          0              0  
PCT 2009              1              0   
*         **  
1        2 
2       0 
0       1 
2        0 
0        0 
1       0 
*         ** 
0        2         
1        1 
1        2 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*           ** 
0       1 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*          ** 
0        2 
0        1 
2        0 
0        1 
0        0 
0        0 






0.190       
-0.538 
0.070      
-0.026     
-0.069 
0.164 












0.395         
-0.316 
6.1 Level of centralisation of 
control 
-0.005    
-0.142    
-0.030     
-0.102     








0.060    
0.023         
-0.057 
0.609* 
0.159        
-0.144 
-0.003       
-0.061       
-0.184 
0.269        
0.000 
0.577 
6.2 Level of centralisation of 
administration 
-0.044    
-0.218     
-0.207 
0.034      
-0.196    
-0.683* 
-0.044    
-0.197    




0.019         
-0.068       
-0.195 
0.088        
-0.146        
-0.054 
-0.062       
-0.163   
0.340* 





6.3 Level of centralisation of 
service planning 
0.004      
-0.188    
-0.087 
0.378      
-0.385 
0.143 
0.012      
-0.017    
-0.090    
-0.130     
-0.416     
-0.286 
0.004         
-0.094        
-0.150 
0.045         
-0.076        
-0.524 
0.008         
-0.071         
-0.086 
0.607*        
-0.416       
-0.143 
6.4 Level of centralisation of 
performance management 
0.053      
-0.047 
0.122       





0.083       
-0.206    
-0.375    
-0.364 
0.009          
-0.188        
-0.014        
-0.069       





0.056         
-0.375       
-0.156 
6.5 Extent to which organisation 
departments operate 
independently 
-0.245**   
-0.075     
-0.125 
0.083 
0.211      
-0.384 
-0.232**  
-0.218*    





0.007        
-0.016        
-0.023        
-0.137 
0.270 
-0.280**    































12.15 Extent to which power lies 
more in centre than departments 
-0.002    
-0.284*    
-0.157     
-0.577*    
-0.116     
-0.620 
0.021       
-0.094     
-0.174    
-0.256 




0.062        
-0.320       
-0.131       
-0.207 
0.025        
-0.076       
-0.266       
-0.327      












Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of decentralised service 
planning statement and CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, 
Service Score and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis C2) 
 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                             *           ** 
LA 2005               0           0 
All 2009               0            0 
LA 2009                0           0  
Fire 2009              1            0 
Police 2009           0           0               
PCT 2009               0           0 
*         **  
0        0 
0       0 
0       0 
0        0 
0        0 
0         0 
*         ** 
0        0         
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
0       0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*          ** 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
6.3 Level of centralisation of 
service planning 
0.004       
-0.188     
-0.087 
0.378       
-0.385 
0.143 
0.012       
-0.017    
-0.090    
-0.130    
-0.416     
-0.286 
0.004        
-0.094 
0.150 
0.045         
-0.076        
-0.524 
0.008            
-0.071          
-0.086 
0.607*          













 Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of decentralisation of 
performance management statements and CPA Rating, Performance 




* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed)  
NX – Not included 










                                *          ** 
LA 2005               1             1 
All 2009                0             0  
LA 2009                0             0 
Fire 2009              1              0 
Police 2009           2             0 
PCT 2009               0             1 
*         **  
1        0 
0       0 
0       0 
0        0 
0        0 
0       0 
*         ** 
0        0         
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
0       0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        1 
*          ** 
0        1 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
1        0 
0        0 
5.34 Performance management 
method of control 
-0.163* 





-0.090    
-0.005    
-0.078 
0.049 
0.750*    
-0.272 
-0.077   
0.053        
-0.033 
0.053 
0.584        
-0.045 
-0.210**  





6.4 Level of centralisation of 
performance management 
0.053       
-0.047 
0.122       





0.083       
-0.206    
-0.375    
-0.364 
0.009        
-0.188       
-0.004       
-0.069       





0.056        








Appendix 5.16  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a consistency of rules and practices 
statements and CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, Service Score 
and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis C4) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 
NC – Not calculated by SPSS 









                                *           ** 
LA 2005                 3            15 
All 2009                  2             2 
LA 2009                  1             2 
Fire 2009                1              0 
Police 2009            0              0 
PCT 2009                1              0 
*         **  
1        4 
1       0 
0       1 
0        0 
0        0 
0       0 
*         ** 
1        3         
1        1 
1        1 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
1       3 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
*          ** 
0        5 
0        1 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 












0.415      
-0.250 






































6.7 Extent to which need for 
‘control’ tends to subvert ‘purpose’ 
-0.173*    
-0.259*     
-0.267      
-0.217 
0.423       
-0.552 
-0.221**   
-0.211     




0.020         
-0.160        
-0.065        
-0.470       
-0.136       
-0.009 
-0.218**    
-0.024        






 6.8 Extent to which administrative 




0.217       
-0.177     
-0.113      
-0.447 
0.209**   
-0.047 
0.014       
-0.192    











0.200        
-0.204        
-0.194 
6.9 Extent to which governance 




0.419        








0.217**      
-0.161 
0.123 
0.035        























Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of political and managerial 
leadership statements and CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, 
Service Score and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis D1) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                                *           ** 
LA 2005                 5            10 
All 2009                 2              1 
LA 2009                 0              1 
Fire 2009               1              1 
Police 2009            1             1 
PCT 2009                1              1    
*         **  
0       4 
0       0 
0       0 
0        1 
0        0 
0       0 
*         ** 
2        1         
2        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
3      1 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
1        0 
*          ** 
0        4 
0        1 
0        1 
1        0 
1        0 
1        0 












0.415      
-0.250   












6.9 Extent to which governance 




0.419        








0.217**      
-0.161 
0.123 
0.035        





0.555*      
0.000 
0.000 
7.2 Level of political leadership in 
organisation 
0.261**   





0.278**   





0.164*    













7.3 D126 Level of officer leadership 
in the organisation 
0.251**    
-0.035 






0.247      
-0.017 
0.567      
-0.040 






































Appendix 5.18  
Pearson correlation coefficients where officer leadership is more pronounced 
than that from elected members statements and CPA Rating, Performance 
Management Score, Service Score and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis 
D2) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                                *           ** 
LA 2005                 6             8 
All 2009                  2            1 
LA 2009                  0            1 
Fire 2009                0             3 
Police 2009            1             0 
PCT 2009                0             0 
*         **  
0       3 
0       0 
0       0 
0        1 
0        0 
0       0 
*         ** 
2        2         
2        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
4      0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        1 
1        0 
0        0 
*          ** 
0        3 
0        1 
0        1 
0        1 
0        0 
0        0 
7.1 Organisation characterised as 
officer led 








0.280      
-0.244 
NC          
-0.250 
0.159*        
-0.170  
0.094        
-0.272   




0.142       
-0.200 
NC            
-0.158 
7.2 Level of political leadership in 
organisation 
0.261** 





0.278**   





0.164*    









0.000       
-0.065 
7.3 Level of officer leadership in the 
organisation 
0.251**    
-0.035 






0.247      
-0.017 
0.567      
-0.040 














7.4 Level of empowerment of 
officers 
0.332**   
-0.049 








0.150      
-0.156 








0.252       
-0.023 



























Appendix 5.19  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of resources statements and 
CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, Service Score and Corporate 
Assessment (Hypothesis E1) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 











                                *          ** 
LA 2005                 6          15 
All 2009                  2            0 
LA 2009                  0            1  
Fire 2009                4            1 
Police 2009            1            0 
PCT 2009                4            2 
*         **  
3       3 
1       0 
0       1 
1        1 
1        0 
0       0 
*         ** 
1        5         
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
*         ** 
2      3 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
1        1 
*          ** 
0        4 
0        0 
0        0 
3        0 
0        0 
2        1 





0.224      




0.092      
-0.066    
-0.557    
-0.218 
0.199**      
-0.055 
0.059 
0.059        
-0.561 
0.267 
0.147         
-0.053 
0.086 
0.000         
-0.557        
-0.218 
4.31 Extent of organisational slack 
in central functions 
0.030 
0.119 







0.067      
-0.055    
-0.212 
-0.068        
-0.094  
0.083        
-0.036        




0.266         
-0.188        
-0.055 
0.106 
4.32 Extent of organisational slack 









0.236      
-0.238     
-0.272 
0.167 
0.031        
-0.018   
0.063        





0.151        





8.5 Extent managers overloaded 
with work 
-0.130     
-0.172     
-0.196 
0.288       
-0.208 
0.000 
-0.226**   
-0.087     
-0.150    
-0.004    
-0.250 
0.068 
-0.126        
-0.018 
0.092         




0.030        
-0.015  
0.590*        
-0.250        
-0.408 
8.6 Extent other employees are 
overloaded with work 
-0.076    
-0.093    
-0.190 
0.522*    
-0.105    
-0.156 
-0.119    
-0.054     
-0.165 
0.244 
0.000      
-0.364 
-0.150*      
-0.134 
0.038 
0.293        
-0.441        
-0.191 
-0.084       
-0.043 
0.023 
0.518*      
0.000         
-0.781** 












0.194**      
-0.031 
0.277 
0.130        






0.000         
-0.392 
8.12  Extent information available 










0.068      




0.039         
-0.080 





0.208         
-0.463        
-0.429  










0.059      
-0.177 
0.250      
-0.413 
0.091         
-0.144 
0.130        
-0.056 






0.250         
-0.124 
8.15 Extent strategic capacity is 
overloaded 
-0.186*  
0.002      
-0.229 
0.742**    
-0.262    
-0.128 
-0.252**   
-0.216    
-0.239    
-0.049    
-0.257    
-0.299 
-0.130       
-0.057 
0.152        
-0.008         
-0.421       
-0.299 
-0.236**     
-0.086        
-0.102 
0.561*       
-0.257       
-0.640* 
8.16 Extent operational capacity is 
overloaded 
-0.159*   
-0.061    
-0.099 
0.121       
-0.355    
-0.209 
-0.197**   
-0.061     
-0.140 
0.323      
-0.192     
-0.449 
-0.184*      
-0.226* 
0.005 
0.046        
-0.545       
-0.454 
-0.139        
-0.191        
-0.212 
0.413         
-0.192        
-0.329 
8.17 Extent policy analysis 
capacity is overloaded 
-0.091    
-0.001 
0.071 
0.329       
-0.120  
0.039      
-0.088 
0.320 
-0.108        
-0.013 
0.122 









0.000      
-0.024 
-0.098       
-0.162 
0.000        
-0.329 
8.18 Extent of budgetary slack in 
the organisation 
0.068      
-0.070 
0.127       
-0.375     
-0.219     
-0.077 
0.094 
0.031   




0.056         
-0.144       
-0.093        





0.152        



























Appendix 5.20  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of resources devoted to 
activities at the centre rather than in services statements and CPA Rating, 
Performance Management Score, Service Score and Corporate Assessment 
(Hypothesis E2) 
STATEMENT  
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 











                                *           ** 
LA 2005                 2           10 
All 2009                  1            0 
LA 2009                  3            1 
Fire 2009                2            1 
Police 2009            0            0 
PCT 2009               7            2 
*         **  
1       3 
1       0 
1       1 
0        1 
0        0 
0       0 
*         ** 
1        2         
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
2        1 
*         ** 
0      1 
0      0 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
2        1 
*          ** 
0        4 
0        0 
1        0 
2        0 
0        0 
3        0 
8.7 Amount of resources deployed at 
corporate centre 
0.052       
-0.051 
0.021 
0.279        
-0.337     
-0.120 
0.037   
0.073      
-0.017 
0.362 
0.000      
-0.562 
-0.094        
-0.158        
-0.169 
0.134         
-0.343        
-0.361 
0.065 
0.025         
-0.007 
0.551*      
0.000         
-0.602 
8.10 Level of resources to do 























0.200        
0.000          
-0.640* 
8.11 Level of resources to do 





0.196       
-0.240 
0.149 
0.140      
-0.051 
0.105      
-0.042    











0.414        




8.12 Extent information available for 










0.068      




0.039         
-0.080 





0.208        
-0.463        
-0.429 
8.15 Extent strategic capacity is 
overloaded 
-0.186* 
0.002        
-0.229 
0.742**    
-0.262     
-0.128 
-0.252**   
-0.216     
-0.239    
-0.049    
-0.257     
-0.299 
-0.130        
-0.057 
0.152        
-0.008       
-0.412       
-0.299 
-0.236**    
-0.086       
-0.102 
0.561*       
-0.257       
-0.640* 
8.17 Extent policy analysis capacity is 
overloaded 
-0.091     
-0.001 
0.071 




0.039      
-0.088 
0.320 
0.000      
-0.024 
-0.108        
-0.013 
0.122 
0.211        





0.202       






























Appendix 5.21  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of resources spent on 
service planning statements and CPA Rating, Performance Management 
Score, Service Score and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis E3) 
STATEMENT  
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                             *           ** 
LA 2005               0             6 
All 2009                0            0 
LA 2009                0            0 
Fire 2009              1            0              
Police 2009          0            0 
PCT 2009              1           1 
*         **  
0       2 
0       0 
0       0 
0        0 
0        0 
0       0 
*         ** 
0        2         
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
*         ** 
0      1 
0      0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        1 
*          ** 
0        1 
0        0 
0       0 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
8.2 Allocation of resources formally 
determined by priorities 
0.192**    
-0.005 
0.031   
NC       
NC  
0.333 
0.196**   
-0.006    
-0.045 
NC     
NC          
-0.111 
0.131   
0.038         
-0.009   
NC        
NC    
0.259 
0.171*        
-0.151        
-0.204   
NC         
NC             
-0.333 
8.7 Amount of resources deployed 
at corporate centre 
0.052       
-0.051 
0.021 
0.279        
-0.337     
-0.120 
0.037    
0.073      
-0.017 
0.362 
0.000      
-0.562 
-0.094       
-0.158          
-0.169 
0.134        
-0.343       
-0.361 
0.065    
0.025         
-0.007 
0.551*      
0.000         
-0.602 
8.12 Extent information available for 










0.068      




0.039        
-0.080 
0.092        
-0.841** 
0.360** 
0.190    
0.203 
0.208         







Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of resources spent on 
performance management statements and CPA Rating, Performance 




* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 











                                *           ** 
LA 2005                1             4 
All 2009                1             0 
LA 2009                3             1 
Fire 2009              1             0 
Police 2009          0             0  
PCT 2009              5            1  
*         **  
0       2 
1       0 
1       1 
0        0 
0        0 
0       0 
*         ** 
1        0         
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
1        1 
*         ** 
0      0 
0      0 
1      0 
0        0 
0        0 
2        0 
*          ** 
0        2 
0        0 
1       0 
1        0 
0        0 
2        0 
8.7 Amount of resources deployed 
at corporate centre 
0.052             
-0.051   
0.021    
0.279                
-0.337           
-0.120 
0.037                  
0.073              
-0.017      
0.362 
0.000        
-0.562 
-0.094       
-0.158       
-0.169 
0.134        
-0.343       
-0.361 
0.065 
0.025        
-0.007 
0.551*      
0.000         
-0.602 
8.10 Level of resources to do 























0.200       
0.000         
-0.640* 
8.11 Level of resources to do 





0.196         
-0.240 
0.149 
0.140        
-0.051 
0.105       
-0.042       





0.092        





0.414        





Pearson correlation coefficients for well-trained and motivated employees 
statements and CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, Service Score 
and Corporate Assessment  (Hypothesis E5) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 











                                *          ** 
LA 2005                 2          10 
All 2009                 3            4 
LA 2009                 5            6 
Fire 2009               0            0 
Police 2009           3            0 
PCT 2009              0             0 
*         **  
1        3 
0        1 
2        1 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
0        2         
2        1 
1       2 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
1       2 
0        0 
2        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*          ** 
0        3 
1        2 
0        3 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
4.7 Organisation wide (corporate) 






NC     
NC 
0.005    
0.139 
0.171      
-0.051 
NC     
NC 
0.073        
-0.030 
0.040 
0.113     





0.067    
NC         
NC 





0.210       
-0.024 












0.330        







4.39 Organisation regarded as 












































0.171        
-0.079       





0.191       
0.000         
-0.200 










0.388**   
-0.071 











0.136        

























Pearson correlation coefficients for resources follow priorities statements and 
CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, Service Score and Corporate 





* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 











                              *           ** 
LA 2005                 1           3 
All 2009                  0          0 
LA 2009                 0           1 
Fire 2009                0           0 
Police 2009            0           0 
PCT 2009                0           0 
*         **  
0        1 
0       0 
0       0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
0        1         
0        0 
0       1 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
0        1 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*          ** 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
8.1 Departmental 
under/overspends carried over 
one year to next 
0.063        
-0.182      
-0.248       
-0.094       
-0.219 
NC 
-0.021     
-0.173     




0.208**   
0.125          
-0.021          
-0.247 
0.152      
NC 
0.010        
-0.046        
-0.152        
-0.286    
0.000    
NC 
8.2 Allocation of resources 
formally determined by 
priorities 
0.192**    
-0.005 
0.031 
0.066        
-0.069 
0.200 
0.196**   
-0.006      
-0.045 
NC      
NC            
-0.111 
0.131   
0.038           
-0.009   
NC            
NC      
0.259 
0.171*        
-0.151        
-0.204 
NC         





Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of ICT use statements and 
CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, Service Score and Corporate 







* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 











                               *           ** 
LA 2005                  1           1 
All 2009                  0           0 
LA 2009                  0           0 
Fire 2009                0           0 
Police 2009            0           0 
PCT 2009                0           0   
*         **  
0       1 
0      0 
0       0 
0        0 
0        0 
0       0 
*         ** 
0        0        
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
0       0 
0      0 
0      0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*          ** 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
5.1 Use of proprietary 
performance management 
software 
0.035         
-0.137       
-0.238 
0.213         
-0.219       
-0.218 
0.060         
-0.202      
-0.195 
0.074        
-0.474     
-0.218 
0.071            
-0.017          
-0.089         
-0.019         
-0.434 
0.024 
0.063         
-0.156       
-0.220 
0.107        
-0.474        
-0.218 


















0.432          
-0.250 
0.185*   
0.071        
-0.023 
0.426 





Pearson correlation coefficients for active engagement with auditors, 
inspectors and other stakeholders’ statements and CPA Rating, Performance 
Management Score, Service Score and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis 
F1) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                                *           ** 
LA 2005                  9          36 
All 2009                  6            3 
LA 2009                  7            3  
Fire 2009                8            4 
Police 2009            0            0 
PCT 2009                1            1 
*         **  
1       12 
0         1 
4         1 
1         0 
0         0 
0         0 
*         ** 
2        7        
2        2 
1       2 
1        0 
0        0 
1        0 
*         ** 
3        8 
1        1 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
1        0 
*         ** 
3        9 
3        0 
2        0 
5        4 
0        0 
0        0 





0.000    






NC      
NC  
0.103          
-0.061 
0.095 
0.234     





0.134   
NC         
NC 




0.385**    
-0.189 











0.523       





0.071   
NC         
NC 
9.6 External auditors 
supportive of organisation 
0.277** 
0.125 
0.254         
-0.189 




0.476**   
-0.037 
NC      
NC  
0.244**        
-0.041 
0.029 
0.123     





0.071   




9.9 Extent internal audit 
involvement in performance 
management 
0.218**    
-0.026 
0.087 
0.188         






0.000        
-0.062 
0.164*         
-0.093 
0.024 






0.533*    
0.000 
0.371 
9.10  Extent use of external 
audit to improve performance 
management 
0.124        
-0.026 
0.182 
0.131         





0.206       
-0.367      
-0.286 
0.119          
-0.021 
0.139 
0.111          





0.716**     
-0.367 
0.156 
9.11 Extent of use consultants 
in centre 
-0.074       
-0.183      
-0.076 
0.146         
-0.441       
-0.302 
-0.040     
-0.108     
-0.186      
-0.079      
-0.202     
-0.201 
-0.014         
-0.296**      
-0.018         
-0.180          
-0.315         
-0.201 
-0.093       
-0.084       
-0.271 
0.774**      
-0.202 
0.000 
9.12 Extent use of inspection 
improves performance at 
service delivery 
0.152*       
-0.076  
0.070 






0.031       
-0.187      
-0.442 
0.125          
-0.116         
-0.012 
0.015          





0.505         
-0.188 
0.000 
9.13 Extent of use consultants 
in services 
-0.119      
-0.043      
-0.084 
0.300 
0.000         
-0.477 
-0.075     
-0.265*   
-0.265      
-0.262 
0.354        
-0.373 
-0.047          
-0.196          
-0.092         
-0.216 
0.243          
-0.248 
-0.132        





9.14 Extent of involvement of 
external stakeholders in 
organisation 









0.487       
-0.204     
-0.111 









0.523*       
-0.204       
-0.111 























0.581*    
0.000         
-0.408 




























9.17 Level of engagement with 
professional organisations 
0.272**    
-0.140      
-0.099 
0.124         
-0.020      
-0.361 
0.079   
0.110       
-0.099 




0.014          
-0.124 




0.120        
-0.015   
0.391          
-0.214 
0.602 
9.18 Extent of use of internal 
networks by organisation 










0.250        
-0.114 










0.250         
-0.052 
9.19 Extent of use of external 
networks by organisation 












0.176*          
-0.035 
0.056 
0.076          








9.22 Extent to which 
stakeholders participate in 
performance management 
0.192**  






0.083       
-0.038 
0.322 
0.359        
-0.294 
0.198**       
-0.200         
-0.258 
0.329 
0.205           
-0.240 
0.229**      





9.23 Extent to which citizens 














0.292**        
-0.232*        
-0.220 
0.438          
-0.389         
-0.356 




0.046         
-0.267 
9.25 Extent partnerships 











0.303        











0.551*       






Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of outsourcing of services 
statements and CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, Service Score 
and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis F2) 
 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                           *           ** 
LA 2005              0            0 
All 2009              1            1 
LA 2009              0            0 
Fire 2009             1           0 
Police 2009         0           0 
PCT 2009             0           0 
*         **  
0        0 
0        1 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
0        0        
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*          ** 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
9.1 Outsourced any central 
services 
0.001        
-0.118       








0.000       
-0.583 
0.035          
-0.112          
-0.096 
0.556* 








9.2 Outsourced any customer 
services 
0.037         
-0.046 
0.035         
-0.094       
-0.277       
-0.488 
0.076        
-0.055 
0.079        
-0.130     
-0.500     
-0.143 
-0.047         
-0.079   
0.103          
-0.101          




0.254        
-0.018        
-0.500       
-0.293 
9.3 Strategic partnership with 
provider of many services 
0.011        
-0.240*      
-0.157       
-0.289      





0.455       
-0.474 
0.444 
0.029          
-0.133         
-0.154 
0.395          
-0.304 
0.259 
0.043        
-0.217*      
-0.174        






Pearson correlation coefficients for greater involvement of stakeholders and 
citizens in performance management statements and CPA Rating, 
Performance Management Score, Service Score and Corporate Assessment 
(Hypothesis F3) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                                *           ** 
LA 2005                 11             25 
All 2009                  2                1 
LA 2009                  1                0 
Fire 2009                 5               1 
Police 2009             1               0 
PCT 2009                3               1 
*         **  
1       9 
0       1 
1       0 
1       0 
0       0 
0       0 
*        ** 
6        3        
0        0 
0       0 
0        0 
0        0 
2        0 
*         ** 
1       6 
1       0 
0       0 
1        1 
1        0 
1        1 
*          ** 
3        7 
1        0 
0        0 
3        0 
0        0 
0        0 
9.7 Views of organisation employees 
formally collected 
0.181** 











0.053        
-0.147       
-0.213       
-0.114 






0.000   
NC 
9.8 Views of politicians formally 
collected 
0.155*    
-0.151    
-0.122 






0.389    
-0.567   
-0.687* 
0.063         
-0.196       
-0.149  
0.477        





0.463       
-0.567      
-0.316 
9.14 Extent of involvement of external 
stakeholders in organisation 









0.487    
-0.204   
-0.111 









0.523*      




9.17 Level of engagement with 
professional organisations 
0.272**   
-0.140    
-0.099 
0.124       
-0.020    
-0.361 
0.079    
0.110    
-0.099 
0.298    
-0.214 
0.762* 
0.288**   
0.014        
-0.124 
0.252        
-0.304 
0.227 
0.216**   
0.120       
-0.015 
0.391       
-0.214 
0.602 
9.18 Extent of use of internal 
networks by organisation 










0.250    
-0.114 
0.204**     
-0.028   
0.066 
0.047 






0.250       
-0.052 
9.19 Extent of use of external 
networks by organisation 












0.176*      
-0.035  
0.056    
0.076        








9.20 Extent of user (of services) 
consultation 
0.360**   
-0.039    
-0.039 
0.000 
0.031       
-0.180 
0.279** 
0.006    
-0.027 
0.197    
-0.169    
-0.120 
0.320**      
-0.157  
0.063 
0.105        





0.356        
-0.169        
-0.180 
9.21 Transactions with citizens rather 
than relationships 
-0.067     
-0.032    





0.008    




0.018      
0.032         
-0.010       
-0.255 
0.095        
-0.060 
-0.103   





9.22 Extent to which stakeholders 
participate in performance 
management 
0.192** 






0.083    
-0.038 
0.322 
0.359    
-0.294 
0.198**      
-0.200         
-0.258 
0.329 
0.205        
-0.240 
0.229**      





9.23 Extent to which citizens 














0.292**       
-0.232*     
-0.220 
0.438        
-0.389        
-0.356 




0.000        
-0.267  
9.24 Extent partnerships fragmenting 




0.200        
0.008  
0.044  
0.156    
-0.419 
0.013         
-0.115         
-0.016       




0.286       
549 
 








9.25 Extent partnerships making 










0.303    











0.551*       



























Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of communication 
statements and CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, Service Score 
and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis G1) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                                *             ** 
LA 2005                2              12 
All 2009                3                2 
LA 2009                 5               1 
Fire 2009               0               2 
Police 2009           0               0 
PCT 2009              1                1   
*         **  
0       5 
0      0 
1       0 
0        0 
0        0 
0       0 
*         ** 
1        3        
2        0 
1        1 
0        1 
0        0 
0        0 
*        ** 
0       1 
0       0 
0       0 
0        1 
0        0 
1         1 
*        ** 
1        3 
1        2 
3        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
10.1 Extent organisation’s 

























10.2 Extent communication on 





0.048       




0.157       





0.322        





0.412      
-0.257 
0.229  










0.288*    
-0.013 

































10.4 Extent strategic direction widely 
communicated 
0.241**   
-0.061     
-0.007     
-0.168 





0.587**   











0.182       
-0.257       
-0.392 
10.5 Extent use of employees’ 











0.143     
-0.204    
-0.248 
0.113         
-0.154       
-0.026 
0.385        











Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of performance reporting 
statements and CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, Service Score 
and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis H1) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                                *          ** 
LA 2005                3          15 
All 2009                 1            0 
LA 2009                 1            0 
Fire 2009               3             0 
Police 2009           1             0 
PCT 2009               2            0  
*         **  
3        3 
0        0 
0        0 
1        0 
1         0 
0         0 
*         ** 
0        5        
0        0 
0       0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
0        2 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
2        0 
*        ** 
0        5 
0        0 
1        0 
2        0 
0        0 
0        0 
11.1 Performance reported on the 
organisation’s Intranet 










NC     
NC 
0.080         
-0.101        
-0.031   
NC         
NC        
NC  
0.144        
-0.056       
-0.159 
0.498    
NC        
NC 
11.2 Performance reported on the 




0.139   
NC      
NC 
0.144  
0.051      
-0.011 
0.150  
NC     
NC 
-0.034       
-0.060 
0.015    
NC        
NC        
NC 
0.154        
-0.152       
-0.314* 
0.498    
NC        
NC 
11.3 Extent publishing 
performance data detrimental 
-0.288**  
-0.090    
-0.138 
0.577*    
-0.098    
-0.392 
-0.250**  
-0.139    
-0.165    
-0.028 
0.000      
-0.131 
-0.144       
-0.263*     
-0.061       
-0.118       
-0.097       
-0.240 
-0.274**    
-0.070 
0.074 





11.4 Extent publishing 
performance data internally 
0.185*    
-0.086    
-0.014 
0.124 




0.036      
-0.049 
0.375      
-0.517 
0.031        
-0.084 
0.145        
-0.089 
0.601        
-0.635* 
0.195**   





11.5 Extent publishing 









0.165      
-0.246 
0.375      
-0.578 
0.125        
-0.202 
0.044         
-0.150 






0.375          
-0.079 
11.6 Feedback to internal 
stakeholders on strategy/ 
performance management 










0.359      
-0.375 




0.286         
-0.722* 
0.238**   





11.7 Feedback to external 












0.247      
-0.296 





























Pearson correlation coefficients for a high supportive and learning culture that 
encourages innovation and non-blame statements with CPA Rating, 
Performance Management Score, Service Score and Corporate Assessment 
(Hypothesis I1) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 










                                *           ** 
LA 2005                19           65 
All 2009                 12            1  
LA 2009                 12            1 
Fire 2009                 9            1 
Police 2009           10            0 
PCT 2009                8            1   
*         **  
2       24 
1         0 
1         0 
3         0 
2         0 
0         0 
*         ** 
3       19        
7        1 
6        1 
0        0 
2        0 
2        0 
*         ** 
8        3 
0         0 
1         0 
1         0 
4         0 
5         1 
*        ** 
6      19 
4        0 
4        0 
5        1 
2        0 
1        0 












0.415      
-0.250 












12.1 Extent that the organisation is 
a learning organisation 
























12.2 Extent to which a 
psychological contract exists 
between employees and 
organisation 
0.298**    
-0.073 
0.023       
-0.037 
0.277       
-0.273   
0.282** 
0.204 
0.338*     
-0.207 
0.333      
-0.091 
0.192*        
-0.021 
0.148         
-0.216 










12.3 Extent to which high degree of 
mutual trust between parts of the 
organisation 
0.419**      
-0.016 
0.034 

















0.168         
-0.055     
0.000 
0.333 
12.4 Extent to which decision 




0.431       





0.131      
-0.514    
-0.535 
0.218**      
-0.016  
0.158 
0.166        





0.525*        
-0.514       
-0.267 
12.5 Extent to which organisation 
has a blame culture 
-0.238**    





-0.239**   
-0.204    
-0.387** 
0.185 
0.000      
-0.437 
0.020    
0.015        
-0.153       
-0.010        
-0.314 
0.125 
-0.248**    
-0.108        
-0.340* 
0.221 
0.000         
-0.316 
12.6 Extent to which management 





0.000       
-0.196     
0.082 
0.084 
0.111      
-0.115 














12.7 Extent to which organisation 











0.289      
-0.488 










0.289         
-0.418 
12.8 Level of ‘good’ ethical 
behaviour 






















0.474         
-0.267 
12.9 Extent to which employee’s 
level in organisation determines 
contribution 
0.091        
-0.124       
-0.085     
-0.277 
0.186 
0.175     
-0.019    
-0.050     
-0.042    
-0.287 
0.000      
-0.135 
0.119         
-0.189       
-0.079       
-0.423 
0.000        
-0.273 
0.088        
-0.062       
-0.170        
-0.105 
0.000        
-0.219 
12.10 Extent to which employee’s 
role determined by job description 





0.076      
-0.132 
0.218 
0.044   
0.035         
-0.128 
0.199 
-0.049   













12.11 Extent to which organisation 
driven by achievement of targets 
0.311**      
-0.110        
-0.004 
0.400 












0.667*       
-0.383 
0.241**      
-0.034        
-0.257 
0.472 
0.416         
-0.111 
12.12 Extent to which people come 






0.000     
0.235** 
0.132 
0.294*     
-0.043 
0.250      
-0.237   








0.135         
-0.055 
0.250         
-0.151 
12.13 Extent to which organisation 
encourages taking initiative 






















0.000         
-0.143 
12.14 Extent to which officers and 
politicians have distinct and clear 
roles 
0.365**     
0.052 
0.158   
0.329    
0.124       
-0.416  
0.318**    
-0.051     
-0.055    
-0.178 




0.135        
-0.041 






0.000         
-0.286 
12.15 Extent to which power lies 
more in centre than departments 
-0.002     
-0.284*     
-0.157     
-0.577*    
-0.116      
-0.620    
0.021      
-0.094    
-0.174     
-0.256 




0.062        
-0.320        
-0.131       
-0.207 
0.025         
-0.076       
-0.226        
-0.327        
-0.000       
-0.124 
12.16 Level of employees’ morale 0.391**  
0.048 
0.303*     
-0.177 
0.131 
0.156   
0.325** 
0.288** 
















12.17 Extent to which organisational 
position determines contribution in 
teams 
-0.016      
-0.047     
-0.005 
0.099       
-0.049 
0.000    
-0.031     
-0.072    




0.017        
-0.069 
0.078        
-0.515        
-0.049        
-0.144 
-0.046   
0.096        
-0.123 





12.18 Extent to which organisation 
driven by rules 
-0.012        
-0.153       
-0.070 
0.152 
0.414       
-0.500 
-0.077  





0.030   





0.040    





12.19 Extent to which organisation 
operates independently in provision 
of services 
-0.093     
-0.132 
0.139       
-0.442      
-0.614 
0.138   
-0.150*   
-0.051     
-0.003    
-0.479     
-0.474 
0.365 
-0.105       
-0.139  
0.154        





0.085         
-0.177       
-0.474 
0.526 
12.20 Extent to which organisation 
is change oriented 





0.106    
0.150*     
-0.023     








0.381        
-0.200 
0.190*       
-0.088       
-0.132 
0.535* 
0.000         
-0.318 
12.21 Extent to which organisation 
is results oriented 





0.267      
0.298** 
0.130 
0.168      
-0.107 
0.354      
-0.134   
0.174*       
-0.137   
0.235        
-0.136 






0.354         
-0.267 
12.22 Extent of barriers to 
cooperation between service areas 
-0.294**    
-0.167     
-0.171      
-0.387      
-0.198 
0.060 
-0.224**   
-0.182     
-0.295 
0.064 
0.000      
-0.189 
-0.016       
-0.158       
-0.057       
-0.118        
-0.392 
0.016 
-0.318**     
-0.253*     
-0.256          
-0.488      
0.000 
0.478 
12.23 Extent of barriers to 
cooperation between centre and 
service areas 
-0.278**    
-0.031     
-0.025 
0.274       
-0.233 
0.000    
-0.228**   
-0.136     
-0.175     
-0.067 
0.000      
-0.131 
-0.023       
-0.152        
-0.004        
-0.268        
-0.461 
0.087 
-0.295**     
-0.018       
-0.122 
0.518*        
-0.233 
0.000 
12.24 Extent service to public a high 
priority 
0.373**    
-0.148 
0.056        
-0.158      
















0.265         
-0.075     
0.000 
0.156 
12.25 Extent to which ideology 
drives organisation activities 
0.040        
-0.149 






0.065        









0.613       
-0.364 
0.686*    
-0.145 
0.775*       
-0.671* 
0.686*       
-0.073 
12.26 Extent to which management 
creates a supportive culture 
0.285**     
-0.097  
0.043       
-0.066 




















12.27 Extent internal environment 


























12.28 Extent external environment 
has impact on organisation’s 
performance 












































































12.31 Extent of learning from 
voluntary sector 
0.225**      
-0.054        
-0.047 
0.128 
0.073       
-0.538 
0.198** 





0.174*       
-0.200 
0.354        
-0.094 
0.394         
-0.100 






12.32 Extent of inclination for 













0.106   













12.33 Extent of misrepresentation of 
performance information 
-0.140*    
0.042 
0.080       
-0.069  
0.042 
0.000     
-0.246**   
-0.026    




0.032         
-0.057 
0.043        









12.34 Extent of misrepresentation of 
financial information 
-0.178*    
-0.120     
-0.093      
-0.213     
-0.693* 
0.000     
-0.146    
-0.084     
-0.088    
-0.074    
-0.500 
0.102 
0.026         
-0.084         
-0.007 
0.019        
-0.687* 
0.386 
-0.131       
-0.229*      
-0.143        
-0.463       
-0.500 
0.204 
12.35 Extent performance 




0.064        
-0.107 
0.430       
-0.500    
0.207** 
0.095 
0.229      
-0.257 




0.030        
-0.337 

















Appendix 5.32  
Pearson correlation coefficients where power is diffused throughout the 
organisation statements and CPA Rating, Performance Management Score, 
Service Score and Corporate Assessment (Hypothesis I2) 
STATEMENT 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 
NX – Not included 











                             *           ** 
LA 2005               1           11 
All 2009               3             0 
LA 2009               0             0 
Fire 2009              1            1 
Police 2009          0            0 
PCT 2009              0            1 
*         **  
0       4 
1       0 
0        0 
1        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
0        2        
2        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 
*         ** 
1        2 
0        0 
0        0 
0        1 
0        0 
0        1 
*        ** 
0        3 
0        0 
0       0 
0        0 
0        0 
0        0 






0.190      
-0.538 
0.070       
-0.026    
-0.069 
0.164 












0.395         
-0.316 




0.237       
-0.141 


















0.152        
-0.500 
7.4 Level of empowerment of 
officers 
0.332**   
-0.049 








0.150      
-0.156 








0.252        
-0.023 




12.3 Extent to which high degree 
of mutual trust between parts of 
the organisation 
0.419**    
-0.016 
0.034 

















0.168         






















































Appendix 5.33  
 
SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for the 
2005 survey using only those statements statistically significant at p<0.05 
with CPA Rating  
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 39.319 25.868 25.868 39.319 25.868 25.868 7.220 
2 5.902 3.883 29.751 5.902 3.883 29.751 7.614 
3 4.460 2.934 32.684 4.460 2.934 32.684 3.095 
4 3.547 2.333 35.018 3.547 2.333 35.018 6.070 
5 3.461 2.277 37.295 3.461 2.277 37.295 5.292 
6 3.281 2.158 39.453 3.281 2.158 39.453 6.774 
7 2.998 1.972 41.425 2.998 1.972 41.425 2.423 
8 2.842 1.870 43.295 2.842 1.870 43.295 8.127 
9 2.598 1.709 45.004 2.598 1.709 45.004 2.950 
10 2.539 1.671 46.675 2.539 1.671 46.675 3.750 
11 2.375 1.562 48.237 2.375 1.562 48.237 7.053 
12 2.357 1.551 49.788 2.357 1.551 49.788 11.759 
13 2.263 1.489 51.277 2.263 1.489 51.277 5.555 
14 2.157 1.419 52.696 2.157 1.419 52.696 8.824 
15 2.066 1.359 54.055 2.066 1.359 54.055 2.490 
16 1.981 1.304 55.359 1.981 1.304 55.359 7.273 
17 1.901 1.251 56.610 1.901 1.251 56.610 6.223 
18 1.860 1.223 57.833 1.860 1.223 57.833 4.754 
19 1.813 1.192 59.026 1.813 1.192 59.026 5.673 
20 1.702 1.120 60.146 1.702 1.120 60.146 9.130 
21 1.664 1.095 61.240 1.664 1.095 61.240 8.894 
22 1.607 1.057 62.297 1.607 1.057 62.297 8.178 
23 1.549 1.019 63.317 1.549 1.019 63.317 3.038 
24 1.496 .984 64.301 1.496 .984 64.301 10.259 
25 1.447 .952 65.253 1.447 .952 65.253 7.785 
26 1.420 .934 66.187 1.420 .934 66.187 1.973 
27 1.400 .921 67.108 1.400 .921 67.108 4.943 
28 1.339 .881 67.989 1.339 .881 67.989 7.772 
29 1.321 .869 68.858 1.321 .869 68.858 8.612 
30 1.287 .847 69.705 1.287 .847 69.705 5.824 
563 
 
31 1.252 .824 70.528 1.252 .824 70.528 2.629 
32 1.225 .806 71.334 1.225 .806 71.334 10.840 
33 1.181 .777 72.111 1.181 .777 72.111 7.476 
34 1.162 .764 72.875 1.162 .764 72.875 5.977 
35 1.133 .745 73.621 1.133 .745 73.621 7.736 
36 1.128 .742 74.363 1.128 .742 74.363 5.078 
37 1.087 .715 75.078 1.087 .715 75.078 6.276 
38 1.064 .700 75.778 1.064 .700 75.778 6.045 
39 1.060 .697 76.475 1.060 .697 76.475 4.166 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to                                                                                 










































Appendix 5.34  
 
SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for the 
2005 survey using only those statements statistically significant at p<0.05 
with Performance Management Score  
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 36.965 26.216 26.216 36.965 26.216 26.216 4.499 
2 5.275 3.741 29.957 5.275 3.741 29.957 6.372 
3 4.259 3.020 32.977 4.259 3.020 32.977 9.443 
4 3.722 2.640 35.617 3.722 2.640 35.617 4.334 
5 3.447 2.444 38.062 3.447 2.444 38.062 6.017 
6 3.077 2.183 40.244 3.077 2.183 40.244 5.838 
7 2.755 1.954 42.198 2.755 1.954 42.198 6.486 
8 2.655 1.883 44.081 2.655 1.883 44.081 8.357 
9 2.438 1.729 45.811 2.438 1.729 45.811 4.453 
10 2.315 1.642 47.452 2.315 1.642 47.452 8.343 
11 2.151 1.525 48.978 2.151 1.525 48.978 2.779 
12 2.086 1.479 50.457 2.086 1.479 50.457 3.211 
13 2.052 1.455 51.912 2.052 1.455 51.912 6.439 
14 1.994 1.414 53.327 1.994 1.414 53.327 10.495 
15 1.918 1.360 54.687 1.918 1.360 54.687 5.350 
16 1.851 1.313 56.000 1.851 1.313 56.000 7.391 
17 1.774 1.258 57.258 1.774 1.258 57.258 6.657 
18 1.704 1.209 58.466 1.704 1.209 58.466 10.508 
19 1.674 1.187 59.653 1.674 1.187 59.653 6.074 
20 1.634 1.159 60.812 1.634 1.159 60.812 3.191 
21 1.579 1.120 61.932 1.579 1.120 61.932 4.506 
22 1.521 1.079 63.011 1.521 1.079 63.011 3.172 
23 1.504 1.067 64.078 1.504 1.067 64.078 4.336 
24 1.454 1.031 65.109 1.454 1.031 65.109 4.612 
25 1.445 1.025 66.134 1.445 1.025 66.134 7.757 
26 1.370 .971 67.105 1.370 .971 67.105 2.703 
27 1.322 .937 68.043 1.322 .937 68.043 6.939 
28 1.286 .912 68.955 1.286 .912 68.955 4.229 
29 1.260 .894 69.849 1.260 .894 69.849 9.149 
30 1.227 .870 70.719 1.227 .870 70.719 2.538 
565 
 
31 1.198 .850 71.569 1.198 .850 71.569 7.179 
32 1.174 .832 72.401 1.174 .832 72.401 3.031 
33 1.148 .814 73.215 1.148 .814 73.215 9.034 
34 1.102 .781 73.996 1.102 .781 73.996 10.651 
35 1.063 .754 74.750 1.063 .754 74.750 6.392 
36 1.055 .748 75.498 1.055 .748 75.498 9.071 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to                                                                            















































Appendix 5.35  
 
SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for the 
2005 survey using only those statements statistically significant at p<0.05 
with Service Score  
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 27.168 26.635 26.635 27.168 26.635 26.635 7.143 
2 4.268 4.184 30.819 4.268 4.184 30.819 4.072 
3 3.303 3.238 34.058 3.303 3.238 34.058 5.465 
4 3.092 3.031 37.089 3.092 3.031 37.089 4.295 
5 2.341 2.295 39.384 2.341 2.295 39.384 2.433 
6 2.319 2.274 41.657 2.319 2.274 41.657 8.323 
7 2.193 2.150 43.807 2.193 2.150 43.807 2.145 
8 2.026 1.986 45.793 2.026 1.986 45.793 4.556 
9 1.957 1.918 47.711 1.957 1.918 47.711 7.305 
10 1.904 1.867 49.578 1.904 1.867 49.578 6.367 
11 1.845 1.809 51.387 1.845 1.809 51.387 6.035 
12 1.770 1.735 53.122 1.770 1.735 53.122 4.394 
13 1.695 1.662 54.784 1.695 1.662 54.784 3.682 
14 1.627 1.595 56.378 1.627 1.595 56.378 5.391 
15 1.551 1.520 57.899 1.551 1.520 57.899 5.135 
16 1.456 1.428 59.326 1.456 1.428 59.326 5.983 
17 1.441 1.413 60.739 1.441 1.413 60.739 4.248 
18 1.391 1.364 62.103 1.391 1.364 62.103 7.437 
19 1.324 1.298 63.400 1.324 1.298 63.400 4.362 
20 1.266 1.241 64.641 1.266 1.241 64.641 4.659 
21 1.236 1.212 65.853 1.236 1.212 65.853 4.454 
22 1.170 1.147 67.000 1.170 1.147 67.000 4.768 
23 1.130 1.108 68.108 1.130 1.108 68.108 7.267 
24 1.105 1.083 69.192 1.105 1.083 69.192 8.551 
25 1.091 1.070 70.262 1.091 1.070 70.262 7.604 
26 1.048 1.028 71.289 1.048 1.028 71.289 2.789 
27 1.023 1.003 72.292 1.023 1.003 72.292 6.353 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to                                                                                    





Appendix 5.36  
 
SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for the 
2005 survey using only those statements statistically significant at p<0.05 
with Corporate Assessment  
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 38.652 26.474 26.474 38.652 26.474 26.474 12.862 
2 5.595 3.832 30.306 5.595 3.832 30.306 3.814 
3 4.282 2.933 33.239 4.282 2.933 33.239 6.156 
4 3.484 2.386 35.625 3.484 2.386 35.625 4.598 
5 3.424 2.346 37.971 3.424 2.346 37.971 4.765 
6 3.281 2.247 40.218 3.281 2.247 40.218 2.893 
7 2.860 1.959 42.177 2.860 1.959 42.177 6.647 
8 2.804 1.921 44.098 2.804 1.921 44.098 2.798 
9 2.591 1.774 45.872 2.591 1.774 45.872 9.521 
10 2.453 1.680 47.553 2.453 1.680 47.553 8.339 
11 2.273 1.557 49.109 2.273 1.557 49.109 2.430 
12 2.216 1.518 50.627 2.216 1.518 50.627 10.869 
13 2.133 1.461 52.088 2.133 1.461 52.088 6.973 
14 2.079 1.424 53.513 2.079 1.424 53.513 8.384 
15 2.021 1.384 54.897 2.021 1.384 54.897 5.694 
16 1.868 1.280 56.177 1.868 1.280 56.177 5.871 
17 1.827 1.252 57.428 1.827 1.252 57.428 2.475 
18 1.718 1.177 58.605 1.718 1.177 58.605 4.435 
19 1.688 1.156 59.761 1.688 1.156 59.761 3.887 
20 1.665 1.141 60.901 1.665 1.141 60.901 2.226 
21 1.593 1.091 61.992 1.593 1.091 61.992 5.844 
22 1.537 1.052 63.045 1.537 1.052 63.045 8.480 
23 1.462 1.001 64.046 1.462 1.001 64.046 6.345 
24 1.450 .993 65.039 1.450 .993 65.039 9.311 
25 1.381 .946 65.985 1.381 .946 65.985 6.713 
26 1.349 .924 66.909 1.349 .924 66.909 5.359 
27 1.308 .896 67.805 1.308 .896 67.805 3.107 
28 1.280 .876 68.681 1.280 .876 68.681 5.850 
29 1.261 .864 69.545 1.261 .864 69.545 7.922 
30 1.248 .855 70.400 1.248 .855 70.400 10.561 
31 1.223 .838 71.238 1.223 .838 71.238 9.679 
568 
 
32 1.205 .825 72.063 1.205 .825 72.063 5.477 
33 1.139 .780 72.843 1.139 .780 72.843 8.404 
34 1.129 .773 73.616 1.129 .773 73.616 7.498 
35 1.087 .744 74.361 1.087 .744 74.361 7.483 
36 1.057 .724 75.085 1.057 .724 75.085 2.153 
37 1.033 .708 75.792 1.033 .708 75.792 2.861 
38 1.023 .701 76.493 1.023 .701 76.493 6.991 
39 1.011 .692 77.186 1.011 .692 77.186 5.809 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to                                                             















































SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for all 
organisation types combined for the 2009 survey using only those 
statements statistically significant at p<0.05 with CPA Rating  
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 5.866 25.506 25.506 5.866 25.506 25.506 4.218 
2 2.245 9.760 35.266 2.245 9.760 35.266 3.928 
3 1.784 7.756 43.022 1.784 7.756 43.022 2.042 
4 1.471 6.394 49.416 1.471 6.394 49.416 1.818 
5 1.346 5.854 55.270 1.346 5.854 55.270 2.144 
6 1.222 5.314 60.584 1.222 5.314 60.584 1.254 
7 1.092 4.747 65.331 1.092 4.747 65.331 2.316 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to                                                                       






























Appendix 5.38  
 
SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for local 
authorities for the 2009 survey using only those statements statistically 
significant at p<0.05 with CPA Rating  
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 10.841 33.878 33.878 10.841 33.878 33.878 7.126 
2 2.444 7.637 41.515 2.444 7.637 41.515 4.347 
3 2.216 6.924 48.439 2.216 6.924 48.439 4.687 
4 1.798 5.618 54.057 1.798 5.618 54.057 2.063 
5 1.544 4.826 58.883 1.544 4.826 58.883 3.175 
6 1.349 4.216 63.100 1.349 4.216 63.100 5.873 
7 1.270 3.970 67.070 1.270 3.970 67.070 2.185 
8 1.218 3.807 70.876 1.218 3.807 70.876 2.842 
9 1.057 3.305 74.181 1.057 3.305 74.181 2.571 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to                                                                           



























Appendix 5.39  
 
SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for 
police forces for the 2009 survey using only those statements statistically 
significant at p<0.05 with CPA Rating  
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 3.467 57.778 57.778 3.467 57.778 57.778 3.050 
2 .976 16.274 74.053 .976 16.274 74.053 2.285 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot 






































SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for 
primary care trusts for the 2009 survey using only those statements 
statistically significant at p<0.05 with CPA Rating  
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 2.897 72.433 72.433 2.897 72.433 72.433 2.736 
2 .730 18.244 90.676 .730 18.244 90.676 1.596 
3 .229 5.714 96.391 .229 5.714 96.391 2.285 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be  





































SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for all 
organisation types combined for the 2009 survey using only those 
statements statistically significant at p<0.05 with Performance Management 
Score 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 15.015 32.641 32.641 15.015 32.641 32.641 7.142 
2 3.221 7.002 39.644 3.221 7.002 39.644 2.758 
3 2.278 4.952 44.596 2.278 4.952 44.596 3.892 
4 2.099 4.563 49.159 2.099 4.563 49.159 7.198 
5 1.704 3.704 52.863 1.704 3.704 52.863 2.579 
6 1.667 3.623 56.486 1.667 3.623 56.486 1.814 
7 1.488 3.234 59.720 1.488 3.234 59.720 6.930 
8 1.453 3.158 62.878 1.453 3.158 62.878 3.960 
9 1.366 2.970 65.847 1.366 2.970 65.847 6.374 
10 1.191 2.589 68.437 1.191 2.589 68.437 4.527 
11 1.116 2.427 70.863 1.116 2.427 70.863 6.312 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be  
























Appendix 5.42  
 
SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for local 
authorities for the 2009 survey using only those statements statistically 
significant at p<0.05 with Performance Management Score 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 13.556 32.277 32.277 13.556 32.277 32.277 6.905 
2 3.414 8.128 40.405 3.414 8.128 40.405 4.218 
3 2.582 6.149 46.554 2.582 6.149 46.554 2.063 
4 2.259 5.378 51.932 2.259 5.378 51.932 7.306 
5 1.941 4.622 56.554 1.941 4.622 56.554 4.704 
6 1.797 4.279 60.834 1.797 4.279 60.834 2.306 
7 1.616 3.848 64.682 1.616 3.848 64.682 3.297 
8 1.487 3.540 68.221 1.487 3.540 68.221 6.089 
9 1.324 3.152 71.373 1.324 3.152 71.373 4.390 
10 1.163 2.770 74.143 1.163 2.770 74.143 5.622 
11 1.048 2.496 76.639 1.048 2.496 76.639 1.915 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be  

























SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for fire 
services for the 2009 survey using only those statements statistically 
significant at p<0.05 with Performance Management Score 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 3.983 56.903 56.903 3.983 56.903 56.903 3.722 
2 .994 14.203 71.106 .994 14.203 71.106 2.464 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot 






































SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for 
PCTs for the 2009 survey using only those statements statistically 
significant at p<0.05 with Performance Management Score 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 5.283 66.037 66.037 5.283 66.037 66.037 4.396 
2 1.042 13.023 79.059 1.042 13.023 79.059 3.795 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot  




































Appendix 5.45  
 
SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for all 
organisation types combined for the 2009 survey using only those 
statements statistically significant at p<0.05 with Service Score 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 1.889 20.987 20.987 1.889 20.987 20.987 1.686 
2 1.376 15.294 36.281 1.376 15.294 36.281 1.377 
3 1.299 14.433 50.714 1.299 14.433 50.714 1.361 
4 1.191 13.235 63.949 1.191 13.235 63.949 1.473 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot  

































Appendix 5.46  
 
SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for local 
authorities for the 2009 survey using only those statements statistically 
significant at p<0.05 with Service Score 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 2.937 41.964 41.964 2.937 41.964 41.964 2.456 
2 1.218 17.403 59.367 1.218 17.403 59.367 1.212 
3 .836 11.940 71.307 .836 11.940 71.307 2.256 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot  



































Appendix 5.47  
 
SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for fire 
services for the 2009 survey using only those statements statistically 
significant at <0.05 with Service Score 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 7.288 52.060 52.060 7.288 52.060 52.060 5.005 
2 1.594 11.384 63.445 1.594 11.384 63.445 5.093 
3 1.402 10.015 73.460 1.402 10.015 73.460 3.090 
4 .850 6.070 79.530 .850 6.070 79.530 3.511 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot 

































Appendix 5.48  
 
SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for 
police forces for the 2009 survey using only those statements statistically 
significant at p<0.05 with Service Score 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 3.405 68.106 68.106 3.405 68.106 68.106 2.939 
2 .743 14.866 82.972 .743 14.866 82.972 2.588 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot 


































Appendix 5.49  
 
SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for all 
organisation types combined for the 2009 survey using only those 
statements statistically significant at p<0.05 with Corporate Assessment  
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 10.244 34.148 34.148 10.244 34.148 34.148 5.578 
2 2.039 6.798 40.945 2.039 6.798 40.945 3.984 
3 1.710 5.699 46.644 1.710 5.699 46.644 3.333 
4 1.538 5.128 51.772 1.538 5.128 51.772 1.970 
5 1.381 4.604 56.376 1.381 4.604 56.376 5.637 
6 1.239 4.131 60.507 1.239 4.131 60.507 1.352 
7 1.161 3.872 64.379 1.161 3.872 64.379 2.720 
8 1.078 3.594 67.972 1.078 3.594 67.972 5.896 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot  





























SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for local 
authorities for the 2009 survey using only those statements statistically 
significant at p<0.05 with Corporate Assessment  
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 11.347 34.386 34.386 11.347 34.386 34.386 6.709 
2 2.267 6.869 41.255 2.267 6.869 41.255 5.317 
3 2.039 6.178 47.433 2.039 6.178 47.433 2.438 
4 1.751 5.307 52.740 1.751 5.307 52.740 3.152 
5 1.572 4.763 57.503 1.572 4.763 57.503 4.066 
6 1.496 4.532 62.035 1.496 4.532 62.035 5.488 
7 1.384 4.194 66.229 1.384 4.194 66.229 2.578 
8 1.305 3.955 70.184 1.305 3.955 70.184 3.986 
9 1.109 3.360 73.543 1.109 3.360 73.543 2.506 
10 1.050 3.182 76.725 1.050 3.182 76.725 3.212 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot  





























SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for 
PCTs for the 2009 survey using only those statements statistically 
significant at p<0.05 with Corporate Assessment  
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 5.206 57.844 57.844 5.206 57.844 57.844 3.563 
2 1.344 14.930 72.774 1.344 14.930 72.774 2.946 
3 1.002 11.135 83.909 1.002 11.135 83.909 2.913 
4 .798 8.870 92.779 .798 8.870 92.779 2.650 
5 .497 5.521 98.300 .497 5.521 98.300 .875 
6 .093 1.031 99.330 .093 1.031 99.330 3.473 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot 
















Explanation for Appendices 6.1 to 6.31 
Appendices 6.2 to 6.31 contain the correlations between the statements in the 
survey questionnaire and organisational performance as assessed by the Audit 
Commission (Joint Inspectorates) through the Comprehensive Area Assessment. 
Correlations are shown for all four organisation types combined in 2010 and then 
for two of the four organisation types individually where sufficient data was 
available. The statistical significance of the correlation is shown thus: *p<0.05 and 
**p<0.01. The number of statements significant at these levels is shown to the top 
left. 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                2            1 
LA 2010                0            1 
Fire 2010              1            0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed)  
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






5.48 Extent performance management skews 
organisation’s priorities 
-0.415**                     
-0.495**                 
-0.575 
5.49 Extent performance management measures things 
that matter 
0.344*                     










The total number of statements 
(variables) statistically significant at 





Pearson correlation coefficients for strategic direction statements and CAA 
Rating (Hypothesis A1) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                2            1 
LA 2010                0            1 
Fire 2010              1            0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






4.1 Written corporate strategy with top objectives tied 
into community strategy 
-0.053                    
-0.055               
NC 
4.2 Written service plans 0.175             
0.210                
NC 
4.3 Corporate strategy planned in advance with 
stakeholders 
0.159            
0.124            
0.373 
4.4 Agreed formal mission/vision statement 0.087            
0.112                
NC 
4.5 Published organisational development strategy -0.220                   
-0.078                   
-0.641* 
4.6 Published medium-term financial plan NC                        
NC                         
NC 
4.9 Took part in I&DeA’s local government improvement 
programme or equivalent 
0.039                
0.057                      
NC 
4.15 Political issues ‘blow’ strategy off course  -0.279                   




4.16 Extent top-down approach to strategic planning 0.092                 
0.124                     
0.119 
4.17 Central policy/ Best Value direction 0.166                    
0.290                    
-0.051 
4.18 Corporate strategy linked to community strategy 0.041                  
0.084                     
-0.188  
4.19 Extent organisation thinks strategically 0.256             
0.277                       
0.060 
4.20 Service developments implemented strategically 0.219                   
0.140                    
0.532  
4.25 Community priorities fed into plans 0.191            
0.245                      
0.051 
4.26 Strategies and plans linked together 0.217                      
0.241                
0.245  
4.27 Budget linked to priorities 0.049                  
0.075                     
-0.043 
4.28 Plan for short, medium and long term 0.282             
0.316                 
0.140 
4.29 Policy decisions based on evidence 0.120                   
0.075               
0.283  
4.30 Extent of formal risk management with written risk 
register 
0.107                
0.221                     
-0.271  
4.36 Employee’s goals aligned with organisation’s -0.026                   
-0.035                   
-0.028 
4.38 Organisation is budget driven 0.073              




4.42 Organisation focuses on service provision 0.051              
0.043              
0.209  
4.45 Extent to which probity is valued 0.120             
0.008                    
0.524  
4.47 Aims and objectives shared across organisation 0.009                 
0.050                    
-0.043 
4.48 Extent of separation between strategy and 
implementation 
-0.123                         
-0.090                    
-0.270 
4.49 Extent of organisation focus on ‘ends’ rather than 
‘means’ 
0.376*             
0.319                    
0.542 
4.54 Team/individual goals aligned to strategy 0.226                     
0.159                     
0.463  
4.55 Aims/objectives corporate body and service 
providers linked 
0.233                      
0.132                    
0.540  
B57 Collect all Quality of Life Indicators NX                         
NX                           
NX 
5.3 Use EFQM Excellence Model or variant -0.012                   
0.273                     
-0.437  
5.4 Use Balanced Scorecard or variant 0.036                     
0.078                    
-0.040  
5.5 Use Total Quality Management 0.036                      
0.273                     
-0.437  
5.6 Use Benchmarking NC                    
NC                          
NC  
5.7 Use Management by Objectives -0.059                   




5.8 Use strategy mapping -0.062                    
0.067                     
-0.395 
5.9 Use corporate planning NC                    
NC                            
NC 
5.32 Are targets ambitious -0.036                   
-0.138                     
0.437  
5.34 Performance management method of control 0.141                       
0.166                    
0.236 
5.37 Level of departmental involvement in developing 
performance management 
0.071                      
0.014                  
0.217  
5.38 Level of departmental involvement in running 
performance management 
0.048                    
0.045                     
-0.177 
5.48 Extent performance management skews 
organisation’s priorities 
-0.415**                     
-0.495**                 
-0.575 
5.49 Extent performance management measures things 
that matter 
0.344*                     
0.309                    
0.573 
5.50 Level of game playing (auditors/government) 0.044                     
-0.004                    
0.289 
5.58 Extent performance management integrated into 
strategy 
0.133                     
0.187                    
-0.040 
5.59 Extent context is considered in analysis 0.031                       
0.006                     
0.000 
5.65 Extent ‘equity’ a driver of service performance -0.062                    
-0.226                     
0.156 
5.66 Extent to which ‘use’ stage of performance 
management successful 
0.234                       




5.67 Extent EFQM/BSC integral part of strategic 
planning 
-0.021                     
-0.092                     
0.012 
5.68 Extent strategy maps are used -0.037                   
-0.041                   
-0.189  
6.5 Extent to which organisation departments operate 
independently 
-0.261                    
-0.288                   
-0.164 
6.9 Extent to which governance needs are discussed -0.039                   
-0.042                   
0.000 
9.3 Strategic partnership with provider of many services 0.086                     
0.189                    
-0.316  
9.25 Extent partnerships making strategies more 
meaningful 
-0.274                    
-0.282                    
-0.156 
10.4  Extent strategic direction widely communicated 0.237                      
0.301                  
0.125  
11.6 Feedback to internal stakeholders on strategy/ 
performance management 
0.130                    
0.170                    
-0.021 
11.7  Feedback to external stakeholders on strategy/ 
performance management 
0.030                         
0.011                      
0.125  
12.19 Extent to which organisation operates 
independently in provision of services 
0.063                        












Appendix 6.2  
Pearson correlation coefficients for higher level of strategic and service 
planning statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis A2) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                 0           0 
LA 2010                 0           0  
Fire 2010               0           0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 





4.1 Written corporate strategy with top objectives tied into 
community strategy 
-0.053                   
-0.055                      
NC 
4.2 Written service plans 0.175          
0.210              
NC 
4.3 Corporate strategy planned in advance with 
stakeholders 
0.159                    
0.124                   
0.373 
4.4 Agreed formal mission/vision statement 0.087               
0.112                     
NC 
4.11 Level of innovation in service planning 0.061                      
0.120                  
0.015  
4.16 Extent top-down approach to strategic planning 0.092                      
0.124                  
0.119 
4.23 Level of departmental involvement in service planning 0.251                    
0.284                 
0.232 
4.24 Extent of departmental involvement in doing service 
planning 
0.133                     




4.44 Service planning is optimum -0.120                     
-0.214                 
0.200 
4.47 Aims and objectives shared across organisation 0.009                
0.050                  
-0.043 
4.55 Aims/objectives corporate body and service providers 
linked 
0.233                      
0.132                  
0.540 
5.9 Use corporate planning NC                    
NC                         
NC 
5.67 Extent EFQM/BSC integral part of strategic planning -0.021                
-0.092                
0.012 
6.3 Level of centralisation of service planning -0.200                
-0.229                  
-0.040 
8.12 Extent information available for corporate/service 
planning 
0.141                      
0.202                  
0.029 
10.2 Extent communication on corporate/service planning  0.146                    
















Appendix 6.3  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of performance 
management statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis A3) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                2            1 
LA 2010                1           1 
Fire 2010              4            0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






4.12 Effectiveness more important than efficiency 0.042                    
0.103                    
-0.202 
4.43 Extent performance management focused on group 
processes 
-0.106                    
-0.132                  
0.103 
4.50 Extent to which critical success factors are used 0.086                    
0.152                   
-0.043 
4.52 Extent to which management (Best Value) reviews result 
in service improvement 
0.233                       
0.229                       
0.352 
5.1 Use of proprietary performance management software 0.085                    
0.086                  
-0.189 
B57 Collect all Quality of Life Indicators NX                           
NX                              
NX 
5.3 Use EFQM Excellence Model or variant -0.012                     
0.273                      
-0.437 
5.4 Use Balanced Scorecard or variant 0.036                    




5.5 Use Total Quality Management 0.036                      
0.273                   
-0.437  
5.6 Use Benchmarking NC                           
NC                           
NC 
5.7 Use Management by Objectives -0.059                
-0.024                  
-0.125 
5.8 Use strategy mapping -0.062                   
0.067                   
-0.395 
5.10 Use Outcome based accountability 0.020                    
0.057                 
-0.040 
5.11 Use of other techniques for performance management 0.052                    
0.213                    
-0.316 
5.13 Hold Investor in People 0.118                  
0.283                   
-0.088 
5.15 Hold any performance-based awards (e.g. Beacon) 0.013                
0.113                  
-0.395 
5.17 Quality accreditation (ISO9000) 0.094                  
0.185                 
-0.437  
5.18 Team based appraisal 0.089                     
0.057                   
0.189  
5.19 Managers formally appraised by subordinates 0.103                   
0.220                   
-0.395 
5.20 Performance management exist to extent if not for central 
government requirements (Best Value) 
0.066                  
0.086                 
NC 
5.21 Extent to which meaningful indicators exist (excluding 
statutory) 
0.133                        




5.22 Performance related pay for (senior managers) Chief 
Executive/Directors 
0.221             
0.309                      
NC 
B69 Performance related pay for other senior managers NX                     
NX                              
NX 
5.24 Appraisal linked to financial reward 0.263                   
0.309                        
NC 
5.25 Appraisal competency based 0.269                       
0.248                   
0.437 
5.26 Extent to which performance management produces 
sufficient timely information 
0.012                
0.020                         
NC 
5.27 Performance management increases accountability to 
citizens 
0.018               
0.031                       
NC 
5.28 Performance management increases accountability to 
central government 
-0.231                      
-0.262                    
NC 
5.29 Extent that performance management too complicated 0.036                    
0.009                       
NC 
5.30 Performance of professionals managed -0.039                       
-0.040                      
NC 
5.31 Too many performance indicators -0.069                   
-0.043                  
-0.125 
5.32 Are targets ambitious -0.036                     
-0.138                    
0.437 
5.33 Range of qualitative and quantitative indicators -0.055                
0.216                  
-0.672* 
5.34 Performance management method of control 0.141                      




5.35 Innovative approach to performance management 0.181          
0.192                 
0.442 
5.36 Approach to performance management top-down -0.097                 
-0.112                  
0.236 
5.37 Level of departmental involvement in developing 
performance management 
0.071                    
0.014                  
0.217 
5.38 Level of departmental involvement in running 
performance management 
0.048                     
0.045                   
-0.177 
5.39 Adequacy of systems for collecting national indicators -0.043                    
-0.140                 
0.316 
5.40 Comprehensiveness of set of local indicators 0.105                    
0.162                  
-0.125 
5.41 Extent of employee rewards for good performance 0.013                     
0.114                     
-0.505 
5.42 Extent of sanctions against employees for poor 
performance 
-0.146                
-0.070                  
-0.410 
5.43 Extent performance managed not just measured 0.291                
0.228               
0.750* 
5.44 Extent performance management an agent of change 0.108                    
0.081                   
0.555 
5.45 Extent managers have access to quality timely 
performance information 
0.149                    
0.113                  
0.316 
5.46 Extent democratic representatives have access to quality 
timely performance information 
0.008                       
0.075                             
-0.316 
5.47 Extent performance management produces perverse 
incentives 
-0.160                  




5.48 Extent performance management skews organisation 
priorities 
-0.415**               
-0.495**                
-0.575 
5.49 Extent performance management measures things that 
matter 
0.344*                       
0.309                    
0.573 
5.50 Level of game playing (auditors/government) 0.044                       
-0.004                  
0.289 
5.51 Extent performance management focused on learning 0.292                      
0.254                   
0.361 
5.52 Extent performance management focused on qualitative 
measures 
0.159                     
0.284                  
-0.375  
5.53 Extent performance management is optimum 0.068                       
-0.006                    
0.312 
5.54 Extent organisational performance rated more highly than 
democratic 
-0.046                        
-0.098                      
0.335 
5.55 External performance constrained by central government 
action 
-0.235                  
-0.298                   
-0.107 
5.56 Extent targets sub-optimise performance -0.035                     
-0.023                   
0.000 
5.57 Extent performance management agent of accountability 0.101                       
0.071                       
0.293 
5.58 Extent performance management integrated into strategy 0.133                       
0.187                      
-0.040 
5.59 Extent context is considered in analysis 0.031                       
0.006                     
0.000 
5.60 Extent focus on national indicators to detriment of local 
indicators 
-0.231                    




5.61 Extent focus on what measured rather than what matters -0.187                        
-0.301                     
0.433 
5.62 Extent performance management has local political 
commitment 
-0.026                      
0.089                     
-0.357 
5.63 Extent performance management has commitment top-
level management 
0.207                       
0.137                    
0.672*  
5.64 Extent effort spent improving accuracy PIs rather than 
managing services 
-0.273                   
-0.237                   
-0.410 
5.65 Extent ‘equity’ a driver of service performance -0.062                     
-0.226                   
0.156 
5.66 Extent to which ‘use’ stage of performance management 
successful 
0.234                          
0.115                   
0.500 
 5.67 Extent EFQM/BSC integral part of strategic planning -0.021                   
-0.092                    
0.012  
5.68 Extent strategy maps are used -0.037                 
-0.041                
-0.189 
6.4 Level of centralisation of performance management -0.146                     
-0.135                    
-0.107 
8.2 Allocation of resources formally determined by priorities -0.009                      
-0.095                     
-0.125 
8.10 Level of resources to do performance management at the 
centre 
0.049                        
0.177                         
0.000 
8.11 Level of resources to do performance management in 
service departments 
0.179                                
0.166                       
0.125 
9.9 Extent internal audit involvement in performance 
management 
-0.069                     




9.10 Extent use of external audit to improve performance 
management 
0.044                        
0.096                        
-0.306 
9.11 Extent of use consultants in centre -0.170                   
-0.182                     
0.168 
9.12 Extent use of inspection improves performance at service 
delivery 
0.155                        
0.187                   
0.156 
9.22 Extent to which stakeholders participate in performance 
management 
-0.112                   
-0.190                   
0.359 
9.23 Extent to which citizens participate in performance 
management 
-0.079                   
-0.061                  
-0.125 
9.24 Extent partnerships fragmenting effort on performance 
management 
0.017                      
0.022                    
0.142 
10.3 Extent of communication on service performance 0.062                       
0.008                     
0.287 
10.5 Extent use of employees’ knowledge in performance 
management 
0.304                      
0.245                     
0.289 
11.1 Performance reported on the organisation’s Intranet 0.171                  
0.226                         
NC 
11.2 Performance reported on the organisation’s website  -0.082                       
-0.081                        
NC 
11.3 Extent publishing performance data detrimental -0.256                       
-0.397*                  
-0.053 
11.4 Extent publishing performance data internally 0.142                       
0.126                      
0.205 
11.5 Extent publishing performance data externally -0.038                     




11.6 Feedback to internal stakeholders on strategy/ 
performance management 
0.130                    
0.170                   
-0.021 
11.7 Feedback to external stakeholders on strategy/ 
performance management 
0.030                           
0.011                      
0.125 
12.11 Extent to which organisation driven by achievement of 
targets 
0.138                       
0.175                      
0.187 
12.33 Extent of misrepresentation of performance information -0.298                       
-0.364                    
0.000 
12.35 Extent performance management sympathetic with 
organisational culture 
0.324*                      





Appendix 6.4  
Pearson correlation coefficients for an organisation with an organisational 
development strategy statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis A4) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                 1           0 
LA 2010                0            0 
Fire 2010              1            0   
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






4.4 Agreed formal mission/vision statement 0.087             
0.112                 
NC 
4.5 Published organisational development strategy -0.220                            
-0.078                    
-0.641* 
4.13 Extent to which effectiveness more important than 
efficiency 
-0.147                              
-0.107                    
-0.281 
4.21 Extent of active management of HRM 0.045                          
0.157                         
-0.372 
4.34 Delegation practiced within organisation 0.088                                 
0.007                      
0.255 
4.36 Employee’s goals aligned with organisation’s -0.026                       
-0.035                     
-0.028 
4.41 Organisation focuses on employees 0.208                          
0.246                      
0.021 
4.47 Aims and objectives shared across organisation 0.009                      




4.51 Extent to which HRM is important for organisational 
performance 
-0.012                     
0.069                      
-0.346 
4.54 Team/individual goals aligned to strategy 0.226                              
0.159                         
0.463 
5.18 Team based appraisal 0.089                         
0.057                       
0.189  
5.19 Managers formally appraised by subordinates 0.103                         
0.220                                 
-0.395 
5.22 Performance related pay for (senior managers) Chief 
Executive/Directors 
0.221                          
0.309                            
NC 
B69 Performance related pay for other senior managers NX                         
NX                               
NX 
5.24 Appraisal linked to financial reward 0.263                       
0.309                         
NC 
5.25 Appraisal competency based 0.269                        
0.248                     
0.437 
5.41 Extent of employee rewards for good performance 0.013                      
0.114                     
-0.505 
 5.42 Extent of sanctions against employees for poor 
performance 
-0.146                      
-0.070                    
-0.410 
5.51 Extent performance management focused on 
learning 
0.292                        
0.254                      
0.361 
8.3 Extent to which employees are well trained 0.311                       
0.340                   
0.375 
8.4 Level of motivation displayed by employees 0.214                      




8.14 Extent employee creativity is harnessed 0.248                        
0.280                      
0.056 
10.2 Extent communication on corporate/service planning  0.146                      
0.026                     
0.577 
10.3 Extent of communication on service performance 0.062                       
0.008                     
0.287 
10.4 Extent strategic direction widely communicated 0.237                      
0.301                     
0.125 
11.1 Performance reported on the organisation’s Intranet 0.171                
0.226                           
NC 
12.1 Extent that the organisation is a learning organisation 0.208                        
0.227                    
0.024 
12.5  Extent to which organisation has a blame culture -0.369*                  
-0.311                     
-0.381 
12.16 Level of employees’ morale 0.096                      


















Pearson correlation coefficients for an organisation with proprietary 
performance management software statement and CAA Rating (Hypothesis 
A5) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0            0 
LA 2010                0            0 
Fire 2010              0            0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






5.1 Use of proprietary performance management 
software 
0.085                      




















Appendix 6.6  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a high level of employee involvement in 
performance management statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis A6) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0           0 
LA 2010                1           0 
Fire 2010              0           0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






4.16 Extent top-down approach to strategic planning 0.092                        
0.124                         
0.119 
4.22 Extent of front-line employee involvement in service 
planning 
0.265                              
0.423*                     
0.021 
4.34 Delegation practiced within organisation 0.088                        
0.007                       
0.255 
4.36 Employee’s goals aligned with organisation’s -0.026                   
-0.035                   
-0.028 
4.41 Organisation focuses on employees 0.208                       
0.246                      
0.021 
4.43 Extent performance management focused on group 
processes 
-0.106                     
-0.132                      
0.103 
10.5 Extent use of employees’ knowledge in performance 
management 
0.304                        








Pearson correlation coefficients for use of BSC/EFQM/TQM/MBO/ 





STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0           0 
LA 2010                0           0 
Fire 2010              0           0 
  * p<0.05  (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






5.3 Use EFQM Excellence Model or variant -0.012                   
0.273                     
-0.437 
5.4 Use Balanced Scorecard or variant 0.036                     
0.078                    
-0.040 
5.5 Use Total Quality Management 0.036                       
0.273                    
-0.437 
5.6 Use Benchmarking NC                       
NC                            
NC 
5.7 Use Management by Objectives -0.059                   
-0.024                    
-0.125 
5.8 Use strategy mapping -0.062                   
0.067                   
-0.395 
5.67 Extent EFQM/BSC integral part of strategic planning -0.021                     





Pearson correlation coefficients for a high level of innovation statements and 












STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                1           0  
LA 2010                0           0 
Fire 2010              0           0 
  * p<0.05 2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






4.10 Level of innovation in service delivery 0.180                     
0.178                      
0.152 
4.11 Level of innovation in service planning 0.061                         
0.120                    
0.015 
12.20 Extent to which organisation is change oriented 0.220                    
0.297                     
-0.087 
12.32 Extent of inclination for experimentation within 
organisation 
0.349*                     




Appendix 6.9  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a high level of citizen/service user focus 
statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis A9) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0           0 
LA 2010                0           0 
Fire 2010              0           0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






4.25 Community priorities fed into plans 0.191                       
0.245                       
0.051 
4.35 Extent of responsiveness of the organisation to service 
users 
0.100                     
0.254                    
-0.399 
4.37 Extent that organisation is citizen centred 0.058                     
0.145                     
-0.140 
4.40 Extent to which organisation focuses on customers 0.027                       
0.126                     
-0.161 
4.42 Organisation focuses on service provision 0.051                        
0.043                        
0.209 
4.46 Extent to which organisation gives value for money 0.145                          
0.186                      
0.140 
5.27 Performance management increase accountability to 
citizens 
0.018                       
0.031                          
NC 
5.65 Extent ‘equity’ a driver of service performance -0.062                   




9.20 Extent of user (of services) consultation -0.016                     
0.121                      
-0.265 
9.21 Transactions with citizens rather than relationships -0.163                    
-0.242                   
-0.107 
9.23 Extent to which citizens participate in performance 
management 
-0.079                     
-0.061                   
-0.125 
12.24 Extent service to public a high priority 0.146                       


























Appendix 6.10  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a comprehensive approach to employee 
appraisal statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis B1) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0           0 
LA 2010                0           0 
Fire 2010              0           0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






4.36 Employee’s goals aligned with organisation’s -0.026                     
-0.035                         
-0.028 
4.53 Extent to which employee incentives are financial 0.153                              
0.193                        
0.028 
5.18 Team-based appraisal 0.089                          
0.057                          
0.189 
5.19 Managers formally appraised by subordinates 0.103                        
0.220                       
-0.395 
5.22 Performance related pay for (senior managers) Chief 
Executive/Directors 
0.221                          
0.309                             
NC 
B69 Performance related pay for other senior managers NX                                
NX                                   
NX 
5.23 Performance related pay other than for senior 
managers 
0.109                             
0.121                             
NC 
5.24 Appraisal linked to financial reward 0.263                           




5.25 Appraisal competency based 0.269                         
0.248                       
0.437 
5.41 Extent of employee rewards for good performance 0.013                        
0.114                     
-0.505 
5.42 Extent of sanctions against employees for poor 
performance 
-0.146                    
-0.070                     
-0.410 
8.3 Extent to which employees are well trained 0.311                         
0.340                        
0.375 
12.9 Extent to which employee’s level in organisation 
determines contribution 
-0.019                        
-0.018                      
0.138 
12.10 Extent to which employee’s role determined by job 
description 
0.210                         














Appendix 6.11  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of service departments’ 
involvement in service planning and performance management statements 
and CAA Rating (Hypothesis B2) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                 0          0 
LA 2010                0           0 
Fire 2010              0           0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






4.23 Level of departmental involvement in developing 
service planning 
0.251                         
0.284                       
0.232 
4.24 Extent of departmental involvement in doing service 
planning 
0.133                          
0.152                        
0.115 
4.25 Community priorities fed into plans 0.191                        
0.245                       
0.051 
5.36 Approach to performance management top-down -0.097                      
-0.112                    
0.236 
5.37 Level of departmental involvement in developing 
performance management 
0.071                         
0.014                      
0.217 
5.38 Level of departmental involvement in running 
performance management 
0.048                      
0.045                      
-0.177 
8.11 Level of resources to do performance management in 
service departments 
0.179                          







Appendix 6.12  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of decentralisation 
statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis C1) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0             0 
LA 2010                0             0 
Fire 2010              0             0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






4.33 Budget devolved to departments 0.066                       
-0.180                     
0.281 
6.1 Level of centralisation of control -0.168                       
-0.263                      
0.243 
6.2 Level of centralisation of administration -0.132                     
-0.052                   
-0.248 
6.3 Level of centralisation of service planning -0.200                       
-0.229                     
-0.040 
6.4 Level of centralisation of performance management -0.146                     
-0.135                    
-0.107 
6.5 Extent to which organisation departments operate 
independently 
-0.261                     
-0.288                    
-0.164 
6.6 Consistency of the level of practices/routines 0.198                      
0.272                     
0.177 
12.15 Extent to which power lies more in centre than 
departments 
-0.077                      







Pearson correlation coefficients for a high level of decentralised service 
planning statement and CAA Rating (Hypothesis C2) 
 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0           0 
LA 2010                0           0 
Fire 2010              0           0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






6.3 Level of centralisation of service planning -0.200                     




















Pearson correlation coefficients for a high level of decentralisation of 
performance management statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis C3) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0           0 
LA 2010                0           0 
Fire 2010              0           0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.0 (2-tailed) 






5.34 Performance management method of control 0.141                        
0.166                      
0.236 
6.4 Level of centralisation of performance management -0.146                     




















Pearson correlation coefficients for a consistency of rules and practices 
statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis C4) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                 0           0 
LA 2010                0            0 
Fire 2010              0            0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






4.45 Extent to which probity is valued 0.120                           
0.008                      
0.524 
6.6 Consistency of the level of practices/routines 0.198                        
0.272                       
0.177 
6.7 Extent to which need for ‘control’ tends to subvert 
‘purpose’ 
-0.082                       
-0.072                   
0.086 
6.8 Extent to which administrative policies and practices are 
evidence-based 
-0.053                    
0.055                    
-0.217 
6.9 Extent to which governance needs are discussed -0.039                     












Appendix 6.16  
Pearson correlation coefficients for a high level of political and managerial 










STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0           0 
LA 2010                0           0 
Fire 2010              1           0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






4.45 Extent to which probity is valued 0.120                      
0.008                      
0.524 
6.9 Extent to which governance needs are discussed -0.039                      
-0.042                     
0.000 
7.2 Level of political leadership in organisation -0.107                    
0.029                     
-0.709* 
7.3 Level of officer leadership in the organisation 0.105                       




Appendix 6.17  
Pearson correlation coefficients where officer leadership is more pronounced 
than that from elected members statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis D2) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0           0 
LA 2010                0           0 
Fire 2010              1           0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






7.1 Organisation characterised as officer led -0.181                      
-0.179                     
-0.125 
7.2 Level of political leadership in organisation -0.107                       
0.029                     
-0.709*  
7.3 Level of officer leadership in the organisation 0.105                       
0.105                             
0.125 
7.4 Level of empowerment of officers 0.138                        















Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of resources statements and 
CAA Rating (Hypothesis E1) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0            0 
LA 2010                0            0 
Fire 2010              0            0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






4.8 Reviews using work measurement 0.085                        
0.043                      
0.279 
4.31 Extent of organisational slack in central functions -0.039                      
-0.039                   
0.050 
4.32 Extent of organisational slack in service departments -0.064                  
0.050                    
-0.221 
8.5 Extent managers overloaded with work 0.099                    
0.029                     
0.357 
8.6 Extent other employees are overloaded with work -0.001                   
-0.065                    
0.350 
8.9 Level of research capacity -0.072                     
-0.124                   
0.000 
8.12 Extent information available for corporate/ service 
planning 
0.141                         
0.202                      
0.029 
8.13 Quality of organisation’s physical infrastructure 0.108                     




8.15 Extent strategic capacity is overloaded -0.092                  
0.004                      
-0.204 
8.16 Extent operational capacity is overloaded -0.183                    
-0.243                     
-0.079 
8.17 Extent policy analysis capacity is overloaded 0.169                     
0.225                    
-0.064 
8.18 Extent of budgetary slack in the organisation 0.206                         



























Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of resources devoted to 







STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0           0 
LA 2010                0           0 
Fire 2010              0           0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






8.7 Amount of resources deployed at corporate centre -0.045                      
-0.044                    
-0.017 
8.10  Level of resources to do performance management 
at the centre 
0.049                          
0.177                      
0.000 
8.11 Level of resources to do performance management 
in service departments 
0.179                       
0.166                     
0.125 
8.12 Extent information available for corporate/ service 
planning 
0.141                         
0.202                      
0.029 
8.15 Extent strategic capacity is overloaded -0.092                       
0.004                     
-0.204 
8.17 Extent policy analysis capacity is overloaded 0.169                        





Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of resources spent on 
















STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                 0          0 
LA 2010                0           0 
Fire 2010              0           0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 2-tailed) 






8.2 Allocation of resources formally determined by priorities -0.009                   
-0.095                     
-0.125 
8.7 Amount of resources deployed at corporate centre -0.045                    
-0.044                     
-0.017 
8.12 Extent information available for corporate/service 
planning 
0.141                         






Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of resources spent on 
performance management statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis E4) 
 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                 0            0 
LA 2010                 0            0         
Fire 2010               0            0    
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






8.7 Amount of resources deployed at corporate centre -0.045                    
-0.044                     
-0.017 
8.10 Level of resources to do performance management at 
the centre 
0.049                        
0.177                       
0.000 
8.11 Level of resources to do performance management in 
service departments 
0.179                       


















Pearson correlation coefficients for well-trained and motivated employees 
statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis E5) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                 1           0 
LA 2010                 0           0              
Fire 2010               1           0    
  * p<0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 level (2-tailed) 






4.7 Organisation wide (corporate) training programme that 
includes management 
0.087                  
0.119                          
NC 
4.14 Extent to which training improves organisation’s 
performance 
-0.305*                     
-0.243                      
-0.611* 
4.39 Organisation regarded as competitive in terms of 
achievement 
0.193                        
0.243                       
0.131 
8.3 Extent to which employees are well trained 0.311                        
0.340                      
0.375 
8.4 Level of motivation displayed by employees 0.214                       












Appendix 6.23  
Pearson correlation coefficients for resources follow priorities statements and 
















STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0            0   
LA 2010                0            0  
Fire 2010              0            0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






8.1 Departmental under/overspends carried over one year 
to next 
-0.092                  
0.005                     
-0.125 
8.2 Allocation of resources formally determined by 
priorities 
-0.009                     





Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of ICT use statements and 
















STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0            0 
LA 2010                0            0        
Fire 2010              0            0   
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






5.1 Use of proprietary performance management 
software 
0.085                           
0.086                              
-0.189 
8.8 Use of ICT in the organisation 0.306                         





Pearson correlation coefficients for active engagement with auditors, 
inspectors and other stakeholders’ statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis 
F1) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                 0           0 
LA 2010                 0           0     
Fire 2010               0           0        
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






9.4 Government supportive of organisation 0.069                       
0.181                       
-0.125 
9.5 Inspectors supportive of organisation -0.061                     
-0.038                      
-0.125 
9.6 External auditors supportive of organisation 0.116                       
0.256                       
-0.125 
9.9 Extent internal audit involvement in performance 
management 
-0.069                     
-0.125                      
-0.088 
9.10 Extent use of external audit to improve performance 
management 
0.044                      
0.096                     
-0.306 
9.11 Extent of use consultants in centre -0.170                       
-0.182                      
0.168 
9.12 Extent use of inspection improves performance at 
service delivery 
0.155                      
0.187                    
0.156 
9.13 Extent of use consultants in services 0.010                      




9.14 Extent of involvement of external stakeholders in 
organisation 
0.093                      
-0.004                      
0.395 
9.15 Level of engagement with inspectors -0.021                     
-0.078                       
0.015 
9.16 Level of engagement with central government 0.019                     
0.065                     
-0.144 
9.17 Level of engagement with professional organisations 0.118                        
0.147                        
0.125  
9.18 Extent of use of internal networks by organisation -0.220                                
-0.376                    
0.236 
9.19 Extent of use of external networks by organisation 0.121                         
0.008                      
0.500 
9.22 Extent to which stakeholders participate in 
performance management 
-0.112                      
-0.190                      
0.359 
9.23 Extent to which citizens participate in performance 
management 
-0.079                     
-0.061                    
-0.125 
9.25 Extent partnerships making strategies more 
meaningful 
-0.274                       







Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of outsourcing of services 













STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0            0 
LA 2010                0            0    
Fire 2010              0            0              
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






9.1 Outsourced any central services 0.004                           
-0.061                         
0.125 
9.2 Outsourced any customer services 0.220                       
0.159                          
0.683 
9.3 Strategic partnership with provider of many services 0.086                           





Pearson correlation coefficients for greater involvement of stakeholders and 
citizens in performance management statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis 
F3) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0             0 
LA 2010                0             0             
Fire 2010              0             0        
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






9.7 Views of organisation employees formally collected 0.221                
0.282                         
NC 
9.8 Views of politicians formally collected 0.070                 
0.154                         
NC 
9.14 Extent of involvement of external stakeholders in 
organisation 
0.093                     
-0.004                    
0.395 
9.17 Level of engagement with professional organisations 0.118                       
0.147                    
0.125 
9.18 Extent of use of internal networks by organisation -0.220                      
-0.376                    
0.236 
9.19 Extent of use of external networks by organisation 0.121                       
0.008                      
0.500 
9.20 Extent of user (of services) consultation -0.016                    
0.121                      
-0.265 
9.21 Transactions with citizens rather than relationships -0.163                   




9.22 Extent to which stakeholders participate in performance 
management 
-0.112                     
-0.190                     
0.359 
9.23 Extent to which citizens participate in performance 
management 
-0.079                    
-0.061                   
-0.125 
9.24 Extent partnerships fragmenting effort on performance 
management 
0.017                        
0.022                       
0.142 
9.25 F170 Extent partnerships making strategies more 
meaningful 
-0.274                     



























Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of communication 









STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0            0  
LA 2010                0            0 
Fire 2010              1            0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






10.1 Extent organisation’s relationship with media is good 0.199                      
-0.007                     
0.694* 
10.2 Extent communication on corporate/service planning  0.146                        
0.026                        
0.577  
10.3 Extent of communication on service performance 0.062                         
0.008                       
0.287 
10.4 Extent strategic direction widely communicated 0.237                        
0.301                       
0.125 
10.5 Extent use of employees’ knowledge in performance 
management 
0.304                        





Pearson correlation coefficients for a higher level of performance reporting 
statements and CAA Rating (Hypothesis H1) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                 0          0 
LA 2010                1          0 
Fire 2010              0          0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






11.1 Performance reported on the organisation’s Intranet 0.171              
0.226                         
NC 
11.2 Performance reported on the organisation’s website  -0.082                      
-0.081                          
NC 
11.3 Extent publishing performance data detrimental -0.256                      
-0.397*                   
-0.053 
11.4 Extent publishing performance data internally 0.142                       
0.126                      
0.205 
11.5 Extent publishing performance data externally -0.038                     
0.047                    
-0.329 
11.6 Feedback to internal stakeholders on strategy/ 
performance management 
0.130                     
0.170                      
-0.021 
11.7 Feedback to external stakeholders on strategy/ 
performance management 
0.030                       








Pearson correlation coefficients for a high supportive and learning culture that 
encourages innovation and non-blame statements with CAA Rating 
(Hypothesis I1) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                6            0 
LA 2010                2            0 
Fire 2010              2            0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






4.45 Extent to which probity is valued 0.120                      
0.008                      
0.524 
12.1 Extent that the organisation is a learning organisation 0.208                        
0.227                     
0.024  
12.2 Extent to which a psychological contract exists 
between employees and organisation 
0.128                      
0.370                     
-0.343  
12.3 Extent to which high degree of mutual trust between 
parts of the organisation 
0.027                   
0.213                     
-0.323 
12.4 Extent to which decision making is by consensus 0.140                      
0.138                      
-0.100 
12.5 Extent to which organisation has a blame culture -0.369*                   
-0.311                    
-0.381 
12.6 Extent to which management create sense of urgency -0.081                    
-0.038                    
-0.187 
12.7 Extent to which organisation has good relations trade 
unions 
0.235                           




12.8 Level of ‘good’ ethical behaviour 0.376*                       
0.330                      
0.750* 
12.9 Extent to which employee’s level in organisation 
determines contribution 
-0.019                     
-0.018                      
0.138 
12.10 Extent to which employee’s role determined by job 
description 
0.210                        
0.222                       
0.253  
12.11 Extent to which organisation driven by achievement 
of targets 
0.138                        
0.175                       
0.187 
12.12 Extent to which people come first in organisation 0.050                     
0.159                      
-0.426 
12.13 Extent to which organisation encourages taking 
initiative 
0.178                       
0.197                       
0.063 
12.14 Extent to which officers and politicians have distinct 
and clear roles 
0.380*                     
0.470*                   
0.265 
12.15 Extent to which power lies more in centre than 
departments 
-0.077                    
-0.068                 
0.196 
12.16 Level of employees’ morale 0.096                   
0.223                    
-0.125 
12.17 Extent to which organisational position determines 
contribution in teams 
0.022                       
-0.106                      
0.368 
12.18 Extent to which organisation driven by rules -0.208                     
-0.287                     
0.187 
12.19 Extent to which organisation operates independently 
in provision of services 
0.063                        
0.210                      
-0.236 
12.20 Extent to which organisation is change oriented 0.220               




12.21 Extent to which organisation is results oriented 0.210                        
0.289                      
0.158 
12.22 Extent of barriers to cooperation between service 
areas 
-0.267                    
-0.315                   
-0.197 
12.23 Extent of barriers to cooperation between centre and 
service areas 
-0.155                   
-0.169                    
-0.325 
12.24 Extent service to public a high priority 0.146                     
0.322                     
-0.250 
12.25 Extent to which ideology drives organisation activities -0.045                    
0.192                    
-0.573 
12.26 Extent to which management creates a supportive 
culture 
0.088                     
0.093                      
-0.029 
12.27 Extent internal environment has impact on 
organisation’s performance 
0.190                        
0.188                       
0.325 
12.28 Extent external environment has impact on 
organisation’s performance 
-0.235                     
-0.371                      
0.157 
12.29 Extent of learning from other organisations 0.228                          
0.228                      
0.243 
12.30 Extent of learning from private sector 0.336*                    
0.468*                     
-0.107 
12.31 Extent of learning from voluntary sector 0.216                         
0.310                      
-0.209 
12.32 Extent of inclination for experimentation within 
organisation 
0.349*                       
0.358                       
0.247 
12.33 Extent of misrepresentation of performance 
information 
-0.298                        




12.34 Extent of misrepresentation of financial information -0.269                   
-0.213                          
-0.431 
12.35 Extent performance management sympathetic with 
organisational culture 
0.324*                     































Pearson correlation coefficients where power is diffused throughout the 
organisation statements and CAA Rating (Appendix I2) 
STATEMENT        *           ** 
All 2010                0            0 
LA 2010                0            0      
Fire 2010              0            0 
  * p<0.05 (2-tailed) 
** p<0.01 (2-tailed) 






4.33 Budget devolved to departments 0.066                      
-0.180                       
0.281 
4.34 Delegation practiced within organisation 0.088                        
0.007                        
0.255 
7.4 Level of empowerment of officers 0.138                        
0.116                     
0.125 
12.3 Extent to which high degree of mutual trust between 
parts of the organisation 
0.027                      


















SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for the 
2010 survey using only those statements statistically significant at p<0.05 
with CAA Rating for all organisations 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 












Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 3.410 37.888 37.888 3.410 37.888 37.888 2.988 
2 1.218 13.529 51.417 1.218 13.529 51.417 2.338 
3 1.116 12.401 63.819 1.116 12.401 63.819 1.144 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot  























Appendix 6.33  
 
SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for the 
2010 survey using only those statements statistically significant at p<0.05 
with CAA Rating for local authorities 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 2.512 50.245 50.245 2.512 50.245 50.245 2.231 
2 1.286 25.718 75.962 1.286 25.718 75.962 1.910 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot 
























Appendix 6.34  
 
SPSS output for PCA with oblimin rotation total variance explained for the 
2010 survey using only those statements statistically significant at p<0.05 
with CAA Rating for fire services 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 















1 5.298 58.872 58.872 5.298 58.872 58.872 4.571 
2 1.336 14.848 73.720 1.336 14.848 73.720 3.747 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Oblimin Rotation 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot  


























Summary of BVPP criteria correlations with CPA measures 
  
Summary of BVPP criteria correlations  
Criteria  Mean  
Std 
Dev  











3.05  1.591  0.294**  0.267*  0.307**  0.265*  
2. Selection of 
Local  
Performance 
Indicators (LPIs)  






0.59  1.224  0.167  0.020  0.197  0.052  
4. Inclusion of 
other PI sets   
1.47  1.194  0.183  0.060  0.309**  0.102  
5.Clear structure 
(Intro-Strategy-
Past Year-Future  
Years-Tabulations)  
3.17  1.215  0.254*  0.257*  0.254*  0.159  
6. Objectives 
clearly shown  
3.51  1.089  0.275*  0.235*  0.263*  0.182  
7. Prioritisation 
evident  
3.38  1.296  0.311**  0.367**  0.275*  0.289*  
8. Level of 
analysis evident  




2.09  1.760  0.168  0.164  0.114  0.132  
10. Link to 
Community  
Plan/Strategy  





2.82  1.679  0.143  -0.029  0.042  0.094  
12. Comparative 
data  
2.18  1.631  0.001  -0.082  0.072  0.035  
13. Reasons for 
variances  
3.38  1.296  0.075  0.029  -0.004  0.097  
642 
 
14. PIs ordered by 
aims/objectives  2.32  1.635  0.205  0.170  0.207  0.0125  
15. Priority PIs 
indicated   
2.24  2.019  0.393**  0.156  0.338**  0.248*  
16. Financial 
statement  
1.55  1.676  0.337**  0.236*  0.143  0.287*  
17. Best Value 
Reviews  
2.32  2.130  0.200  0.156  0.087  0.218  
18. Service 
Planning  




2.03  1.583  0.184  0.088  0.089  0.118  
20. Review of 
strategies  




1.42  1.359  0.301**  0.290*  0.281*  0.229*  
* p<0.05 (2-tailed).  































 Appendix 7.2  
  
PCA of BVPP Statements SPSS output (for CPA Rating) 
  
KMO and Bartlett's Test  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy.  .770  
545.520  Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity  
Approx. Chi-Square  
df  210  
Sig.  .000  
  
Total Variance Explained  
 
Initial Eigenvalues  
Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings  
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings  
Total  
% of  
Var.  
Cumul.  
%  Total  
% of  
Var.  
Cumul.  
%  Total  
% of  
Var.  
Cumul
. %  Comp.  
1  6.031  28.719  28.719  6.031  28.719  28.719  3.535  16.835  16.835  
2  1.879  8.948  37.668  1.879  8.948  37.668  2.303  10.968  27.803  
3  1.529  7.279  44.946  1.529  7.279  44.946  2.178  10.372  38.175  
4  1.359  6.473  51.420  1.359  6.473  51.420  1.973  9.397  47.572  
5  1.185  5.643  57.063  1.185  5.643  57.063  1.746  8.312  55.884  
6  1.106  5.269  62.331  1.106  5.269  62.331  1.354  6.448  62.331  
7  .958  4.562  66.893              











  9  .819  3.902  74.800  
10  .748  3.560  78.360              











  12  .619  2.948  84.706  
13  .585  2.786  87.491              











  15  .465  2.215  92.094  
16  .402  1.914  94.008              











  18  .295  1.405  97.118  
19  .254  1.210  98.329              











  21  .147  .698  100.000  

























Appendix 7.3  
  
BVPP content analysis correlations for CPA Rating 
SPSS output for Pearson correlation analysis  
  
  
 CPA Rating (0 to 4 or Poor 
to Excellent)  
CPA Rating (0 to 4 or 
Poor to Excellent)  
Pearson Correlation  
Sig. (2-tailed)  





Total BVPP %  Pearson Correlation  .433**  
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  
N  76  
BVPP % Scoring 4 or 5  Pearson Correlation  .379**  




BVPP % Scoring 0 or 1  Pearson Correlation  -.409**  
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  
N  76  























BVPP content analysis correlations for Performance Management Score  
  
 Performance Management 
Score (1 to 4)  
Performance  
Management Score (1 
to 4)  
Pearson Correlation  
Sig. (2-tailed)  
1  
  
N  76  
Total BVPP %  Pearson Correlation  
Sig. (2-tailed)  
                      .332**  
                        .003  
N  76  
BVPP % Scoring 4 or 5  Pearson Correlation  
Sig. (2-tailed)  
                      .319** 
                       .005  
N  76  
BVPP % Scoring 0 or 1  Pearson Correlation  
Sig. (2-tailed)  
                     -.302**  
                       .008  
N  76  




BVPP content analysis correlations for Service Score  
  
Service Score  
(1 to 4)  
Service Score (1 to 4)  Pearson Correlation  1  
Sig. (2-tailed)    
N  76  
Total BVPP %  Pearson Correlation  .351**  
Sig. (2-tailed)  .002  
N  76  
BVPP % Scoring 4 or 5  Pearson Correlation  .341**  
Sig. (2-tailed)  .003  
N  76  
BVPP % Scoring 0 or 1  Pearson Correlation  -.317**  
Sig. (2-tailed)  .005  
N  76  









(expressed as % 
out of 100)  
Corporate Assessment  
(expressed as % out of 100)  
Pearson Correlation  1  
Sig. (2-tailed)    
N  76  
Total BVPP %  Pearson Correlation  .366**  
Sig. (2-tailed)  .001  
N  76  
BVPP % Scoring 4 or 5  Pearson Correlation  
Sig. (2-tailed)  
                     .323**  
                       .004  
 N  76  
BVPP % Scoring 0 or 1  Pearson Correlation  -.350**  
Sig. (2-tailed)  .002  
N  76  




















Principal component analysis statistical check data for datasets 2000 and 
2005 
 











> 0.500 < 0.05 > 0.00001 Yes
KMO Approx chi-squaredf Sig Determinant Valid Dataset
0.914 920.816 45 0.000 0.004 Yes 2000 All LA
0.913 797.789 45 0.000 0.003 Yes 2000 England LA
0.709 129.427 45 0.000 0.0000864 Yes 2000 Scotland LA
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2000 Wales LA
0.905 808.226 45 0.000 0.008 Yes 2005 All LA
0.898 638.871 45 0.000 0.011 Yes 2005 England LA
0.786 97.552 45 0.000 0.001 Yes 2005 Scotland LA
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2005 Wales LA
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2005 England LA CPA Poor
0.569 104.895 45 0.000 0.00000153 ?No 2005 England LA CPA Weak
0.824 181.931 45 0.000 0.005 Yes 2005 England LA CPA Fair
0.859 224.741 45 0.000 0.011 Yes 2005 England LA CPA Good
0.754 182.71 45 0.000 0.002 Yes 2005 England LA CPA Excellent
0.388 92.989 45 0.000 0.000000119 ?No 2005 England LA CPA PM 1
0.882 323.694 45 0.000 0.011 Yes 2005 England LA CPA PM 2
0.806 265.639 45 0.000 0.002 Yes 2005 England LA CPA PM 3
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2005 England LA CPA PM 4
0.845 184.173 45 0.000 0.001 Yes 2005 England LA CPA SS 2
0.874 350.696 45 0.000 0.014 Yes 2005 England LA CPA SS 3
0.777 121.308 45 0.000 0.002 Yes 2005 England LA CPA SS 4
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2005 England LA CPA CA 2
0.880 399.996 45 0.000 0.013 Yes 2005 England LA CPA CA 3
0.772 217.809 45 0.000 0.002 Yes 2005 England LA CPA CA 4
649 
 
Appendix 8.2  
Principal component analysis statistical check data for dataset 2009 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
> 0.500 < 0.05 > 0.00001 Yes
KMO Approx chi-squaredf Sig Determinant Valid Dataset
0.816 419.21 45 0.000 0.006 Yes 2009 England All Organisations
0.828 286.909 45 0.000 0.002 Yes 2009 England LA
0.429 75.816 45 0.003 0.001 ?Yes 2009 England Fire
0.175 119.2 45 0.000 0.00000000133 ?No 2009 England Police
0.594 72.328 45 0.006 0.00000412 ?No 2009 England PCT
0.581 141.442 45 0.000 0.001 Yes 2009 England All Organisations CPA Fair
0.763 195.86 45 0.000 0.003 Yes 2009 England All Organisations CPA Good
0.730 162.204 45 0.000 0.000 ?No 2009 England All Organisations CPA Excellent
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England All Organisations CPA PM 1
0.712 190.287 45 0.000 0.000 ?No 2009 England All Organisations CPA PM 2
0.835 222.143 45 0.000 0.003 Yes 2009 England All Organisations CPA PM 3
0.371 69.281 45 0.012 0.000 ?No 2009 England All Organisations CPA PM 4
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England All Organisations CPA SS 1
0.699 65.745 45 0.023 0.0000663 Yes 2009 England All Organisations CPA SS 2
0.784 152.804 45 0.000 0.003 Yes 2009 England All Organisations CPA SS 3
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England All Organisations CPA SS 4
0.765 146.585 45 0.000 0.000 ?No 2009 England All Organisations CPA CA 2
0.782 246.725 45 0.000 0.009 Yes 2009 England All Organisations CPA CA 3
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England All Organisations CPA CA 4
0.369 93.745 45 0.000 0.0000011 ?No 2009 England LA CPA Fair
0.650 123.966 45 0.000 0.00000335 ?No 2009 England LA CPA Good
0.675 150.102 45 0.000 0.000 ?No 2009 England LA CPA Excellent
0.685 176.680 45 0.000 0.0000277 Yes 2009 England LA CPA PM 2
0.802 140.080 45 0.000 0.0000792 Yes 2009 England LA CPA PM 3
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England LA CPA PM 4
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England LA CPA SS 2
0.732 152.660 45 0.000 0.000 ?No 2009 England LA CPA SS 3
0.482 94.381 45 0.000 0.000001 ?No 2009 England LA CPA CA 2
0.825 197.526 45 0.000 0.001 Yes 2009 England LA CPA CA 3
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England LA CPA CA 4
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England Fire CPA Fair
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England Fire CPA Good
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England Fire CPA PM 3
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England Fire CPA PM 4
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England Fire CPA SS 3
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England Fire CPA SS 4
0.379 48.521 45 0.333 0.001 ?No 2009 England Fire CPA CA 3
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England Fire CPA CA 4
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England Police CPA Good
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England Police CPA PM 3
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England Police CPA SS 3
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England Police CPA CA 3
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England PCT CPA Fair
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England PCT CPA Good
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England PCT CPA PM 2
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England PCT CPA PM 3
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2009 England PCT CPA SS 2




Principal component analysis statistical check data for dataset 2010 
 





















> 0.500 < 0.05 > 0.00001 Yes
KMO Approx chi-squaredf Sig Determinant Valid Dataset
0.803 180.401 45 0.000 0.007 Yes 2010 England All Organisations
0.821 145.354 45 0.000 0.003 Yes 2010 England LA
0.230 49.234 45 0.308 0.00000264 ?No 2010 England Fire
0.447 51.706 45 0.228 0.001 ?No 2010 England All Organisations CAA Adequate
0.755 122.545 45 0.000 0.001 Yes 2010 England All Organisations CAA Well
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2010 England All Organisations CAA Excellent
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2010 England LA CAA Adequate
0.713 89.693 45 0.000 0.000 ?No 2010 England LA CAA Well
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2010 England LA CAA Excellent
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 No 2010 England Fire CAA Adequate





Comparison of the results of case study with the survey results for the 
strongest correlations with CPA Rating for Darlington Borough Council 
STRONGEST 15 CORRELATIONS WITH CPA RATING 
Responses from Darlington Borough Council 
Score between 1 - Low and 6 - High (except 9.5 – Yes/No) 


















0.405** 6 4 5 5 5 6 5.0 





0.407** 4 4 5 4 3 6 4.4 





0.409** 4 4 4 5 4 4 4.2 







0.411** 5 5 6 6 4 6 5.4 













0.422** Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
4.42 Extent to 
which 







4.35 Extent of 
responsivenes




0.443** 4 3 5 5 3 6 4.4 






0.445** 5 3 4 4 3 5 3.8 











0.456** 4 5 5 5 5 4 4.8 




0.464** 5 4 3 6 4 5 4.4 
4.46 Extent to 
which 
organisation 
gives value for 
money 
0.468** 3 4 4 5 5 6 4.8 




0.469** 2 3 4 4 5 5 4.2 





0.493** 3 5 5 5 4 2 4.2 
Means  4.29      4.66 





Results of the case study for the organisational profile 2005 compared to 
the survey questionnaire results for Darlington Borough Council 
ORGANISATIONAL PROFILE 2005 SCORE 
Responses from Darlington Borough Council 

















5 7 8 4 7 8 6.8 
Position Power 
to Leadership 
4 5 6 5 8 6 6.0 
Rule to People 
Centred 




8 8 7 4 5 6 6.0 
Status Quo to 
Change 
Orientated 




7 8 8 7 8 8 7.8 
Centralised to 
Decentralised 









2 7 8 5 4 8 6.4 
Monopolistic to 
Competitive 
3 4 8 6 6 3 5.4 
Means 4.90      5.52 
Note: The mean is of the case study interviews and focus group and 
excludes the questionnaire response 
 
